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THE THIN FLAT LINE: REDEFNING WHO IS LEGALLY
DEAD IN ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH
MAXINE M. HARRINGTONt
Well, it just so happens that your friend here is only mostly dead.
There's a big difference between mostly dead and all dead .... Now,
mostly dead is slightly alive.
1
INTRODUCTION
By the end of 2008, a pilot program to recover organs from those
dying on the streets of New York City could be in effect.2 Under a fed-
erally-funded grant, the city is proposing to expand the donor pool by
deploying a "rapid organ-recovery ambulance" to procure the organs of
people who die of cardiac arrest outside hospitals.3 According to news-
paper reports, a special transplant ambulance would trail an emergency
ambulance responding to notification of a victim with cardiac arrest.
4
After regular paramedics cease resuscitation efforts, the transplant am-
bulance team would wait five minutes and then attempt to maintain the
viability of organs by administering drugs and by performing chest com-
pressions to the victim until more extensive preservation efforts could be
performed at the hospital and consent for donation from the next of kin
could be obtained.5
Announcement of the program generated considerable controversy.
One commentator referred to the organ-recovery ambulance as a "meat
wagon. ' '6  An academic bioethicist pronounced the initiative "disgust-
ing.",7 Another bioethicist voiced her concern that the victims of cardiac
arrest might not be "irreversibly" dead when the organ transplant team
took over minutes after resuscitation efforts ceased.8
Within a few months after the New York City initiative was an-
nounced, the New England Journal of Medicine reported that a team of
t Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., The George Washing-
ton University; B.A. University of North Dakota.
I. THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1987).
2. Cara Buckley, City Plans Ambulance for Donor Collections, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at
A35.
3. Id.; see also Rob Stein, N.Y Planning Special Ambulance to Recover Organs, WASH.
POST, May 24, 2008, at A01.
4. Buckley, supra note 2.
5. Stein, supra note 3, at A08.
6. William Saletan, Meat Wagons, SLATE, May 27, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/humannature/archive/2008/05/27/meat-wagons.aspx.
7. Stein, supra note 3 (quoting Michael A. Grodin, director of bioethics at Boston Universi-
ty).
8. Id. (quoting Leslie M. Whetsine, a bioethicist at Walsh University).
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physicians at Denver Children's Hospital had been able to transplant
hearts from three infant donors who were not brain-dead, but who had
been removed from mechanical life support. 9 Death was declared in one
infant three minutes after cardiac and respiratory efforts ceased; in the
other two infants, death was pronounced after seventy-five seconds of
absent heart and lung functions.' 0 Once death was declared, organ re-
covery began." Again, some medical bioethicists were alarmed. George
Annas, who has been called the "father of patient rights, 1 2 warned:
"The donors are not dead. I understand they would like us to change the
definition of death, but they can't do that by themselves."', 3 Robert M.
Veatch, professor of medical ethics at Georgetown University, added:
The whole issue is whether the infants from whom the hearts were
taken were dead. It seems very clear to me that they were not .... I
think it's illegal, and if it's illegal, what we're talking about is the
physicians causing the death of the three patients, and that would be
homicide. It's immoral. I think it should be stopped.
14
Should we worry that organs are being removed from people who
are just "mostly" dead? Law and medicine are grappling with a funda-
mental tension between, on the one hand, delaying the pronouncement of
death until there is no chance of recovery and, on the other hand, increas-
ing the quantity and quality of organs for transplant by pronouncing
death as soon as possible. This article examines whether, in the relent-
less pursuit of organs, medicine has gone too far in tinkering with the
definition of death.
Most cadaveric organs are recovered from donors who meet brain
death criteria.1 5  There is, however, a growing imbalance between the
number of brain-dead donors and the demand for organs. The New York
City study and the Denver Children's Hospital protocol are recent exam-
9. Mark M. Boucek et al., Pediatric Heart Transplantation After Declaration of Cardiocir-
culatory Death, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 709, 711, 713 (2008). As an indication of the importance of
this debate, The New England Journal of Medicine also featured three perspective reports, an edi-
torial, and a videotaped roundtable discussion among bioethicists, all of which are available on the
journal's website at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/359/7/669/DCl (last visited Dec. 19,
2008).
10. Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 711.
11. Id.
12. Boston University School of Public Health, George Annas, Biography,
http://sph.bu.edu/index.php?option=com-sphdir&id=239&Itemid=340&INDEX=577 (last visited
Dec. 19, 2008).
13. Rob Stein, Infant Transplant Procedure Ignites Debate; Ethicists Question Strategy in
Which Hearts are Removed Minutes After They Stop Beating, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2008, at AOl
(quoting George J. Annas).
14. Id. (quoting Robert M. Veatch); see also James L. Bernat, The Boundaries of Organ
Donation After Circulatory Death, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669, 671 (2008) (asserting that the proto-
col's shortened time period for determining death did not comply with prevailing medical standards).
15. See Eelco F.M. Wijdicks, The Diagnosis of Brain Death, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1215,
1215-18 (2001) (describing the clinical criteria used to determine brain death, and noting that "brain
death is the principle requisite for the donation of organs for transplantation").
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ples of a movement in the transplant community to increase the supply of
organs by using donors whose heart and lung functions have ceased, but
who are not yet brain dead. This practice, known as donation after car-
diac death (DCD), has proved controversial for a number of reasons.
6
This article addresses the threshold controversy: whether DCD donors
are legally dead at the time organ procurement begins.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and its state
counterparts require the "irreversible" cessation of the functions of either
(1) the entire brain or (2) the heart and lungs before a person can be con-
sidered dead.1 7 There is a significant debate among scholars over whether
the UDDA recognizes two kinds of death or only two different criteria,
cardiac and neurological, under a unitary concept of death.' 8 The propo-
nents of DCD have resolved this controversy by recognizing donation
after "cardiac death," where organs can be removed minutes after the
heart stops, before brain death occurs.' 9 Locating a precise moment of
death is not an issue in most victims of cardiac arrest. It is a primary
issue in DCD, however, because once the heart stops, there is a need to
protect transplantable organs from deteriorating due to a lack of blood
flow.20 The quality of organs is less of a concern with patients who are
declared dead under brain death criteria because the donor is maintained
on artificial support after death to keep the heart and lungs functioning
throughout organ procurement. 2' The DCD donor is not declared dead
until life support is withdrawn or unsuccessful resuscitation is termi-
22nated. The need for viable organs creates a conflict between ensuringthat the donor patient is dead and removing organs as soon as possible.23
As DCD is generally practiced in the United States, death is de-
clared two to five minutes after the cessation of cardiac and respiratory
functions.24 Once a diagnosis of cardiac death is made, transplant surge-
16. Concerns have also been raised about the pre-mortem administration of drugs and preser-
vation of organs in the dying or newly dead donor; see Sarah D. Barber, The Tell-Tale Heart: Ethi-
cal and Legal Implications of ln Situ Organ Preservation in the Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donor,
6 HEALTH MATRix 471, 473,487-89 (1996); see also infra note 111.
17. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 589 (1980); see also discussion
infra Part Ill.
18. Alexander M. Capron, Brain Death-Well Settled Yet Still Unresolved, 344 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1244, 1245 (2001).
19. Robert Steinbrook, Organ Donation After Cardiac Death, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 209,
209 (2007).
20. INST. OF MED., NON-HEARTING-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: PRACTICE AND
PROTOCOLS 22 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=9700 [hereinafter
2000 IOM Report].
21. George J. Annas, Brain Death and Organ Donation: You Can Have One Without the
Other, 18 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 28, 28 (1988).
22. Robert D. Truog & Franklin Miller, The Dead Donor Rule and Organ Transplantation,
359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 674, 674 (2008).
23. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20 (noting that the "need to maintain organ viability creates
a strong incentive for an early determination of death").
24. See James L. Bemat et al., Report of a National Conference on Donation After Cardiac
Death, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 281, 282 (2006) (stating that most organ procurement organiza-
2009]
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ons begin the process of organ retrieval. It is unlikely that the DCD do-
nor satisfies the criteria for brain death at the time of organ procurement
as it takes longer than five minutes for the entire brain to be irreversibly
damaged from lack of oxygen.25 The speed with which a diagnosis of
death is made in the DCD context is done solely to facilitate organ pro-
curement. 26 The closer the donor is to life, the more useful the organs
will be to the recipient.
The debate over whether DCD donors are truly dead is not new but
has surfaced mostly in the academic community. Recently, however,
DCD has become a focus of media and public attention, as demonstrated
by the debate over the New York City and Denver Children's Hospital
initiatives. In addition, the Washington Post featured an article in March
2007 about a "new trend in organ donation," airing the concerns of some
physicians and bioethicists about the controversial practice of donation
after cardiac death.27 In 2008, widespread publicity was given to the
indictment of a transplant surgeon in California in connection with the
alleged administration of excessive and inappropriate medications to a
potential donor awaiting cardiac death after removal from a ventilator.28
These reports in the lay press mirror the expanding use of DCD to
boost the supply of organs. Although the number of organs transplanted
from cardiac death donors is still relatively small, 29 an increase is ex-
pected as hospitals and organ procurement organizations begin to devel-
op DCD policies under mandate from oversight bodies.3° Currently,
most DCD donors are severely ill, hospitalized patients who do not meet
the criteria for brain death but who have decided, either personally or
through a surrogate, to refuse resuscitation and to withdraw life-
sustaining medical care.3' The controversy over whether patients are
tions use a five minute interval, while three use an interval of two minutes and one uses four mi-
nutes). Pediatric DCD is relatively new, and with two donors, Denver Children's Hospital waited
only seventy-five seconds after death to begin organ retrieval. See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at
711 and accompanying text.
25. See Barber, supra note 16, at 471-72 (defining brain death); see also infra notes 211-12
and accompanying text.
26. Rob Stein, New Trend in Organ Donation Raises Questions, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007,
at A03.
27. Id.
28. See Jesse McKinley, Surgeon Is Accused of Hurrying Death of Patient to Get Organs,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at Al (reporting that transplant physician ordered excessive doses of
morphine and Ativan and administered Betadine, a topical antiseptic, through a nasogastric tube).
The physician was acquitted of all charges in December 2008, although the jury issued a note with
its verdict stating that the case illustrated a need for clear standards in cardiac death donation. Jesse
McKinley, Surgeon Cleared of Harming Man to Rush Organ Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008,
at A20.
29. In 2006, DCD organs comprised eight percent of the total cadaveric organs transplanted.
HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVS. ADMIN., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ORGAN
PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK AND THE SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS: TRANSPLANT DATA 1997-2006 Table 1.1 (2007), available at
http://www.optn.org/AR2007/11ldh.pdf [hereinafter 2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT].
30. See infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
31. Steinbrook, supra note 19, at 209-10.
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"dead enough" for organ procurement has focused almost exclusively on
this subset of potential donors, and little attention has been given to the
distinct medical and legal concerns presented by the expansion of DCD
to victims of sudden cardiac arrest outside the hospital. There is an ob-
vious conflict between the right of these individuals to adequate emer-
gency resuscitative efforts and the need to procure organs only minutes
after cessation of the heartbeat. Removing organs a mere seventy-five
seconds after the heart stops and transplanting hearts from donors who
are not brain dead are two other recent developments in DCD that test
the legal and ethical boundaries of organ transplantation. These contro-
versial practices raise fundamental questions about the extent to which
society is willing to tolerate the removal of vital organs from people we
cannot be certain are dead in order to satisfy the escalating demand for
organs. This article suggests that there is a need for a wider public de-
bate on the permissible limits of DCD, but that a reasonable accommoda-
tion can be reached without compromising legal standards for determin-
ing death. There are ethically defensible reasons to allow this form of
organ procurement in hospitalized patients voluntarily removed from life
support, but absent broad social and political consensus, DCD, as cur-
rently practiced, should not be expanded to other potential donors.
Part I of this article begins with a brief background of solid organ
transplantation and the statutory framework in which it operates. Part II
explains the practice of donation after cardiac death and the history of its
use in the United States. Part 1I examines whether DCD donors are le-
gally dead under the UDDA. In Part IV, the article explores whether it is
appropriate, given the speed with which death is determined, to apply
DCD as it is currently practiced to those in sudden cardiac arrest or to
children. Part V addresses the concern that DCD is causing the death of
donors. Part VI suggests several approaches to resolve the controversy
over the determination of death in DCD donors. This article concludes
with a call for this debate to move beyond scholarly journals into the
public arena.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOLID ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND THE
LEGAL RESPONSE
The first successful human transplant was performed in 1954 when
Dr. Joseph Murray transplanted a kidney from a live donor into his iden-
tical twin brother.32 Eight years later, Dr. Murray performed the first
transplant from a cadaveric donor.33 Early cadaveric transplants, pri-
marily kidneys, were from patients who had suffered traditional circula-
tory death, where the lungs and heart ceased functioning.34 Survival
32. Peter I. Abt et al., Donation After Cardiac Death in the US: History and Use, 203 J. AM.
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rates of recipients were poor, however, primarily due to problems with
rejection and poor organ quality caused by warm ischemia time,35 the
period in which the donor's organs begin to die from lack of an oxyge-
nated blood supply.
36
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the use of neurological criteria to de-
fine death, which eventually came to be known as brain death, began to
develop.37 In 1959, French neurophysiologists coined the term, le coma
depasse, or irreversible coma, to describe patients with irreparable brain
damage. 38 By the mid-1960s, medical technology had progressed to the
point where it was possible to keep patients with devastating neurologi-
cal injuries alive.39 In many of these cases, medical tests, including the
electroencephalogram (EEG) demonstrated irreversible cessation of brain
activity.40 Some patients developed what is known as respirator brain, a
condition where the heart and lungs can be kept functioning through me-
chanical ventilation, but where the brain tissue shows extensive signs of
cell death.41
The burgeoning transplant community understood the implications
of being able to recover organs that were still perfusing, or receiving a
blood supply, through artificial support while the person was brain
dead. 42 Recovering organs from a "heart-beating donor" would avoid the
problem of warm ischemia time associated with circulatory death, which
diminishes the quality of organs available for transplantation.43 In other
words, the donor's brain would be dead, but the transplantable organs
still very much alive.
There was a perceived legal impediment to the removal of organs
from those who had suffered brain death, however. State laws were si-
lent or unsettled on the new phenomenon of neurological death.44 The
35. Warm ischemia time refers to the time in which the heart and lungs are not functioning
adequately to ensure the flow of blood to the organs. Without blood, oxygen cannot be delivered
and vital organs will die. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at xv.




40. Id. at 213.
41. PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 23 (1981), available at
http:lwww.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/defining-death.pdf [hereinafter DEFINING
DEATH].
42. Id. (stating that there was a "new urgency" in the transplant community to recognize brain
death).
43. See N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 689 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(noting agreement of experts that kidneys obtained from donors who died from cardiopulmonary
death resulted in an eighty-eight percent incidence of renal failure in the recipient, while kidneys
from those who were brain dead were indistinguishable from those obtained from living donors).
44. See id. at 689-91 (addressing a petition for declaratory judgment that New York's defini-
tion of death included neurological death).
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common law defined death as cardiac and respiratory failure. 45 Trans-
plant surgeons who attempted to remove organs from persons who were
brain dead but who still had heart and lung function, albeit mechanically,
were concerned with possible criminal prosecution or civil suits.
46
In 1968, the landmark work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Har-
vard Medical School was published, which proposed irreversible coma as
a new criterion for determining death.47  The committee stated that its
purpose was two-fold: to decrease the burden on families of keeping a
person on continued medical support who had irreversible brain damage,
and to facilitate the recovery of organs from such people because they
were dead, not under traditional circulatory criteria, but under the new
definition of brain death.48  According to the Ad Hoc Committee,
"[o]bsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy in
obtaining organs for transplantation.,,49 The Ad Hoc Committee's find-
ings were quickly and widely accepted by the medical community. In
1970, Kansas adopted the first statute to formulate a legal definition of
death to include brain death, as well as circulatory death.50 Other states
quickly followed suit and, by 1980, twenty-four states had enacted statu-
tory definitions of death that incorporated brain death.5'
Due to the failure of some states to enact brain death legislation and
the lack of uniformity in existing state laws, in 1980 Congress convened
an interdisciplinary body under the auspices of the President's Commis-
sion for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (President's Commission) to explore the advisabili-
ty of developing a uniform definition of death.52 In 1981, the President's
Commission recommended adoption of the Uniform Determination of
Death Act (UDDA).53 The UDDA provides:
45. Id. at 689; Lovato v. Dist. Court Tenth Judicial Dist., 601 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Colo. 1979).
46. See Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (noting that one of the reasons the petitioner sought
court approval of a new definition of death was the fear of potential criminal or civil liability); see
also Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Deter-
mining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 97-100 (1972) (discuss-
ing the need for a statutory definition of neurological death to allay professionals' fears of civil and
criminal litigation).
47. AD Hoc COMMITTEE OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL TO EXAMINE THE DEFINITION
OF BRAIN DEATH, A DEFINITION OF IRREVERSIBLE COMA, 205 JAMA 85, 85 (1968) [hereinafter Ad
Hoc Committee]. The report uses the terms irreversible coma and brain death coextensively. Id. at
88. Later, the medical community would recognize that these diagnoses are not interchangeable.
See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 25.
48. Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 47, at 85.
49. Id.
50. Capron & Kass, supra note 46, at 108-09.
51. RICHARD M. ZANER, DEATH: BEYOND WHOLE-BRAIN CRITERIA 2 (Richard M. Zaner ed.,
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988).
52. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 1, 7-8; see also supra at 24-25 (the Commission stated
that it was also necessary to clarify the "misleading" term, irreversible coma, used by the Ad Hoc
Committee in its 1968 report).
53. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41.
2009]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A
determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards.
54
The President's Commission was aware of the impact its recom-
mendations would have on the burgeoning field of organ transplantation.
If the UDDA were widely adopted, neurologically devastated patients
with functioning hearts and lungs could be declared dead in every juris-
diction.55 The Commission's hopes were soon realized. The UDDA or
similar legislation was approved in almost every state, although the sta-
tutes are not entirely "uniform" in their definitions of death. 56 Legal rec-
ognition of brain death led to the almost universal abandonment of organ
procurement from persons suffering a traditional death following cardiac
arrest.57 Because mechanical ventilation sustained the vital functions of
the heart and lungs, the quality of organs recovered from brain-dead,
heart-beating donors was vastly superior to organs impaired by the warm
ischemia time associated with circulatory death.58
To promote organ donation, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) was adopted in 1968, and subsequently revised in 1987 and
2006. 59 This act encourages cadaveric organ transplantation by authoriz-
ing the donation of an organ by an adult effective at death and by the
next of kin after death.60 The UAGA also immunizes physicians reco-
vering organs in good faith from civil and criminal prosecution. 61 Every
state has adopted one of the versions of the UAGA.62
As a mechanism for organizing organ donations and transplantation,
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) was passed in 1984.63
NOTA established the Organ Procurement Transplantation Network
(OPTN), which is charged with maintaining a waiting list of individuals
54. UN1F. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 781 (2008).
55. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 7-8 (asserting that state variations in the definition of
death are not acceptable).
56. See generally Jason L. Goldsmith, Wanted! Dead and/or Alive: Choosing Among the Not-
So-Uniform Statutory Definitions of Death, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 871, 889-90 (2007) (noting differ-
ences in the language of state law definitions of death).
57. See Abt et al., supra note 32, at 213-14 (noting that after the recognition of brain death,
almost every transplant center stopped retrieving organs from DCD patients); Michael A. DeVita, et
al., Observations of Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment from Patients Who Became Non-
Heart-Beating Organ Donors, 28 CRrrICAL CARE MED. 1709, 1709 (2000) (stating that non-heart-
beating donation was largely abandoned when it was found that organs from brain-dead donors had
better survival).
58. See Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
59. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 1-11 (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 27, 19 (Supp. 2008).
60. Id. §§ 4,9.
61. Id. § 18.
62. Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation
Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 76 (2008) (stating that the UAGA has been
adopted in one of its forms by all fifty states).
63. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 273-274g (2008).
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who need organs, matching potential recipients with organs, operating a
system for procuring and allocating organs, and increasing the supply of
organs.64 In 1986, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) re-
ceived the first (and only) federal contract to operate the OPTN and to
coordinate the placement of organs and the collection of data on donor
and transplant recipients.65 The OPTN also includes a system of regional
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) that are responsible for pro-
curing, testing, and distributing organs within their respective geographic
areas.
66
II. THE RENEWED INTEREST IN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH
The clinical field of transplantation was spurred not only by the
shift in recovery of better quality organs from brain-dead, heart-beating
donors, but also by improved techniques for preserving organs after their
removal and by the use of immunosuppressants to prevent organ rejec-
67tion in recipients. In particular, the discovery of cyclosporine in 1978
is thought to have revolutionized the field of transplantation by markedly
improving survival rates in organ recipients.
68
By the end of the twentieth century, solid organ transplantation had
become the standard of care for treating organ failure, with recipients
living longer with better quality of life than that offered by conventional
treatments. 69 For example, numerous studies demonstrate that with end-
stage renal failure, patients who receive kidney transplants have signifi-
cantly higher long-term survival rates compared to those who remain on
dialysis.7°
Yet transplantation is "a victim of its own success.,,
7 1 With im-
provement in the lives of recipients, the demand for transplants has far
outstripped the supply. Even if all brain-dead patients were suitable do-
nors, the number of organs recovered could not meet the needs of all the
patients on the transplant waiting list.7 2 In 1997, there were a total of
9,539 donors; by 2006, that number had increased to 14,756, of which
8,024 were cadaveric donors and 6,732 were living donors.73 During the
64. Id. § 274(b)(2).
65. United Network for Organ Sharing: Organ Donation and Transplantation, History of the
UNOS Database, http://www.unos.org/data/about/history.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
66. 42 U.S.C. §273(b)(3).
67. Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
68. Id. at 208, 214.
69. Id. at 214.
70. See, e.g., J.E. Locke et al., Outcomes of Kidneys from Donors After Cardiac Death:
Implications for Allocation and Preservation, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1797, 1803 (2007) (not-
ing a sixty-eight percent reduction in the long-term mortality of transplanted patients over those on
dialysis).
71. Mark D. Fox, Stewards of a Public Trust: Responsible Transplantation, 3 AM. J.
BIOETHICS v, vi (2003).
72. Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United
States, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 667, 673 (2003).
73. 2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at Table 1.1.
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same period, however, the waiting list 74 increased by more than 40,000:
from 55,501 in 1997 to 98,263 in 2006.75
In response to the growing imbalance between supply and demand,
there has been a surge of new initiatives to increase the donor pool. The
National Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative was established in
2003 to develop best practices for hospitals in order to achieve organ
donation rates of seventy-five percent, up from an average of forty-three
76
percent. Medicare conditions of participation require each hospital to
notify its OPO of all patient deaths and imminent deaths so that the OPO
has the opportunity to determine the suitability of potential organ do-
nors. 77 The deceased donor pool has been expanded through the use of
"marginal" organs, so that older donors or those with an underlying dis-
ease are being increasingly used to fill the need for cadaveric organs.78
The use of living donors, primarily for kidneys, increased by seventy
percent from 1997 through 2004, but has fallen slightly in the last several
years. 79 Despite current law prohibiting the sale of organs, 80 there have
been proposals to financially incentivize donors, either through payments
to the donor before death or the family after death, although none of
these controversial recommendations has been implemented.8' Xeno-
transplantation, the transplantation of organs from non-humans to hu-
mans, is in the experimental stage but its use is severely limited by un-
known health risks and ethical questions.82
Finally, pressure to increase the supply of organs caused the trans-
plant community to re-examine organ retrieval from patients who were
not brain-dead but whose circulatory functions had stopped.83 By the
end of the twentieth century, the once seemingly insurmountable prob-
lems associated with warm ischemia time and the rapid deterioration of
74. 2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at Chapter I (noting that some pa-
tients may be listed on multiple waiting lists, and the total number of registrations is higher than the
number of unique patients); id. (stating that thirty percent of those on the waiting list are deemed
"inactive" because they are not immediately eligible for an organ if one becomes available); see also
Rob Stein, A Third of Patients on Transplant List Are Not Eligible, WASH. POST. Mar. 22, 2008, at
AO1 (questioning the reliability of the waiting list numbers).
75. 2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at Table 1.3.
76. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROGRAMS, Div. OF TRANSPLANTATION No. 240-94-0037, THE ORGAN
DONATION BREAKTHROUGH COLLABORATIVE: BEST PRACTICES FINAL REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.njha.com/onit/pdf/930200530512PM71 .pdf.
77. 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(1) (2003).
78. Craig R. Smith & Jeffrey A. Lowell, Ethical Considerations in Organ Donation and
Transplantation, 15 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 231, 235 (2000).
79. 2007 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 29, at Table 1.1.
80. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C § 274e (2008).
81. See generally Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End Ameri-
ca's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 108-118 (2004) (summarizing financial initiatives
to increase organ donation).
82. See generally Margaret A. Clark, This Little Piggy Went to Market: The Xenotransplanta-
tion and Xenozoonose Debate, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 137, 138-145 (1999) (discussing the medical,
ethical, and legal issues raised by xenotrasplantation).
83. Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
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organs after cardiac arrest were being alleviated with improved donor
preparation and organ preservation methods. 84 These donors were origi-
nally referred to as non-heart-beating donors (NHBDs), in contrast to the
heart-beating donors who suffered brain death. 85 Donation from a non-
heart-beating donor is now termed donation after cardiac death (DCD)
and that term is used throughout this article to provide a consistent ter-
minology.86
Legal developments in end-of-life care also spurred renewed inter-
est in DCD. In 1968, at the time of the Ad Hoc Committee's recognition
of brain death, physicians were urged not to remove respirators before a
declaration of death was made as this could subject them to legal jeopar-
dy.87 Beginning with the Quinlan case in 1976,88 through Cruzan in
1990,89 the "right to die" debate had evolved from a nascent movement
to widespread acceptance of a patient's right to withdraw life-sustaining
technology. Patients who were terminally ill but not brain-dead and who
requested or had their surrogates request removal of extraordinary care
were now a potential source of organs.90
Organ donors who die from cardiac death rather than brain death are
categorized as either controlled or uncontrolled donors.91 In the con-
trolled group are those who are neurologically damaged or severely ill,
usually on a ventilator, and who have a planned withdrawal from life-
sustaining treatment because of the futility of further care.92 The uncon-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. One critic has alleged that the terminology was changed from NHBD to DCD as a market-
ing ploy in the face of uncertainty in determining death. Mohammed Y. Rady et al., Non-Heart
Beating, or Cardiac Death, Organ Donation: Why We Should Care, 2 J. HOSP. MED. 324, 328
(2007). The Institute of Medicine has suggested that the terminology be further refined to donation
after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). COMMITTEE ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN
DONATION, ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 128 (James F. Childress & Catharyn T.
Liverman, eds., 2006), available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3740/24738/34249.aspx [hereinafter
2006 IOM REPORT].
87. Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 47, at 339.
88. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jer-
sey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that a patient has a constitutional right of privacy to terminate life-
sustaining treatment).
89. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment).
90. ROGER HERDMAN & JOHN T. POTIS, DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION MEDICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN
PROCUREMENT 24 (1997), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=6036 [hereinafter
1997 IOM REPORT].
91. Id. at 1. These categories are derived from the classification of non-heart-beating donors
developed at the University Hospital Maastricht in the Netherlands. Id. at 25. The Maastricht cate-
gories include: 1. Dead on arrival; 2. Unsuccessful resuscitation; 3. Awaiting cardiac arrest; and 4.
Cardiac arrest while brain dead. G. Koostra et al., Categories of Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 27
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2883, 2883 (1995). Category three is controlled; the other categories are
uncontrolled. Id. at 2893-94. A fifth uncontrolled donor category, unexpected cardiac arrest in a
critically ill patient, was recently added. Dale Gardiner et al., Editorial, Non-Heart-Beating Dona-
tion-Solution or a Step Too Far?, 62 ANESTHESIA 431, 431 (2007).
92. 1997 IOM REPORT, supra note 90, at I.
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trolled donor includes those who experience an out-of-hospital cardiac
arrest or who are hospitalized and suffer an unexpected cardiac arrest and
are not successfully resuscitated.93
Most DCD donors are in the controlled group, where the timing of
cardiac arrest and the retrieval of organs are carefully planned events and
provide transplant surgeons with the shortest time for the retrieval of
viable organs.94 To approach the success rates of transplantation with
organs from brain-dead, heart-beating donors requires a short interval to
death and a prompt declaration of death followed by rapid organ retrieval
and cold preservation of the organs.95 With the consent of the patient or
patient's family, physicians remove the ventilator and other life support
in or near an operating room, waiting for the pulse and respirations to
cease. 96 Once that occurs, death is declared quickly, usually within two
to five minutes, and the organ procurement process immediately be-
gins.97 Occasionally, circulation does not promptly cease after life sup-
port has been withdrawn.98 If cardiopulmonary arrest does not occur
within a short period of time after removal of the ventilator, organ quali-
ty diminishes. 99 Most DCD protocols provide that if death does not oc-
cur within one hour, organ recovery will not be carried out.' ° In that
event, the patient is returned to a patient care unit to await death.101
In the United States, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
was one of the first to revisit the non-heart-beating donor as a possible
source of organs. In 1992, the transplant center produced a protocol for
recovering organs from persons who were not brain dead but who were
expected to die from cardiac arrest following the voluntary withdrawal of
life support. 102 A central piece of this policy (commonly known as the
"Pittsburgh protocol") was that procurement of organs could not begin
until the donor suffered irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary func-
tion, which required an observation time of two minutes following car-




94. Id. at 24.
95. Id. at 26.
96. DeVita et al., supra note 57, at 1710 (describing the process of organ procurement at the
University of Pittsburg Medical Center).
97. Id.




102. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Policy and Procedure Manual, Subject: Man-
agement of Terminally I Patients Who May become Organ Donors After Death, reprinted in
PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, THE DEBATE OVER NON-HEART BEATING CADAVER
PROTOCOLS, app. at 235 (Robert M. Arnold et al., eds., 1995) [hereinafter PROCURING ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT].
103. Id. at 240. Clinical tests to confirm death included pulselessness, apnea, and electrocardi-
ographic criteria. Id.
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Concerns in the medical community about the two-minute length of
time between cessation of circulatory functions and the declaration of
death were promptly raised. An entire issue of the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal was devoted to the controversies surrounding the Pittsburg
protocol. 1°4 Ren6e Fox, who was a member of the President's Commis-
sion, called the plan macabre and an "ignoble form of cannibalism."' 5
The primary concern, which persists to this day, is that the period of time
between the cessation of circulation and the declaration of death is too
short to be certain the patient is irreversibly dead before organs are har-
vested.
Following the lead of the Pittsburgh Medical Center, the Cleveland
Clinic developed a similar proposal for recovering organs from DCD
donors.'0 6 However, a professor of bioethics at Cleveland State Univer-
sity went to the local county prosecutor, alleging that under the draft
protocol, the Clinic intended to hasten patients' deaths in order to pro-
cure their organs for transplant) 0 7 In March 1997, Sixty Minutes, a na-
tional television show, aired a segment in which it claimed that patients
at the Cleveland Clinic were being killed for their organs.'0 8 Calling it a
"matter of grave concern," the assistant district attorney commenced an
investigation into the organ procurement policy. 1°9 The protocol was not
implemented.110
In response to concerns about DCD, the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) was asked by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
in 1997 to review the medical and ethical issues associated with non-
heart-beating donation.' In its report, the IOM acknowledged the "re-
lentlessly increasing need for organs for patients with life-threatening
organ failures .... 12 The number of DCD donors was a very small
component of the cadaveric donors: in 1996 there were only sixty-five
DCD donors out of 5,416 dead donors." 3 The majority of OPOs recov-
104. 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 103 (1993). The articles in this issue were later published in
PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102.
105. Ren6e Fox, "An Ignoble Form of Cannibalism": Reflections on the Pittsburgh Protocol
for Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadavers, in PROCURING ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 155, 162.
106. George J. Agich, From Pittsburgh to Cleveland: NHBD Controversies and Bioethics, 8
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 269, 269 (1999).
107. Id.; see also Gina Kolata, Controversy Erupts over Organ Removals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 1997, at A28.
108. Agich, supra note 106, at 269.
109. Kolata, supra note 107.
110. James M. DuBois & Michael DeVita, Donation After Cardiac Death in the United States:
How to Move Forward, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 3045, 3045 (2006) (stating that the Cleveland
Clinic DCD protocol was never implemented).
111. 1997 IOM REPORT, supra note 90, App. A. In addition to the criteria for determining
death, the IOM discussed ethical issues involving DCD policies and oversight, pre-and post-mortem
medical interventions, conflicts of interest, and interaction with families. Id. at 47-57, 61-63.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id. at 10, 27, Table 4.1A.
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ered no organs from DCD donors.1 14 Citing the more than 50,000 people
on the waiting list, the IOM concluded it was unlikely that in the future,
brain-dead donors or living donors would be able to satisfy the increas-
ing demand.' 15 Returning to DCD donors as a source of organs was one
way the transplant community could address the shortage of organs. A
study cited by the IOM predicted that use of controlled donors could
increase cadaver donors by at least twenty-five percent. 1
6
In 1997, there were twenty-nine OPOs (out of sixty-three) that had a
written DCD protocol." 7 The standards for determining the irreversibili-
ty of cardiopulmonary death varied considerably: several protocols re-
quired very specific criteria such as confirmation of a zero pulse, ap-
nea, t1 8 unresponsiveness to verbal stimuli, and absence of electrical ac-
tivity for two minutes on the electrocardiogram (ECG)." 9 Others were
vague as to the criteria for determining death.120  Although prominent
European programs required a ten minute cessation of cardiopulmonary
function before organ procurement,' 2' U.S. guidelines were either silent
or varied significantly with respect to the period of time organ retrieval
could begin after heart stoppage. Some allowed organ retrieval imme-
diately after cardiac arrest, while others mandated a waiting period rang-
ing from sixty seconds to five minutes.
22
While voicing its support for increasing the supply of organs from
this patient population, the IOM suggested that DCD policies as to the
timing and criteria for determining death be uniform among OPOs and
hospitals. 23 The IOM noted the difficulties surrounding the timing of
events and the requirement of "irreversible" cardiac death. 124 A lack of
adequate safeguards in declaring death could leave transplant programs
open to charges of orchestrating a premature death and retrieval of or-
gans. 125 The IOM recommended a waiting period of at least five minutes
after the cessation of heart and lung activity as demonstrated by ECG
114. Id. at 31.
115. Id. at 14. At the end of 1996, there were 50,047 people on the transplantation waiting list.
Id. at 11. During the same year, there were 8,940 donors, of which 5,416 were dead donors and
3,524 were living donors. Id. at 10.
116. Id. at 30.
117. Id. at 34-35.
118. Apnea is the absence of breathing. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 118 (28th ed. 2006).
119. 1997 1DM Report, supra note 90, at 40.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 58; see R. Schlumpf, et al., Transplantation of Kidneys from Non-Heart-Beating
Donors: Protocol, Cardiac Death Diagnosis, and Results, 28 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 107, 107
(1996) (stating that protocol of University of Zurich Hospital is to wait ten minutes after the diagno-
sis of cardiac death before further organ retrieval procedures are implemented); G. Koostra, State-
ment on Non-Heart-Beating Donor Programs, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2965, 2965 (1995)
(reporting that the first international workshop on non-heart-beating protocols reached consensus on
a ten-minute interval after cardiac arrest to ensure the dead donor rule).
122. 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 40-41.
123. Id. at 48.
124. Id. at 57.
125. Id.
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changes consistent with absent heart function and zero pulse activity as
monitored by an arterial catheter before a declaration of death is made
and organ retrieval commences. 126 A two-minute or shorter interval from
cardiopulmonary cessation to declaration of death was deemed by the
IOM as too short to ensure irreversibility. 127 The IOM's recommenda-
tion for a five-minute interval applied solely to controlled donors who
decline resuscitation after the withdrawal of life support; no suggestions
were made as to the appropriate waiting period for uncontrolled donors,
who, as the IOM noted, present a different set of ethical and legal chal-
lenges.
128
Despite the IOM's imprimatur and the growing demand for organs,
over the next few years the process of harvesting organs from non-heart-
beating donors failed to gain wide acceptance. 29 In an effort to promote
DCD and to overcome obstacles to its implementation, the IOM issued a
follow-up report in 2000, encouraging the development of DCD proto-
cols. 130 No new ground was broken by this report. The IOM reiterated
its original proposal for consistency among DCD protocols in the deter-
mination of death,131 although it appeared to retreat from its 1997 report
recommending a five minute interval from cardiopulmonary function
until a declaration of death. In its 2000 report, the IOM recognized that
"well considered" opinions may differ on the proper interval and that a
two-minute wait was acceptable.1
32
Progress on DCD continued slowly. By 2003, out of sixty-nine
OPOs, twenty-five performed no DCD retrieval, and only eight OPOs
recovered organs from ten or more donors, which accounted for sixty-
eight percent of all DCD donations in the United States. 33 In 2005, a
national conference of experts ("consensus conference") was convened
to assess the medical and ethical issues surrounding DCD. 134 The partic-
ipants concluded that DCD was ethically acceptable and encouraged
greater use of such protocols to increase the number of organs available
for transplantation. 135 The consensus conference also found a short wait-
ing period acceptable: a period of at least two minutes but not longer
than five minutes should lapse between asystole,136or the lack of a heart-
126. Id. at 59, 61.
127. Id. at 59.
128. Id. at 5, 50; see also infra discussion Part V.A.
129. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that less than three percent of donors were
NHBDs and that there were only about a dozen active NHBD programs); see also DeVita, et al.,
supra note 57, at 1711 (noting the lack of support for non-heart-beating donation).
130. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 2.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Id.
133. Richard J, Howard, A JO-Year Analysis of Organ Donation After Cardiac Death in the
United States, 80 TRANSPLANTATION 564, 565 (2005).
134. Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 281
135. Id. at 287.
136. Asystole is defined as the absence of heart contractions. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY,
supra note 118, at 172.
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beat, and recovery of organs.137 Interestingly, rejecting the IOM's rec-
ommendation, the conference decided that it was not necessary to con-
firm loss of circulatory functions by electronic monitoring.' 38 Thus, a
person could be declared dead while still demonstrating cardiac electrical
activity on an ECG.
In spite of its efforts, the IOM recognized that in 2006, there was
still "general inertia" in implementing DCD.139  Noting that DCD re-
mained controversial, the IOM stated: "this committee believes that it is
worth examining why three IOM committees and at least two interna-
tional consensus conferences have all concluded that both controlled and
uncontrolled [DCD] can proceed in an ethical manner yet so little has
changed in clinical practice."'
140
One of the reasons for the lagging interest in DCD has been clinical
resistance.'14  A survey published in 2006 revealed that bedside caregiv-
ers had numerous concerns about DCD. 142 Among the reservations listed
by healthcare providers at all professional levels was a perceived similar-
ity between DCD and "euthanasia."'
' 43
The lack of support for DCD may soon change. Following the ef-
forts of the IOM and transplant community to encourage greater use of
DCD, the Joint Commission, which accredits ninety-one percent of the
nation's hospitals, 44 implemented a new standard, effective January
2007, requiring hospitals to develop policies addressing the recovery of
organs from asystolic donors. 145 The Joint Commission does not require
hospitals to provide DCD, but if the hospital and its medical staff do not
wish to implement a DCD protocol, the hospital must justify its reasons
in writing.146 Finally, UNOS developed model elements for a DCD poli-
137. Bemat et al., supra note 24, at 282.
138. Id.
139. 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 136.
140. Id. at 144.
141. See M. Susan Mandell et al., National Evaluation of Healthcare Provider Attitudes To-
ward Organ Donation After Cardiac Death, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2952, 2952 (2006).
142. Id. at 2955.
143. Id. The term euthanasia was not defined, and could mean either active or passive eutha-
nasia.
144. JOINT COMM'N, JOINT COMMISSION FACT SHEETS, FACTS ABouT JOINT COMMISSION
ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION, http:/www.jointcommission.orglAboutUslFactSheets/
facts-jc-acrr-cert.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
145. See JOINT COMM'N. OF ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., THE JOINT
COMMISSION. HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: HOSPITAL TRANSPLANT SAFETY, STANDARD
TS.01.01.01, 2 (2008), available at http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/E9943504-BFF5-
42B1-9467-79FECID9BD66/0/HAPTS.pdf. The provision was previously designated as a part of
Standard LD 3.110. See Joint Conm'n. on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Approved: Revisions
to Standard LD.3.110, 26 JOINT COMM'N PERSPS. 7 (2006), available at
www.sharenj.org/hospital%20professionals/pdf/JCAHO%20Standard%20LD%203%201 10.pdf.
146. JOINT COMMISSION HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: HOSPITAL TRANSPLANT
SAFETY, supra note 145, at 2. The Joint Commission requirement for a hospital to justify a decision
to forego a DCD policy became effective January 1, 2008. See Joint Commission, Approved: Revi-
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cy for all OPOs and transplant centers, which became effective July 1,
2007.n7 The mainstream medical community has seemingly put its seal
of approval on DCD.
148
III. DEFINING DEATH UNDER THE UDDA
Despite the apparent consensus in the transplant community on the
acceptability of DCD, a growing number of physicians and ethicists have
raised concerns about this approach to recovering organs. 149 With a few
notable exceptions, little attention has been given to this issue in the legal
community. 15  In addressing the current practice of DCD, it makes sense
to ask the question: does it matter whether we remove organs from those
who may not be quite dead?
The "dead donor rule" has become entrenched in the transplant
community: vital organs cannot be removed from a patient who is not
dead and organ retrieval cannot be the cause of death.151 A number of
states codify the dead donor rule. For example, Maryland's version of
the UDDA states: "A pronouncement of death under this section shall be
made before any vital organ is removed for transplantation." 152  The
UAGA also implicitly recognizes that donors must be dead before organ
retrieval by providing that the gift of a vital organ is not effective until
the death of the donor.153 The UAGA does not define death and to de-
sions to Standard LD.3.110, Element of Performance 12, for Critical Access Hospitals and Hospit-
als, 27 JOINT COMM'N PERSPS. 6, 14 (2007).
147. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, MODEL ELEMENTS FOR CONTROLLED DCD
RECOVERY PROTOCOLS, UNOS Bylaws, app. B, attachment II (2007), available at
http://www.unos.org/policiesandBylaws2/bylawsfUNOSByLaws/pdfs/bylawl 145.pdf.
148. In 2006, a national initiative in Canada also recommended the adoption of DCD pro-
grams, using a five minute observation period before death could be declared. See Sam D. Shemie et
al., National Recommendations for Donation After Cardiocirculatory Death in Canada, 175 CAN.
MED. ASS'N J. S 1, S6 (Supp. 2006).
149. Jerry Menikoff, Less Bull, Better Bioethics, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1133, 1146-47
(2005) (reviewing ALBERT R. JONSEN, BIOETHICS BEYOND THE HEADLINES: WHO LIVES? WHO
DIS? WHO DECIDES? (2005)).
150. See, e.g., Jerry Menikoff, The Importance Of Being Dead: Non-Heart-Beating Organ
Donation, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (2002); James M. DuBois, Is Organ Procurement Causing the
Death of Patients?, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 21 (2002); Jerry Menikoff, Doubts About Death: The
Silence of the Institute of Medicine, 26 J. L. MED & ETHICS 157 (1998).
151. Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner, The Dead Donor Rule: Should We Stretch It,
Bend It, or Abandon It?, in PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 220-21.
Although John Robertson is credited with coining the term, it is not altogether clear when the dead
donor rule originated. Id. at 220. The idea that a donor has to been dead before vital organs are
removed dates at least as far back as the late 1960s. Id.
152. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202(b)(2) (West 2005); see also ALA. CODE § 22-31-
3(a) (LexisNexis 2006) ("When a part of a donor is proposed to be used for transplantation.., there
shall be an independent confirmation of the death by another medical doctor licensed in Alabama.");
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327C-1(b) (LexisNexis 2008) ("Death shall be pronounced before.., any
vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (A) (2008)
("In any case when organs are to be used in a transplant, then an additional physician .... not a
member of the transplant team, must make the pronouncement of death."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-
4(C) (LexisNexis 2008) ("Death is to be pronounced.., before any vital organ is removed for pur-
poses of transplantation ....").
153. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT, supra note 59, § 2(3).
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termine who is dead from the absence of either brain or cardiac activity
requires looking at the state law defining death.
154
A. The Meaning of "Irreversible"
In accordance with the UDDA, most states define cardiopulmonary
death as the "irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory func-
tions" as determined by accepted medical standards. 15  Under the
UDDA, death is not merely the lack of circulation and respiration; for
death to occur, those functions must have irreversibly ceased. In re-
commending adoption of the UDDA, the President's Commission noted
that a clinical assessment of irreversibility will change with new medical
technology and capabilities. According to the Commission, "Many pa-
tients declared dead fifty years ago because of heart failure would have
not experienced an 'irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions' in the hands of a modern hospital."'
' 56
Neither the UDDA nor its state counterparts define the term irre-
versible. The President's Commission was concerned primarily with
expanding the concept of brain death, and failed to address what is meant
by irreversibility of cardiopulmonary functions. 57  Further, although
death is to be determined under the UDDA according to accepted medi-
cal standards, no uniform standard for irreversibility exists in the DCD
context.' 58 In most areas of medicine, determining the precise moment
of death is not critical. 59 In DCD, however, minutes can mean the dif-
ference between a viable and nonviable organ.16° For practical reasons,
therefore, the point at which death becomes irreversible must be a very
short interval after heart stoppage; ergo, the basis for a two to five minute
waiting period.
The meaning of irreversible in the determination of death has been
the subject of much debate among physicians and medical ethicists.' 61
154. Comments to the 1968 version of the UAGA state:
Subsection (b) leaves the determination of the time of death to the attending or certifying
physician. No attempt is made to define the uncertain point in time when life terminates.
The point is not subject to clear cut definition and medical authorities are currently work-
ing toward a consensus on the matter. . . . The real question is when have irreversible
changes taken place that preclude return to normal brain activity and self sustaining bodi-
ly functions.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 7, 8A U.L.A. 147 (2003).
155. See Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 903.
156. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 76.
157. Id. at 76-77 (discussing the degree of brain damage necessary to meet irreversible cessa-
tion of functions).
158. 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 61; see also Stuart J. Youngner et al., When is
"Dead"?, 29 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 14, 16 (1999) (noting that controversy about the meaning of
irreversibility has made it difficult to achieve consensus about the timing of death in DCD).
159. 1997 10M Report, supra note 90, at 57.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 16 (stating that although the term irreversible
is used in both the law and clinical practice, its exact meaning is unclear); E.T. Bartlett, Differences
Between Death and Dying, 21 J. MED. ETHics 270, 274 (1995) (contending that the meaning of
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The term irreversible implies that more than a mere cessation of heart-
beat is necessary for one to be dead. Otherwise, people who suffer car-
diac arrest and are resuscitated are being literally brought back from the
dead. On the other hand, it is often difficult to determine the precise
moment of physiological death. 162 Physicians recognize that dying is a
process that culminates in a diagnosis of clinical death, yet the law re-
quires a demarcation between life and death-the irreversible loss of
function of the organism. 63 James L. Bernat, lead author of the 2005
consensus conference report, argues that death is an event, not a
process.' 64 He believes that "[b]ecause all organisms must be either alive
or dead, death is an inherently discontinuous and instantaneous event."'
' 65
In both its 1997 and 2000 Reports, the IOM noted the difficulties
associated with the term irreversibility in DCD. "[E]xisting empirical
data cannot confirm or disprove a specific interval at which the cessation
of cardiopulmonary function becomes irreversible."' 66  The IOM rea-
soned that a five minute waiting period of time is an acceptable indica-
tion of irreversibility because a patient will not autoresuscitate after that
period of time, i.e. the patient will not resume circulation on his own
without medical assistance.167  Although James M. DuBois asserts that
"[t]he medical community has arrived at a moral certainty that circulato-
ry and respiratory functions do not spontaneously resume ... after they
have been lost more than a couple of minutes,"' 168 there is little scientific
data to support this assumption.' 69 The five studies on which the IOM
relied were not direct studies of autoresuscitation and were conducted in
the early to mid-twentieth century, with the last one performed in
1970."70 In 1997, the IOM recommended further research to validate the
irreversibility is unambiguous and means "not capable of being reversed or reversing."); Tom Tom-
linson, The Irreversibility of Death: Reply to Cole, 3 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHIcs J., 157, 161 (1993)
(asserting that irreversibility is tied to the setting in which it is used); David J. Cole, The Reversibili-
ty of Death, 18 J. MED. ETHics 26, 29 (1992) (arguing that the concept of irreversibility should be
abandoned because it departs from conventional notions of death).
162. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 77 (recognizing that determining the time of death
can be "troublesome").
163. Id. (noting that "death should be 'viewed not as process but as the event that separates the
process of dying from the process of disintegration').
164. James L. Bernat, A Defense of the Whole-Brain Concept of Death, 28 HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT 14, 15 (1998).
165. Id. at 16.
166. 2000 IOM Report supra, note 20, at 22; see also 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 58
(citing a lack of scientific certainty in defining the interval for irreversibility).
167. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 22-23.
168. DuBois, supra note 150, at 32.
169. See DeVita, supra note 57, at 1710 ('The empirical data are sparse but suggest that 2
mins, rather than 5 mins, may be sufficient to ensure irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary
function."); Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 15 (concluding that the data cited by the IOM on
autoresuscitation are "seriously flawed" and "provided the weakest possible evidence for a recom-
mendation"); Rady et al., supra note 86, at 325 (suggesting the true incidence of autoresuscitation is
unknown because of underreporting).
170. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 22-23.
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appropriate interval necessary to exclude the possibility of autoresuscita-
tion.1 71 Those studies have not been undertaken.
72
Some critics of DCD do not dispute that the possibility of spontane-
ous recovery of circulation in controlled donors withdrawn from life
support is exceedingly unlikely. 73 They do question, however, whether
a body's inability to reverse circulation on its own carries the same
meaning as irreversible cessation of function under the UDDA.174 Irre-
versible cessation of cardiopulmonary function can be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways: (1) the patient's circulation will not spontaneously resume
absent outside intervention (autoresuscitation); (2) the patient's circula-
tion will not be reversed because the patient or family has chosen to
withdraw life support and to refuse further resuscitative efforts; or (3) the
patient's circulation can not be reversed, even with cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) or other technical means. 175 The IOM and the trans-
plant community have chosen a combination of the first and second con-
structs of irreversibility: after two to five minutes, the patient is unlikely
to resume heart and lung functions on his own and circulation will not be
artificially started at the request of the patient or family. 76 The reason
the transplant community rejects the third meaning of irreversibility is
obvious: the patient can not be irreversibly dead when organs are pro-
cured after just two to five minutes of asystole because many patients
can be successfully resuscitated after this short an interval.
77
Although the UDDA does not define "irreversible" or address organ
donation, a few states favor a strict construction of irreversible in their
death statutes. For example, Oklahoma law provides: "A determination
of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards;
provided however all reasonable attempts to restore spontaneous circula-
tory or respiratory functions shall first be made, prior to such declara-
tion."' 178 The Virginia statute also mandates that before a person is de-
171. 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 59 (stating there was a need to collect data to conduct
the appropriate interval).
172. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24 (noting that the studies it recommended had not
been undertaken); see also Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 282 (stating in 2005 consensus conference
report that studies on the minimum period of observation necessary to rule out resuscitation had not
been conducted).
173. The possibility of spontaneous circulation is an issue with uncontrolled donors in whom
resuscitation has been attempted, however. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
174. See Joanne Lynn, Are the Patients Who Become Organ Donors Under the Pittsburgh
Protocol for "Non-Heart-Beating Donors" Really Dead?, in PROCURING ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 98-99 (stating that the two-minute waiting period in the Pittsburg
protocol may not be wrong, but it is a departure from conventional notions of irreversibility).
175. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24.
176. Id.
177. See infra notes 212, 213 and accompanying text.
178. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122(2) (West 2004).
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clared dead, a physician must confirm that all further attempts at resusci-
tation would be unsuccessful.
79
There is a paucity of case law on the meaning of irreversible cessa-
tion of circulatory functions under the UDDA, but the little that exists
appears to support a definition of irreversible that is at odds with current
DCD practice. In a 1995 Michigan case, the district attorney charged the
defendant with negligent vehicular homicide of an infant born after an
emergency caesarean section. 180 The baby had no discernible heartbeat
or respiratory effort for at least ten minutes after delivery.1 81 Medical
personnel were able to detect a heart rate fifteen minutes after birth and
gasping respirations ten minutes later. 182 Under Michigan law, negligent
homicide has to cause the death of a person, which excludes viable fetus-
es not born alive.183 The defendant contended he could not be charged
with homicide because the infant was not alive at birth. 84  The court
struggled with how to define "alive" and looked to Michigan's version of
the UDDA to determine if the child was bom "dead." 185 The court con-
cluded that because heart and respiratory functions were restored, albeit
many minutes after delivery, the child did not have irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions at birth.1 86 The fact that the child
required medical intervention to restore circulation did not preclude a
finding that the child was born alive. "Otherwise," the court reasoned,
"the use of the word 'irreversible' becomes meaningless."
187
A few other cases have reached a similar conclusion. In Jefferson
County v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (In re Johnson), 88 a
hospital appealed from a finding by county commissioners that it was not
entitled to payment for emergency resuscitation rendered to an indigent
patient. 189 The commissioners found that due to an asthma attack, thepatient had suffered cardiac arrest at 5:19 p.m. and had no pulse, blood
179. A person shall be medically and legally dead if.. . there is the absence of spontaneous
respiratory and spontaneous cardiac functions and, because of the disease or condition which directly
or indirectly caused these functions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions
ceased, attempts at resuscitation would not, in the opinion of such physician, be successful in restor-
ing spontaneous life-sustaining functions, and, in such event, death shall be deemed to have occurred
at the time these functions ceased. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (West 2005).
180. People v. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d 321, 322-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
181. Id. at 323 (citing expert testimony that the baby's Apgar scores at one, five and ten mi-
nutes following birth were zero, which meant that the heart rate and respiratory effort were virtually
nonexistent).
182. Id. The infant was removed from the respirator after a few hours and declared brain dead.
Id.
183. Id. at 324. The intentional or willful killing of an "unborn quick child" is, however,
punishable as manslaughter. MicI-. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 2004).
184. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d at 323.
185. Id. at 325.
186. See id. at 328.
187. Id. at 328.
188. 883 P.2d 1084 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
189. Id. at 1085-86.
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pressure, and respirations at 5:45 p.m. 190 The patient remained unres-
ponsive during transport and arrived at the hospital cyanotic 9' and in-
continent of urine and stool. 192 Despite the patient's status, the emergen-
cy room physician began resuscitation efforts that did not cease until
6:28 p.m. 193 The commissioners decided that because the patient was
dead on arrival at the hospital, the treatment rendered was neither rea-
sonable nor necessary. 194 Reversing the commissioner's denial of pay-
ment, the court stated:
The only evidence which contrasted with the doctor's medical opi-
nion was testimony from Johnson's husband who believed that his
wife had died on their lawn while being attended by the paramedics.
This lay testimony, however, was insufficient to supplant the expert
opinion of the doctor as to whether there was a reasonable prospect
that the cessation of Johnson's life functions could be reversed when
she arrived at the hospital. 195
A recent (and rather peculiar) case nicely illustrates the ordinary
understanding of irreversibility. Prior to his wife's filing of an action for
divorce, Joseph Finnegan had suffered three heart attacks, but had been
successfully resuscitated each time.196 He moved to dismiss the action
on the ground the court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage be-
cause he had died on three occasions and the parties' marriage ended
upon his death. 197 The court rebuffed defendant's claims, noting that he
still existed and that his "alleged deaths were neither permanent nor irre-
versible."
' 198
The rapid declaration of death in DCD donors serves the broader
goal of increasing the supply of organs. Yet, the price of this achieve-
ment is an acknowledgment among DCD proponents that death is con-
textual and irreversibility is defined by the intent of the patient. 99 To
satisfy the dead donor rule, DCD proponents have to disregard the con-
ventional understanding of irreversibility, i.e. whether it is possible to
reverse a cardiac arrest. According to DCD supporters, because con-
trolled donors choose to be withdrawn from life support and it would be
unethical, if not legally wrong, to resuscitate these individuals, it is ac-
ceptable to construe irreversibility to mean that we will not reverse, not
190. Id. at 1086.
191. Cyanosis is a dark bluish color of the skin due to a lack of oxygen. STEDMAN'S MED.
DICTIONARY, supra note 118, at 475.
192. In re Johnson, 883 P.2d at 1086.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1087 (emphasis supplied).
196. Finnegan v. Finnegan, No. FA074031514, 2008 WL 642627, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
19, 2008) (unpublished).
197. Id.
198. Id. at *2.
199. See DuBois, supra note 150, at 32-33 (recommending that irreversibility be determined
contextually).
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that we cannot reverse, circulatory functions. 20 0  The irreversibility of
heart function is thus a moral, not a physiological, reality that promotes
the social objectives of organ transplantation.0 1
Further evidence that irreversibility may have a different meaning in
the DCD context is the frequent substitution of the word "permanent" for
"irreversible" cessation of respiration and circulation. 20 2 In accepting the
weak construal of irreversibility to mean that resuscitation will not be
attempted, the report of the 2005 Consensus Conference notes: "This
meaning of 'irreversibility' also has been called the 'permanent' cessa-
tion of respiration and circulation. If data show that autoresuscitation...
cannot occur and if there is no attempt at artificial resuscitation, it can be
concluded that respiration and circulation have ceased permanently. 2 3
Jerry Menikoff is highly critical of this pragmatic definition of irre-
versible circulatory death.2 4 He suggests that the intent of the patient
plays no role in the determination of death under the UDDA and that
cardiopulmonary function is not irreversibly lost as long as it could con-
ceivably be restored by resuscitation efforts.20 5  Others agree. E.T. Bar-
tlett is critical of the Pittsburgh protocol because it confuses being dead
with dying.
Surely, no one would seriously argue that the condition of a pa-
tient, two minutes post-arrest, who is unable on his own to re-
turn to a normal rhythm is, ipso facto, dead. If that were true
then we should now refuse CPR on similar patients because
they are dead!
206
Alexander Morgan Capron, executive director of the President's
Commission, also argues that the weak construal of irreversibility is in-
consistent with the UDDA because there are not two kinds of death-
circulatory and neurological-but only one phenomenon based on differ-
ent criteria.20 7 "Thus," he concludes, "replacing 'irreversible cessation of
200. See John Robertson, The Dead Donor Rule, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at
6, 12 ("[I]t is difficult to see why one should adopt a construal of irreversibility that ignores whether
the patient could in fact legally or morally be resuscitated."); see also Tomlinson, supra note 161, at
162 (concluding that, in a patient who has refused life-sustaining care, "medical means for reversing
cardiopulmonary arrest are no longer ethically significant possibilities").
201. See Tomlinson, supra note 161, at 162-63 (distinguishing between the physiological and
functional criteria for death).
202. See 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 146 (concluding that the term "permanent" loss
of function is a reasonable interpretation of irreversibility under the UDDA).
203. Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 282.
204. See Jerry Menikoff, Doubts About Death: The Silence of the Institute of Medicine, 26 J.L.
MED & ETHICS 157, 158-61 (1999).
205. Id. at 158.
206. Bartlett, supra note 161, at 274.
207. Alexander Morgan Capron, The Bifurcated Legal Standard for Determining Death, in
THE DEFINITION OF DEATH CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 117, 133 (Stuart J. Youngner et al.
eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999).
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circulatory of respiratory functions' with 'we choose not to reverse' flies
in ,,201in the face of the UDDA's underlying premise.
In addition, lungs are increasingly being recovered from DCD do-
nors with promising results,20 9 and, with the Denver Children's Hospital
program, we know there have been at least three DCD heart transplanta-
tions.21° Whatever definition of irreversibility is chosen, it seems incon-
sistent to say that a person's heart and lungs irreversibly ceased when
they are later transplanted and revived in recipients. Simply put, "[I]f a
heart is restarted, the person from whom it was taken cannot have been
dead according to cardiac criteria.,
211
B. Are There Two Kinds of Death Under the UDDA?
Adding to the controversy is the fact that the brain may still be func-
tioning in DCD donors at the time of organ procurement. Irreversible
brain damage usually does not occur within two to five minutes of asys-
tole.2 t2 Many patients will survive and have normal neurological func-
tion if resuscitated at this point.21 3 Even supporters of DCD admit that it
may take ten to fifteen minutes of no circulation for the brain to suffer
irreparable damage.21 4 New resuscitative therapies demonstrate the pos-
sibilities that a patient may survive neurologically intact even after pro-
longed cardiac arrest 215 and that the poor survival rates and neurological
outcomes associated with cardiac arrest may be due, at least in part, to
216outmoded clinical practices.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., David G6mez de Antonio et al., Results of Clinical Lung Transplant from Un-
controlled Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 26 J. HEART & LUNG TRANSPLANTATION 529, 533 (2007).
210. See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 710. It is more accurate to say Denver Children's
Hospital performed three modem DCD heart transplants. The first heart transplants performed by
Christian Barnard in the late 1960s took place before the concept of brain death arose and it is not
clear whether the patients satisfied brain death criteria. See MARGARET LOCK, TWICE DEAD:
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF DEATH 80, 87 (Univ. Cal. Press 2002).
211. Robert M. Veatch, Donating Hearts After Cardiac Death-Reversing the Irreversible, 359
NEW ENG. J. MED. 672, 673 (2008).
212. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 17 (recognizing that a four to six minute loss of
blood flow does not irreversibly damage the brainstem). See also Lynn, supra note 174, at 99 (stat-
ing that "no one" would argue that the brain would cease functioning after only two minutes without
oxygen).
213. See Lynn, supra note 174, at 99 (noting there would be a "legion" of examples of people
surviving with intact brain function after cessation of the heartbeat for two minutes). In fact, one
bioethicist has suggested that patients may not even be unconscious after only two minutes of asys-
tole. Robert M. Veatch, Consent for Perfusion and Other Dilemmas with Organ Procurement from
Non-Heart Beating Donors, in PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 198.
214. See DuBois, supra note 150, at 34 (noting that it would probably take ten to fifteen mi-
nutes after arrest for the brain to die); see also DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 16-17 ("If de-
prived of blood flow for at least 10-15 minutes, the brain, including the brainstem, will completely
cease functioning.").
215. See Rady et al., supra note 86, at 327-28 (stating that patients resuscitated with extracor-
poreal perfusion are able to recover after much longer periods than two to five minutes of cardiores-
piratory arrest); see also infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.
216. See Myron K, Weisfeldt & Lance B. Becker, Resuscitation After Cardiac Arrest, A 3-
Phase Time-Sensitive Mode, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3035, 3036 (2002) (stating that although sur-
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In response to concerns that the brain is not irreversibly damaged
after two to five minutes, proponents of a short waiting period point to
the UDDA, under which, they assert, death can be determined by either
the cessation of brain or cardiopulmonary functions.217 Thus, loss of
circulation is an independent determination of death, unrelated to wheth-
er there is irreversible loss of brain function. 218 Nonsense, says Meni-
koff. Accusing the IOM of "shading the truth,' '219 Menikoff contends
the history of the UDDA conclusively dispels the notion there are two
different kinds of death.220 Death occurs when the organism ceases to
function as a whole, and not when death comes to particular parts.
221
Citing an influential 1981 article by Capron and Leon R. Kass, Meni-
koff states that "cardiopulmonary criteria were being retained [in the
proposed statute] precisely because they gave clear results in the easy
cases, where it was quite evident that brain function had ceased .... ,223
The President's Commission also looked upon death as a unitary pheno-
menon. 224 Consideration was given by the Commission to a statute that
would contain only a definition of brain death but circulatory death was
included as alternative criteria because "the loss of spontaneous breath-
ing and heartbeat are surrogates for the loss of brain functions.
' 225
Bernat, who today is an ardent supporter of DCD, previously criti-
cized the Pittsburgh protocol because it was not clear the donors were
brain dead after only two minutes.226 He stated:
Tests measuring circulation for the patient not receiving cardiopul-
monary support assess the prolonged absence of heartbeat (asystole
or ventricular fibrillation) and the prolonged absence of breathing
(apnea). These are adequate tests for death in this context because
they lead directly to the destruction of the brain and all other organs.
The cessation of heartbeat and breathing must be prolonged because
their absence must be of sufficient duration for the brain to become
vival rates are poor after ten minutes of cardiac arrest, it is unknown whether this is due to irreversi-
ble injury or the failure of current therapeutic approaches).
217. See 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24 (asserting that there is no basis for a require-
ment that death by cardiopulmonary criteria must be of sufficient duration to cause the loss of brain
function).
218. Id.; see also Bemat et al., supra note 24, at 281 (stating that the cardiopulnonary standard
may be used when the donor can not meet brain death criteria).
219. Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162.
220. Id. at 160.
221. See ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON, The Report of the President's Commission on the
Uniform Determination of Death Act, in DEATH: BEYOND WHOLE BRAIN CRITERIA, supra note 51,
at 156.
222. See Capron & Kass, supra note 46, at 113-14.
223. Menikoff, supra note 204, at 159-60.
224. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 7.
225. Id. at 37.
226. Bemat, supra note 164, at 20.
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diffusely infarcted and for the cessation of heartbeat and breathing
conclusively to be irreversible.
227
Similarly, one of the originators of DCD, the Maastrich University Hos-
pital in The Netherlands, rejects the Pittsburgh protocol, preferring in-
stead a ten-minute waiting time before organ procurement "to be sure
that the patient's brain is irreversibly damaged and an equivalent situa-
tion to brain death has been reached. 228
Intertwined with the problematic issue of whether controlled donors
have irreversible brain functions is the increasing post-mortem use of
artificial resuscitation to ensure viability of the organs. One technique
used to preserve organs in the donor is extracorporeal membrane oxyge-
nation (ECMO), where blood is circulated through an oxygenating sys-
tem.229 ECMO, which is a modification of the heart-lung machine used
during bypass surgery, is often employed as a resuscitative intervention
in those who have experienced cardiac arrest.230  In DCD, however,
ECMO is begun after the patient is declared dead to restore blood flow
and to preserve the organs.23' Once the heart is perfused with oxygen
through ECMO, it may begin to beat again.232 A recent editorial in Anes-
thesia, a British journal, described an "astonished audience" at an inter-
national conference in London in 2006 when it heard that a medical cen-
ter in the United States was experimenting with ECMO after only two
213
minutes of pulseless activity, resulting in reanimation of the heart. As
critics have pointed out, claiming that the patient has died and then re-
versing the circulatory arrest seems to profoundly misapply the irreversi-
234bility requirement.
Michael A. DeVita acknowledges that a problem in non-heart-
beating donation is that brain function can return after cardiac arrest if
resuscitative attempts restore circulation within five to ten minutes.235
227. Id.
228. Koostra et al., supra note 91, at 2893.
229. See Joseph F. Magliocca et al., Extracorporeal Support for Organ Donation After Cardiac
Death Effectively Expands the Donor Pool, 58 J. TRAUMA 1095, 1096-97 (2005).
230. David Bracco et al., The Thin Line Between Life and Death, 33 INTENSIVE CARE MED.
751, 751 (2007).
231. Magliocca et al., supra note 229, at 1096.
232. Carla DeJohn & Joseph B. Zwischenberger, Ethical Implications of Extracorporeal Inter-
val Support for Organ Retrieval, 52 AM. SOC'Y ARTIFICIAL INTERNAL ORGANS J. 119, 121 (2006);
see also Magliocca et al., supra note 229, at 1097.
233. Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation, supra note 91, at 432-33.
234. Joanne Lynn & Ronald Cranford, The Persisting Perplexities in the Determination of
Death, in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, supra note 207, at 106
(stating that restoring circulation after a determination of death is evidence of "confused thinking"
and a misapplication of the criteria for irreversibility).
235. DeVita et al., supra note 57, at 1711. Michael DeVita is a professor at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Medicine. Id. at 1709. See also Christopher James Doig & Graham Rocker,
Retrieving Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donors: A Review of Medical and Legal Issues,
50 CAN. J. ANESTHESIA 1069, 1072 (2003) (suggesting that if circulatory functions and blood flow
to the brain are restored, it is possible that patients could experience pain or even regain conscious-
ness).
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The practice of restoring circulation through ECMO or other techniques
raises the possibility that the brain is also being resuscitated while the
recovery of organs is ongoing.236 Some advocates of DCD nevertheless
encourage resuscitation of victims of cardiac arrest for the sole purpose
of preserving organ viability for procurement.237 The New York City
organ recovery program envisions the transplant ambulance team contin-
uing CPR and administering oxygen to the victim who had previously
been declared dead in order to maintain blood flow during transport to
the hospital.23 8 This raises the specter of limited brain resuscitation.239
Critics argue that if transplant surgeons are to use artificial means to re-
store circulation, it becomes imperative to wait in excess of ten minutes
to confirm the total cessation of the entire brain before ECMO or other
techniques are used.24 ° Otherwise, it may be possible for at least some
patients to regain brain functions, including awareness or the perception
of pain.24 t
C. A Not So Uniform Determination of Death
In adopting the weaker construct of irreversibility, the transplant
community has embraced a definition of death that is conducive to organ
procurement but is at odds with the UDDA and the intentions of the
President's Commission. For example, patients A and B are both in the
intensive care unit.242 A is a potential donor and refuses CPR. Patient B
236. Joseph L. Verheijde et al., Recovery of Transplantable Organs After Cardiac or Circula-
tory Death: Transforming the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ Donation, 2 PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS
& HUMANITIES IN MED. 1, 3 (2007) (asserting that post-mortem technology to preserve organs
results in the resuscitation of the heart and brain), available at http://www.peh-
med.com/content/pdf/1747-5341-2-8.pdf.
237. See, e.g., Mary Bennett & Niranjan Kissoon, Is Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation War-
ranted in Children Who Suffer Cardiac Arrest Post Trauma?, 23 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY CARE 267,
271 (2007) (stating that the possibility of organ donation may be a reason to attempt a prolonged
resuscitation); see also 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 158 ("[P]remature removal of mechani-
cal support can be a major barrier to organ donation.").
238. Stein, supra note 3, at AOl.
239. M.D.D. Bell, Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation: Old Procurement Strategy-New
Ethical Problems, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 179 (stating that the combination of cardiac massage and
administration of oxygen after death "may be associated with some restoration of brain functions").
240. Verheijde et al., supra note 236, at 3. To assuage the concerns of medical personnel about
post-mortem beating of the heart, some transplant centers use a thoracic aortic balloon or lidocaine
to prevent reanimation of the heart during ECMO. See DeJohn & Zwischenberger, supra note 232,
at 121. Using a thoracic balloon will also prevent perfusion to the brain, thus avoiding the problem
of brain resuscitation during ECMO. Bernat, supra note 14, at 671.
241. This is theoretical, of course, because once organs are removed and the patient dies, we
cannot know whether the patient had any such experience. There is also a debate in the medical
community about whether it is possible for patients to regain cognition or experience pain after only
five minutes of absent blood flow. See Martha A. Q.Curley et al., Letters to the Editor, Organ
Donation After Cardiac Death: Are We Willing to Abandon the Dead Donor Rule? The Author's
Reply, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 507, 508 (2007) (stating that studies show patients' cogni-
tion and the ability to perceive pain are likely absent after five minutes of no cardiac output); Doig &
Rocker, supra note 235, at 1072 (questioning whether patients in DCD protocols could experience
pain or regain consciousness when brain perfusion is restored by mechanical means).
242. This scenario is adapted from a similar hypothetical described in Youngner et al., supra
note 158, at 17.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
has stated that he wants CPR if he arrests. According to current DCD
practice, A can be declared dead after at least two minutes of cardiopul-
monary arrest. B also suffers two minutes of asystole and apnea, but
resuscitative efforts are started. Is B dead after two minutes? If B is
successfully resuscitated, was he brought back from the dead, or was he
not dead in the first place? The answer under the UDDA is that B is not
dead because he did not suffer irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions. Using the weaker construal of irreversibility only
for organ donors but not for other patients who suffer cardiac arrest con-
travenes the purpose of the UDDA, which was to set uniform criteria for
the determination of death in all individuals. As the President's Com-
mission commented:
[S]ince the proposed statute is intended to apply in all situations, it
ought not to be incorporated into a state's Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (UAGA). Placing it there would create the mistaken impression
that a special "definition" of death needs to be applied to organ trans-
plantation, which is not the case.
2 4 3
DCD advocates point out that under the UDDA, the determination
of death is to be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.
Since the medical community has found DCD ethical, they reason, it
falls within the standard of care.244 But declaring a person dead after two
to five minutes of absent circulation is not the medical standard of care
for all patients. 245 For those who experience sudden cardiac arrest, ag-
gressive resuscitation is the rule.246 Under the UDDA, proof of death is
both a medical and legal question.247 The question for medical experts is
whether there is biological evidence of life (or death), not whether the
patient has chosen to live or die.248 There is no separate test of death for
249organ transplant purposes.
Further, to argue that the medical criteria for determining death
have evolved since the 1980s in an effort to shorten the time in which
243. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 80. Neither does the UAGA purport to define death
for purposes of organ transplantation. Id. at 145.
244. See DuBois, supra note 150, at 33.
245. Kimmo Sainio, Are Non-Heart-Beating Donors Really Dead?, 29 ANNALS MED. 473, 474
(1997) (noting that in an emergency room, a patient with unexpected asystole would not be declared
dead after two minutes).
246. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
247. Randles v. Ind. Patient's Comp. Fund, 860 N.E.2d 1212, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
248. See id. ("it is the role of the medical professional to decide whether brain death or other
cessation of cardiopulmonary function is present in accordance with current medical standards")
(quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D Death § 424); see also UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr (1980),
supra note 17, prefatory note ("Time of death is a fact to be determined with all others in each indi-
vidual case, and may be resolved, when in doubt, upon expert testimony before the appropriate
court.").
249. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 595 (Fla. 1992) (finding that anencephalic infant who
lacked higher brain functions could not be declared legally dead for purposes of organ donation).
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death is diagnosed is to stand medical progress on its head.25° If any-
thing, recent resuscitative techniques have demonstrated that some indi-
viduals whom physicians would have declared dead even a few years ago
can survive and lead productive lives. 1
The goal of increasing organs for transplantation is worthwhile, but
whether there ought to be different definitions of death, depending on the
context, is an issue that deserves greater scrutiny and public discussion
before DCD attains widespread use. There is also some value in treating
all individuals equally. "Otherwise," commentators have noted, "pa-
tients would be dead or alive, depending on whether or not they were
,,252organ donors.
The lack of consistency among hospital protocols in the pro-
nouncement of death is also troublesome.253 If Sue is withdrawn from
life support in Pittsburg, she is dead after two minutes without evidence
of cardiac activity. If Sue is in Shreveport, Louisiana, she will not be
declared irreversibly dead until five minutes transpire after asystole.254
In other words, in Shreveport, Sue is just mostly dead after two minutes
and her organs cannot be recovered while, in Pittsburg, Sue is really dead
and her organs can be taken. In 1997, the IOM criticized as "uncomfort-
able" a situation where a donor could be considered dead in one OPO
region while defined as alive in another.25 5 Nevertheless, just three years
later, the IOM countenanced such inconsistencies when it concluded that
there was "room for significant differences of opinion" on the interval
required to assure the irreversibility of circulatory functions.256 This
leaves patients or families who are considering donation in a disconcert-
ing situation where they may not know or be able to choose which ver-
sion of "death" will be applied to them.
Such variations in the timing of death do not engender confidence in
the organ transplant system, which depends on the trust of potential do-
nors and their families that a physician will not prematurely declare them
dead to harvest organs. It also does not comport with the UDDA, which
envisioned that there would be a uniform definition of death in every
jurisdiction.
250. See 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 146 (asserting that evolving medical standards
support the weak construal of irreversibility).
251. See discussion infra Part W.A.
252. Stuart J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold, Philosophical Debates About the Definition of
Death: Who Cares?, 26 J. MED. & PHIL. 527, 531 (2001).
253. See Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 20 (arguing for uniformity among protocols to
avoid public criticism).
254. LA. STATE UNIV. HEALTH SCI. CTR.-SHREVEPORT, ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC
DEATH (DCD) PROTOCOL LOUISIANA ORGAN PROCUREMENT AGENCY (LOPA) 4 (2008),
http://www.sh.lsuhsc.edu/policies/policy-manuals-via ms word/hospital-policy/h_5.7.1.pdf.
255. 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 59.
256. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 39.
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IV. THE EXPANSION OF DCD IN UNCONTROLLED DONORS AND
CHILDREN
Does this academic discussion about the time of death in DCD mat-
ter? Those prospective donors who are voluntarily withdrawn from life
support in a hospital are not going to be resuscitated and their brain func-
tion will soon be irretrievably lost due to lack of cardiac function. In
other words, in a few more minutes, they are going to be all dead, not
just mostly dead. At least a persuasive utilitarian argument can be made
that we should remove their organs to benefit those desperately in need
of "the gift of life" while the organs are still useful. Yet, as the New
York City proposal for organ recovery ambulances demonstrates, DCD
practices are also being applied to victims who suffer cardiac arrest out-
side the hospital. Children are also viewed as potential DCD donors;
indeed, doctors conducted the first DCD pediatric heart transplants quite
recently. There are compelling reasons, however, why organ procure-
ment from uncontrolled donors and children should proceed slowly.
A. Uncontrolled Donors
Most current DCD protocols in the United States focus on the con-
trolled donor as the time of cardiopulmonary arrest is known and warm
ischemia time can be minimized through careful planning of the organ
procurement process.257 However, uncontrolled donors, i.e., those who
suffer an unexpected or sudden cardiac arrest and who are not brain
dead, may comprise the largest group of untapped donors. 8 Approx-
imately thirty-eight percent of all deaths occur outside a hospital.2 59 The
IOM estimates that if persons undergoing unsuccessful resuscitation
were considered as potential organ donors, there could be an additional
22,000 cadaveric donors each year.260
There is a "powerful potential conflict" between the interest of the
prospective uncontrolled donor in a thorough and lengthy resuscitative
effort and the interest of the future recipient in a viable organ procured
soon after cardiac arrest. 261 If DCD is expanded to potential uncontrolled
donors, will physicians wait only two to five minutes after cessation of
cardiac and pulmonary functions before removing organs? The New
York City proposal suggests that the same standard will apply: organ
257. Controlled donors were the primary focus of the 1997 and 2000 IOM reports and the 2005
consensus conference.
258. 2006 IOM report, supra note 86, at 154 (citing an estimate of 335,000 deaths a year due to
sudden cardiac arrest).
259. Akinlolu 0. Ojo et al., Quantifying Organ Donation Rates by Donation Service Area, 5
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 958, 961 (2005).
260. 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 156.
261. 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 60.
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recovery ambulances will begin organ preservation methods five minutes
after death is declared in the field.262
With the controlled donor, the patient or family has chosen to fore-
go resuscitative measures and, in the absence of autoresuscitation, is
dead (or at least soon will be dead). But with the uncontrolled donor,
there is no presumption that resuscitation is not desired. The American
Heart Association's current resuscitation guidelines state that "all pa-
tients in cardiac arrest should receive resuscitation," unless one of three
criteria is met: the patient has a do not resuscitate order, the patient has
signs of irreversible death such as rigor mortis, or no physiological bene-
26fit will be expected. 63 In other words, "irreversibility" in the context of
uncontrolled donors means that circulation cannot be restarted with cur-
rent medical technology.
The claim that a DCD donor is irreversibly dead because there is no
possibility of self-resuscitation after a two-minute period of asystole is
also suspect when applied to victims of sudden cardiac arrest who under-
go CPR. The medical literature speaks of the "Lazarus phenomenon,"
where patients who have been declared dead after unsuccessful resuscita-
tion have a delayed, unexpected return of spontaneous circulation.26
The time from termination of CPR to return of spontaneous circulation in
these patients ranges from a few minutes to as long as twenty minutes
with functional recovery.265 Some of these cases of "resurrection" have
received widespread public attention. For example, Richard Selzer, a
surgeon, wrote about his recovery after being declared dead.266 While in
the ICU, Selzer experienced a cardiac arrest.267 Despite vigorous resusci-
tation, he had no heartbeat and a flat tracing on an ECG for over four and
a half minutes.268 The attending nurse entered the time of death and ten
minutes later observed body characteristics compatible with death.269
Suddenly, Selzer began to breathe, tracing returned to the ECG, and the
heartbeat became regular.27° On his discharge from the hospital, Selzer
262. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
263. 2005 American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and
Emergency Cardiovascular Care, Part 2: Ethical Issues, 112 CIRCuLATION V-6, IV-7 (2005),
available at http://circ.ahajoumals.org/cgi/reprintl 12/24_supplI1V-6.
264. See Vedamurthy Adhiyaman et al., The Lazarus Phenomenon, J. ROYAL. SOC. MED. 552,
552 (2007) (stating that there have been thirty-eight reported cases in the medical literature of de-
layed spontaneous return of circulation). The article also cited a number of media reports in which
patients were declared dead, but were later found alive. Id. at 555.
265. Id. at 553, Table 1; see also Antti Kamariinen et al., Spontaneous Defibrillation After
Cessation of Resuscitation in Out-Of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest: A Case of Lazarus Phenomenon, 75
RESUSCITATION 543, 544 (2007) (describing the case of a man in a body bag who was observed
breathing spontaneously fifteen minutes after resuscitation ended).
266. LOCK, supra note 210, at 54-55.
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stated, "Next time hold a feather to my lips. It's more reliable., 271 These
cases are uncommon, 272 but they raise serious questions about whether
very brief intervals between the cessation of CPR and the process of or-
gan recovery should be used in uncontrolled donation when resuscitation
efforts have been previously attempted. 3 To exclude the possibility of
an errant diagnosis of death, several commentators have recommended
that patients be observed for at least ten minutes after CPR has ended
before confirming death to rule out the possibility of a delayed return of
spontaneous circulation.274  Otherwise, it may be the removal of organs
that makes the uncontrolled donor's cessation of circulatory functions
"irreversible."
New resuscitative techniques also hold much promise for those who
suffer prolonged cardiac arrest and have made it more difficult to deter-
mine when there is an irreversible cessation of circulatory functions that
would justify termination of CPR. Survival rates in individuals who suf-
fer sudden cardiac arrest have historically been dismal. With out-of-
hospital CPR, survival ranges between five and twenty-one percent. 75
In-hospital CPR results in an average fifteen percent survival rate.276
Many of those surviving have poor neurological outcomes.277 By using
cardiopulmonary bypass as part of integrated resuscitative therapy, a
recent study demonstrated a seventy-nine percent survival rate in thirty-
four victims with prolonged cardiac arrest,278 with minimal neurological
damage.2 79  Although this was a small patient population, the authors
conclude that "[r]ecovery without adverse neurological outcomes is poss-
ible in a large number of cardiac arrest victims following prolonged ma-
nual CPR. , 280 Another report documents the usefulness of ECMO in
271. Id. (quoting RICHARD SELZER, RAISING THE DEAD 99 (Penguin Books 1994)).
272. The true incidence of Lazarus phenomenon may be unknown because of underreporting.
Adhiyaman et al., supra note 264, at 552; see also Wolfgang H. Maleck et al., Unexpected Return of
Spontaneous Circulation After Cessation of Resuscitation (Lazarus Phenomenon), 39
RESUSCITATION 125, 127 (1998) (suggesting that the true incidence of the phenomenon may be
fairly high and that its underreporting is due to legal concerns).
273. The Lazarus phenomenon is by definition applicable to those who have previously been
subjected to resuscitation efforts and, therefore, would not apply to controlled donors who have
chosen to forego CPR. See Sam D. Shemie, Clarifying the Paradigm for the Ethics of Donation and
Transplantation: Was "Dead" Really so Clear Before Organ Donation?, 2 PHIL., ETHICS, &
HUMAN. IN MED. 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.peh-med.com/content/pdf/1747-5341-2-
18.pdf.
274. Adhiyaman et al., supra note 264, at 555 (recommending that patients be passively moni-
tored for at least ten minutes, if not longer, after the cessation of CPR); Kitmarainen et al., supra note
265, at 545 (advocating minimum of ten minutes of monitoring to rule out Lazarus phenomenon).
275. Constantine.L. Athanasuleas et al., Sudden Cardiac Death: Directing the Scope of Resus-
citation Towards the Heart and Brain, 70 RESUSCITATION 44, 45 (2006).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 45, 47.
278. The patients in the study had experienced periods of refractory cardiac arrest ranging from
twenty minutes to one and one-half hours. Id. at 46-47.
279. Id. at 49 (stating that only two of the thirty-four patients had an adverse neurological
outcome).
280. Id. at 45.
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refractory cardiac arrest, including the case of a four-year-old boy who
had undergone three hours of CPR before ECMO was started.2 81  He
survived and had normal neurological function on discharge from the
hospital.282 Additional studies confirm the significant strides in survival
rates made possible by resuscitation through ECMO, cardiopulmonary
bypass, or hypothermia (cooling of the body temperature).283 One com-
mentator suggests that with current technology, the limits of brain resus-
citation after cardiac arrest can not be definitively established:
In reality, the duration of circulatory arrest that precludes recovery of
any residual amount of brain function is unknown but is lengthening.
Although arrest time is paramount, the conditions of the cardiac ar-
rest (temperature) and the manner in which the circulation is re-
established (e.g., hypertensive reperfusion, hypothermia, neuropro-
tective agents) will extend the time for potential recovery of various
degrees of brain function well beyond 10 minutes.
284
The success of these new interventions raises difficult questions
about who decides whether a person arriving in the emergency room
after cardiac arrest will be subjected to techniques like ECMO to reverse
the cardiac arrest or will be declared dead and then have ECMO to pre-
serve the organs for donation. In essence, "Where is the line between
refractory cardiac arrest-making the patient a potential candidate for
ECLS [extracorporeal life support] and irreversible cardiac arrest-
making the patient a potential organ donor?
' 285
Even some supporters of DCD question whether the weak construal
of irreversibility in controlled donors who choose not to be resuscitated
should apply in other contexts. DuBois calls for a "stricter sense of irre-
versibility" in situations that do not involve the controlled donor. 86 In
1997, the IOM similarly warned that where death is unexpected or sud-
den, longer periods of observation may be necessary to ensure that the
cardiac arrest is truly irreversible. 87 Yet seven years later, without ex-
planation, the IOM suggested that with uncontrolled donors, a hands-off
281. Bracco et al., supra note 230, at 751.
282. Id.
283. See Massimo Massetti et al., Back from Irreversibility: Extracorporeal Life Support for
Prolonged Cardiac Arrest, 79 ANN. THORACIC SURGERY 178, 181 (2005) (demonstrating increased
survival rates in patients with refractory cardiac arrest who received extracorporeal support); Weis-
feldt & Becker, supra note 216, at 3037 (citing several studies showing an advantage in survival
rates when controlled reperfusion or hypothermia are used).
284. Shemie, supra note 273, at 3. See also Lynn & Cranford, supra note 234, at 109 (recom-
mending a delay of at least ten minutes to avoid potential error in diagnosing death in individuals
undergoing resuscitation).
285. Bracco et al., supra note 230, at 753.
286. DuBois, supra note 150, at 33; see also Veatch, supra note 213, at 197 (suggesting the
question of whether a patient is dead after two minutes of asystole may not be important in uncon-
trolled donors, but would "raise serious problems" in patients who suffer sudden cardiac arrest).
287. 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 58. See also Veatch, supra note 213, at 197-198
(recommending periods of pulselessness longer than two minutes to establish irreversibility).
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period between the end of resuscitation and transfer to an organ trans-
288plant team may not even be necessary.
Finally, it is questionable whether waiting ten minutes or slightly
longer after an absent heartbeat for organ procurement is detrimental to
viability of the organs. One of the oldest DCD programs is at the Hos-
pital Clfnico San Carlos in Madrid, Spain, where most of the non-heart-
beating donors are adults who suffer cardiac arrest outside the hospital.289
The Madrid criteria include a requirement that the heartbeat must be ab-
sent for at least ten minutes after CPR is stopped.290 Despite this waiting
period, transplantation of kidneys from uncontrolled DCD donors have
long-term outcomes similar to those of organs from brain-dead donors.29'
The University of Zurich, another program that has been using kidney
transplants from non-heart-beating donors since the mid-1980s, has also
demonstrated that using a ten minute interval between cardiopulmonary
arrest and organ procurement does not impair long-term graft survival
292rates. Waiting slightly longer to recover organs may diminish their
quality but that seems a price most people would be willing to pay to
ensure that they are not prematurely declared dead.
B. Children
Although DCD has been primarily used in adult donors, there are
calls for expanding its use in pediatric populations.293 The need for new
sources of pediatric organs is particularly acute as the number of brain-
dead donors in the pediatric population is decreasing due to improve-
ments in resuscitation and rehabilitation.294 Concerns have been voiced,
however, as to whether the same criteria used in adult DCD should apply
to children.295
288. 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 152-53.
289. Ana I. Sdnchez-Fructuoso et al., Victims of Cardiac Arrest Occurring Outside the Hospit-
al: A Source of Transplantable Kidneys, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 157, 157 (2006). The clinic
began its DCD program in 1989. Id.
290. 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 139.
291. Snchez-Fructuoso et al., supra note 289, at 162. Organs other than kidneys may have
poorer results. Id. at 162-63.
292. Markus Weber et al., Kidney Transplantation from Donors Without a Heartbeat, 347
NEW ENG. J. MED. 248, 248, 255 (2002). From 1985 until 1995, the hospital initiated organ retrieval
five minutes after cardiac arrest. Beginning in 1995, it instituted a ten minute waiting period. Id. at
249; see also Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162 (citing to studies that indicated a longer waiting
period would not impair the usefulness of organs).
293. See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 713, 714 (encouraging pediatric heart transplantation
from DCD donors); Amy L. Durall et al., Potential for Donation After Cardiac Death in a Child-
ren's Hospital, 119 PEDIATRICS 219, 221 (2007) (noting that the experience with DCD in pediatrics
hospitals is "quite small"); Nikoleta S. Kolovos et al., Donation After Cardiac Death in Pediatric
Critical Care, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 47, 47 (2007) (stating that DCD may increase the
number of pediatric organs for donation).
294. Margaret Ferguson & Jeannie Zuk, Organ Donation After Cardiac Death: A New Trend
in Pediatrics, J. PEDIATRIC GASTROENTEROLOGY & NuTRITION 219, 219 (2003).
295. The transplantation of hearts from three DCD donors by a team at Denver Children's
Hospital raises questions not only about applying DCD protocols to children, but also whether hearts
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DeVita, one of the leading proponents of DCD, has questioned
whether adult DCD protocols are appropriate for children because child-
296ren may tolerate prolonged circulatory collapse. Current American
297
Heart Association resuscitation guidelines make the same observation.
Others have suggested that the risk of autoresuscitation may be variable
in the pediatric population.2 98 There is also a heightened potential for
conflicts of interest in pediatric DCD. Unlike the adult patient popula-
tion in which the patient-donor is in a specialty critical care unit treated
by one set of physicians and the potential recipient is at another location
treated by another set of physicians, most potential pediatric donors are
in multidisciplinary units, in which the same team may take care of both
the potential donor and recipient.299  This arrangement leads to "[t]he
prospect of having to advise one set of parents that they should consider
withdrawal of [life] support because of devastating brain injury while
other patients in the same unit might become recipients of the newly de-
ceased child's organs seems highly troubling to some intensivists.
This situation raises questions about conflicts inherent in terminating
resuscitative efforts in the child donor.30 '
In some children's hospitals, the rush to expand pediatric DCD fac-
es an unenthusiastic clinical staff.3 °2 This may be due to the lack of pe-
diatric DCD programs and the unfamiliarity of staff with this type of
organ donation.30 3 The reluctance of pediatric care providers to embrace
DCD may also reflect wariness in forging ahead on a new form of organ
donation where there are many unanswered questions, including the ap-
propriate time interval between the cessation of cardiac function and
organ recovery. 3°  With the mandates of The Joint Commission and
UNOS for all hospitals and transplant centers to develop DCD policies,
its use in pediatric institutions deserves more scrutiny.
can ethically and legally be removed from adult or child DCD donors. See infra note 315 and ac-
companying text.
296. DeVita et al., supra note 49, at 1712.
297. 2005 American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and
Emergency Cardiovascular, Part 2: Ethical Issues, supra note 253, at IV-7 (noting that intact sur-
vival in children after prolonged resuscitation has been documented).
298. See, e.g., Joel E. Frader, Deconstructing Donation After Cardiac Death, 8 PEDIATRIC
CRITICAL CARE MED. 76, 77 (2007) (stating that the pediatric community needs to study whether the
risk of autoresuscitation varies with age).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See Bernat, supra note 14, at 670 (noting that conflicts are more of a concern where the
potential donor is a child).
302. See, e.g., Martha A. Q. Curly, Pediatric Staff Perspectives on Organ Donation After
Cardiac Death in Children, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 212, 216-18 (2007).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 217 (reporting that thirty-eight percent of survey participants favored basing the
determination of death on the absence of brain activity, while sixty percent approved an average
waiting period after cardiac cessation of five minutes and a range of two to ten minutes); see also
Frader, supra note 298, at 77 (calling for further research on DCD in pediatric hospitals).
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V. Is DCD CAUSING THE DEATH OF DONORS?
The most serious criticism of DCD is that the removal of organs af-
ter two to five minutes of asystole causes the death of donors and is tan-
tamount to murder. °5 This is a complex issue, particularly with con-
trolled donors who have a constitutionally protected right to withdraw
life-sustaining care.3°  Modem law recognizes the difference between
killing and being allowed to die.307 The removal of life support provides
the condition for death; once the heart stops, the body can no longer
supply the means of sustaining life and death through lack of oxygen to
the brain follows. Hastening death by the removal of life support with
the patient's consent is not unlawful.30 8 The question presented by DCD
is whether the act of organ recovery in donors in the minutes before brain
death alters that legal principle.
Menikoff argues that, at least with controlled donors, it is not organ
retrieval that factually causes death; it is the loss of oxygen to the brain
caused by removal of the ventilator.309 The intervening removal of or-
gans during the process of dying does not affect the timing of brain
death, which is occurring because of lack of blood flow. 310  Since con-
trolled donors will not be resuscitated, it is only a matter of time before
irreversible death occurs, a point that is not hastened by organ procure-
ment."'
Even if organ procurement does not cause death in the controlled
donor, a precept of the dead donor rule is that vital organs cannot be re-
moved before a person is dead.312 DCD donors may very well be alive at
the time organs are removed. In controlled donors, this may not be sig-
nificant because they have chosen to forego life support and likely will
not survive even if organ removal is not performed. For those who suffer
unexpected cardiac arrest and who have not made their end-of-life wish-
es known, however, the rush to procure organs is worrisome. Recent
305. See Joan McGregor et al., Do Donation After Cardiac Death Protocols Violate Criminal
Homicide Statutes?, 27 MED. & L. 241, 251 (2008) (contending that the removal of organs prior to
brain death may be the proximate cause of death); Michael Potts, Truthfulness in Transplantation:
Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation, 2 PHIL., ETHICS, & HUMAN. IN MED. 1, 2 (2007), available at
http://www.peh-med.comlcontent/2/l/17 (calling for a ban on DCD because the donor is not dead
until the organs are removed); Veatch, supra note 211, at 673 (asserting that removing a heart from a
DCD donor after seventy-five seconds is "ending a life by organ removal").
306. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating that a compe-
tent person's liberty interest in refusing treatment could be inferred from the Court's prior deci-
sions).
307. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) ("This Court has also recognized, at least
implicitly, the distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die.").
308. Id. at 802-03.
309. Menikoff, supra note 150, at 162.
310. Id.
311. Id.; see also James L. Bernat, Are Organ Donors After Cardiac Death Really Dead?, 17 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 122, 127 (2006) (agreeing with Menikoff that organ donation does not hasten
death in controlled donors).
312. Menikoff, supra note 150, at 162.
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studies indicate that there are many victims of sudden cardiac arrest who,
provided with appropriate therapy, survive after prolonged periods of
cardiac arrest and, therefore, should not be considered dead after only
two to five minutes of absent circulation.1 3 For at least some victims of
sudden cardiac arrest, whether in or out of a hospital, a decision to begin
organ procurement minutes after stopping CPR deprives them of an op-
portunity to reverse the arrest, which may be considered a hastening or
direct cause of their demise. As the IOM recognized in 1997, premature-
ly abandoning resuscitation in the uncontrolled donor so that organ re-
covery can proceed "may forfeit the life of a patient who is otherwise a
salvageable, competent person. 314
Also troublesome are the removal of hearts from DCD donors and
their reanimation in recipients. As Veatch has pointed out, how can irre-
versible cardiac death be diagnosed when the functions of the heart are
later reversed? 3'5 The use of ECMO to restart circulation in a person
declared dead because of irreversible cessation of circulation raises the
same concern. Although it may be true that in most cases, withdrawal of
life support and the accompanying cessation of breathing and circulation
are the cause of death, this hypothesis does not account for cases in
which circulation is restored after "death." If blood flow is restored
through artificial means shortly after the declaration of cardiac death,
there is a possibility of brain resuscitation.31 6 Thus, it would seem that
surgeons need to postpone organ recovery until brain death Occurs. 317 As
one commentator explains, "If the state of death is reversed, then har-
vesting organs from the reanimated patient prior to death occurring a
second time is failure to respect the dead donor rule: it constitutes restor-
ing life and killing. 31 8
Absent reanimation of the patient, however, it would be an onerous
task for a prosecutor to bring homicide charges because of the difficulty,
if not impossibility, of proving at what point in the organ procurement
process the dying patient was alive or had reached the point of irreversi-
bility. Patients' clinical conditions vary and so does the speed at which
they die after cardiac arrest. Potential controlled donors who are taken
off life support and who are already severely neurologically compro-
mised may die sooner than those who have not suffered a prior brain
313. See discussion supra Part M.A.
314. 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 49.
315. Veatch, supra note 211, at 673.
316. McGregor et al., supra note 305, at 250.
317. See McGregor et al., supra note 305, at 251 (recommending a waiting time of fifteen to
twenty minutes until brain death).
318. James M. DuBois, Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation: A Defense of the Required De-
termination of Death, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 126, 130 (1999).
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insult.31 9 Controlled and uncontrolled donors who have an intact brain
prior to cardiac arrest may have a more prolonged process of dying.32 °
Although there may be clear-cut cases in which a patient's death is has-
tened by organ recovery, in most cases, there are probably too many un-
knowns in locating the precise moment of death that, with the high bur-
den of proof, would negate criminal prosecution of physicians who prac-
tice DCD.32'
Further, there may not be the sense of public outrage over DCD that
would spur a prosecutor to examine homicide charges.322 Like many
experts, the public may believe that it is acceptable to procure organs
from patients voluntarily removed from life support who may not be
quite dead-after all, they will be dead shortly. Norman Fost suggests
that Americans have little interest in esoteric arguments about life and
death in organ donation, noting that when concerns about DCD in con-
trolled donors were raised by the media, the public was apathetic in its
response.323 A recent study also indicates that many members of the
public may be willing to violate the dead donor rule because they are
confused about the definition of brain death and when organs can legally
be procured from those who suffer devastating neurological injuries.32 4
It is debatable whether the public will be apathetic about the expan-
sion of DCD to victims of sudden cardiac arrest. New York City's plan
for organ recovery ambulances is the first of these initiatives to be aired
by the mainstream media.325 While many individuals may be confused
about the concept of brain death, they no doubt understand what it means
when the heart stops beating. Many are also understandably concerned
about the level of care they will receive in the event of an unexpected
cardiac arrest at home or at work. It is one thing to argue that adults who
consent to the withdrawal of life support be allowed to donate organs
even if we are not quite sure at what point in the process they are poten-
tially alive or irreversibly dead. It is quite another to hastily remove or-
gans from victims of cardiac arrest who expect a thorough resuscitation.
319. See Rady et al., supra note 86, at 327 (recognizing that although donors who have preex-
isting neurological injuries may not have meaningful brain activity at the time of arrest, the same
may not be true of potential donors who have intact brain function prior to arrest).
320. Id.
321. The California transplant surgeon who allegedly administered excessive and unnecessary
medication is not being prosecuted for homicide, but for dependent adult abuse and prescribing a
controlled substance without a medical purpose. McKinley, supra note 28, at Al.
322. See Norman Fost, Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important that Organ Do-
nors be Dead?, 14 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 249, 255 (2004) (arguing that prosecutors have tole-
rated "clearly illegal behavior" by physicians in sympathetic cases).
323. Id. at 254-56.
324. Laura A. Siinoff et al., Death and Organ Procurement: Public Belief and Attitudes, 14
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 217, 228 (2004) (reporting that ninety-eight percent of study participants
had heard of brain death, but that only one-third believed that brain-dead persons were legally dead.
Of those who considered a brain-dead person alive, over sixty-six percent said they would donate
organs).
325. Cara Buckley, City To Explore a Way To Add Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008.
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Although most people support organ donation in theory, many are unwil-
ling to become donors or to donate a family member's organs.326 One of
the explanations for this reluctance is the fear of being declared prema-
turely dead or that emergency care will be compromised.327 The question
that must be asked is, under what circumstances will the public be will-
ing to accept a certain level of error in diagnosing death in order to pro-
mote organ procurement?
VI. How SHOULD DEATH BE DEFINED IN DCD DONORS?
Recognizing that defining death is not a simple matter, some in the
medical community question whether this is even an important issue.
Under the title, "Philosophical Debates About the Definition of Death:
Who Cares?," Stuart J. Youngner and Robert M. Arnold argue that the
concept of irreversibility is impossibly muddled and that the conversa-
tion should turn instead to whether it is permissible to take organs from
patients who are "beyond harm," but who may not be dead. 328 Robert D.
Truog, a prominent bioethicist, has long argued that the dead donor rule
should be abandoned and that people whom we consider alive, but who
are terminally ill or permanently unconscious, should be allowed to do-
nate organs while still alive, because the harm inflicted on these patients
is minimal. 329  For example, a person in a persistent vegetative state
(PVS), who is not legally dead, 330 should be allowed the pre-mortem
opportunity to donate her organs. For these people, the quality of life is
so unacceptable or death is so imminent that, with their consent, we ethi-
cally can take their organs before they die.331 Similarly, other notable
medical ethicists, including Fost, assert that the very premise on which
we remove vital organs-death of the donor-is scientifically flawed, so
that certain patients should have the right to donate organs even if it
means a premature death.332
Others contend that we should not abandon the dead donor rule but
rather allow individuals the choice of defining the conditions in which
they could be considered dead so as to allow the removal of organs.
Veatch has argued for over three decades that brain death should include
326. See Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing Families' Consent for Donation of Solid
Organs for Transplantation, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 71,71 (2001) (citing studies showing that while
more than seventy-five percent of people said they would donate their organs if asked, less than half
of families actually agreed to donation after death).
327. See DuBois, supra note 318, at 132 (citing surveys showing that significant numbers of
people fear their health care will be compromised if they agree to be organ donors).
328. Youngner & Arnold, supra note 252, at 533.
329. Robert D. Truog, Brain Death-Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 273,278 (2007).
330. A person in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is not brain dead under the UDDA because
the person has not suffered whole brain death; PVS patients have brain stem functions. See Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.1 (describing the physiological state of Nancy
Cruzan, who was in a PVS).
331. Truog, supra note 329, at 278.
332. Fost, supra note 322, at 250-51.
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not only those who have complete loss of brain functions including the
brain stem, but also those who have lost only higher brain or cerebral
activity.333 According to Veatch, those who are no longer "members in
full standing of the moral community" (such as those in PVS) should be
able, at their option, to be defined as dead so that organs could be legally
taken without violating the dead donor rule.334
The UDDA, UAGA, and most state laws defining death stand in the
way of proposals to abandon the dead donor rule or except certain groups
from its confines. Under the UAGA, one needs to be deceased to be a
donor, and the UDDA defines brain death as death of the whole brain,
including the brain stem. 335 Homicide laws also prohibit intentionally
causing death through the removal of vital organs.336 There have been no
serious attempts to change the legal definition of death and it is to be
expected that the public, courts, and legislators may balk at allowing
physicians to remove organs from the living (as presently defined).
337
Others who have expressed unreserved support for the dead donor
rule in removing organs from brain-dead donors struggle with its applica-
tion in the DCD context. Despite his early criticism of the Pittsburg Pro-
tocol for allowing organ recovery in patients who were not dead,338 Ber-
nat now concludes that it is irrelevant whether DCD violates the dead
donor rule.3 39 He acknowledges that by using the true meaning of irre-
versible, i.e. that a patient can not be successfully resuscitated, some
DCD donors may not be dead.340  To avoid the problem of removing
organs from one who is not irreversibly dead, he advocates substituting
the word "permanent" for "irreversible" in describing the loss of circula-
tory functions in DCD donors.3 4' Permanent in this context means that
functions will not be restored, either spontaneously by the patient or
through artificial resuscitation.342 Bernat does not advocate changing the
UDDA to reflect this change in terminology, however, because he be-
lieves that most physicians are already using the permanence standard in
practice.343 He candidly recognizes that using permanent loss of func-
333. Robert M. Veatch, The Dead Donor Rule: True by Definition, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 10, 10-
11(2003).
334. Robert M. Veatch, Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the Definition of Death, 14
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 261, 269 (2004).
335. A number of states also codify the dead donor rule. See supra note 152.
336. Truog recognizes the legal difficulty in abandoning the dead donor rule, as it would mean
that organ recovery is the cause of a patient's death. He counters that the transplant physician's
actions could be ethically regarded as not constituting a homicide. Truog, supra note 329, at 279.
337. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 592 (Fla. 1992) (refusing to declare an anencephalic
infant dead for purposes of organ transplantation).
338. Bemat, supra note 164, at 20 (stating that at the time organs are procured under the Pitts-
burgh protocol, "death has not yet occurred").
339. Bemat, supra note 311, at 128-29.
340. Id. at 125, 128.
341. Id. at 124-25.
342. Id. at 124.
343. Id. at 127.
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tions as the test for death in DCD donors may transgress the dead donor
rule, but argues that this exception is justified because the patient soon
will be dead and the outcome is the same whether using a permanence or
irreversibility standard. 344
For Truog, Bernat's recommendation for a change in terminology
confirms the obsolete nature of the dead donor rule.345 He views Ber-
nat's proposal as an implicit acknowledgment that patients under a DCD
protocol are not dead.346 By acknowledging the fact that DCD donors
may be alive, Truog contends the transplant community has already
crossed the boundary of the dead donor rule and should be honest and
abolish it, both as to brain death and cardiac death. 347 Similarly, Joseph
L. Verheijde and colleagues, who have been vociferous critics of DCD
because it violates the dead donor rule, support efforts to eliminate the
dead donor rule as long as patients and their families give meaningful
informed consent to the removal of organs before death.348
There may be legitimate reasons for reconstructing the definition of
death as it applies to organ donation after cardiac death. From a purely
utilitarian view, increasing the supply of organs is a social good. Particu-
larly, in cases of planned withdrawal from life support-where the pa-
tient or surrogate has chosen not to resuscitate-it may be morally de-
fensible to declare death within a short period of time in order to facili-
tate organ retrieval. Again, a comparison of patients in an ICU is illustr-
ative of this principle.349 Patient A wishes to withdraw life support and
to donate organs. B, also a patient in the ICU, declines CPR, but does not
wish to be an organ donor. B has a cardiac arrest but is not resuscitated.
At what point is B irreversibly dead? The answer is that, in most cases,
the exact time of death does not matter because no surgical intervention,
such as organ procurement, is to be immediately performed on the
body.35° Patient B could be declared dead at the time of asystole. But it
is also likely that a physician will not rush to declare B dead and that
some delay will occur before B is transported to the morgue. Just like A,
B will be "allowed to die," but precisely when B becomes irreversibly
344. Id. at 128-29. Ten years ago, Bernat took a much different position: "Accepting a circula-
tory formulation for death immediately throws into jeopardy the entire multiorgan transplantation
program unless the dead donor rule is sacrificed." Bemat, supra note 164, at 22.
345. Robert D. Truog & Thomas I. Cochrane, The Truth About "Donation After Cardiac
Death," 17 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 133, 136 (2006).
346. Id. at 133, 136 (stating that DCD is a misnomer because donors are "dying but not yet
dead").
347. Id. at 136.
348. Verheijde et al., supra note 236, at 7.
349. This scenario is also adapted from a similar hypothetical described in Youngner et al.,
supra note 158, at 17.
350. The time of a non-donor's death could be of legal significance under some circumstances,
however, such as whether a person survived another under the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
UNIF. SWIULTANEOUS DEATH AcT §§ 2-4 (1993), 8B U.L.A. 147 (2001).
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dead is generally of little moral or legal consequence.35' Some have ar-
gued that if B can be considered dead when cardiopulmonary functions
cease, why should we not consider A, the controlled donor, dead at the
same moment? 352 Both A and B are patients in whom we cannot clearly
define the line between life and death, and locating the moment of irre-
versible death is more of a moral decision than a legal one. Defining
irreversibility to mean that the heart will not be started in controlled DCD
at least fulfills the patient's wishes to end life-sustaining care and to be-
come an organ donor. As John Robertson argued:
Not to regard her then as dead because she might have been resusci-
tated in a situation in which she never will be resuscitated is counte-
rintuitive to common understandings of death held by the general
public, families, health care providers, and most ethicists, philoso-
phers, and lawyers who study these issues.
353
There may be limits, however, to how far the transplant community
can legally or ethically venture in controlled DCD. Even some suppor-
ters of DCD draw the line at calling death in less than two minutes and
do not support transplanting hearts from DCD donors, a practice which
seems on its face to squarely contradict any notion of the irreversibility
of circulatory functions.354 But accepting some restrictions, preferably
set in place by legislators along with medical experts, DCD in adult con-
trolled donors could proceed.
Nonetheless, this resolution of the debate also means that, with
DCD, death will be defined not by an irreversible physiological state but
by the context it which it occurs. If we redefine irreversibility in order to
retrieve viable organs from controlled donors, where will our "gerry-
mandering" 355 of death criteria end? Truog argues that if DCD is ethical-
ly acceptable even if donors are not quite dead, it should be permissible
for other consenting terminally ill or neurologically devastated patients
to donate their organs under general anesthesia before death.356 After all,
it is certain that they, too, will soon be dead and their organs will be
351. See Jerry Menikoff, The Importance Of Being Dead: Non-Heart-Beating Organ, 18
IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 6 (2002) (stating that until physicians wanted to remove organs from non-heart-
beating donors, there was no rush to declare death and a person could be pronounced dead as long as
an hour after the heart stopped beating).
352. See Bernat, supra note 311, at 127 (defending the timing of death in DCD donors because
it is consistent with how death is usually determined in the non-donor).
353. Robertson, supra note 200, at 12.
354. See Bemat, supra note 14, at 671(stating that recovering hearts from DCD donors and
determining death seventy-five seconds after heart stoppage exceed the boundaries of DCD);
Veatch, supra note 211, at 673 (contending that the removal of hearts from DCD donors is the cause
of death).
355. Arnold & Youngner, supra note 151, at 222 (arguing that the concept of brain death was
an effort to "gerrymander" the definition of death to increase the donor pool).
356. Troug, supra note 329, at 278.
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more useful if recovered before death.357 Ultimately, "For better or for
worse, the bright line [between life and death] is growing dimmer.
3 58
With controlled donors, we can say their intent is to have life sup-
port removed, to die, and to donate their organs. The public may not
care whether these patients are declared dead a little early in the dying
process. 359 But this reasoning cannot seamlessly be applied to uncon-
trolled donors. We can not easily determine the wishes of those in sud-
den or unexpected cardiac arrest. In most cases, these patients want to be
resuscitated and to live. To begin the organ procurement process only a
few minutes (or seconds) after "unsuccessful" resuscitation in victims of
sudden cardiac arrest seems to give insufficient respect to their personal
autonomy and to jeopardize their small, but increasing, chance of surviv-
al.
Under the protocol being considered in New York City, emergency
responders will call the time of death when further resuscitative efforts
are deemed futile.36° With the organ recovery ambulance hovering near-
by, there is a risk that some people will fear that they will be abandoned
too soon. Such suspicions may not always be justified, but they are un-
derstandable and can undermine confidence in the transplantation sys-
tem. We should proceed cautiously if DCD is to be expanded to this
population so that organs will not be inadvertently removed from those
few who may still be "slightly alive."
361
There are several possible solutions to this debate. The first, and
most preferable, option is to alter death statutes to define irreversibility in
patients voluntarily withdrawing life support (who are not brain dead) as
the time of cessation of circulatory functions plus a period that scientific
studies demonstrate would exclude the possibility of self-resuscitation.
This definition would affect not only organ donors; death would have the
same meaning for all who electively withdraw life-sustaining measures.
Part of the dilemma over the meaning of irreversibility is that the UDDA
and many state death statutes were enacted before patients had a legal
right to choose whether to be kept alive through extraordinary medical
treatment. In promoting a standard of irreversibility that requires an ina-
bility to resuscitate, the UDDA fails to recognize that many deaths in
hospitals today are from a planned withdrawal of life support in patients
who refuse further resuscitation. Thus, defining death in this population
to mean the cessation of cardiopulmonary functions plus a waiting period
to exclude self-resuscitation acknowledges both legal approval and social
357. Truog, supra note 345, at 134.
358. Arnold & Youngner, supra note 151, at 224.
359. Bernat, supra note 311, at 129.
360. See Buckley, supra note 2.
361. See, e.g., William J. Burke, More Donors Could be Survivors, ST. LOuis REV. ONLINE,
June 13, 2003, http://www.stlouisreview.comL/article.php?id=4179 (asserting that DCD deprives
some donors of a chance at survival and calling for a halt to the practice in Catholic hospitals).
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acceptance of the "right to die." Along with this statutory recognition,
the medical community must come to a common understanding and clear
criteria about how long an interval is necessary to rule out the possibility
of autoresuscitation. The idea that, after two minutes (or seventy-five
seconds), one can be considered dead in one hospital but alive in another
is inexcusable.
Although a delay of only a few minutes from arrest to declaration of
death in patients for whom there will be no resuscitative efforts may be
acceptable, that short an interval is not tolerable in individuals under-
going CPR. Irreversibility in its common sense notion-that functions
cannot be reversed-should be retained for all other individuals, a stan-
dard that takes into account the great strides in resuscitation being made
today and that provides a measure of safety from an erroneous diagnosis
of death.
The second option is to wait at least ten minutes or longer to declare
death in all DCD donors to make sure that any attempt at resuscitation
would fail, i.e. we can not reverse because the brain is irreversibly dam-
aged.362 The transplant community has resisted this construal of irrever-
sibility because of concerns about how longer waiting times can affect
organ viability. Yet studies over the last two decades tend to demon-
strate that a ten-minute waiting time does not impair long-term survival
rates in recipients of kidneys, the organs most in demand. The primary
drawback to this proposal is using a fixed period of time to determine
irreversibility in the uncontrolled donor. With victims of sudden cardiac
arrest, the prevailing view has been that after ten to fifteen minutes of
pulselessness, irreversible brain damage inevitably follows. As dis-
cussed previously, recent studies have demonstrated that with innovative
resuscitative therapies, some patients can survive prolonged periods of
cardiac arrest, with little neurological sequelae. The period of time from
arrest to organ procurement should, therefore, vary according to current
medical knowledge and technology. Appointing a fixed hands-off wait-
ing period to uncontrolled donors may deny future victims a possible
chance of survival.
The third solution is to do nothing. DuBois argues that the meaning
of irreversibility should remain vague and left to physicians to define
depending on the context. 363 The do-nothing solution may preserve the
status quo in controlled donors, but in light of the apparent expansion of
DCD to uncontrolled donors, to children, and to heart transplants, public
engagement on this question is inevitable. There are cutting edge issues
associated with DCD that have received little attention. Protocols ac-
ceptable in the adult population may not transfer in toto to child DCD
362. Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162 (suggesting that a ten to fifteen minute wait might be
appropriate).
363. DuBois, supra note 318, at 127.
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donors. Recovering hearts and reanimating them in the recipient or using
ECMO or other techniques to restore circulation and possibly resuscitate
the brain seem to transgress the "prudent boundaries" of DCD.36 These
are practices that should not be pursued until such time as they have been
fully examined and approved by both the medical community and poli-
cymakers.
CONCLUSION
The focus of organ transplantation has been almost exclusively on
the welfare of the recipient of organs rather than the donor. Perhaps that
is as it should be; medicine needs to concentrate on the living rather than
on the dying. Denton Cooley, one of the pioneers of heart transplanta-
tion, stated: "We should not jeopardize the possible survival of the reci-
pient while we are waiting around to make a decision whether the cadav-
er, as you call it, is dead or not., 365 Pragmatism, however, can only go so
far before basic legal and ethical principles are compromised, and it is
worthwhile to ask if we should redefine who is dead in order to salvage
their organs.
Donation after cardiac death from controlled donors has been pro-
ceeding with little public or legislative discussion of whether these pa-
tients meet the legal criteria for death. In our incessant demand for or-
gans, we have glossed over difficult questions: what does it mean to be
dead, and is death, however defined, a necessary condition for organ
donation? There is a need to air the debate over DCD in the public arena
before it is extended to other situations that present new legal and ethical
challenges. Otherwise, what seems controversial today, for example,
removing hearts from infants seventy-five seconds after arrest and rea-
nimating them in other children, may become routine and acceptable
tomorrow.
Some argue this is an academic controversy that will not spark any
public interest or concern among lawmakers.366 Others are worried that
if the public is alerted to the debate about the uncertainty of death, its
willingness to donate organs will diminish.367 Yet this is a public policy
issue that should not be decided by the medical community alone.368 The
organ transplant system depends on civic participation, and the dispute
over whether organs should be taken from some patients before death
deserves discussion beyond the pages of scholarly journals. As DCD
364. Bernat, supra note 14, at 671.
365. LOCK, supra note 210, at 87-88.
366. See, e.g., Fost, supra note 322, at 254-56.
367. See Robert A. Burt, Where Do We Go From Here?, in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH:
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, supra note 207, at 332, 333 (arguing that legislative changes may
provoke public distrust of organ donation).
368. See Menikoff, supra note 35 1, at 20 (contending that the debate over the definition of
death should not be sidestepped as it squarely addresses the kind of protections we are willing to
give people in our society).
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moves from consenting patients in hospitals to unexpected victims in the
streets, the public needs to be reassured that the medical community will
not further manipulate the blurred line between life and death.
The disquiet over DCD may be rendered moot by the inevitable
progress of science. Through xenotransplantation or the growing of or-
gans from stem cells, we may someday be able to look to alternative
sources of transplantable organs. Until that happens, the only source of
organs is from humans-wanted, dead or alive.
3 69
369. "Wanted, dead or alive" is a common phrase from the Old West, but it was also used in
the title of an article about the UDDA. Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 871.
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BEYOND "THINKING LIKE A LAWYER" AND THE
TRADITIONAL LEGAL PARADIGM: TOWARD A
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
JESS M. KRANNICH, JAMES R. HOLBROOK, AND JULIE J. McADAMSt
INTRODUCTION
As anyone who is familiar with the annual U.S. News and World
Report survey of American law schools is aware, there are a great num-
ber of institutions engaged in the business of educating lawyers in this
country--currently, there are nearly two hundred accredited law
schools.' America's law schools have vastly different rates of enroll-
ment. For example, the Thomas M. Cooley School of Law reported
3,606 students enrolled for the 2006-2007 academic year, while the Uni-
versity of Montana School of Law reported 83 students.2 The size of the
schools' first-year entering classes also varies wildly. Again, the Tho-
mas M. Cooley School of Law was at the high end of the range in 2006,
with 1,691 first-year students entering its program last fall, while the
University of South Dakota welcomed only 72 first-year students.3 Giv-
en these ranges and the sheer number of law schools, both public and
private, it is clear that a vast number of students begin an education in
the field of law each year.
Despite the differences among American law schools, however, the
students' education will be remarkably similar, regardless of which insti-
tution they attend. Legal education-perhaps more than any other type
of instruction-is characterized by a distinctive teaching methodology
designed to create a common experience and mindset for all who are
exposed to it. A lawyer who was educated in Boston can tell a lawyer
who attended school in Los Angeles about the time his contracts profes-
sor questioned him regarding the rule of mitigation. Not only will the
lawyer from Los Angeles be familiar with the type of classroom dialogue
the lawyer from Boston is referring to, but he will likely also be able to
identify with the precise feelings the exchange engendered.
t Jess M. Krannich, Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP; J.D., University of Utah S.J. Quin-
ney College of Law; B.S., with Honors, University of Utah. James R. Holbrook, Clinical Professor
of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; J.D., University of Utah College of Law;
M.A., Indiana University; B.A., Grinnell College. Julie J. McAdams, Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School; B.S., Utah State
University.
1. See U.S. News and World Report, Best Law Schools (2008), http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/grad/law/search.
2. See U.S. News and World Report, Best Law Schools Index (2008), http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/gradlaw/items.
3. Id.
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This common educational experience results from the fact that
American law schools have historically emphasized one specific skill-
known as "legal analysis," "legal reasoning," or simply "thinking like a
lawyer"-in their curricula, and have almost universally used a particular
type of instruction to develop this skill. Indeed, the foundation of mod-
em legal education is the institutionalized belief that students' legal apti-
tude is best developed through a classroom dialogue known as the "So-
cratic method," whereby professors force students to distill "rules" from
case law and apply those rules to various factual scenarios. This type of
instruction has dominated legal education for more than one hundred
years, and during that time legal reasoning has been the primary skill
taught to law students.
That law schools collectively focus on developing students' skill in
legal analysis is not, in and of itself, a problem. It is natural for those
who have been educated in a particular profession to have shared expe-
riences; certainly all medical students learn how to chart a patient's
progress. It is also beyond debate that legal reasoning is a crucial skill
for the legal practitioner, and is thus a necessary component of a proper
legal education. However, many law schools tend to focus on legal anal-
ysis to the exclusion of other equally important skills, and therefore give
students an incomplete understanding of legal practice. As a result, a
common perspective among new lawyers is that law school taught them
how to think like a lawyer, but if they wish to actually learn how to be a
lawyer, they must do so after earning their degree. This is a pessimistic,
but realistic, view for many students, and not one that we should be
proud of as educators. We should also be alarmed by the toll that the
standardized teaching methods take on many students. A wealth of re-
cent research has demonstrated that law schools' heavy emphasis on le-
gal analysis-and the teaching methodology that is used to develop this
skill-has unintended consequences that detrimentally impact students
both personally and professionally.
In the materials that follow, we first detail the historical underpin-
nings of traditional legal education and the impetus for law schools' fo-
cus on the skill of legal reasoning. We then discuss in depth the limita-
tions and consequences of this method of instruction. Finally, we ad-
dress the changes that have been occurring in the institutional culture of
legal education in recent years, changes that stem from the shortcomings
of the traditional model. As discussed below, we believe that these
changes are the harbinger of a broad shift in the nature of legal educa-
tion-a shift toward a more comprehensive, integrated approach de-
signed to teach students the broad range of skills and perspectives they
will need to succeed as professionals.
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I. TRADITIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE "PIGEON-HOLE" OF LEGAL
REASONING
Modem legal education can be traced to Dean Christopher Colum-
bus Langdell' s development of the case method as a tool for teaching the
skill of legal analysis at Harvard Law School in the 1870s.4 Prior to
Langdell's appointment to the deanship,
students were typically taught black-letter law by professors who lec-
tured from treatises, and they learned practical skills by applyingS •5
their knowledge in apprenticeships. Law was widely regarded as a
profession grounded in the humanities, and legal education took an
interdisciplinary approach emphasizing literature and philosophy.
6
Indeed, one of the profession's stalwarts, Judge Learned Hand, con-
sistently advocated an interdisciplinary approach to legal education
during his lifetime, believing "that law is centrally located in the hu-
manities, and is not complete unless it draws nourishment from
them.",7 Langdell, on the other hand, viewed law as a form of science
premised on a distinctive methodology-legal analysis.
8
For Langdell, "legal science" consisted, principally, of the art of
reading a relatively closed set of materials found in libraries: the deci-
sions of judges, particularly those at the appellate level. From these de-
cisions the legal scientist would then discern, through the power of legal
analysis, the structures of overarching doctrine that could unite such
seemingly disparate topics as the sale of potatoes and the sale of slaves
into one subject matter called "contracts." 9
Langdell thus viewed legal training as a process of learning how to
synthesize rules by dissecting cases, a process that was distinctly scien-
tific and did not require input from humanistic disciplines.10 Langdell's
4. See, e.g., Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal Education of a Patriot: Josiah Quincy Jr.'s
Law Commonplace, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 324 (2007) (discussing Langdell's development of case
method of legal education at Harvard law School in 1870); Adam Todd, Neither Dead Nor Danger-
ous: Postmodernism and the Teaching of Legal Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 915-16 (2006)
("Most doctrinal law classes are taught in a modernist paradigm little changed from the pedagogical
classes introduced by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in 1870.... The professor is
seen as holding the truth or core knowledge about the subject and students are tested at the end of the
semester using exams where formalism and black letter law are expected to be mechanically applied
to limited fact patterns."); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Unea-
sy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 159-60 (2006) (discussing Langdell's influence on
"[t]he modem American legal academy" due to the prominence of the case method to develop the
skill of legal analysis (or, in the words of the authors, "legal craft")); Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our
Cake and Having it, Too: Why Real Change is So Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 359, 374
n.26 (2006) ("Langdell's innovative methodology resulted not just in a new, optional pedagogical
tool, but became the foundational basis for what was to become established conventional practice in
American legal education." (citation omitted)).
5. Coquillette, supra note 4, at 323-24.
6. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 155-57.
7. Id. at 157.
8. Id. at 159-60.
9. Id.
10. See Coquillette, supra note 4, at 324.
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theory was quickly put into practice at Harvard, and it soon became the
dominant view of legal education in America." In particular, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. helped champion Langdell's cause. In his legen-
dary speech entitled "The Path of the Law," delivered at the Boston Uni-
versity School of Law in 1897, Holmes endorsed a scientific perspective
of legal education, predicting that the future of legal academics would
rely more on economic theory than on philosophy.12 Holmes' speech
was certainly prophetic; Langdell's approach has remained in vogue for
more than a hundred years, and during that time the most prominent in-
terdisciplinary perspective to be introduced has been the law and eco-
nomics movement, the ultimate view of law as science. 1
3
In order to fulfill his "avowed mission.. . to transform American
legal education into 'scientific analysis, ' "14 Langdell devised a new me-
thod of instruction so powerful that it has persisted until the present day.
Known as the "case method," Langdell's model required professors to
teach using compilations of cases-typically from appellate courts-
known as casebooks, rather than treatises. 5 The compilations were or-
ganized by doctrinal topic, which had the additional effect of reorganiz-
ing Harvard's first-year curriculum into the core courses that are still
taught to nearly every IL student in America: constitutional law, con-
tracts, criminal law, property, torts, and civil procedure.' 6 Langdell's
case method was also designed to rely on a Socratic style of classroom
dialogue, instead of lectures, as the means of instructing students in legal
doctrine.' 7 In a typical Socratic class, the professor will pose questions
to the students about the cases they have been assigned to read for that
particular day. A Socratic law professor rarely indicates when his ques-
tions have been answered correctly, but instead manipulates the course of
the classroom dialogue so that the students themselves are forced to dis-
till the governing rules from the cases they have read. The relevant legal
principles are thus teased out through a nuanced discussion and applied
to various hypothetical scenarios devised by the professor. In many
ways, a Socratic professor functions as a conductor or puppet master,
carefully orchestrating the questions and arguments to guide the dis-
course in a preordained direction. A case method classroom therefore
centers on the professor himself, and the students typically view the pro-
fessor as holding the truth to the subject, but rarely revealing it. 8
Langdell's case method is a calculated means of developing a very
specific set of skills. Superficially, the case method trains students to
11. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 160.
12. Id. at 157.
13. Id. at 159-60.
14. Id. at 159.
15. Coquillette, supra note 4, at 324.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Todd, supra note 4, at 916.
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synthesize overarching rules of law by dissecting raw cases and extract-
ing snippets of doctrine that, when viewed cumulatively, make up a body
of law in a particular subject. Students learn how to recognize not just
the rules used in certain cases, but also, hopefully, the policies animating
the rules. Without an understanding of the policies-historical, political,
economic, and social-upon which rules are premised, a lawyer cannot
truly master a particular area of law, for it is these policies that give the
rules both predictability and fairness. A lawyer who cannot grasp the
reasoning behind the evolution of rules from case to case-which re-
quires an understanding of the history and purposes of the field of law in
which the rules exist--cannot predict the future evolution of rules, which
is a key attribute for effective advocacy. In addition to teaching students
how to understand and synthesize rules of law, the case method also
trains students to apply the rules they have synthesized to specific dis-
putes. In fact, students' grades in nearly every first-year course are de-
termined by a single, comprehensive exam in which students must pre-
dict the legal outcome of hypothetical fact patterns devised by their pro-
fessor by applying the legal doctrine they have learned during the course
of the semester.
While the case method, on the surface, teaches students to recognize
and apply legal rules, its most profound impact is on the way students
think. Put simply, legal reasoning is a subtle thinking process in which
legal rules, as extrapolated from case law, are applied to facts, real or
hypothetical, to predict outcomes.19 The process is not an intuitive one,
and few students arrive at law school with an understanding of it. Prior
to law school, most students' academic experience has centered on me-
morizing information and supplying the right answers to professors'
questions, whether in class or on exams. Those who are qualified
enough to gain admittance to law school have obviously become adept at
this process, and many are surprised to find that it has little to do with
law school success. Indeed, most first-year students struggle, at least
initially, with the fact that the case method requires them to continually
try to answer questions that appear to have no "right" answer. The
process leaves many students feeling that their professors are "hiding the
ball." But the point of the case method is that there usually is not a right
answer; students are being trained to analyze disputes a certain way, ra-
ther than to solve the particular issues at hand.
19. This definition of legal reasoning, which is the best we have found in all our research, is
taken from a classroom handout that John J. Flynn, Hugh B. Brown Professor Emeritus of Law at the
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, frequently gave to his first-year students. The
handout is entitled "Why 'Why'?," and it provides an excellent description of why first-year doctrin-
al courses are taught as they are, explaining that the skill of legal reasoning is an inductive, not
deductive, thinking process that is best learned when students are forced to struggle with questions
having no apparent right answer. We are deeply indebted to Professor Flynn for his wisdom and
insight, which informs much of the content in this section. For those who have further interest,
Professor Flynn's handout remains on file with the authors. John J. Flynn, Why "Why"? (unpub-
lished handout, on file with authors).
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From the moment they set foot in their IL classrooms, first year law
students are being initiated into a distinctive method of thinking that will
forever alter the way they analyze disputes. Non-lawyers typically view
disputes from a narrative standpoint, focusing on the "story" of the cha-
racters involved. 20  This perspective tends to emphasize the social and
interpersonal dynamics involved in situations of conflict. 21  And most
law students initially approach their coursework from this perspective,
focusing on the story behind each case they read.22  In class, however,
students quickly learn that law professors are not interested in narrative
accounts of disputes and do not particularly care about the relationships
or emotions of the characters involved. Rather, in a case method class-
room students are encouraged to focus on only the strategic positions of
the parties.23 Through Socratic questioning, professors prompt students
to reframe the narratives involved in the cases students have read by or-
ganizing the "facts" in terms of legal claims and precedent. 24 Students
are repeatedly encouraged to siphon all non-essential facts from the dis-
putes they analyze and to focus instead on only those facts relevant to the
specific legal principles at issue.25 Form is thus elevated over substance,
and students are conditioned to disregard the emotional, interpersonal,
moral, and social consequences of disputes as extraneous concerns that
will only confuse the legal analysis to be performed.26  Students quickly
learn "that to 'think like a lawyer' means redefining messy situations of
actual or potential conflict as opportunities for advancing a client's cause
through legal argument before a judge., 27 Many come to see legal rea-
soning as a tool used to formalistically "pigeon-hole" the facts of a par-
20. See, e.g., 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 869, 874-75 (2007) (reviewing and summarizing
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A LAWYER"
(Oxford 2007) and Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REv. 483, 494-95 (2007) ("When students attempt to tell the stories of
conflict embodied in the cases assigned for their courses, they typically start by focusing on the
content of the story.") [hereinafter Mertz Summary]); Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession:
The Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 6 (2006) (non-lawyers tend to
focus on personal aspects of disputes).
21. See Daicoff, supra note 20, at 6 (citing Sandra Janoff, The Influences of Legal Education
on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REv. 193, 219-22 (1991) and CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 17-21 (1982)).
22. See Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 494-95.
23. Id. at 498-99.
24. See id. at 493-94; see also WILLIAM M. SuLLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 187 (The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching 2006) (discussing effects of case method style of instruction on first-year law students)
[hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
25. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187 ("[S]tudents are led to analyze situations by
looking for points of dispute or conflict and considering as 'facts' only those details that contribute
to someone's staking a legal claim on the basis of precedent."); Daicoff, supra note 20, at 5 ("Law
schools traditionally teach students to sift through facts and issues to eliminate 'irrelevant' concerns
and focus only on what is 'relevant' to the rule of law. The emotional and interpersonal dynamics of
a matter are deemed irrelevant to the pure legal analysis learned in the first year of law school.").
26. See Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 498-99; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187-
88.
27. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187.
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ticular dispute into legally relevant categories, discarding those that can-
not be so categorized.
The pedagogical power of the case method and its accompanying
Socratic classroom dialogue cannot be denied. In an extremely short
educational period, the case method forces students "to grasp the law as a
subject characterized by a particular way of thinking, a distinctive stance
toward the world., 28 As the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching ("Carnegie Foundation") found in its recent ground-breaking
study of legal education:
Within months of their arrival in law school, students demonstrate
new capacities for understanding the legal processes, for seeing both
sides of legal arguments, for sifting through facts and precedents in
search of the more plausible account, for using precise language, and
for understanding the applications and conflicts of legal rules. De-
spite a wide variety of social backgrounds and undergraduate expe-
riences, they are learning, in the parlance of legal education, to "think
like a lawyer."
29
From this perspective, the case method must be viewed as a re-
sounding success, a nearly fool-proof strategy for training students in the
art of legal reasoning. And because legal analysis is uniformly priori-
tized in legal education-the doctrinal courses at nearly every law school
(the majority of which are encompassed in the standardized first-year
curriculum) overwhelmingly rely on the case method-there "is a strik-
ing conformity in outlook and habits of thought among legal gra-
duates., 30 Regardless of their patterns of thought prior to law school,
students leave law school with the ability to cull legally relevant facts
from complicated disputes and organize those facts around persuasive
legal arguments.
While the uniformity with which law schools produce students
skilled in legal reasoning is an impressive feat, the flip-side of the coin is
that, by heavily prioritizing such training, schools are also uniformly
creating the same deficiencies. Indeed, Langdell's methodology has
been so successful that law schools have steadfastly adhered to it, even in
the face of mounting empirical research demonstrating that the tradition-
al methods of instruction suffer from major shortcomings. 3' As dis-
cussed in the following section, the case method of legal instruction,
when used in isolation, has many unintended consequences that ultimate-
ly impair lawyers' professional development and well-being. The com-
bined effect of these consequences has resulted in an imbalance in Amer-
28. Id.
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id.
31. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 160.
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ican legal education and in the practice of law, an imbalance that can be
corrected by a more comprehensive approach to legal instruction.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION
While there is no question that the traditional model of legal educa-
tion produces dramatic results, it also has equally dramatic and unin-
tended consequences. At most law schools, the genius of Langdell's
methodology has not been matched by an equally well-considered means
of instructing students in legal practice. Legal institutions have mastered
the process of teaching students how to think like lawyers, but not the
process of "teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity
of actual law practice. '32 Courses that emphasize practical skills and
real-world training typically hold a subordinate place to doctrinal courses
in most law schools' curricula.33 Furthermore, the course offerings that
are designed to prepare students for the practice of law are not nearly as
synchronized or refined as the doctrinal part of the curriculum, and there
is little integration between the two types of courses. 34 In the required
portion of legal education, which is primarily doctrinal, students are in-
undated with training in legal reasoning via a coordinated set of "core"
classes. But most students are then left to tailor the remainder of their
law school experience, including any practical courses they wish to take,
haphazardly. Because little emphasis is placed on direct training in pro-
fessional practice, legal analysis thus overshadows the entirety of stu-
dents' education, "conveying the impression that lawyers are more like
competitive scholars than attorneys engaged with the problems of
clients. 35 Most students' educational experience is therefore dominated
by the process of learning to "think like a lawyer. ' 36 The result of this
unbalanced and inaccurate perspective is that many students spend the
third (and even second) year of law school figuratively treading water,
having been taught the skill of legal reasoning but not provided a struc-
tured way to place this skill in the context of legal practice.37 The second
two years of law school thus provide diminishing returns in terms of stu-
dents' educational advancement, with a great number of students simply
waiting to graduate and begin practice even though they have little
knowledge of what the practice of law actually entails.38 While this gap
between education and practice highlights a major inefficiency in Ameri-
can legal education, the more alarming consequence is that America's
32. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 188 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. See id. at 194.
35. Id. at 188.
36. Id. at 186.
37. See id. at 195.
38. See id. at 77.
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law schools are not producing lawyers equipped with the skills necessary
to thrive as professionals.39
When the skill of legal reasoning is considered within the context of
the actual practice of law, it is clear why the focus of the case method is
so narrow. The American judicial system is premised on an adversarial,
winner-take-all approach to dispute resolution in which legal rules are
formalistically applied to the facts of a particular conflict and the party
with the more persuasive position is assigned the contested resource.40
Traditional legal education is deliberately geared toward developing the
primary skill needed to operate within this system; the case method drills
students to focus exclusively on the legal rights, liabilities, obligations,
duties, and entitlements present in a given fact pattern.41 To this end,
students are trained to disregard all facts and consequences that are out-
side the precise legal issue at hand and recognize as relevant only those
42facts that pertain to the legal tests that will be used in court. This pur-
poseful simplification of conflicts removes all peripheral issues from the
equation, preventing students from being distracted by moral concerns or
compassion and allowing them to focus solely on honing their analytical
skills.43 From a litigation standpoint, this perspective makes sense: to
zealously represent or advise a client faced with a lawsuit, a lawyer must
be able to evaluate and marshal the facts presented by the client by refer-
ence to the law that will apply to the dispute in court. 44 Legal analysis is
therefore an essential skill for lawyers practicing in the American legal
system, but it is far from the only skill needed, even for litigators.
In practice, lawyers provide analysis, advocacy, and advice to both
people and organizations regarding an infinite number of different trans-
actions, disputes, and problems, both legal and non-legal. To provide
competent representation to their clients,45 all lawyers, regardless of spe-
cialty, must draw on a vast array of skills and perspectives beyond the
pure legal analysis that is emphasized in law school. For example (and
39. Of course, a great many law students who are successful at learning legal analysis are also
successful at learning practical skills during their first few years after graduation. But the point is
that law school is, for most students, the only opportunity to learn practical legal skills in a simu-
lated, structured environment. By not emphasizing and integrating this aspect of the curriculum, law
schools are failing to provide crucial and necessary training to the next generation of practicing
attorneys.
40. ROBERT A. BARUSCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 56-58 (Jossey-Bass Pub-
lishers 1994).
41. See Daicoff, supra note 20, at 5.
42. Id.
43. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187.
44. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) ("A lawyer must ... act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of a client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.").
45. Id. R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably neces-
sary for the representation.").
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without attempting to be exhaustive), every lawyer needs excellent social
and ethical skills. 46 Despite the rapid growth and change that has oc-
curred in recent years, the legal profession remains a people-centered
business.47 Attorneys interact with a large assortment of characters, in-
cluding clients, potential clients, co-workers, opposing lawyers, experts,
witnesses, and judges. It is therefore crucial that practicing attorneys
have well-developed, versatile communication skills and a proficiency
for interpersonal relations. Yet, it is surprising how many attorneys are
deficient in these areas. Law schools rarely train students in these skills
in any structured manner, and thus the lawyers who have excellent com-
munication abilities are either those who are naturally endowed with
them or those who have developed such skills through trial and error in
practice. 48 Indeed, two of the most common complaints lodged against
the legal profession are that lawyers "tend to put process above people"
and that "certain mindsets and attitudes stand between [clients] and the
lawyers they hire.",49 Analysis is important, but it must be placed in con-
text and it should not come at the expense of lawyers' abilities to relate
to the people with whom they must interact.
Similarly, because of the countless relationships and dilemmas with
which they are faced, practicing lawyers are regularly forced to consider
the moral and ethical implications of various courses of action. It is es-
sential for lawyers to appear to-and to actually-have firm morals and
ethics because the legitimacy of the legal profession depends on the inte-
grity of its members. And while ethics are taught in law school, typically
via an upper-level course focusing on the rules that govern attorneys'
conduct, the importance of moral and ethical considerations is minimized
when these concerns are purposely excluded by the case method, only to
be reintroduced in an isolated fashion later.50 When morals and ethics
are segregated in this manner, students are left with the impression that
such matters are irrelevant for purposes of law school success and, by
correlation, secondary to what counts in practice.5' Students are also
rarely given the opportunity to explore moral and ethical issues in simu-
lated practice settings, and thus enter practice with only a marginal un-
derstanding of the manner in which these issues may affect their practical
responsibilities as professionals.
52
46. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187-88.
47. See, e.g., LARRY RICHARD & SUSAN RARIDON LAMBRETH, MAKING LAWYERS INTO
LEADERS (2006), available at http://www.hildebrandt.com/Documents.aspx?Doc-ID=2476 (discuss-
ing "the tremendous change affecting the legal profession generally and law firms specifically").
48. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6 (discussing law schools' general failure
to develop law students' ethical and social skills).
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Every practicing attorney must also be equipped with a broad set of
problem-solving skills. At base, lawyers are advisors and advocates who
use their expertise to help clients solve legal problems. To provide tho-
rough and competent counsel to clients, lawyers must take into account
an immense number of disparate issues, both legal and non-legal. This
requires the ability to view legal problems comprehensively and from
many different perspectives. While the problems lawyers are called
upon to solve frequently require the skill of legal reasoning, this is not
always the case, and legal reasoning is rarely the exclusive skill needed.
For example, a lawyer representing an automobile parts supplier in a
breach of contract dispute with a manufacturer will probably need to
assess the likelihood of prevailing if the case should go to trial. But if
the parties engage in settlement discussions, the lawyer will also need to,
among other things, discuss and consider the client's goals (including
non-legal goals, such as business productivity and good will), conduct a
detailed risk analysis that takes into account the costs and benefits of
various non-litigation alternatives, devise a negotiation strategy in light
of the various personalities and interests involved, and negotiate the po-
tential settlement. This is a scenario that practicing lawyers face on a
regular basis, for settlement is a possibility in virtually every lawsuit and,
statistically speaking, is an exponentially more likely outcome than tri-
al.53 Yet, the tasks described above require perspectives and skills that
are much more broadly-focused and nuanced than the pure legal analysis
that is emphasized in doctrinal law school courses.
As another example, consider the issues an attorney representing a
party in a bitter divorce action might face. Legal analysis is often less
important in such situations because most states have enacted no-fault
divorce statutes, 54 and the parties' respective factual positions relative to
the applicable law therefore often have less impact on the outcome.55
Extralegal concerns may in fact be far more important. For instance, the
parties may view the psychological and emotional impact of the divorce
as the most important issue because they have young children and will
need to maintain a cordial relationship going forward. They may want
family counseling to be an important component of the separation
agreement in order to provide a forum for the children to deal with their
feelings. They may see the children's education as a crucial concern, and
want to prioritize this issue in discussing the financial ramifications of
53. Cf David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitra-
tion of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a
New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 150 (1999).
54. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/406 (West 2007).
55. Of course, legal analysis may still be relevant in such situations. The parties may, for
example, dispute the amount of alimony that should be paid. The resolution of this issue will depend
largely on the parties' respective earning capacities and the pre-divorce standard of living, evaluated
in light of the applicable statute. This is obviously a classic example of legal analysis. Our point,
however, is that other concerns often dominate divorce proceedings, and extralegal considerations
will likely remain relevant even when legal analysis is necessary to resolve a specific issue.
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the divorce. The parties' needs in a situation such as this have very little
to do with legal analysis, and their interests will likely not be served if
they become embroiled in protracted litigation. To effectively represent
the parties in such a scenario, the lawyers must therefore be able to take
into account a variety of extralegal concerns, such as the emotional con-
sequences of various courses of action, and must be able to carefully
manage the tensions between the parties. Obviously, training in legal
analysis does not equip a lawyer to provide such representation; rather,
the case method encourages students to ignore such concerns.56
Recent research has also shown that leadership skills are tremend-
ously valuable to practicing attorneys but, like social, ethical, and prob-
lem-solving skills, are not purposely taught or adequately emphasized in
law school. 57 This should not be surprising, for leadership is a "people-
focused, inspirational, emotional, non-linear and visceral" skill, and most
of these qualities are de-emphasized by traditional legal education.
58
Law school graduates have a tendency to be "less sociable and more
skeptical, urgent, analytical, autonomous, and more defensive and thin-
skinned than the general public-by a wide margin. 59 While these cha-
racteristics make us good legal analysts, they usually also make us medi-
ocre leaders. Leadership is a skill that is based on one's ability to exhibit
certain key behaviors; because these behaviors can be learned, leadership
can also be learned. 60 According to Larry Richard and Hillary Lambreth,
the key behaviors include: thinking outside the box and experimenting
with new and better ways of doing things; advocating positive, forward-
looking goals; collaborating with, encouraging, and praising co-workers
rather than hoarding power; acting in accordance with the values and
principles to which others are held; and being self-aware enough to take
responsibility for and determine how to overcome setbacks.61 Certainly
these behaviors could be incorporated into legal education-for example,
by teaching certain practice-based courses using a team-based approach
and encouraging students to brainstorm both legal and non-legal solu-
tions to problems. Currently, however, law schools rarely take such con-
siderations into account, and the case method of instruction does little to
promote these behaviors.
Not only does the singular focus of traditional legal education fail to
adequately develop the full range of skills students will need as lawyers,
56. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6 ("[The task of connecting [legal] con-
clusions with the rich complexity of actual situations that involve full-dimensional people, let alone
the job of thinking through the social consequences or ethical aspects of the conclusions, remains
outside the case-dialogue method."); Daicoff, supra note 20, at 6 ("[lI]n law school, emotional and
interpersonal concerns are strongly de-emphasized, if not blatantly ignored.").
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but the teaching methods themselves also have a detrimental impact on
law students. The case method is designed to require summative assess-
ments in which students' competence in doctrinal subjects is measured
solely by comprehensive examinations given at the end of the semester.62
The usual result of summative assessments is to rank, sort, and filter
those being assessed.63 Certainly this is most students' experience with
the high-stakes exams given during the first year of law school, which
have the effect of opening academic and career options for some students
and closing them for others. 64 In certain situations, summative assess-
ments are a preferable form of evaluation. For example, the bar exami-
nation is a summative assessment designed to create a barrier to entry in
the legal profession by ensuring that those who are admitted have basic
levels of competency.65 Such an examination may be desirable in some
law school courses, but the dominance of this form of evaluation in law
schools is troubling. Studies have shown that formative assessments-in
which students are evaluated periodically, allowing educators to better
chart and encourage students' progress-are far more conducive to learn-
ing.66  Yet, formative evaluations are rarely utilized in law school
classes.67 If law schools' mission is truly to educate, then schools should
consider using a variety of teaching methodologies so that students' ca-
pacity for learning is maximized.
The prominence of the case method in legal education also has a
proven negative impact on students' psyches. By forcing students to
narrowly focus on only the legal consequences of disputes, the case me-
thod excludes the social context in which disputes occur from students'
frames of reference. 68 For purposes of instructing students in legal anal-
ysis, this is an effective strategy. But law schools typically reintroduce
the social, moral, interpersonal, psychological, and emotional dynamics
of legal issues haphazardly, if at all, leaving students to determine on
their own the relevance of such issues to legal practice.69 As discussed
above, this frequently leaves students with the misimpression that such
concerns are irrelevant in legal practice when, in fact, nothing could be
further from the truth. But the lack of attention given to such matters in
traditional legal education also has another, more personal consequence.
Many students find the narrow, formalistic approach emphasized in law
school to be disillusioning because it discourages the ideals and goals
that bring a great many students to law school in the first place, such as






68. See Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 5; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6.
69. See Daicoff, supra note 20, at 5-6; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6-7.
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helping people or promoting social justice.70 On one hand, the case me-
thod eliminates misconceptions about how the law works; in a great
many individual cases the law operates in a manner counter to students'
ideals and aspirations, and legal results are often reached without refer-
ence to social or moral consequences. 7' But one would hope that law-
yers, as officers of the American judicial system, aspire to something
greater in their representation of clients than the simple ability to mani-
pulate legal rules. When law students are conditioned to believe that the
practice of law entails nothing more, they are forced to either shift their
goals and values or reluctantly accept the hand they have been dealt.
Commentators have found that both types of changes regularly occur in
law students, resulting in a great deal of cynicism and anxiety.72
For example, Kennon M. Sheldon and Lawrence S. Krieger recently
completed a three-year longitudinal study of law students at two different
law schools.73 The first school heavily emphasized abstract legal theory
and analysis in its curriculum, while the second attempted to integrate
this traditional approach with a heavy dose of practical skills training.74
Using a variety of statistical tests, Sheldon and Krieger measured the
students' well-being as they progressed through law school.75  The re-
sults of the study are striking. At both schools, the students experienced
a decline in emotional and psychological well-being.76 Sheldon and
Krieger attribute this decline to multiple factors. First, they found that
the students experienced a dramatic shift in their value systems during
law school, from a generally intrinsic focus to a generally extrinsic fo-
70. See, e.g., Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 5 ("[T]he way legal reasoning is taught and
practiced creates a closed linguistic system that is capable of devouring all manner of social detail,
but without budging from its core assumptions." (internal quotation marks omitted)); CARNEGIE
REPORT, supra note 24, at 6 ("Students often find [the exclusion of moral concerns from their train-
ing in legal analysis] confusing and disillusioning. The fact that moral concerns are reintroduced
only haphazardly conveys a cynical impression of the law that is rarely intended.").
71. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6.
72. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 454, 464 (2005) (re-
viewing JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION
FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS (Duke Univ. Press 2005) ("On a personal level, lawyers confront stories
that evoke visceral moral responses; on a professional level, they are consistently denied recourse to
those responses when they do their work. ... It's easy to see that this can be a recipe for cynicism
and despair, because it undermines the very notion that human beings can achieve a degree of moral
order by establishing a legal system."); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal
Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values,
and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. Sci. & LAW 261, 283 (2004) (finding that students generally experience
increasing distress during law school associated with a shift in values and perspectives) [hereinafter
Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being].
73. Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal
Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test and Extension of Self-Determination Theory, PERS.
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.consol3papers.cfm?
abstractid--913824 [hereinafter Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects].
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 15-19.
76. Id. at 4.
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cus.
7 7 On entering law school, most students' values were oriented to-
ward societal contribution, helping others, emotional connections, and
personal growth.78 Over the course of law school, however, students
became less likely to act based on personal interest or inherent satisfac-
tion and more likely to act based on extrinsic rewards such as image,
appearance, and prestige. 79 This shift in values understandably caused a
great deal of distress for the students, for it represented a change in many
students' self identities. 80 Sheldon and Krieger also found that the stu-
dents' levels of need satisfaction declined during law school, resulting in
an overall loss of motivation.8 1 Their studies linked the decline in need
satisfaction to lower levels of autonomy (i.e., feelings of independence
and self-sufficiency), intrinsic satisfaction (i.e., the ability to satisfy per-
sonal needs and values), and psychological satisfaction (i.e., feelings of
competence and relatedness to others).82
According to Sheldon and Krieger, the methodology of traditional
legal education is primarily responsible for the decline in well-being that
they identified.83  While students' emotional and psychological well-
being declined at both schools, it declined much more precipitously at
the school that heavily emphasized legal theory.84 Sheldon and Krieger
found that this disparity resulted from the difference in social contexts at
the two schools.85 When the social context in law school supports stu-
dents' autonomy, gives them balanced interdisciplinary training, and
focuses on satisfying students' psychological needs, such as competence
and relatedness, students' need satisfaction increases. 86 And when stu-
dents' needs are satisfied, their emotional well-being and psychological
health is enhanced, their performance (as measured by, for example,
GPA) improves, and their self-determined job motivation increases.87
Self-determined job motivation is a particularly important gauge of insti-
tutional success, for it is highly correlative with professional achieve-
ment and fulfillment after graduation. 88 Unhappy lawyers make unpro-
fessional lawyers, and therefore we must train law students in a way that
77. Id.; see also Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at
272-83 (discussing law students' shift in values during law school).
78. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 4; Sheldon & Krieger: Motiva-
tion, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 264-78.
79. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 4; Sheldon & Krieger: Motiva-
tion, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 272-83.
80. See, e.g., Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 283
(discussing law student distress).
81. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative effects, supra note 73, at 4-5, 28-32.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 28-33.
84. Id. at 11, 21.
85. Id. at 11, 32.
86. Id. at 28-33.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 31.
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promotes intrinsic fulfillment and encourages them to pursue personally
satisfying career options.
However, traditional legal education, with its formalistic use of the
case method and narrow focus on legal analysis, does not provide a so-
cial atmosphere conducive to students' intrinsic needs. 90 In fact, when
used in isolation, the standard methods of legal instruction tend to stifle
students' needs and promote a shift in values that is detrimental to stu-
dents and, consequently, to the profession.9' Sheldon and Krieger sug-
gest that even schools that focus primarily on teaching legal analysis can
foster a culture that improves students' well-being by, for example, fo-
cusing on student concerns, providing students with choices, and includ-
ing rationales and explanations for mandatory requirements.92 But their
study also found that law schools with a balanced, comprehensive curri-
culum are much more likely to create such a culture because students
who are given the opportunity to learn and implement a larger range of
legal skills have increased feelings of independence and competence.
93
Thus, the second school in Sheldon and Krieger's study was able to tem-
per the negative effects they identified by balancing the development of
traditional legal skills with application-based practical courses.94
Analyses such as Sheldon and Krieger's help explain the alarming
rates of depression, cynicism, and career dissatisfaction that afflict the
legal profession. Recent studies have shown that lawyers suffer depres-
sion at a rate four times higher than the general population; in fact, in a
study of more than 100 professions, lawyers had the highest incidence of
depression.95 In a survey of lawyers with six to nine years of experience,
only forty one percent reported being satisfied with their career.96 Of
that same group, only thirty-five percent would recommend a legal ca-
reer to a young person.97 Commentators have attributed these ills to the
general lack of intrinsic fulfillment and intrapersonal development in the
legal profession, 98 problems that, as demonstrated by Sheldon and Krieg-
89. See Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfac-
tion: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, II CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 426 (2005).
90. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative effects, supra note 73, at 4-5, 28-33.
91. See id. at 3-4 (noting that the case method style of instruction, when used in isolation,
"thwart[s] the needs and preferences of typical law students" because it "train[s] students to ignore
their own values and moral sense, undermine[s] students' sense of identity and self-confidence, and
create[s] cynicism"); see also Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, note 72, at
272-83 (discussing impact of traditional legal training on law students' values).
92. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative effects, supra note 73, at 5-6.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id. at 11, 32.
95. Joan E. Mounteer, Depression Among Lawyers, 33 CoLO. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 36, 37,
available at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl-articles.cfmArticlelD=2963.
96. Stephanie F. Ward, Pulse of the Legal Profession, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2007,
http://www.abajoumal.commagazine/pulse-of-the-legal-profession.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Daicoff, supra note 20, at 53-54 (noting that the "crisis" facing the legal profes-
sion is that many lawyers' do not have the "ability to know themselves well").
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er, can be traced back to a lawyer's education. 99 In an educational sys-
tem that promotes such a rapid shift in thought processes-away from
intrinsic fulfillment and growth-it should come as little surprise that
disillusionment reverberates through many lawyers' early careers, partic-
ularly when the intrinsic impact legal education has on who law students
are as people is not addressed at an institutional level.
In summary, legal analysis is merely the tip of the iceberg in terms
of the skills practicing lawyers require. None of the skills discussed in
this section are taught in a structured manner or even emphasized in most
law schools' curricula, yet all are crucial for professional success. Thus,
when the case method is used in isolation and legal analysis is empha-
sized to the exclusion of other important skills and perspectives, students
are being short-changed because they are trained to analyze disputes
from only one narrow point of view. Students graduate with an incom-
plete set of tools and are therefore ill-prepared for the variety of situa-
tions they will face as practicing attorneys. The dominant methods of
legal instruction also have a negative emotional and psychological im-
pact on students, causing a shift in perspectives and values that fosters
cynicism and distress. The failure of legal institutions to attend to stu-
dents' well-being and satisfaction has a tendency to create disillusioned
students, and this does not serve those being educated, the profession, or
society as a whole. As educators, we can do better. Law schools are
institutions of higher learning, and their educational mission should be to
educate the best lawyers possible. When schools are instead churning
out masses of unprepared, disenchanted practitioners, it is time to reeva-
luate our teaching methodologies. With this background in mind, the
following section examines the changes currently underway in legal edu-
cation and suggests an approach that will both give students more com-
prehensive training in legal practice and also maximize the personal ben-
efit students receive from their law school experience.
1II. TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Law is a profession of immense depth, and it would be impossible
to convey a full understanding of all its nuances and intricacies during a
mere three-year instructional period. Indeed, legal education is a process
that can never be viewed as "complete," for law is never static and those
who practice it will continue to update their doctrinal knowledge and
hone their skills throughout their careers. The best lawyers are those that
remain eager to learn and improve their craft long after they have accu-
mulated enough experience to be considered seasoned practitioners.
Thus, law school must be viewed as the beginning of students' legal edu-
cation rather than an experience that will impart everything they need to
99. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 4; Sheldon & Krieger: Motiva-
tion, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 272-83.
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know for a career as a lawyer. Nonetheless, the significance of the insti-
tutional failures that are occurring in American law schools cannot be
overstated. Law school is the singular experience that unites all mem-
bers of the legal profession, "where the profession puts its defining val-
ues and exemplars on display, and future practitioners can begin both to
assume and critically examine their future identities."0° When law stu-
dents are educated in a manner that is not only inadequate but also fos-
ters cynicism and distress, the entire profession suffers and, correspon-
dingly, so does society in general. After all, lawyers are officers of the
court, and the legal profession is the sole supplier of personnel for the
judicial branch of our government, which is sworn to serve the public by
justly deciding disputes. The training this nation's legal institutions im-
part to future lawyers is vital to the successful functioning of American
democracy. 10 It is therefore crucial that law schools redefine their edu-
cational mission and begin to train students in more of the skills and
perspectives they will need to maximize their success as professionals.
Reforming the institution of legal education will not be easy. It is a
testament to the pedagogical power of Langdell's approach that the case
method remains firmly entrenched as the dominant form of legal instruc-
tion despite mounting criticism in recent years. And while all institu-
tional cultures are generally resistant to change, legal education may be
even more so. The prevailing mindset in the profession is not one that
encourages change; most educators have been trained to "think like a
lawyer" and contest conflicting information, rather than alter their ap-
proach when contradictory data are presented. 10 2 Furthermore, because
the current regime has morphed into a reliable method of sorting students
for prestigious law firms and the government, 0 3 the most influential ac-
tors in the profession do not have a strong incentive to promote
reform. 104
Nonetheless, American legal education has been gradually evolving
in spite of these obstacles. Indeed, law students currently receive more
practical skills training and are exposed to a broader range of interdiscip-
100. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
101. Carnegie Foundation, Carnegie Examines the Education of Lawyers and Calls for Change,
2007, http://www.camegiefoundation.org/news/sub.asp?key=51 &subkey=2152 ("The calling of
legal educators is a high one-to prepare future professionals with enough understanding, skill and
judgment to support the vast and complicated system of the law needed to sustain the United States
as a free society worthy of its citizens' loyalty.").
102. See, e.g., Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 5-6 (contrasting the mindset of those trained
in legal reasoning with "that of academics in, for example, social sciences, who are forced, at least
eventually, to revise their theories when confronted with conflicting or contradictory data").
103. Steven W. Keeva, Practicing From the Inside Out, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 97, 105
(2002).
104. On the other hand, legal employers would ultimately benefit if law schools reliably pro-
duced more self-aware, well-rounded lawyers. Not only would new lawyers enter the workforce
with a larger set of skills, but they would also be more in touch with their professional goals and
desires, and would thus be less likely to leave their jobs (or the profession) at such a rapid rate.
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linary perspectives than ever before. 10 5 For example, many law students
now receive real world legal experience through clinical programs,"°6 and
the vast majority of law schools offer courses that teach practical legal
skills such as interviewing, counseling, and negotiation.107 In addition, a
variety of novel approaches to legal practice have sprung up within just
the last ten years and have been incorporated to some extent in law
school curricula. Examples of these alternative approaches include: "(1)
collaborative law, (2) creative problem solving, (3) holistic justice, (4)
preventive law, (5) problem solving courts, (6) procedural justice, (7)
restorative justice, (8) therapeutic jurisprudence, and (9) transformative
mediation."10 8 These recent developments are all responsive to the di-
lemma of traditional legal education outlined previously; in law school,
students are trained in analysis, issue-spotting, fact siphoning, and logical
deduction but regularly need a broader and more dynamic skill-set to
solve the problems with which they are confronted in practice. 109 The
skills and perspectives making their way into legal education have thus
developed to fill the vacuum created by the case method's singular focus.
Many of these perspectives are interdisciplinary in nature and are de-
signed to provide lawyers with a different "lens" through which to view
disputes or problems. 01 For example, therapeutic jurisprudence is a dis-
tinctly psychological practice in which lawyers consider the effect of
legal options on the well-being of the characters involved in a particular
dispute in addition to the usual legal concerns, such as rights and du-
ties."' "[G]iven two different options for achieving a particular legal
result, if one option is more therapeutic than the other, the lawyer should
attempt to pursue the more therapeutic course of action."'1 2 Similarly,
the discipline of creative problem solving is "a broad approach to solving
legal problems that takes into account a wide variety of non-legal issues
and concerns and then seeks creative, win-win solutions to otherwise
win-lose scenarios.""' 3 While traditional legal analysis is often a starting
point, a creative problem solving approach encourages students to ex-
plore options and solutions beyond what would result from the formal
application of legal rules." 14
Although the recent advances in legal education encompass a varie-
ty of skills and approaches, the reforms all share several common pers-
105. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 189 ("Compared to fifty years ago, law
schools now provide students with more experience, more contextual experience, more choice and
more connection with the larger university world and other disciplines.").
106. Daicoff, supra note 20, at 47.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
109. Id. at 46.
110. Id. at 10.
111. Seeid. at ll-12.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id. at 20.
114. Id. at 20-21.
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pectives. First, an interdisciplinary view of legal practice in which extra-
legal concerns such as resources, goals, morals, values, psychological
well-being, and interpersonal relations are integrated with legal reason-
ing is becoming increasingly prominent." 15 A second and related devel-
opment is that a broad problem-solving approach to dispute resolution is
being stressed instead of the narrow focus of pure legal analysis. Finally,
many of the changes represent an implicit recognition of the personal
nature of legal practice and the corresponding need for lawyers to devel-
op excellent human relations and communication skills. 1 6 These com-
mon threads have led some commentators to refer to the changes cumu-
latively as the "comprehensive law movement"' 7 or "postmodern" legal
education." 8 Viewed collectively, the recent reforms reflect a gradually
increasing shift back to legal education's humanistic roots as law schools
broaden their curricula and begin exposing students to a more diverse
range of skills and perspectives.
While the focus of legal education has certainly changed during the
last fifty years, the reforms have not yet stimulated the type of improve-
ments that are necessary to maximize students' law school experience.
Most of the changes that have occurred "have been more piecemeal than
comprehensive. ' 19 In other words, most law schools have treated alter-
native skills and perspectives in an additive fashion, refusing to intrude
on the priority given to training in legal analysis. 120 Courses in, for ex-
ample, practical legal skills are thus subordinated to doctrinal training
and are not integrated into the curriculum or developed to the extent that
traditional courses are. 121  Although the majority of students graduate
with a well-developed capacity for legal analysis, most are still trained in
other crucial skills only haphazardly. 122 As a result, the deficiencies
identified in the prior section persist.
123
What is needed is an integrated, comprehensive approach to legal
education. In his revolutionary book, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and
Practice of the Learning Organization, Peter Senge gives the DC-3, the
world's first twin engine airplane that was introduced in 1935, as an ex-
ample of a comprehensive approach in the field of engineering. 24 As
Senge writes,
115. Id. at4.
116. Id. at 4, 46-48.
117. Id. at3.
118. Todd, supra note 4, at 895.
119. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 190.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 188.
123. Id. at 191-92.
124. PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFrH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING
ORGANIZATION 6 (New York Doubleday 1990).
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[t]he DC-3, for the first time, brought together five critical compo-
nent technologies that formed a successful ensemble. They were: the
variable-pitch propeller, retractable landing gear, a type of light-
weight molded body construction called "monocoque," radial air-
cooled engine, and wing flaps. To succeed, the DC-3 needed all five;
four were not enough. 125
Law schools need to adopt such an approach to creating lawyers: a
comprehensive, integrated curriculum focused on developing a greater
range of the skills and perspectives lawyers need to succeed in practice.
As an institution, legal education must acknowledge the deficiencies of
the traditional methods of legal instruction and recognize that practical
legal skills and diverse perspectives, such as those emphasized in the
comprehensive law movement, are every bit as essential to a lawyer's
development as legal analysis.
Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School once stated that law
students need human relations and communication training because
"lawyers deal with people. They deal with people far more than they do
with appellate courts., 126 Similarly, in discussing attorneys' role in so-
ciety, former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said, "[w]e must be legal
architects, engineers, builders, and from time to time, inventors as well.
We have served, and must continue to see our role, as problem-solvers..
• .,,127 Law schools should respond to the calling of these two great scho-
lars and integrate the practical and non-traditional parts of their curricula
with the standard doctrinal training. In its recent study of American law
schools, the Carnegie Foundation advocated such an approach, urging
schools to "bridge the gap between analytical and practical knowledge"
by "unit[ing] the two sides of legal knowledge: formal knowledge and
experience of practice."'' 28 This requires numerous changes in the way
law schools approach legal training. While doctrinal instruction and
legal analysis are central to legal education, they should not overwhelm
the curriculum or represent "the exclusive content" of students' first-year
experience. 2 9 From the beginning of their law school experience, stu-
dents should be taught the importance of legal analysis to legal practice
but also its limits. Schools can promote such a perspective by, for exam-
ple, emphasizing other skills in their doctrinal classes, even while teach-
ing students how to narrowly analyze disputes in the traditional sense.
To illustrate, doctrinal classes could be taught using a team-based ap-
proach in which students are asked to analyze specific cases in small
groups. Professors can also ensure that extralegal concerns are not ig-
125. Id.
126. David M. Hunsaker, Law, Humanism, and Communication: Suggestions for Limited
Curricular Reform, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 417, 421 (1980).
127. Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1,5 (1993).
128. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 12.
129. Id. at 195.
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nored by discussing the social and moral consequences of specific re-
sults, or asking students to assume the role of a party's attorney and dis-
cuss how they would approach a particular case from both legal and non-
legal standpoints. We explicitly use such an approach in our courses by
encouraging students to incorporate extralegal goals and values into their
formalistic decision-making.
Law schools should also give students practical experience early on
by including in the first year curriculum at least one course that develops
practical skills and teaches students to "think like a lawyer" in simulated
practice settings. 130 The practical aspects of legal education should then
be expanded as students progress through law school, giving students an
increased opportunity to assume the responsibility of acting on behalf of
clients.' 3' In this manner, students would gradually transition from learn-
ing how to think like a lawyer to learning how to act like a lawyer. For
example, schools could construct various sequences of practical
courses--organized by, for instance, practice settings such as litigation
or transactional work-in which students would learn and apply compre-
hensive skills. A commonly-taught course that follows this model is a
pre-trial practice class, which typically builds on first-year civil proce-
dure and other doctrinal courses by requiring students to apply their ana-
lytical knowledge to a simulated legal dispute as it progresses from dis-
covery to trial. Law schools should also expand and refine their clinical
training and require students to perform supervised legal work while in
law school. 132 Ideally, students would work in small clinical groups and
meet weekly with their supervisor in a classroom setting to discuss their
experiences. By organizing clinics in this manner, schools would pro-
vide students with real-world experience and also a forum in which to
brainstorm, share ideas, and receive advice and feedback.
In addition to emphasizing practical knowledge, schools should also
seek to expose students to alternative perspectives, such as those that
comprise the comprehensive law movement, either integrated with exist-
ing classes or as free-standing courses. This would allow schools to
promote extralegal and interdisciplinary perspectives explicitly in addi-
tion to the implicit recognition such perspectives would receive in a more
integrated curriculum. Furthermore, law schools must give increased
emphasis to the ethical aspects of lawyering. Simply requiring a class on
professional conduct is insufficient; training in professional ethics should
be required earlier in law school and integrated with practice settings as
students progress so that they can more fully appreciate the manner in
which ethical and moral concerns impact their actions as practicing at-
torneys. For example, in our courses we often use practical simulations,
130. See id. at 188 (arguing that law schools should "employ well-elaborated case studies of
professional work" to teach students how to use their skills in practice settings).
131. Id. at 178.
132. Id.
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such as working with a client with diminished capacity, that require stu-
dents to account for moral and ethical concerns in addition to legal anal-
ysis. An example of a similar approach in a doctrinal course would be a
corporations professor teaching a hypothetical that required the students
to address the policy concerns behind the attorney reporting requirements
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. By integrating these types of concerns, law
schools can provide a structured framework for the "exploration and as-
sumption of the identity, values and dispositions consonant with the fun-
damental purposes of the legal profession."
' 133
The integration discussed above would dramatically improve legal
education by maximizing the impact of the second and third years of law
school and training students in a more complete set of skills. 13 4 It would
also, in and of itself, improve students' well-being and professional out-
look by creating more well-balanced, self-aware, and satisfied law school
graduates.135 But law schools must also "be responsive to both the needs
of our time and recent knowledge about how learning takes place."
136
Legal education as a whole needs to consider "the actual and potential
effects of the law school experience on the formation of future profes-
sionals"1 37 and engage in a self-critical examination of its teaching me-
thodologies. This requires a recognition of the effects of not only the
case method-which would be largely addressed by integrating the law
school curriculum-but also of the way we teach and test across the
board. If, as educators, we are truly committed to creating the best law-
yers possible rather than ranking students so that law firms can determine
who to hire, we must reevaluate the purpose of summative teaching and
testing in legal education. This is not to say that summative assessment
has no place in law school but rather that it should not be used to the
exclusion of other methods that would enhance learning. To the extent
possible, students should be evaluated periodically during the course of
every law school class, even those in which grades are determined pri-
marily on the basis of a final comprehensive exam. This would give
professors the chance to assess students' progress and give them feed-
back and students the opportunity to improve and maximize their learn-
ing experience in each course.
Finally, law schools should also explicitly address the personal im-
pact that their training-integrated or not-has on students. Legal edu-
cation has a tremendous impact on the way students think and view the
world; we cannot pretend that it does not also have an immeasurable
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., id. at 36-37 (discussing need for law schools to make better use of the second
and third years of law school).
135. See, e.g., Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 28-33 (discussing the
negative effects of traditional legal education on students' well-being and job motivation and the
positive impact a more comprehensive approach to instruction would have).
136. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 12.
137. Id.
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effect on who students are as people (nor should we want to).1 8 When
the personal, intrinsic changes that occur during law school are ignored,
young lawyers enter the profession disillusioned, without a compass to
guide their professional growth. Yet, the professional identities that stu-
dents will carry with them into practice are forged from the intersection
of their personalities and their newly developed capacities and perspec-
tives. It is therefore essential that students develop a deep understanding
of both who they are as individuals and how the legal training they are
receiving can be integrated with their sense of self. To this end, law
schools must create focused opportunities for students to reflect on their
intrapersonal development. 139 Law schools must also help students de-
velop a self-awareness of who they want to be as professionals by en-
couraging them to integrate their intrinsic goals and needs with the prac-
tice area they choose to pursue.
CONCLUSION
In essence, what we are advocating is a legal education focused on
the practical and humanistic aspects of the profession to the same extent
as the theoretical. By critiquing the current state of legal education, we
do not purport to solve all of its ills. Education is fluid, and institutions
maximize their potential by remaining flexible and dynamic, not by ad-
hering to hard and fast rules. Change and growth are inevitable even
under a comprehensive, integrated view of legal education because law
schools must be responsive to the demands of the legal profession and
society. But we believe that the narrow perspective of traditional legal
education has become antiquated and that the comprehensive law move-
ment is the harbinger of a rapidly approaching paradigm shift in legal
education. By integrating the doctrinal and practical aspects of their cur-
ricula and providing direct training in the skills and perspectives outlined
herein, law schools would provide students with a much more compre-
hensive toolkit with which to view disputes. Students would enter the
legal profession as creative problem-solvers, rather than mere legal ana-
lysts. Such an approach would be much more consonant with society's
need for lawyers. We must not forget that the law is founded on the so-
cial and moral evolution of humankind, not merely black-letter treatises,
codes, or casebooks..
138. See, e.g., Joshua E. Perry, Thinking Like a Professional (unpublished essay on file with
the authors) ("Over the course of their legal education, our students evolve both personally and
professionally along complex and rich domains."); Parker J. Palmer, A New Professional: The Aims
of Education Revisited, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION, Nov./Dec. 2007,
http:llwww.camegiefoundation.org/change/sub.asp?key=98&subkey=2455 (discussing how profes-
sional education has a tendency to focus exclusively on objective, analytical perspectives at the
expense of important humanistic, emotional elements); Keeva, supra note 49, at 98 ("Almost no-
where in our modern lexicon does the use of the word practice suggest that side by side with acquir-
ing knowledge of our chosen field we are simultaneously called on to make an active, ongoing effort
to work with ourselves inwardly if we are to engage in the full practice of our profession.").
139. See Perry, supra note 138, at 9.
[Vol. 86:2
PRAYING FOR A TAX BREAK: CHURCHES, POLITICAL




"Barack knows what it means to be a black man living in a country
and a culture that is controlled by rich white people. Hillary can never
know that."'  Those words were part of a Christmas morning sermon
preached by the Reverend Jeremiah Wright who, at the time, was the
senior pastor of the Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago, Illinois.2
The sermon was noteworthy for at least two reasons. One, then-Senator
Barack Obama was a member of Trinity United Church of Christ. Partly
because of that sermon, then-Senator Obama came under fire for Reve-
rend Wright's views,3 and subsequently had to respond with speech deal-
ing with Reverend Wright's sermons.4 More importantly for purposes of
this piece, Reverend Wright put his church's tax-exempt status in jeopar-
dy with this sermon.
On October 31, 2004, two days before the presidential election, the
Reverend George Regas preached a sermon at the All Saints Church in
Pasadena, California entitled "If Jesus Debated President Bush and Sena-
tor Kerry." 5 That sermon precipitated a chain of events that endangered
the All Saints Church's tax-exempt status.
Bill Keller, an evangelist based in Florida, was under fire for com-
ments made about Mitt Romney while Romney was a candidate to be the
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I. See Suzanne Sataline, Obama Pastors' Sermons May Violate Tax Law, WALL ST. J., Mar.
10, 2008, at Al.
2. Id.
3. See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Works to Shift Campaign Back to Domestic Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com2008/03/20/us/politics/20speech.html?_r=-
I &ref=politics&oref=slogin.
4. See generally Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union, Speech at the National Constitution
Center (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/us/politics/l8text-
obama.html?em&ex= 1206158400&en=8b748f91c621f76e&ei=5087%OA.
5. George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, All Saints Church, Sermon at the All Saints Church: If
Jesus Debated Senator Kerry And President Bush (Oct. 31, 2004), available at http://www.allsaints-
pas.org/sermons/(10-31-04)%20If%2oJesus%20Debated.pdf.
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Republican nominee for president. Americans United sent a letter to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requesting that it investigate Keller for
stating that "if you vote for Mitt Romney, you are voting for Satan."
6
Reverend Keller has defended his statement, asserting that he was mak-
ing a spiritual statement, not a political one.7 Reverend Keller will not be
the person making that decision however.
These are but three examples of a situation that is becoming more
problematic in American society-that of religious organizations, partic-
ularly churches, 8 providing guidance to their parishioners on how to vote
and for whom to vote. These churches and ministers that preside at the
churches do not feel they are doing anything wrong. Rather, they believe
that they are providing information to their parishioners on which candi-
dates support issues that are important to the church. Critics of these
churches and ministers contend that no matter how it is characterized,
such speech violates the prohibition on tax-exempt organizations partici-
pating in the political process. Therefore, the critics maintain that those
churches should lose their tax-exempt status.
Churches enjoy tax-exempt status pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code.9 That section provides the parameters by
which churches and other tax-exempt organizations may enjoy the bene-
fits of tax exemption. One requirement is that they do not engage in po-
litical speech or otherwise entangle themselves with the political process.
Churches and houses of worship are unique entities in American so-
ciety. They minister to their parishioners, run food banks, distribute
food, offer job counseling and, generally, deliver services to the commu-
nity at large. Indeed, the federal government has recognized that
churches are necessary providers of these services, and has enabled
churches and other religious organizations to receive funds under the
"faith based initiative" of the 1996 welfare reform act.'0 Some churches
6. See Separation of Church and State and Tax Exemptions, WAS14INGTON POST, June 1,
2007, at A04.
7. Id.
8. Throughout the course of this article the word "church" will be used to reference church,
temple, mosque, and other houses of worship. "Certain characteristics are generally attributed to
churches. These attributes of a church have been developed by the IRS and by court decisions.
They include: distinct legal existence; recognized creed and form of worship; definite and distinct
ecclesiastical government; formal code of doctrine and discipline; distinct religious history; mem-
bership not associated with any other church or denomination; organization of ordained ministers;
ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed courses of study; literature of its own; estab-
lished places of worship; regular congregations; regular religious services; Sunday schools for the
religious instruction of the young; schools for the preparation of its ministers. The IRS generally
uses a combination of these characteristics, together with other facts and circumstances, to determine
whether an organization is considered a church for federal tax purposes." See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, 27, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p 1828.pdf.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007).
10. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, § 104(A) and (B), 110 Stat. 2105. See also Michele Estrin Gilman, If At First You
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also believe that part of their calling is to speak out on issues that affect
their parishioners and their community. Accordingly, churches should
be able to speak on any issue that is of interest and importance to its pari-
shioners without fear of the loss of tax-exempt status.
This article explores the issues involved with churches and political
speech. Part I examines the relationship between religion and the state
starting with examples from the Christian Bible. It also briefly discusses
the history of religious tax exemptions through modem times. This Part
also examines how churches and religion have affected American life.
Part 11 examines Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
and discusses how the ban on political intervention came to be, and re-
views Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,1 the seminal case involving
churches, political speech, and tax-exempt status. This Part will also
review the Political Activities Compliance Initiative, a program started
by the IRS to review alleged political intervention by tax-exempt organi-
zations. The IRS, through this program, has investigated a number of
organizations.
Part In explores the constitutional issues related to churches and po-
litical speech. Specifically, this Part will examine the interplay of the
First Amendment and Section 501(c)(3) and whether the ban on political
intervention poses any constitutional problems.
Part IV discusses the problems of the political intervention ban in
Section 501(c)(3). It will also look at problems that are unique to
churches and structural problems with Section 501(c)(3).
Part V will demonstrate how Section 501(c)(3) actually affects
churches through a case study of the IRS's investigation of All Saints
Church. The All Saints investigation provides a current and public ex-
ample of what can happen if the IRS decides to investigate a church. All
Saints Church has posted all of its correspondence with the IRS on its
website. That has provided an unprecedented picture of how a church
investigation is conducted. This Part will then propose a limited solution
to the problem. Recognizing that there are legitimate reasons both for
having a ban on political intervention by churches and for allowing
churches to keep tax-exempt status despite making what is deemed polit-
ical speech, I will propose that a small exception be carved out for
churches. While my solution will likely not please either side in this
debate, it is a reasonable and necessary step.
Don't Succeed, Sign An Executive Order: President Bush And The Expansion Of Charitable Choice,
15 WM. & MARY BiLL RTS. J. 1103, 1104-06 (2007). Professor Gilman's article examines President
Bush's charitable choice executive orders to determine whether the orders were constitutional.
11. 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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I. AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCHES AND
THE STATE
A. A Brief History of Churches and Tax Exemptions
Religion and politics have had a close relationship since Biblical
times. According to the Bible, ancient Israel was a theocracy which was
ruled by a series of "judges" appointed directly by God.12 Subsequently,
when Israel demanded a king, God, through the prophet Samuel, chose
Saul.' 3 Israel's fortunes were directly affected by its obedience to God's
rule. For example, Israel was subject to three years of no rain until it
rejected Baal and pledged allegiance to God.14 Israel's apostasy led to its
captivity by ancient Babylon. 5
Given the close relationship between religion and the state, it is not
surprising that special privileges would be afforded to churches. The
earliest tax exemptions for churches can be traced to the Roman Em-
pire. 1 6 Emperor Constantine, after he joined the early Christian church,
granted preferences to the church. One of the preferences was a total
exemption from all forms of taxation.
1 7
England also has a history of tax exemption for churches dating
back to the Middle Ages.' 8 The common law in England during the six-
teenth century governed all aspects of church life. 19 It dictated what was
preached, where churches were located, the duties of its ministers, and
corporate form of the church, among other things.2° In addition to the
governance of church operations, the English common law governed
21church taxation.
Church property used for "religious" purposes was generally ex-
empt from taxation.22 The rationale for this exemption apparently was
that the church performed governmental functions and in exchange for
12. See, generally, the Biblical book of Judges for a description of the theocracy in ancient
Israel.
13. 1 Samuel 10:1.
14. 1 Kings 16:32-33; 17:1; 18:1.
15. 2 Chronicles 36:16-17, 20.
16. See Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches
Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 35 (2004).
Professor James discusses the question of whether churches in the United States are not complying
with the requirements of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code but still benefit by obtain-
ing tax-exempt status. Ultimately, Professor James concludes that churches have been engaging in
political activity and that Congress should amend Section 501(c)(3). See Id. at 78-79.
17. Id. at 35-36 (citing ALFRED BALK, THE FREE LIST: PROPERTY WITHOUT TAXES 21
(1971)).
18. Id. at 36 (citing ROUNDELL, ANCIENT FACTS AND FICTIONS CONCERNING CHURCHES
AND TITHES 194 (Macmillan and Company 1888)).
19. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 369 (1991).
20. Id.
21. ld. at 371-72.
22. Id.
[Vol. 86:2
PRA YING FOR A TAX BREAK
those functions would receive a tax exemption. In essence, there was a
quid pro quo for the church performing functions that the state either
could not or did not wish to perform.
B. Religious Tax Exemption in American Life
It should be no surprise that churches benefitted from tax exemp-
tions in early American life. Prior to the American Revolution, nine of
the thirteen colonies provided tax relief to established churches.2 4 Con-
gress as early as 1802 provided a tax exemption for churches. 25
When Congress enacted the first income tax during the Civil War, it
exempted charitable organizations.26 In the Tariff Act of 1894, Congress
explicitly provided a tax exemption for entities organized for religious
purposes.27 In 1917, Congress added a provision allowing deductions to
be taken for making a charitable contribution to organizations that oper-
ated exclusively for religious purposes.28
In 1934, there was an attempt by Congress to enact a ban on politi-
cal activity by tax-exempt organizations. 29 However, Congress was una-
ble to come to an agreement on language that would have protected cer-
tain charitable organizations and the ban was not passed. A ban on lob-
bying by tax-exempt organizations was enacted.3 °
C. The Importance of Churches in American Secular Life
Governments have given churches and religious organizations tax
exemptions because of the value that these entities provide to society.
Churches and religious leaders, however, are involved in numerous areas
of social work and political discourse which do not, at first glance, ap-
pear to relate directly to the spiritual well-being of their congregants.
A recent study by the Pew Research Center found that 78% of
American adults reported belonging to some Christian faith and 5% re-
ported belonging to some other faith, leaving only 16% unaffiliated with
23. Id. at 375.
24. See John K. Wilson, Comment, Religion Under the State Constitutions 1776-1880, 32 J.
CHURCH & ST. 753, 754 (1990).
25. See Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church, Political Activity and Tax Exemp-
tion, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 376 (2007).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See David M. Anderson, Political Silence at Church: The Empty Threat of Removing
Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial Attempts to Influence Legislation, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 115, 123-
24 (2006). The exemption also applied to contributions made to organizations that were organized
and operated exclusively for charitable, scientific or educational purposes.
29. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by Charitable Organizations under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69
BROOK. L. REv. 1, 23 (2003).
30. Id.
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any particular religion.3' While not every person who reported being
affiliated with a religion is a devout follower, it is not inconceivable that
a large number of people get more than traditional "spiritual" guidance
from their various denominations. These people receive guidance on
issues affecting their entire lives, not just on traditional "spiritual" is-
sues.
3 2
Clergy are speaking on a wide range of social issues.3 3 Survey res-
pondents who attended church services once or twice a month reported
that their ministers spoke about the following issues from the pulpit:
hunger and poverty, abortion, the war in Iraq, homosexuality, the envi-
ronment, evolution, the death penalty, stem cell research, and immigra-
tion.34 These are issues that touch all sectors of life in the United States.
If a church believes that it has a social justice mission, it would not be a
surprise that church leaders would want to speak on these issues.
Interestingly, the public is virtually evenly split on the question of
whether churches should actually speak out on political and social issues.
A survey conducted by the Pew Center found that 51% of respondents
believed that churches should speak out on political and social issues.
This split is not surprising. The United States is not monolithic in its
values. There are very few issues on which a solid majority agrees, ab-
sent a national crisis. Churches, like society, are not monoliths-some
are conservative, some are liberal, and others cannot be labeled. The
survey participants' ambivalence on the issue of speaking out on political
and social issues is a reflection of society.
D. Churches' Influence on Society
Churches and ministers have been at the forefront of social and po-
litical change throughout the history of the United States. It is hard to
imagine what our society would look like if churches had not been in-
volved in social justice. From civil rights to abortion to the peace
movement, churches have spoken out, marched, sat-in, and generally
rallied our country around these issues. And, churches have taken vary-
ing positions on some of the issues, which has enriched the debate on the
various issues.
31. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 10
(2008), http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-chapter- 1 .pdf. This
survey examined the public's acceptance of churches addressing topics than those that might be
considered purely Biblical. The survey generally found that while most Americans found that
religion was losing influence in the daily lives of Americans, religion was gaining influence in
politics and government.
32. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 73-74 (Basic Books 1993).
33. See generally THE PEw FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, MANY AMERICANS UNEASY
WITH MIX OF RELIGION AND POLITICS 9 (Aug. 24, 2006),
http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics-06.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.
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1. Reverend Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement
The Reverend Martin Luther King is probably the most prominent
example of a religious leader who influenced social policy and the politi-
cal process during the twentieth century. In 1955, Reverend King, while
the pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, organized the Mont-
gomery bus boycott which was precipitated by Rosa Parks's refusal to
give up her seat on a bus. 36 As a result of the boycott, the Supreme Court
ended segregation in public transportation.37 Reverend King further
helped found the Southern Christian Leader Conference, a prominent
civil rights organization in the 1950s and 1960s.38
There can be little doubt that the "church" and the teachings of the
"church" played a prominent role in Reverend King's leadership and in
the lives of the thousands who participated in the civil rights movement
because of him. It is not overstating the issue to say that the modern civil
rights movement would not have been as successful were it not for the
support of Reverend King's church and other black churches. Church
members were mobilized by their ministers. They were informed of civil
rights developments in church. The information shared in these churches
was not strictly religious in nature. However, those messages were in-
formed by shared beliefs grounded in the faith of those who gave the
messages and those who heard them. None of this would have been
possible were it not for the church.
2. President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative
The federal government is aware of the importance of churches in
providing social services to their communities. President Bush made his
"faith-based initiative" a centerpiece of his domestic policy. On January
29, 2001, he issued an Executive Order which created the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. 39  This office was
created to facilitate the awarding of funds to faith-based organizations
that wish to compete for federal funds to provide social services.40 This
initiative has been a major priority of President Bush. Since its inception
in 2001, eleven federal agencies have participated in the program; 41 and
36. See JOHN A. KIRK, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., 19-36 (Pearson Education Limited 2005)
(2005).
37. See Marc Brenman, Transportation Inequity in the United States: A Historical Overview,
34 HUM. RTS., Summer 2007, at 7, 9.
38. Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Our History,
http://sclcnational.org/net/content/page.aspx?s=25461.0.12.2607 (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
39. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/01/20010129-2.html.
40. White House Faith-Based & Community Initiative
http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemmentlfbci/president-initiative.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
41. Id.
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more than $2.1 billion in grants were awarded pursuant to this initiative
in the 2005 fiscal year.42
Religious organizations receiving funds under the initiative do not
have to hide the fact that they are, indeed, religious entities when provid-
ing services.43 They can retain religious symbols and icons in the facili-
ties where they provide services. They also can take religion into ac-
count when making employment decisions.44 They may not, however,
perform "inherently religious" activities when providing social services
pursuant to the federal grant. They also may not discriminate on the ba-
sis of religion against the recipients of the services that they are provid-
ing.45 This appears to be an attempt by the administration to allow reli-
gious organizations to retain some of their religious identity while recog-
nizing that separation of church and state must not be breached. It is also
another example of how religious organizations are integrated into all
areas of life, including those areas connected to politics.
Even absent the faith-based initiative, religious organizations re-
main major providers of social services in the United States. Organiza-
tions such as Catholic Charities and Adventist Community Services pro-
vide vital services to communities that local, state, and federal govern-
ments do not provide. These religious organizations provide job training,
meals, day-care services, counseling services, and a host of other social
services to their communities. These services do not involve teaching
religious doctrine, but they are biblically based. Were it not for organi-
zations like these, either the recipients of the services would do without,
or local, state, and federal governments would have to provide them.
These are but a few examples of how churches and other religious
organizations are an integral part of American life. Churches provide
value and service to their communities that the local, state and federal
governments do not and most likely cannot provide. Indeed, the federal
government encourages churches to provide social services that it is not
providing through the faith-based initiative.
Many Americans depend on their churches for guidance in all parts
of their lives, including politics: "The truth-an awkward one for the
guardians of the public square-is that tens of millions of Americans rely
on their religious traditions for the moral knowledge that tells them how
to conduct their lives, including their political lives.' 46 Given that so
42. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Compassion in Action: Producing
Real Results for Americans Most in Need (Mar. 9, 2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060309-3.htm
43. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,




46. See CARTER, supra note 32, at 67.
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many people rely on their faith to guide their daily living choices, it
stands to reason that churches want to give that guidance.
The fact that churches touch on so many aspects of people's lives
makes them different from other charitable and social justice organiza-
tions. A person might join Planned Parenthood or NARAL Pro-Choice
America 7 because they agree with one of the groups' position on abor-
tion. They might even vote for a political candidate based on whether
the candidate's views on abortion conform to their own and the group's
views. However, it is unlikely that either group will provide the range of
social services, let alone the moral teachings, that churches provide.
The members of individual churches also share strong religious
bonds that members of other organizations might not share.48 These
bonds can shape a congregant's life in all aspects, from making moral
choices, marriage decisions and, ultimately, the decision for whom to
vote. While other tax-exempt organizations have members that are pas-
sionate about them, those organizations just do not touch on as many
areas of their members' lives as churches do.
II. How AND WHY SECTION 501(C)(3) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE LIMITS WHAT CHURCHES MAY SAY
In 1954, circumstances occurred which led to the passage of the ban
on political activity as we now know it. Although there is little legisla-
tive history, it is generally accepted that the following facts probably led
to the ban. 49 In 1954, Senator Lyndon Johnson was running for reelec-
tion in his home state of Texas.50 Senator Johnson faced a primary chal-
lenge from one Dudley Dougherty, a rancher-oilman, who also happened
to be a millionaire. Dougherty was supported by the Committee for
Constitutional Government ("Committee"). The Committee, a conserva-
tive political group, produced material which, among other things, advo-
cated limiting the treaty-making authority of the President.51 The materi-
al also advocated voting for Senator Johnson's opponent, Dougherty, and
against Johnson.52
Senator Johnson became aware of the material, and asked his coun-
sel, Gerald Siegel, for an opinion on its legality. 53 Siegel informed John-
47. Formerly The National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League.
48. See Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When Churches Participate in Political Cam-
paigns, 10-11 (Ohio State Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 76, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=924770.
49. See Chris Kemitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of
Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 152 (2006).
50. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Poli-
tics by Charitable Organizations under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L.
REv. 1, 24 (2003).
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id. at 25-26.
53. Id. at 27.
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son that while the materials violated Texas law, they did not violate fed-
eral law as there was no prohibition against directly or indirectly attempt-
ing to influence a political campaign.54 Senator Johnson subsequently
introduced an amendment to Section 501(c)(3) that would prohibit tax-
exempt organizations from attempting to influence political campaigns.55
The present ban, codified in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, resulted.
A. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and How it Affects
Churches
The Internal Revenue Code provides tax exemptions for more than
thirty types of organizations. These organizations are usually governed
by one of five sections of the Code: 501(c)(3); 501(c)(4); 501(c)(5);
501(c)(6); and 527. Each of these sections controls a different type of
organization.
Section 501(c)(3) provides the guidance for "charitable organiza-
tions. 56 A charitable organization is one "organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, lite-
rary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international ama-
teur sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals . . . ,5' Section 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from
undertaking any political campaign activity and may only engage in a de
minimus amount of lobbying activity.5 8 No other tax-exempt organiza-
tions have this limitation.
Entities receiving a tax exemption pursuant to Section 501(c)(4) are
generally referred to as "social welfare" organizations. These organiza-
tions bear some similarity to those governed by Section 501(c)(3), but
there are some significant differences. First, Section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions are prohibited from receiving tax-exempt contributions, while Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations have no such prohibition.59 Second, Section
501(c)(4) entities are not as limited in the amount of political activity that
they may undertake, while Section 501(c)(3) organizations have strong
limitations.
60
Section 501(c)(5) organizations are described as labor, industrial, or
horticultural organizations. 61 Section 501(c)(6) organizations are de-
scribed as "business leagues, chambers of commerce, [and] real-estate
54. Id.
55. Id. at 28-29.
56. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3)-(4).
60. Id.
61. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(5).
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boards ... " among others. 62 Section 527 organizations are political or-
ganizations created for the purpose of accepting political contributions.
Generally speaking, the Internal Revenue Code exempts religious
(and charitable) organizations from the payment of taxes.63 There are
three conditions that must be met in order to receive the exemption.
First, no part of net earnings of the entity may benefit any private share-
holder or individual. Second, no substantial part of the organization's
activities may consist of lobbying or attempting to otherwise influence
legislation. Finally, the entity may not participate in or intervene in a
political campaign for any political office-state, local, or federal.
64
Taxpayers that contribute to these organizations are able to deduct those
contributions on their individual income tax returns.
65
The Internal Revenue Code mandates that religious organizations
seeking to obtain tax-exempt status from the IRS apply for a determina-
tion that they do, indeed, meet the requirements for tax-exempt status.66
Churches, however, are exempt from this advance filing requirement. A
church may simply hold itself out as tax-exempt. 67 In addition, churches
are relieved from reporting requirements that other tax-exempt organiza-
tions face.68 Nevertheless, in order to maintain their tax-exempt status,
churches and other religious organizations must comply with the prohibi-
tion against political lobbying and participating or intervening in political
campaigns.69
B. Political Activity
The Internal Revenue Code prohibits 501(c)(3) entities from "par-
ticipating in, or intervening in" political campaigns "on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office., 70 Section 501(c)(3) gives
no further guidance as to what exactly "participating" or "intervening" in
a political campaign actually is. The regulations accompanying Section
501(c)(3) are similarly unhelpful. The regulations simply state that "the
publication or distribution of written or printed statements or the making
of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate" are
prohibited activities.71
62. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(6).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3).
64. Id.
65. 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (2007).
66. 26 U.S.C. § 508(a) (2007).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 508(c)(1)(A).
68. See James, supra note 25, at 377.
69. Although the focus of this paper is not on lobbying, a brief discussion on lobbying is
instructive. Section 501(c)(3) states that "no substantial part" of a tax exempt organization's activi-
ties may be lobbying, which is described as "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to,
influence legislation." 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007).
70. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007).
71. See Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2008).
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The IRS has issued a revenue ruling which attempts to clarify the
situations for tax-exempt organizations because the Code and the regula-
tions are so vague.72 The revenue ruling describes twenty-one situations
and, in each hypothetical situation, attempts to answer the question of
whether the entity has intervened in a political campaign.73 The IRS
makes the obvious and somewhat unhelpful statement that "whether an
organization is participating .... directly or indirectly, in any political
campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office
depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of each case. 74 The
situations described in the revenue ruling are grouped into various cate-
gories of activities.
The first type of activity analyzed is voter education, voter registra-
tion and "get out the vote" drives.75 Section 501(c)(3) entities are al-
lowed to engage in these activities as long as the activity is non-partisan.
The activities must not favor or oppose one candidate over another.76
The revenue ruling next considers individual activities by leaders of
a 501(c)(3) organization. The IRS recognizes that the leaders have ex-
pression rights separate and apart from the organization that they
represent, and thus there is no restriction on these individuals taking part
in a political campaign. However, these individuals cannot make parti-
san statements in any organization publication or at official functions of
the organization.77
The next activity tackled is candidate appearances. Candidate ap-
pearances have become a major issue over the last few election cycles.
A 501(c)(3) organization may invite a candidate to speak and keep its
tax-exempt status. If a candidate is invited to speak in his or her capacity
as a candidate, the IRS will look at a number of factors to determine
whether the entity is impermissibly intervening in a political campaign.
The three factors 78 listed in the revenue ruling are: 1) whether the organi-
zation provided an equal opportunity for other candidates for the same
office to participate; 2) whether the organization indicated either support
or opposition to the candidate; and 3) whether fundraising occurred at the
event.79 No one factor is dispositive of the issue.
A timely example of the seriousness of this issue is the recent IRS
investigation into the United Church of Christ, the denomination to
72. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, I.R.B. 25 (2007).
73. Id. at 1421.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1422.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1422-23.
78. Although the Revenue Ruling indicates that the list is not exhaustive, no other factors are
listed as guidance for organizations. Id. at 1423.
79. Id.
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which then-Senator Barack Obama belongs.8° While the revenue ruling
states that whether other candidates are given an equal opportunity to
participate is a factor that the IRS will consider, the letter from the IRS to
the United Church of Christ states: "If a candidate is invited to speak in
his or her capacity as a candidate, then other candidates running for the
same office must also be invited to speak and there should be no indica-
tion of support for, or opposition to, any candidate by the organiza-
tion.""
This inconsistency between the ruling's text and its application is
also reflected in one of the examples in the revenue ruling for Section
501(c)(3). In the example, a minister invites a candidate to preach at her
church during worship services and invites no other candidates. The
example states that "by selectively providing church facilities to allow
Candidate X to speak in support of his campaign, Church O's actions
constitute political campaign intervention. 82  What was listed as one
factor that the IRS will consider has become, in the same revenue ruling,
an absolute ban on inviting a sole candidate to make an appearance. This
inconsistency provides no guidance to churches and other organizations
that wish to invite a candidate to speak. Admittedly, given the example
in the revenue ruling, a church might determine that the safest course of
action would be to invite all candidates for a political office to speak.
The IRS's letter to the United Church of Christ would certainly seem to
reinforce that belief. But the revenue ruling's text is inconsistent with its
examples, and an organization could make a legitimate argument that
inviting multiple candidates is not required.
Similarly, if an organization invites a candidate to speak as a non-
candidate, but the candidate is "publicly recognized" by the organization,
then the IRS will consider the following factors in determining whether
there has been an impermissible intervention in a political campaign: 1)
whether the individual has been chosen to speak solely for reasons unre-
lated to his candidacy; 2) whether the individual is speaking in a non-
candidate capacity; 3) whether either the individual or organization
makes mention of the political candidacy; 4) whether any campaign ac-
tivity occurs in connection with the appearance; 5) whether there is a
"nonpartisan atmosphere" at the event where the candidate is present;
and 6) whether the organization indicates the capacity the individual is
appearing and does not mention the individual's candidacy. 83 It appears
80. See Letter from Marsha Ramirez, Dir., Exempt Orgs., Examinations, to United Church of
Christ (Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://www.ucc.org/news/pdf/lettrirs.pdf. Then-Senator Obama
spoke at the United Church of Christ's biennial General Synod at the Hartford Civic Center on June
23, 2007. Additionally, a number of volunteers to the Obama campaign staffed tables outside the
event promoting then-Senator Obama's candidacy.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
83. Id.
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that as long as the individual's candidacy is not mentioned the IRS will
not find that the inviting entity intervened in a political campaign.
The next category of activities is issue advocacy. Section 501(c)(3)
organizations may take positions on issues as long as they do not favor
one candidate over another. 84 The IRS lists a number of factors that it
will consider when making a determination on whether an organization
intervened in a political campaign on this basis.85 Although "all facts
and circumstances need to be considered," the communication will prob-
ably be deemed an intervention in a campaign if it makes reference to
86candidates or an upcoming election.
The IRS also scrutinizes business activities and website links, but
these activities are beyond this paper's scope and will not be discussed.
C. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti
The seminal case dealing with churches and political speech is
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti. The defendant, Branch Ministries, Inc.,
operated the Church at Pierce Creek, in Binghamton, New York. It
placed advertisements in USA Today and the Washington Times four
days before the 1992 presidential election. The advertisements, which
bore the headline "Christians Beware," asserted that Bill Clinton's posi-
tions on abortion, homosexuality, and condom distribution to teenagers
were contrary to the Bible and urged all Christians not to vote for him.
87
At the bottom of the advertisement was a statement informing the reader
that the advertisement was co-sponsored by the Church at Pierce Creek
and other unnamed churches and concerned Christians nationwide. It
further stated that tax-deductible donations for the advertisement would
be accepted and gave a mailing address for donations.
88
A newspaper article in the New York Times mentioned that the ad-
vertisement was scheduled to run in 157 more newspapers. 89 Not only
did the New York Times take note of the advertisement, but the IRS also
noticed. On November 20, 1992, the Regional Commissioner of the IRS
notified Branch Ministries that he had authorized a "church tax in-




87. Id. at 140.
88. Id.
89. Peter Applebome, Religious Right Intensifies Campaign for Bush, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31,
1992, at Al.
90. The Internal Revenue Service can initiate a "church tax inquiry" pursuant to Section 7611
of the Internal Revenue Code. The inquiry can only be "initiate[d] ... if the Director, Exempt
Organizations, Examinations reasonably believes . . . that the [church]: (a) may not qualify to be
tax-exempt; or (b) may not be paying tax on an unrelated business or other taxable [entity]." See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, at 26,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
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tax-exempt or that you may be liable for tax."9' As part of the inquiry,
the IRS summoned information from Branch Ministries. Branch Minis-
92tries refused to fully comply with the summons. The IRS then began
an examination of Branch Ministries. The examination proved to be
unproductive, and as a result the IRS revoked the churches tax-exempt
status. Branch Ministries subsequently sued over the loss of its tax-
exempt status.
93
In district court, the church asserted that the revocation of its tax-
exempt status violated its right to free speech and free exercise of reli-
gion, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The church
also asserted that the IRS engaged in selective prosecution in violation of
the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.94 The district court
eventually granted the United States' motion for summary judgment. 95
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit dealt with three arguments raised by
Branch Ministries. First, it rejected the argument that the IRS did not
have the statutory authority to revoke Branch Ministries' tax-exempt
status. 96 Branch Ministries made the somewhat clever argument that the
statutory language of Section 501(c)(3) refers to religious organizations,
not churches, and that Section 508(c)(1)(A) exempts churches from ap-
plying in advance for tax-exempt status.97  Therefore, according to
Branch Ministries, a church's tax-exempt status flows from the fact that
there is no provision in the tax code for the taxation of churches.98 The
D.C. Circuit rejected this argument stating that although every religious
organization is not a church, every church is a religious organization.
Therefore, Section 501(c)(3) applied to Branch Ministries.99 Additional-
ly, Branch Ministries applied for and received an advance determination
from the IRS that it indeed was a church. 1°°
The court next dismissed Branch Ministries' free-exercise claim,
finding that the revocation of its tax-exempt status did not "substantially
burden" its right to practice religion.' 10 Specifically, the court found that
withdrawing from electoral politics would not impact the church's reli-
gious beliefs. The court found that "the sole effect of the loss of the tax
exemption will be to decrease the amount of money available to the
Church for its religious practices. ' 02 The court also found that the
91. See Branch Ministries v. Rossoti, 211 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 141.
95. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15. 27 (D.D.C. 1999).





101. Id. at 142.
102. Id.
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church could establish a separate organization under Section 501(c)(4) of
the Internal Revenue Code, and have that organization set up a political
action committee to engage in political speech. 10 3 Finally, the court re-
jected the church's claim that the government violated the Fifth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution by engaging in selective prosecution. The
court stated that the church did not show it was similarly situated to the
other churches.'°4
While the Branch Ministries court came to the correct result given
the facts of the case, it is likely it reached that result for the incorrect
reasons. As noted earlier, the court found that "the sole effect of the loss
of the tax exemption will be to decrease the amount of money available
to the Church for its religious practices. ' '105 The court was probably cor-
rect in recognizing that the church would have less money available to it.
However, the court appears to have taken the position that this loss
would be irrelevant to whether the church could continue in its ministry.
That view does not give enough weight to the effect of losing tax-exempt
status. It is hard to imagine that a church would be able to minister to its
congregants and provide pastoral care and services at the same level if
the amount of money available to it were to decrease. Loss of the tax
exemption would directly impact how a church is able to exercise its
religion.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TAX EXEMPTIONS
Although churches are bound by the same ban on political activity
as other tax-exempt organizations in Section 501(c)(3), they differ from
other tax-exempt and social justice organizations. The first major differ-
ence between churches and other charitable organizations is that religion
is specifically mentioned and protected in the U.S. Constitution. 106 The
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause set religion and
churches apart from other charitable and social justice organizations. It
is instructive that protection for religion was included in the very first
amendment to the Constitution. The First Amendment contains provi-
sions that the government shall not establish a state religion, the Estab-
103. Id. at 143. The Court did note that the Section 501(c)(4) organization would need to be
separately incorporated and maintain records that demonstrated that no tax-exempt donations were
used to support the political action committee.
104. Id. at 144. In order to prevail in a claim of selective prosecution, it must be shown that (1)
the party was singled out for prosecution from others that were singularly situated; and (2) the prose-
cution was improperly motivated. The Court found that Branch Ministries did not show that other
churches had placed advertisements in national newspapers and solicited donations to pay for the
advertisements. It appears that the scope of the political speech by Branch Ministries played a role
in the Court's reasoning.
105. Id. at 142. The Court also stated that it thought that the impact of the decrease in money
was "overstated." The IRS asserted, and the Court agreed, that the Church may hold itself out as a
501(c)(3) organization in the future and that donors would be tax deductible as long as the donors
established that the Church met the requirements of Section 501(c)(3). Id. at 142-43.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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lishment Clause, and that citizens shall be able to freely exercise their
religion, the Free Exercise Clause.
107
The First Amendment is an acknowledgement that, for many, reli-
gion is an important part of American life. The First Amendment pro-
tects those who value religion from those that do not and, just as impor-
tant, it protects those who do not value religion from those that do.
While the NAACP, ACLU, and NRA are important parts of the lives of
those who are members of those organizations, these organizations do
not receive the explicit protection that churches do through the First
Amendment.
A. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause provides that the government may not
prefer one religion over another. 10 8 The seminal Establishment Clause
case is Lemon v. Kurtzman.09 In Lemon, taxpayers in Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania challenged statutes that gave state aid to non-public
schools. 110 In Rhode Island, the state provided a salary supplement to
teachers in non-public schools at which the average expenditure per stu-
dent on secular education was less than the average in the state's public
school.1 At the time of the trial, 250 teachers had applied for the sup-
plement, all of whom were employed in Roman Catholic schools.'1 2 A
federal district court found the Rhode Island statute unconstitutional as a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
1 3
Similarly, a Pennsylvania statute allowed non-public schools to be
directly reimbursed for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional ma-
terials.1 4 However, it limited reimbursement to "secular" subjects and
prohibited reimbursement for a course that contained materials express-
ing religious teaching. 115 A Pennsylvania federal district court found that
the Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause.' 16 The U.S. Supreme Court decided to consolidate
the two cases.' 17
The Supreme Court held that both statutes were unconstitutional
and articulated a three-part test for the analysis of cases which impacted
the religion clauses. First, a statute must have a secular purpose; second,
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
110. Id. at 606-07.
111. Id. at 607.
112. Id. at 608.
113. Id. at 609.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 610.
116. Id. at 611.
117. See id. at 606 ("These two appeals raise questions as to Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools.").
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the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and finally, the sta-
tute in question must not cause an "excessive entanglement" with reli-
gion. 118 The Court found that both the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes had an impermissible entanglement with religion.
B. Free Exercise Clause
The more interesting part of the religion clauses when it comes to
an analysis of churches and political speech is the Free Exercise Clause.
The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . .1"9 First and foremost,
"The free exercise of religion means ... the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires. 1 20 Because an argument can be
made that the current prohibition on political activity by churches pre-
vents them from exercising their religious rights, a free exercise analysis
must be undertaken.
The Supreme Court's current jurisprudence regarding the Free Ex-
ercise Clause is explained in Employment Division v. Smith.1 21 In Smith,
the government fired two men from their jobs for using peyote, a hallu-
cinogenic drug, during ceremonies at their Native-American church. The
employees were subsequently denied unemployment benefits because of
a state law barring persons from receiving unemployment benefits if they
were fired for misconduct. The men sued the state asserting that the
denial of benefits violated their First Amendment right to free exercise of
their religion. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the state statute
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court, however, stated that a statute that not only infringed on
the Free Exercise Clause but also implicated another First Amendment
right could be unconstitutional. 2 2 An example of this "hybrid" type of
claim is one that involves a Free Exercise claim and a freedom of speech
claim. Because Smith only involved a Free Exercise claim, it was not
subject to analysis under the hybrid claim analysis and the statute in
question was upheld.
C. First Amendment Analysis of Section 501(c)(3)
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is a blanket prohibi-
tion on entities that wish to remain tax-exempt from undertaking any
political activity.123 This prohibition implicates both freedom of speech
and freedom of religion and, therefore, is subject to analysis under Smith.
118. Id. at 612-13.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
120. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
121. Id. at 874.
122. Id. at 881.
123. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007).
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1. Freedom of Speech
There should be no doubt that Section 501(c)(3) impacts the free
speech rights of churches. Religious speech and political speech can be
hard, or sometimes impossible, to differentiate. 124  Where one person
might assert that a minister is making a political statement, another might
say the minister is making purely religious remarks.
For example, a minister might preach a sermon on the New Testa-
ment parable of the Good Samaritan. 12  The minister might use the para-
ble to encourage his congregation to help all people regardless of their
differences. That would be a fairly benign use of the parable and would
not implicate Section 501 (c)(3).
But suppose the minister wished to use the parable to make the case
that a candidate running for public office advocated positions which ran
counter to the church's position on helping all. Or, what if the pastor
wished to point out that another candidate advocated positions which
would have made it easier to minister to people of different nationalities
or ethnicities? Including either of those facts into a sermon might invite
an inquiry from the IRS.
Could the sermon be given without reference to either of the candi-
dates? Yes, of course it could. Would it be as effective? That is a ques-
tion that only the minister can answer. Would a minister omit the refer-
ences to the candidates in order to avoid an investigation by the IRS?
Clearly, there are some churches and pastors that do not let the threat of
an IRS investigation deter them; that is why this issue is growing in visi-
bility and significance. However, there are some churches that may be
deterred from speaking out on issues because of the fear of losing tax-
exempt status. 126 This is a colorable infringement on speech that should
trigger a hybrid claim under Smith.
2. Free Exercise
For a church that believes that it has a social justice mission, speak-
ing out on matters that may be deemed political in nature may be an es-
124. See Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohi-
bits; Why; To What End?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 903, 907, 911 (2001).
125. Luke 10:25-37. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, a Jewish traveler is accosted by
robbers along a road and left for dead. A priest and a Levite see the traveler but do not stop to help.
A Samaritan sees the traveler, stops, and helps the man to a place of safety. The significance of the
parable is that Samaritans and Jews were enemies.
126. A real-life example of this occurred in the controversy over the remarks made by Reve-
rend Jeremiah Wright and then-Senator Obama's subsequent speech in response to the furor. Then-
Senator Obama's speech occurred just days before Easter Sunday, and some ministers thought that
would be an appropriate time to address the issues of race raised by then-Senator Obama. Some
ministers, however, were afraid to speak on the subject for fear of triggering an investigation by the
Internal Revenue Service. See Laurie Goodstein and Neela Banerjee, Obama's Talk Fuels Easter
Sermons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at Al.
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sential part of its ministry. 127 The moral issues that churches in particular
and society in general care about cannot be spoken about solely by refe-
rencing the Bible or the Koran or any other religious book. These mes-
sages must have context, and that context is society at large. This
"mixed message" is important for churches. If a church is precluded
from speaking on an issue because it fears the loss of its tax-exempt sta-
tus, that is an arguable infringement on the church's free exercise
rights.'28
For example, a church wishing to teach on the abortion issue will
not only instruct its congregants from the Bible (or Koran) but will also
speak about the effect that abortion has on the parties involved and on
society. The church might also want to speak on the legality of abortion
in this country and, presumably, the positions that politicians have taken
on the issue.
Consider again the hypothetical of the church that wishes to preach
on the Good Samaritan and reference political candidates. In that situa-
tion, a minister has two options. 29 One option is to preach the sermon
with references to the candidates and let the chips fall where they may.
There are churches that choose this option, but it cannot be expected that
all churches would do so. Churches, after all, are organizations that be-
lieve in keeping the law. While some churches do advocate civil disobe-
dience in certain circumstances, this might not be the issue that forces a
church into civil disobedience.
A second option would be for the minister to preach the sermon but
forego making reference to the candidates. The sermon would still give
instruction to the congregants on Biblical teaching, but the decision is
being made because the church does not want to lose its tax-exempt sta-
tus. In other words, the church is limiting its speech in order to obtain a
governmental benefit. That is an infringement on speech colorable
enough to implicate a hybrid claim under Smith.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE LAW
It should be apparent that Section 501(c)(3) provides enforcement
problems both for the IRS and for churches, although both issues are
intermingled to some extent.
127. See Megan J. Ryan, Can the IRS Silence Religious Organizations, 40 IND. L. REV. 73, 92
(2007).
128. See id.; see also Deirdre Dessingue Halloran & Kevin M. Kearney, Federal Tax Code
Restrictions on Church Political Activity, 38 CATH. LAW. 105, 129-30 (1998).
129. There actually might be a third option. The Church could operate a separate entity under
Section 501(c)(4) and make all of its "religious" pronouncements through that organization. There
are problems with this approach, however. Setting up a separate entity under Section 501(c)(4) may
be less attractive for churches and religious organizations because contributions to 501(c)(4)s are not
deductible for the donor. There may also be extensive record-keeping issues and problems asso-
ciated with determining how to account for a pastor's time who both preaches for a 501(c)(3) and
advocates for a 501 (c)(4).
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A. Problems for Churches
For many people, their religious faith touches on all aspects of their
lives.1 30 These people rely on their religious faith to govern who they
marry, where they educate their children, how they invest their money,
and all aspects of their lives. It would be heretical to expect these people
to make a life decision, be it major or minor, without their faith playing a
role in the decision. For a few, adherence to religious principles is just as
or more important than adherence to civil laws.13 1 Given the importance
of faith in their lives, some church members might want their church to
give guidance on issues that touch on politics.
Churches also have an important role in society. They can provide
moral clarity to issues that are problematic to society as a whole. Also,
churches of various denominations may take differing positions on issues
and provide more voices for society to hear.
The ban on churches engaging in political speech deprives society
of a voice that adds diversity to the dialogue on issues important to socie-
ty.' 32 Churches have a distinct voice, and the public square is diminished
when churches avoid speaking because of the ban in Section 501(c)(3).
133
While every person might not want to hear the voice of the church,
churches still need to be heard.
Additionally, the ban on political activity forces churches to make a
distinction between what is "purely religious" and what is "political."'
134
This distinction ignores the fact that a church's message goes further
than its religious doctrine. Many churches take to heart the call to social
activism in the Christian Bible and call on their members to feed the
hungry, clothe the naked, and help the poor. 35 These churches, when
they see an injustice in society, will combat that injustice by sitting in,
marching, and yes, speaking out. Sometimes that speech will necessarily
call out a politician that the church believes can and should do more to
help.
All churches, however, do not feel a "social justice" call. There are
many churches that do not feel it is their place to do so, and it is their
130. See Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith: Rethinking the Prohibition on Political Campaign
Intervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 298, 310 (2007).
131. See Eduardo Mois~s Pefialver and Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1095, 1130 (2007).
132. See Richard Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42
B.C. L. REV. 771, 799-800 (2001). Gamett argues that by restricting a church's political involve-
ment the government is interpreting the means by which religious groups live out their faith and
reinforcing the notion that religion is and should be kept merely a private matter and in essence
privatizes religion. This treatment encourages non-believers to view religion as a private matter and
reinforces the government's own view of the nature of religion to the detriment of faith communi-
ties.
133. See Goodstein and Banerjee, supra note 126, at Al.
134. See Kemmitt, supra note 49, at 167.
135. See Matthew 25:34-40.
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right under the First Amendment to refrain from this mission if they do
not feel they are called to it. However, there are many churches that feel
the call to social justice, and they should not be prohibited from heeding
that call because of the threat of losing tax-exempt status.
The fear of losing tax-exempt status most certainly raises free exer-
cise issues for churches. The loss of tax-exempt status for engaging in
speech or activities that churches feel are mandated by their religious
beliefs effectively forces churches to change their behavior in order to
receive tax-exempt status. "Churches that convey a religious mes-
sage... are taxed; churches who abstain are not."' 36 As one commenta-
tor stated, "Section 501(c)(3)... pays churches through tax-exempt sta-
tus to be silent on issues deemed by the state to be political."
1 37
Churches face the false choice of choosing to retain tax-exempt sta-
tus or to exercise their faith in the manner they feel they are called to
do.' 38 Very few churches have the wherewithal and financial ability to
engage the IRS in a battle over whether their activities are tax-exempt.
39
Thus, most churches will most likely not choose to forego tax-exempt
status, but rather will not engage in arguably "political" activity.
Some commentators claim that lifting the ban on political activity
might be a free exercise violation because it would be a "subsidy" by the
government to churches to practice religion. 14° Setting aside the issue of
whether tax-exempt status truly is a subsidy, that claim ignores the fact
that even with the prohibition on political activity, the government is
providing a "subsidy" to churches to engage in the free exercise of reli-
gion, albeit absent political activity.
The harm that would be the most catastrophic for churches is also
the one most difficult to measure-the loss of contributions by congre-
gants because of the loss of tax deductibility. If a church loses its tax-
exempt status, donations to that church are no longer tax deductible.
14'
Most of a church's income is derived from donations. 42 The best statis-
tics indicate that thirty percent of taxpayers itemize their deductions.
43
What is unknown is how many church-goers itemize their deductions. It
136. See Kemmitt, supra note 49, at 171.
137. Randy Lee, When A King Speaks Of God; When God Speaks To A King: Faith, Politics,
Tax Exempt Status, And The Constitution In The Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 2000, at 391,434.
138. Dessingue, supra note 124, at 920.
139. See Halloran & Kearney, supra note 128, at 131.
140. See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)S, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1347 (2007).
141. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2007).
142. See Ellen Aprill, Churches, Politics and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C.
L. REv. 843, 844-45 (2001); see also Michael Hatfield, Ignore the Rumors-Campaigning from the
Pulpit is Okay: Thinking past the Symbolism of Section 501(c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 125, 155 (2006). Aprill and Hatfield cite statistics that estimate that religious organiza-
tions receive either 84% (Hatfield) or 94 % (April]) of their revenue from donations.
143. Aprill, supra note 142, at 845.
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would not be unreasonable to believe that church-goers itemize at the
same rate as the rest of the taxpaying public. 144 However, the real, and
for churches the frightening, unknown is how many of the donors would
stop donating if a church were to lose its tax-exempt status. That is a
question whose answer can only be known if, and when, a church loses
its tax-exempt status. Congregants may assert they are contributing be-
cause of their religious convictions, but until those congregants are faced
with the loss of the deductibility of their donations, and potentially high-
er tax liabilities, there is no way to know what they will do.
Given that churches are so dependant on donations, the loss of even
a small portion of their revenue could be problematic. It stands to reason
that a church would have to cut back on the services that it offers. The
choice might come down to scaling back the services that a church pro-
vides to its members or scaling back the services that it provides to its
community.
B. Structural Problems
The IRS must necessarily monitor church services and communica-
tions to ensure that their content does not cross the line into political ad-
vocacy. 145 It must also determine who spoke, when the speech took
place, if anyone else was invited to speak, and what was said. This ex-
amination into the affairs of Section 501(c)(3) organizations is intrusive,
at best. This examination of churches runs dangerously close to an en-
tanglement between the government and churches that violates the Free
Exercise Clause. 146
Less apparent, but equally serious, are confidentiality issues.
147
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits the IRS from dis-
closing taxpayer information in almost every circumstance. 14 This pro-
hibition was enacted to protect taxpayer privacy. 149 However, the prohi-
bition also means that the public is unaware when or if a church is being
investigated for a possible violation of Section 501(c)(3) unless, of
course, the church discloses the fact that it is being investigated. This
confidentiality poses unique problems in this circumstance.
Because of the confidentiality requirement, churches do not have
clear guidance regarding the circumstances under which an investigation
will be started or what activities are permissible or impermissible. 150
Moreover, because these investigations involve politics, there is suspi-
cion that the investigations are, or at least might be, politically moti-
144. Hatfield, supra note 142, at 157.
145. See Samansky, supra note 48, at 28.
146. Id. at 49.
147. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2007); see also Tobin, supra note 140, at 1355-56.
148. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2007).
149. Tobin, supra note 140, at 1355.
150. Id. at 1356.
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vated.151 And, because of Section 6103, the IRS cannot defend itself
against charges of selective or politically motivated investigations.
52
Additionally, given the intensively factual nature of these investiga-
tions, there is no bright-line test for churches on what is and is not per-
missible. Section 501(c)(3) is vague and the regulations do not add
much, if any, clarity to the discussion. Add to that the fact there is a
scarcity of case law and that creates a sea of uncertainty for churches.
153
An additional problem is that the law has historically not been strin-
gently enforced. There has only been one court case where a church has
lost tax-exempt status for violating the ban on political activity. 54 How-
ever, in 2004, the IRS started what it called the "Political Activities
Compliance Initiative.' 55 In a report issued on the initiative, the IRS
stated that the objective of the initiative was to "promote compliance
with the IRC § 501(c)(3) prohibition against political campaign interven-
tion by reviewing and addressing allegations of political intervention by
tax-exempt organizations on an expedited basis during the 2004 election
year.' 156 The initiative focused on the 2004 election cycle and covered
referrals through November 2004.157
The IRS initially assigned 132 cases to the field for examination,
but determined during an initial review that twenty-two of them would
be closed without contacting the organization, resulting in 110 actual
examinations. 158  Of the remaining 110 examinations, forty involved
churches. 59 Within the forty church examinations, the IRS found that
thirty-seven churches intervened in a political campaign and were either
issued an advisory by the IRS that the church had impermissibly inter-
vened or had an excise tax assessed.160  Given the vast number of
churches in the United States and the seemingly large number of
churches that appears to, at the least, dabble in politics this enforcement
appears to be minimal.
This lax enforcement by the IRS is definitely counter-intuitive. It
would be easy to believe that the churches are being investigated con-
stantly for violating the ban on political intervention in Section
501(c)(3). However, that is not the case, despite the perceived level of
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1357-58.
154. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
155. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302, POLITICAL ACTIvrrIEs
COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/finaLpaci-report.pdf.
156. Id. at 1.
157. Id.
158. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2004 POLITICAL ACTIVITY COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE
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non-compliance with the statute. 61 Lax enforcement by the IRS may
result in more churches that may feel emboldened to violate the ban giv-
en the low number of investigations of churches. 162 While this article
calls for Section 501(c)(3) to be amended, it does not call for wide-
spread flouting of the law.
The IRS's minimal enforcement of Section 501(c)(3) undoubtedly
leads to enforcement that is at best inequitable for similarly situated
churches. 163 While a high-profile church might be investigated for an
alleged violation of Section 501(c)(3), a church with a lower profile
might engage in the same conduct and not draw the attention and scruti-
ny of the IRS. Because of the confidentiality rules of Section 501(c)(3),
neither church might be aware of the disparate treatment. While there
were very few examinations of churches during the 2004 election cycle
and fewer determinations of noncompliance, it is likely that noncom-
pliance with Section 501(c)(3) was more widespread.
V. REAL LIFE EXAMPLES AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
While hypothetical examples can show the problems of the current
law regarding tax-exempt status, there is a real-life example that shines a
light on the issue.
A. The All Saints Investigation
Two days before the 2004 election, the Reverend George Regas
preached a sermon entitled, "If Jesus Debated President Bush and Sena-
tor Kerry."' 64 Reverend Regas is the Rector Emeritus and former pastor
of the All Saints Church. In the sermon, Reverend Regas immediately
stated two things: 1) that Jesus wins; and 2) that he (Reverend Regas)
does not intend to tell anyone how to vote. 65 Reverend Regas then pro-
ceeded to preach a sermon touching on the peace movement, poverty,
and abortion. At times, the sermon used hypothetical questions from
Jesus addressing both President Bush and Senator Kerry. Other times,
the questions were addressed solely to President Bush. At another point,
Reverend Regas took on conservative politicians who allegedly have
more compassion for fetuses than for children after they were born. Re-
verend Regas then closed the sermon with the following words: "When
you go into the voting booth on Tuesday, take with you all that you know
about Jesus, the peacemaker. Take all that Jesus means to you. Then
vote your deepest values. Amen."'
' 66
161. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by
Charities, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT. L. REv. 1, 4 (2007).
162. See id. at 16, 19-20.
163. See Tobin, supra note 140, at 1356.
164. Regas, supra note 5, at 1.
165. Id. at 1.
166. Id. at 6.
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It is clear that the Reverend-in all likelihood because he was aware
of the prohibition against campaigning in church-attempted make his
sermon as neutral as possible. But, it is also clear that the sermon, de-
spite best efforts, was more critical of President Bush than Senator Ker-
ry. News of the sermon spread fast. The day following the sermon, an
article appeared in the Los Angeles Times regarding the sermon.' 67 The
IRS became aware of the sermon through the article and sent All Saints a
"Tax Inquiry Letter," stating that it was commencing an investigation
into the sermon, and that All Saints might have violated the prohibition
against political campaigning. 168 Attached to the letter was a series of
questions. 169
Ed Bacon, the pastor of the All Saints Church, informed the congre-
gation of the investigation on November 6, 2005.170 The day following
the announcement of the investigation to the congregants, the church
issued a press release regarding the IRS investigation.'
71
The IRS summons issued to All Saints started out by seeking the
organizing documents for All Saints. It, however, quickly got to the
heart of the matter and sought the following documents: 1) a copy of all
electronic recordings of Reverend Regas's sermon; 2) a copy of all elec-
tronic recordings made of remarks to the church after the Reverend Re-
gas's sermon which referenced the sermon; and 3) a copy of all writings
which referenced Reverend Regas's sermon. 172 All Saints did not comp-
ly with the summons.
All Saints subsequently heard nothing from the Internal Revenue
Service until September 10, 2007, when the IRS informed the church that
it had concluded its investigation. 173 The IRS's letter to All Saints stated
that All Saints had, indeed, intervened in the 2004 presidential campaign,
167. Josh Getlin, The Race for the White House: Pulpits Ring with Election Messages, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at Al.
168. Tax Inquiry Letter from R. C. Johnson, Dir., Exempt Org., Examinations, to All Saints
Church (June 9, 2005), http://aschu.convio.net/pdf/IRS%2Letter%2Oto%20A1%20Saints.pdf.
169. Id.
170. The All Saints website describes the day as one that was both joyful and sad as the Reve-
rend Desmond Tutu preached at the church on that particular Sunday. The announcement to the
congregants stated that All Saints church was "self identified" as a "peace church" since 1987. The
announcement further stated that the church would "continue from a nonpartisan perspective to teach
and proclaim with vigor the core values of Christianity as we stand in the prophetic tradition of Jesus
the peacemaker." See All Saints Church News and Actions, http://www.allsaints-
pas.org/site/PageServer?pagename=IRS-Exam-splash (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
171. PRESS RELEASE, ALL SAINTS CHURCH (Nov. 4, 2005)
http://aschu.convio.net/pdf/ARS%20PressRelease.pdf. The Church's tax counsel was quoted in the
press release. The counsel is the former director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division.
172. SUMMONS FROM INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT
ENTITIES DIVISION, TO ALL SAINTS CHURCH at 1 (Sept. 15, 2006), http://www.allsaints-
pas.org/site/DocServer/IRS-Summons.pdf?doclD=503.
173. See LETTER FROM MARSHA A. RAMiREz, Din. EXEMPT ORGS., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, TO MARCUS S. OWENS, COUNSEL FOR ALL SAINTS CHURCH I (Sept. 10, 2007),
www.allsaints-pas.org/site/DocServer/Letter_fromlRS toAllSaintsChurch.pdf?doclD=254 1.
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but that the intervention appeared to be a one-time occurrence and All
Saints still qualified for tax-exempt status.
174
This development, while a good one for the All Saints Church,
should be unsatisfying to both opponents and proponents of the Section
501(c)(3) ban. For those supporting the ban, the good news is that the
IRS found that All Saints intervened in the 2004 campaign. The bad
news is that the IRS concluded that the intervention was a one-time event
and allowed All Saints to keep its tax-exempt status. Given that All
Saints has self-identified as a peace church, it is probable that the sermon
by Reverend Regas was not the only time that All Saints has spoken out
on issues that touched on politics and candidates. 175 Because All Saints
did not comply with the IRS's summons and the IRS did not attempt to
compel compliance, the IRS could not have conducted a complete inves-
tigation into All Saints' past practices. The IRS was probably unable to
make a determination that could have sustained a revocation of All
Saints' tax-exempt status.
Opponents of the ban most likely cheer the fact that All Saints did
not lose its tax-exempt status-but that is probably all they are cheering
about. The IRS found that All Saints intervened in a political campaign.
The IRS very easily could have stripped All Saints of its tax-exempt sta-
tus, as it did Branch Ministries. This fact was not lost on All Saints.
Subsequent to receiving the closing letter from the IRS, All Saints called
on the IRS to apologize and issue a correction.1 76 Specifically, Reverend
Bacon, quoted in a press release distributed by All Saints, stated that
[w]hile we are pleased that the IRS examination is finally over, the
IRS has failed to explain its conclusion regarding the single sermon
at issue. Synagogues, mosques, and churches across America have
no more guidance about the IRS rules now than when we started this
process over two long years ago. The impact of this letter leaves a
chilling effect cast over the freedom of America's pulpits to preach
core moral values. We have no choice but to demand clarification on
this matter with the IRS.
17 7
Reverend Bacon recognized the very reason the conclusion of the
investigation was unsatisfactory: There was no indication from the IRS
174. Id.
175. It should be noted that the author has no evidence that the situation described above was
not an isolated incident.
176. See LETrER FROM ALL SAINTS CHURCH, TO IRS (Sept. 21, 2008), http://www.allsaints-
pas.org/site/DocServer/Letterto IRS-Commissioner_092107.pdf?doclD=-2542.
177. See PRESS RELEASE FROM ALL SAINTS CHURCH, ALL SAINTS CHURCH, PASADENA
DEMANDS CORRECTION AND APOLOGY FROM THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1 (Sept, 23, 2007)
http://www.allsaints-pas.org/site/DocServer/IRSPress_ReleaseSept_23_2007.pdf?doclD=2521.
All Saints also alleged in the press release that IRS might have breached confidentiality rules by
discussing the case with "high-level Department of Justice personnel" and that the alleged discus-
sions indicate that the All Saints investigation might have been politically motivated. All Saints
referred its concerns to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration.
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as to what exactly in Reverend Regas's sermon was objectionable. All
Saints, and other houses of worship, can draw no instruction from the All
Saints investigation on what is objectionable speech and what is allowa-
ble speech. This is troubling and unwelcome news for churches that
wish to speak out on issues that touch society in general and politics spe-
cifically.
B. A Legislative Fix to Section 501(c)(3) is Necessary
Given the numerous problems with Section 501(c)(3)-as applied
to churches and other religious organizations-that the All Saints inves-
tigation illustrates, Section 501(c)(3) should be amended to repeal the
ban on churches "intervening" in politics. Legislation is the preferred
means of lifting the ban in Section 501(c)(3) so that churches will have
some certainty as to the legality of their actions. Having the IRS or a
federal court find that a particular church did or did not violate Section
501(c)(3) does not solve the problems of the statute.
The All Saints situation is an example of the problems with Section
501(c)(3) and why it should be amended. An amendment to Section
501(c)(3) is preferable to a judicial remedy. A judicial remedy in the All
Saints case most likely would have determined whether All Saints im-
permissibly intervened in a political campaign; it likely would not have
dealt with the issue of whether the ban in Section 501(c)(3) was a good
policy decision. Additionally, a federal court would not have found Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) unconstitutional.178 Therefore, Congress should amend
Section 501(c)(3) to allow churches to engage in political speech in li-
mited circumstances.
Since 2001, there have been numerous pieces of legislation intro-
duced in both the House and the Senate to amend Section 501(c)(3).
None of the pieces of legislation has been enacted. An analysis of some
of the legislation follows.
1. H.R. 2931-The Bright-Line Act of 2001
Representative Phillip M. Crane introduced the "Bright-Line Act of
2001" ("Bright-Line Act") to "clarify the restrictions on the lobbying and
campaign activities of churches." 179 The Bright-Line Act would have
allowed a church to expend up to 5% of its gross revenues each year to
participate in political campaigns and up to 20% of its gross revenues on
lobbying efforts. 180 A church could only spend an aggregate of 20% of
its gross revenues on lobbying and participating in political campaigns.
178. See Totten, supra note 130, at 317-318.
179. See Bright-Line Act of 2001, H.R. 2391, 107th Cong. Preamble (2001), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong-bills&docid=f:h2931 ih.txt.pdf.
180. Id. § 2.
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The bill was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which
received comments and held a hearing on the bill on May 14, 2002.18
The Ways and Means Committee did not hold a vote on the bill.
182
While the Bright-Line Act was a noble attempt at solving the prob-
lem, it had flaws. The main problem was that by setting a limit on the
amount of expenditures that can be made for "political activity" and for
lobbying, it would have required the IRS to examine the financial records
of a church to determine if the church had exceeded the limits in the bill.
This would still have the IRS making an intrusion into the internal affairs
of a church. Additionally, after the threshold has been reached, the IRS
would be in the same situation as it currently is in-examining religious
activities to determine if a violation of Section 501(c)(3) occurred. Giv-
en that the current statute has numerous problems, the Bright-Line Act
would only have been a band-aid.
2. S. 2886-The Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection
Act
In 2002, Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire introduced the
Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, which would have
amended section 501(c)(3) to "ensure the religious free exercise and free
speech rights of churches and other houses of worship to engage in an
insubstantial amount of political activities."' 83 The bill was referred to
the Senate Finance Committee, where, apparently, no action was taken.
This bill, which was better than the Bright-Line Act because it omit-
ted the "gross revenues" provision, also had a major problem. The bill
would have allowed political activity as long as it was "insubstantial."
' 184
However, nowhere in the bill was "insubstantial" or "substantial" de-
fined. Currently, the word substantial is not well-defined in the tax
code.185 There is no bright-line rule for what "substantial" means in the
Internal Revenue Code. There is some indication that between five and
fifteen percent of an organization's activities as measured by time, effort,
expenditures, and other relevant factors is "insubstantial."'' 86 Likewise, a
comprehensive definition of "substantial" might have alleviated some of
the problems with this bill. However, a church would then be subject to
181. See Review Of Internal Revenue Code Section 501 (c)(3) Requirements For Religious
Organizations: Hearing Before The Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means,
107th Cong. (2002), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/oversite/
107cong/5-14-02/107-69final.htm. The hearing had eight witnesses on both sides of the issue.
There also were written submissions by numerous individuals and organizations on both sides of the
issue.
182. See Mayer, supra note 161, at 4 n.8.
183. See Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, S. 2886, 107th Cong. Preamble
(2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= l07cong-bills&
docid=f:s2886is.txt.pdf.
184. Id. §2.
185. See Anderson, supra note 28, at 125.
186. See Halloran & Kearney, supra note 128, at 108 n. 18.
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the same government entanglement in its affairs that implicate the Free
Exercise Clause.
3. H.R. 235-The Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act
of 2005
On January 4, 2005, Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina
introduced the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of
2005.187 This bill would have allowed a church to maintain tax-exempt
status even if they intervened on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate
for public office in the course of a "homily, sermon, teaching, dialectic,
or other presentation made during religious services or gatherings."' 88 It
also would have allowed church members and leaders to express their
personal views on political matters at religious services "as long as those
views are not disseminated beyond the members and guests assembled
together at the service."
t 89
This bill most likely was unsatisfactory to both those who opposed
the current ban and those who supported the current ban. Obviously,
those who supported the current ban would have felt that no change was
necessary in the first place. This bill would have allowed political inter-
vention at any church service that was primarily intended for church
members and for personal views on politics to be given at those services.
This undoubtedly would not have been acceptable to those who support
the current ban.
Those who opposed the ban might not have been happy that the bill
was relatively narrow. The bill would have limited political activity to
religious services and the activity must have been targeted primarily to
members. While those that opposed the ban likely would have been
happy that the ban was relaxed, they likely would have wished that the
limitation on speaking primarily to members was not present.
4. S. 178-The Religious Freedom Act of 2007
The most recent attempt to amend Section 501(c)(3) was by Senator
James Inhofe, who introduced the Religious Freedom Act of 2007.190
The goal of the act was "to protect freedom of speech exercisable by
houses of worship or meditation and affiliated organizations. ' 9' The act
187. See Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong.
(2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong-bils&
docid=f:h235ih.txt.pdf. Representative Jones also introduced bills which would have relaxed the
political activity ban for churches in 2001. See, e.g., Nonprofit Political Speech Act, H.R. 355,
107th Cong. (2001), available at hUp:H/frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetdoc.cgi?dbname
=107_congbills&docid=f:h355ih.txt.pdf.
188. H.R. 235 §. 2(a).
189. Id. § 3.
190. See The Religious Freedom Act of 2007, S. 178, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http:llfrwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bingetdoc.cgi?dbname=l 10_cong-biils&docid=f:sl 78is.txt.pdf.
191. Id. at Preamble.
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would prohibit the government from denying churches, and their donors,
tax exempt status if the churches engaged in "comment on public issues,
election contests, and pending legislation made in theological or philo-
sophical context of such organization.' ' 92 The act was referred to the
Senate Finance Committee, which took no action on it.
This act was not an amendment of Section 501(c)(3) but rather a
separate bill. It was the most far-reaching of the proposed legislation. It
would have completely allowed churches and church leaders to engage
or comment on political issues. Interestingly, the act declared that such
activity is constitutionally protected activity. 193 This act was very broad
and would have allowed churches the virtually unfettered ability to speak
on political issues if they believed that this was part of their theological
mission.
C. A Limited Proposal
There is no proposal that will completely satisfy those who want to
allow churches the freedom to engage in political activity. However, an
incremental step would provide churches with more freedom to speak on
issues that are important to the church.
None of the proposed bills examined earlier is completely suitable
as a replacement for the current ban. One bill, however, could probably
satisfy proponents of lifting the ban. Section 2 of the Houses of Worship
Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005 would have allowed churches to
maintain tax-exempt status and engage in political activity so long as the
activity was in a "homily, sermon, teaching, dialectic, or other presenta-
tion made during religious services or gatherings."' 94 That is a fairly
broad area in which churches would be able to speak freely to members
regarding issues that touch on politics.
Allowing churches to communicate with its members in religious
services and other meetings is not an unheard of proposition. 9 A simi-
lar, though not identical, proposal has been advocated by other commen-
192. Id. § 2(a).
193. Id.
194. See Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong.
§ 2(a) (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109-cong_
bills&docid=f:h235ih.txt.pdf. This paper is not advocating that Section 3 of the Act be adopted. The
personal views of the members and leaders of a church really are irrelevant. The ability of the
church to teach according to its religious principles is what is at issue, not the personal views of
particular members.
195. See Samansky, supra note 48, at 27, 28 (2006). Professor Samansky's proposal allows
churches and religious leaders to communicate freely about political candidates with their members
as long as the church or religious leaders do not officially endorse a candidate for public office.
Churches would not be allowed to undertake activities they don't usually engage in and as long as
the activity in question is not targeted at nonmembers. Any communication must take place as a
routine part of a church's activity geared primarily toward members and the hope is that this will
"reduce entanglement of the government and religion."
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tators.196 There are several benefits to this limited proposal. First, the
proposal only applies to churches, and not to other religious organiza-
tions. Second, the proposal is limited to regularly scheduled religious
services which should calm fears about churches taking out advertise-
ments endorsing candidates.1 97 Third, the proposal eliminates the "re-
straint on the issues a religious leader might address." 198 In other words,
churches would be able to freely discuss issues of importance to the
members of the church without fear of an IRS investigation or loss of
tax-exempt status.
Limiting the exception to religious services resolves a number of is-
sues with the current ban. First, churches would be allowed to speak
directly to their members about issues that the church leaders believe are
an integral part of religious life without fear of an investigation.
Churches would also be allowed to freely compare candidates, as was
done in the sermon preached at All Saints Church before the 2004 elec-
tion. Churches would also be able to examine how a candidate's position
on various issues conforms to its positions on issues without fear of los-
ing tax-exempt status. The IRS would no longer be allowed to scrutinize
sermons and other church teachings and make determinations on whether
the sermon or teaching was "religious" in nature.
The proposal is also appealing because the communication must be
intended primarily for church members. Therefore, a sermon or church
bulletin would not be subject to review. And, because the communica-
tion must be intended primarily for members, churches would be pre-
vented from running campaign events for the community and still expect
to keep tax-exempt status.
An added benefit is that enforcement issues will go away. Because
the IRS will have fewer opportunities to investigate churches, concerns
about lax and uneven enforcement would be alleviated. Even though the
IRS has historically conducted relatively few investigations, the number
of investigations is sure to rise in the future given the increased interplay
between religion and politics. This proposal is one way to eliminate
most investigations.
Even without the above benefits, the proposal still should be
enacted as an acknowledgement of the special role churches have in so-
ciety. As discussed above, churches have played a unique role in Ameri-
can life. Because of this unique role and the fact that what some might
consider political speech cannot be separated from "purely religious"
speech, churches should have the ability to meet their unique mission.
Absent a change to Section 501(c)(3), churches that believe their mission
196. See Totten, supra note 130, at 321-22. Totten's proposal would only apply to oral, not
written, communications.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 322.
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is to speak out on social justice issues will not be able to do so if that
speech touches on "political activity."
CONCLUSION
Allowing churches to speak directly to their members on matters
that walk the line between purely "religious" and purely "political"
would allow them to fulfill their religious mission. It would allow a
community of faith to reason together and discuss issues that are impor-
tant to them as a community without fear of the government infringing
on their free expression rights.
Churches play a unique and complicated role in American society.
Amending Section 501(c)(3) would be an acknowledgment of that role.
An amendment of Section 501(c)(3) would also allow churches to fulfill
their theological mission if they feel that the mission requires them to
speak out on social issues.
The proposal set forth in this paper is not perfect and will not please
everyone. It is not likely that Congress will act on the issue of churches,
tax-exempt status and political speech given the history of prior pieces of
legislation. A discussion is needed, however, on churches and their role








"Justice O'Connor's Husband Finds New Love," reported CBS
News in 2007.' John O'Connor, who married the Justice in 1952, was
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease in 1990. The Justice resigned from
the Supreme Court in 2005 to move him to an assisted living facility,
where he soon fell in love with another Alzheimer's patient.2 Justice
O'Connor's response to news of the romance was to be glad that her
husband was happy, but many spouses and families are not so emotional-
ly generous.3 Other news stories report that families are horrified to find
their elderly spouses or parents in new relationships and insistent that the
romance be terminated. In one case, the son of an elderly man with de-
mentia required the facility to keep his father's girlfriend away from him,
and eventually moved his father to another facility, insisting that neither
his father nor his girlfriend be told in advance of the change.4 In another
case, once the family learned that their seventy-two-year-old mother was
having sex with a sixty-eight-year-old man, they became irate "and
threatened to sue because they didn't picture their mom having sex while
she had grandkids running around the nursing home."5
The human need for intimacy and physical contact has been well es-
tablished in various studies, but until recently such research often ig-
nored the elderly. Newer articles attempt to fill that gap, arguing that
"life-long sexual function ... [has come to be seen as] a primary compo-
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nent of achieving successful ageing in general."6 The need for intimate
relationships, rather than disappearing as one grows older, may actually
increase as one copes with loss: the loss of family members, declining
health, dislocation from a long-time home, and other factors. 7 The bene-
fits of intimacy have been well established, contributing to a better quali-
ty of life and health. 8 The United States Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of intimate association by protecting individuals from
government intrusion into their private lives. The term "freedom of in-
timate association" was first used by the Court in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, in which Justice Brennan spoke of a "line of decisions [in
which] the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain
certain human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by
the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme." 9 More
recently, the Court struck down a statute that forbade persons of the same
sex from engaging in certain types of private sexual conduct.10 "Liber-
ty," declared Justice Kennedy, "presumes an autonomy of self that in-
cludes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct."' This liberty goes beyond the right of a married couple to choose
whether to use contraceptives12 or to marry someone of another race;13 it
also protects unmarried individuals in exercising their personal rights.'
4
While no law prohibits the elderly or residents of nursing homes from
engaging in intimate conduct, and thus the freedom of intimate associa-
tion is not directly involved, the practice at such facilities is to actively
discourage such conduct. In doing so, facilities may be violating federal
and state statutes enumerating patient rights.
For elderly living in their own homes, the freedom of intimate asso-
ciation may have gone to the opposite extreme. Eager to support an in-
6. Merryn Gott, Sexual Health and the New Ageing, 35 AGE & AGEING 106, 106 (2006),
available at http://ageing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/fullI35/2/106 (citing Stephen Katz and
Barbara Marshall, New Sex For Old: Lifestyles, Consumerism, and the Ethics of Aging Well, 17 J.
AGING STUDIES 3, 12 (2003), available at http://www.trentu.ca/academic/sociology/
faculty/documents/NewSexForOld-000.pdf, and Merryn Gott and Sharron Hinchliff, How Important
is Sex in Later Life? The Views of Older People, 56 Soc. SCI. MED. 8, 1617, 1626 (2003)).
7. Jennifer Sisk, Sexuality in Nursing Homes: Preserving Rights, Promoting Well-being,
AGING WELL, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.agingwellmag.com/septstory3.shtml.
8. Id.; Steven H. Miles & Kara Parker, Sexuality in the Nursing Home: latrogenic Loneli-
ness, 23 GENERATIONS 36, 36 (1999).
9. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984). In contrast, the other line of
decisions recognize "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by
the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion." Id. at 618.
10. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
11. Id. at 562.
12. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965).
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
14. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating a statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); see also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (invalidating a New York law forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to
persons under sixteen years of age).
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dividual's right to marry, and loathe to allow any third person to interfere
with that relationship, states have adopted policies and statutes that may
leave some elderly persons vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Thus, elderly
people who lack family to care for them at home face two tough choices.
They can either stay in their homes and retain a great deal of freedom
over their personal affairs, or they can go to a facility, where they may
find their freedom severely restricted. Is there a solution between these
two extremes?
The number of people facing this choice in the near future is poten-
tially vast. The population of Americans sixty-five years and older
doubled from seventeen million in 1960 to thirty-five million in 2000,15
and is expected to double again to more than seventy million in 2030.16
A recent study found that 48% of people over age sixty are sexually ac-
tive. 17 Many people maintain sexual interest into their nineties. 18 Those
in assisted living facilities or nursing homes may also be sexually active,
as evidenced by articles in professional publications and the popular
press. 19
While the issue of freedom of intimate association is a problem for
elderly people in general, it is especially acute for those with dementia.
Over five million Americans have been diagnosed with Alzheimer's dis-
ease, and the number is expected to increase dramatically, with as many
as sixteen million by 2050.20 A recent study published in Neuroepidemi-
ology estimated that 13.9% of Americans age seventy-one and over, or
about 3.4 million people, have some form of dementia.2 1 Alzheimer's
disease accounted for over two-thirds (69.9%) of all dementia diagnos-
es.22 Dementia does not end the need for intimacy; while sexual intima-
cy where one partner has Alzheimer's may decrease it can still be a va-
lued aspect of the relationship.23
15. John D. DeLamater & Morgan Sill, Sexual Desire in Later Life, 42 THE JOURNAL OF SEX
RESEARCH, 138 (2005).
16. Id. at 125.
17. Janet K. Feldkamp, Navigating the Uncertain Legal Waters of Resident Sexuality: Resi-
dents' Rights to Sexual Expression Can Create Complicated Issues for Facilities and Family Mem-
bers, NURSING HOMES, Feb. 2003, at 62.
18. Michael Bauer et al., Sexuality, Health Care and the Older Person: An Overview of the
Literature, 2 INT'L J. OF OLDER PEOPLE NURSING, 63, 64 (2007); Stacy Lindau et al., A Study of
Sexuality and Health Among Older Adults in the United States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762, 772
(2007).
19. See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 7; Miles & Parker, supra note 8; Sex In Nursing Homes, supra
note 5.
20. McCarroll, supra note 2.
21. Brenda Plassman et al., Prevalence of Dementia in the United States: The Aging, Demo-
graphics, and Memory Study, 29 NEUROEPIDEMOLOGY 125, 125 (2007).
22. Id. at 128. Vascular dementia, usually caused by a stroke, accounted for 17.4%; the
remaining 12.7% of cases included "dementia, undetermined etiology," Parkinson's dementia,
alcoholic dementia, and traumatic brain injury, among others. Id.
23. Christian Derousene et al., Sexual Behavior and Changes in Alzheimer's Disease, 10
ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE & RELATED DISORDERS 86, 92 (1996).
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This article will explore two critical issues facing the elderly: the
lack of personal freedom suffered by those who move into large assisted
living facilities and nursing homes, versus the lack of social support for
those who remain in their own homes. Part I discusses those in institu-
tions, and contrasts the federal and state laws that attempt to secure per-
sonal privacy for the elderly with the actual practice in some facilities.
In many cases, especially if the elderly person has some cognitive im-
pairment, institutions assume that the person is incapable of consenting
to physical contact, thus reversing traditional rape law. Part II compares
these restrictions with the virtual absence of any oversight of elderly in
their own homes, and the almost conclusive presumption that a marriage
is valid. The result in some cases is that the elderly are being taken ad-
vantage of by unscrupulous caregivers, even in states that have legisla-
tion attempting to protect them. Part I11 looks at innovative solutions to
these problems, including education, new legislation, better living condi-
tions for seniors, and a more assertive role for the judiciary.
I. ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES AND NURSING HOMES
In 1987 Congress enacted the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act as
part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, ensuring that residents
of nursing facilities would have a right of privacy and immediate access
by family and other visitors. 24 The Act requires the nursing home to give
notice of a transfer and explain why it is necessary before moving the
patient.2 5 Federal law also grants residents of a Medicare or Medicaid
certified nursing facility the right to privacy, including full visual and
26auditory privacy.
Many states have enacted a Patient's or Nursing Home Bill of
Rights purporting to give residents a right of privacy and a right to asso-
27ciate. An Alaska law declares that "a resident of an assisted living
home has the right to ... close the door of the resident's room at any
time, including during visits in the room with guests or other residents..
S.,,28 Arkansas and Florida laws give residents "the right to private and
uncensored communication, including.., visiting with any person of the
resident's choice during visiting hours ....,9 Statutes allow residents
"to close room doors and to have facility personnel knock before enter-
ing the room, except in the case of an emergency or unless medically
24. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(iii) (privacy),
(c)(3) (access and visitation rights) (2008).
25. Id. § (c)(2)(B)(i)(I).
26. Feldkamp, supra note 17.
27. Jeffrey Spitzer-Resnick & Maya Krajcinovic, Protecting the Rights of Nursing Home
Residents: How Tort Liability Interacts with Statutory Protections, 19 NOVA L. REV. 629, 633-34
(1995).
28. ALASKA STAT. § 47.33.300(a)(5) (2008).




contraindicated.,, 30 New York has regulations to ensure that "[r]esident
rooms shall be designed and equipped for adequate nursing care, comfort
and privacy of residents.' California law requires each person admitted
to a residential care facility for the elderly to sign a document that he or
she has received a statement of "Personal Rights" including a right "to
have his/her visitors . . . permitted to visit privately during reasonable
hours and without prior notice, provided that the rights of other residents
are not infringed upon. ' '32 A joint publication of AARP Tennessee and
the Legal Aid Society of Middle Tennessee declares, "You have the right
to visit in private with anyone during reasonable hours. The nursing
home can keep you from having such visits only if: it would harm the
health and safety of a resident or staff member; or it could harm the
property of a resident, staff member, or the nursing home.,
33
The practice, however, is altogether different. Many nursing homes
and assisted living facilities do not allow residents to lock their doors,
and staff use a "knock and enter" policy without waiting for a response.34
Many facilities have no private rooms, and use curtains to separate
roommates, not walls. Sexual intimacy among residents is actively dis-
couraged by staff; published studies indicate that married and single resi-
dents who wish to be intimate "have been deprived of privacy, have been
restrained, have had clothes put on backwards, and have been put in zip-
perless jumpsuits, separated, or forced to resort to subterfuge such as
locking themselves in bathrooms., 35  Many nursing homes have a
framework of "supervised informed consent" in which nurses or social
workers meet with the residents individually and together to discuss the
sexual activity.36 Nursing home staff may prohibit sexual activity direct-
ly, or discourage it indirectly by harassing and ridiculing residents about
their relationships. 37 Even at facilities known for their progressive poli-
cies toward residents' intimate affairs, staff will notify the family as well
as social workers and other staff when a relationship comes to their atten-
tion.38
If both parties are fully competent, there seems to be no legal or
medical justification for an intervention by the nursing home or by the
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.022(1)(m) (2008).
31. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 415.29(c) (2008).
32. CA. CODE OF REGS. tit. 22, § 87468(a)( 11) (2008).
33. AARP TENNESSEE AND LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE, YOU HAVE RIGHTS
IN A NURSING HOME 10 (2001).
34. Madonna H. Meyer & Came Roseamelia, Emerging Issues for Older Couples: Protecting
Income and Assets, Right to Intimacy, and End-of-Life Decisions, GENERATIONS, Fall 2007, at 66,
68.
35. Miles & Parker, supra note 8, at 39.
36. Id.
37. Meyer & Roseamelia, supra note 34, at 68.
38. Douglas J. Edwards, Sex and Intimacy in the Nursing Home, NURSING HOMES: LONG
TERM CARE MANAGEMENT, Feb. 2003, at 18; Dirk Johnson & Julie Scelfo, Sex, Love, and Nursing
Homes, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 2004, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/52779/output/print.
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families, although such interventions regularly occur.39 The issue be-
comes complicated when a resident has a cognitive impairment such as
dementia. Does someone with advanced Alzheimer's disease have the
requisite capacity to consent to sex? What if the resident mistakenly
believes that her partner is her spouse, or does not understand that her
spouse is still alive? Administrators may feel compelled to inform fami-
ly members when their relative with dementia is involved with another
person, and may agree to take steps to terminate the relationship. 40 Cu-
riously, in none of the cited articles is there any indication that the elder-
ly person was in distress or felt pressured to engage in the activity.41
Instead, silence has somehow been interpreted as the equivalent of lack
of consent. Even in cases where the couple is married, nursing homes
have refused visitation rights to a spouse on the grounds that the resident
is incapable of consent. In one case, Drake nursing home in Ohio re-
fused a husband's request for an overnight visit with his wife, who had
suffered a stroke which rendered her incompetent. 42 The nursing home
explained that "if he were to molest his wife, she might later regain her
competence and sue Drake. 4 3 Mr. Belinky sued the nursing home for
permission to have overnight visits with his wife. The court determined
that Mr. Belinky had no standing to sue on his own behalf, because the
law only protected the rights of nursing home residents, but he could sue
on behalf of his wife. Ohio law states that one member of a patient's
family may visit the patient at any time, provided, however, the operator
may make reasonable rules to insure that such visit will not unduly dis-
turb other patients or residents or interfere with the operation of the
home. 44 The court remanded on the question of whether the center had
reasonable rules that precluded an overnight visit.45 The fact that Mrs.
Belinky may have lacked competence to consent to the visit was never
discussed by the court.
Is it reasonable, or legal, for a nursing home to assume that an elder-
ly patient is incapable of consenting to sex? The Ohio court in Belinky
thought not, but many nursing home administrators, fearful of suits alleg-
ing sexual assault, believe otherwise, especially where one or both part-
ners is not fully competent. American rape law has changed a great deal
from its seventeenth-century origins, but perhaps this change goes too
far. Early American law made rape a difficult crime to prove. Rape
39. Feldkamp, supra note 17; Johnson & Scelfo, supra note 38 (quoting a 65-year-old resi-
dent who "wanted some privacy with a lady friend: 'But we knew we'd be evicted from the facility
if we got caught"').
40. See, e.g., Henneberger, supra note 4.
41. Id.; see also Sex In Nursing Homes, supra note 5.
42. Belinky v. Drake Ctr., Inc., 690 N.E.2d 1302, 1305-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
43. Id. Mrs. Belinky would not be able to sue her husband, however, as Ohio exempts spous-
es from sexual battery. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A) (2008) ("No person shall engage in
sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply . .
44. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3701-17-09(d).
45. Belinky, 690 N.E.2d at 1309.
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could not be committed by one's spouse.46 Three theories once formed
the bases of marital immunity: first, wives were characterized as the
property of their husbands; second, the husband and wife were unified in
marriage as one entity and thus one could not be charged with assaulting
oneself; or third, by marrying, a woman gave her consent to sex with her
husband. All three have been attacked as outdated and sexist. 47 While
some jurisdictions still retain marital immunity in some form and thus
presume consent to sexual activity, at least twenty-four states have ab-
48olished marital immunity to rape.
In cases where rape charges could be brought, what evidence suffic-
es to show lack of consent? In early American law, for parties not mar-
ried to each other, the law presumed consent unless the victim earnestly
or reasonably resisted, even questioning whether mere words were
enough to overcome a presumption of consent. 49 Thus, at one time some
states required "utmost resistance" to prove lack of consent. 50  Today
most states have dropped the necessity of showing physical resistance by
the victim, holding that words or conduct may be sufficient to show lack
of consent.51 Nursing home staff have now taken this a step further by
presuming the complete inability of a patient with dementia to consent.52
Staff may regard intimacy as something to be ridiculed or actively dis-
couraged in residents, rather than as a part of healthy human behavior.
5 3
This assumption arguably violates the Patient's Bill of Rights and is far
too broad. Even those with severe Alzheimer's may retain the ability to
consent in certain circumstances.54
The most difficult problem may be the situation where one partner
mistakenly believes the other is her spouse. The Model Penal Code de-
fines the crime of "gross sexual imposition" as occurring when a man has
sexual intercourse with a woman not his wife if "he knows that ... she
submits because she mistakenly supposes that he is her husband. '55 If
the man is capable of recognizing her mistake, he may be committing a
crime.
For those with no cognitive impairments, simply making them
aware that they have the right to privacy and to sexual intimacy in the
nursing home may be enough. Statutes like California's notification
46. Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Infe-
rences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1456 (2003).
47. Id. at 1478-84.
48. Id. at 1470-71.
49. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 17.4 (2d ed. 2008).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Johnson & Scelfo, supra note 38.
53. Miles & Parker, supra note 8, at 23, 38.
54. Daniel Kuhn, Intimacy, Sexuality, and Residents with Dementia, 3 ALZHEIMER'S CARE
QUARTERLY 165, 167 (2002).
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(c) (1962).
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law56 are a start; articles in popular publications, and training for staff,
may also help. For elderly with cognitive impairments, much more will
be needed to reverse the current assumption that sex is nonconsensual
and must always be prohibited.
II. ELDERLY WITH DEMENTIA AND IN-HOME CARE
Freedom of intimate association is not generally an issue for elderly
who live alone. The problem may instead be too much freedom, which
can leave them prey to unscrupulous persons. Realizing the vulnerability
of some elderly, California and Idaho have enacted statutes raising a pre-
sumption of undue influence in cases where a caregiver is named in a
will or other donative instrument.57  Long-time friends of the elderly
person who provide care without pay are included in the definition of
"care custodians" in California;58 Idaho includes those working in the
testator's own home.59 To receive the donative transfer, the caregiver
must rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing
evidence. 60 The California Supreme Court noted that California's statute
was originally enacted in 1993 in response to reports that an Orange
County attorney who represented a large number of Leisure World resi-
dents had drafted numerous wills and trusts under which he was a major
or exclusive beneficiary, and had abused his position as trustee or con-
servator in many cases to benefit himself or his law partners.6'
The law was amended in 1997 to add care custodians as presump-
tively prohibited transferees.62 But the California statute continues to
exempt spouses, relatives, and domestic partners of transferors, 63 thus
leaving an opening exploited by unscrupulous caregivers. As long as the
caregiver can marry the dependent elderly person, in most states it is
almost impossible to invalidate the marriage, even in cases where the
elderly person has no idea he or she is married.
Challenging the validity of a marriage has traditionally been diffi-
cult, given the presumption of ceremonial validity, a presumption of
sanity, and restrictions on challenges to a marriage. At common law, a
marriage to a person who lacked competence to understand that he or she
was getting married was void and could be attacked after the incompe-
56. CAL. CODE REGS. 22, § 72527(a)( 11) (West 2008).
57. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (West 2008); Idaho Code Ann. § 15-2-616 (2008).
58. Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1207-08 (2006).
59. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-616.
60. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(d). Another way to provide for the caregiver under California
law is to have the instrument reviewed by an independent attorney who counsels the transferor and
also executes a "Certificate of Independent Review." Id. § 21351(b). The Idaho statute simply says
the presumption is "rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-616.
61. Rice v. Clark, 47 P.3d 300, 304 (2002).
62. Bernard, 139 P.3d at 1205.
63. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(a) states that no presumption of undue influence is raised if
"the transferor is related by blood or marriage to, is a cohabitant with, or is the registered domestic
partner of the transferee," among other exceptions.
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tent spouse's death, although attacks rarely succeeded.64 Today, given
the fundamental right to marry, states have proceeded cautiously in re-
stricting the rights of incompetent people to marry, and are wary of al-
lowing termination of the marriage by third parties, whether before or
after the spouse's death. Even an insane person or one who has been
declared incompetent may still have the capacity to marry.65 As a North
Dakota court stated, "the best accepted test as to whether there is a men-
tal capacity sufficient to contract a valid marriage is whether there is a
capacity to understand the nature of the contract and the duties and re-
sponsibilities which it creates, 66 and thus "mere weakness or imbecility
of mind is not sufficient, nor is eccentricity or partial dementia.' 67 A
recent Alaska case is illustrative of the difficulties of overcoming the
presumption of sanity and the presumption of validity of the marriage.
Lillie Rahm-Riddell already suffered from Alzheimer's disease from
681993 when she met Robert Riddell, a man thirty years her junior. Her
daughter petitioned for an appointment of a conservator in April 1995,
but while that proceeding was pending, Lillie and Robert married. 69 A
conservator was appointed for Lillie; a court also found that Robert had
attacked Lillie and enjoined him from contacting her. Despite that, Ro-
bert removed Lillie from an assisted living home and moved her to Ore-
gon, refusing to reveal Lillie's location even after a court order.70 Lillie
died in Oregon in 1997.71 A court held that Lillie's 1997 will leaving her
entire estate to Robert was invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity.
72
Still, the court found that the marriage was valid and thus Robert was
entitled as a surviving spouse to receive his homestead allowance, family
allowance, and elective share.73 The Alaska Supreme Court refused to
impose a constructive trust despite clear and convincing evidence of Ro-
bert's fraudulent conduct, his physical abuse, and his isolation of Lillie
so that she was "utterly dependent on him for all her needs. 74 The fact
that Robert spirited Lillie away while the conservancy petition was pend-
ing was not sufficient to establish that Lillie failed to understand that she
was getting married. Courts generally have recognized that someone
who needs a conservator might still be competent in certain matters, such
as marriage. The Supreme Court of Illinois, for example, has held that
the appointment of a guardian is not conclusive of the capacity to under-
64. In re Estate of Romano, 246 P. 2d 501, 505 (1952); Terry Turnipseed, How Do I Love
Thee, Let Me Count The Days: Deathbed Marriages in America, 96 KY. L.J. 275, 287 (2007-2008).
65. Geitner v. Townsend, 312 S.E.2d 236,238 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
66. Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8, 14 (N.D. 1960).
67. Fischer v. Adams, 38 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Neb. 1949).
68. Riddell v. Edwards, 32 P.3d 4, 6, 16 (Alaska 2001).
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 19.
73. Riddell v. Edwards, 76 P.3d 847, 853 (Alaska 2003).
74. Id. at 849.
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stand the nature, effect, duties, and obligations of marriage, "although the
former fact is strong evidence of the latter."
75
A few states still follow the common law rule and allow a third par-
ty to challenge the marriage after one spouse's death. Courts in Alabama
and Florida, for example, have voided marriages on grounds of lack of
competence. For example, a daughter sued to annul her mother's mar-
riage in Alabama on the grounds of insanity and intoxication at the time
of the marriage that continued without interruption until the mother's
death three months later.76 While the allegation of intoxication, if prov-
en, would render the marriage merely voidable, insanity would make the
marriage invalid from the time it was entered.77 Florida has allowed
heirs of a woman who alleged that her marriage took place while she was
insane and in a diabetic coma to challenge its validity after her death.78
Some states have codified the common law into statutes that declare
79a marriage of a person who lacks mental capacity is void. Cases in a
few of these states have allowed a challenge to the marriage after the
death of one spouse. New Jersey has allowed such suits on the grounds
of lack of capacity to consent, fraud, or simply based on a court's general
80powers in equity. Similarly, Kentucky has held that a marriage of a
mentally incompetent person is void and thus can be set aside after the
incompetent's death; in contrast, a marriage procured by fraud or duress
is voidable, and can only be annulled while the parties are alive.81 A
court in Pennsylvania invalidated the marriage of an Alzheimer's patient
even though his family had not raised an objection to the validity of the
marriage.
82
Louisiana allows the suit to be brought after a spouse's death, de-
spite language in the statute that appears to be to the contrary. Louisiana
law states: "A marriage is relatively null when the consent of one of the
parties to marry is not freely given. Such a marriage may be declared
null upon application of the party whose consent was not free. '8 3 This
right to nullify the marriage, a court held, may be brought by the succes-
sion representative, interpreting broad language giving the representative
the right to sue to enforce a right of the deceased, whether the action is
75. Pape v. Byrd, 582 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. 1991).
76. Abel v. Waters, 373 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
77. Id. at 1128.
78. Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 1184 (Fla. 1932).
79. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020(1)(a)(2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (2008); NEB.
REv. ST. § 42-103(2) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1(d) (2008); 23 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §
3304(a)(3) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 15-1-5; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47A(a) (Vernon 2008).
80. In re Estate of Santolino, 895 A.2d 506, 514-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
81. Johnson v. Sands, 53 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Ky. 1932). The case was remanded for trial on
the merits; in a subsequent decision, the court determined the husband was not in fact insane, and the
marriage was valid. Johnson v. Sands, 276 Ky. 492 (1939).
82. In re Acker, 48 Pa. D. & C. 4th 489 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. 2000).
83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 95 (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
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personal, real, or mixed.84 Conversely, although a North Carolina statute
appears to codify the common law,85 case law in that state speaks of such
marriages being voidable, rather than void.86
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) Section 208
changed the common law, and now the majority rule in the United States
is that such a marriage is voidable, and thus cannot be challenged after
the death of either spouse.87 Commentary to the UMDA explains why
the law was changed:
The underlying policy reasons for this principle are clear: the tradi-
tional "void marriage" doctrine often imposed unwise and unfair pe-
nalties on innocent "spouses" in stable family situations long after the
questioned marriage occurred. The penalties serve no effective deter-
rent purpose, but cause severe economic dislocations; a spouse may
be denied ... a share in a spouse's estate, after the marriage has been
terminated by the death of the other spouse, despite the fact that the
surviving spouse had no reason to suspect the invalidity of the mar-
riage.
88
Should we return to the common law and void the marriage of an
incompetent elderly person? Alternatively, should courts be bolder in
asserting their equitable powers? Consider the Washington case of Es-
tate of Romano.89 The decedent, age sixty-four, was nearly blind and in
poor physical condition when he married his housekeeper Mary Alice
Sauve. 90 The court found that, at the time of the wedding ceremony,
"Romano was mentally incompetent. He did not realize what he was
doing and was incapable of entering into a contract or consenting to mar-
riage. The trip to Reno [for the wedding] and his participation in the
marriage ceremony were procured by fraud and duress practiced by Mary
Alice Sauve."9' Sauve conceded that the marriage did not comply with
the law of Nevada due to lack of capacity and fraud.92 Still, the court
held that the marriage could not be attacked after Romano's death absent
"fraud of the grossest kind. 93 Such fraud was absent in this case be-
84. Succession of Ricks, 893 So. 2d 98, 100 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 685 (2008) (enacted in 1960)).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (2008).
86. See, e.g., Geitner v. Townsend, 312 S.E.2d 236, 238 (N.C Ct. App. 1984) ("a marriage of
a person incapable of contracting for want of understanding is not void, but voidable," (citing Ivery
v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 730 (1963))).
87. Turnipseed, supra note 64, at 287-289. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.031; ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-12-201; Vance v. Hinch, 222 Ark. 494, 497(1953) (marriage which involves party lacking
mental capacity is voidable but not absolutely void); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210 (West 2008); Husted
v. Husted, 35 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1963); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-111 ()(a).
88. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 208 cmt. 1998 Main Volume (1970) (amended
1971 and 1973), 9A U.L.A. 188 (1998).
89. In re Estate of Romano, 246 P.2d 501 (Wash. 1952).
90. Id. at 502-03.
91. Id. at 503.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 506.
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cause the incompetent spouse lived for almost two years after the mar-
riage, giving ample time for a challenge to the validity of the marriage
while Romano was alive.
94
The New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote of a "Hobson's choice"
in the Legislature's decision that marriage by an incompetent person is
either void or voidable: "The former method [declaring that the marriage
is void] may allow the heirs to step forward after death and claim the
fruit of their own neglect. The latter method [declaring that the marriage
is voidable] may allow a scheming suitor to marry for money. '95 Still,
the court concluded that it was the Legislature's decision, not the court's,
and the Legislature had declared marriage of an incompetent to be void-
able, and thus impossible to attack after the death of one spouse.96
Even if a state is willing to annul the marriage, this may not elimi-
nate the financial incentive. New York, for example, allows the marriage
to be annulled after one party has died,97 but the spouse who exercised
undue influence or fraud is still entitled to his or her elective share.98
Bigamy is treated differently in New York: not only can the marriage be
declared void after one party's death, but the survivor is not treated as a
spouse and thus gets no elective share.99 If a person with dementia enters
into a marriage ceremony with no understanding of its significance,
shouldn't that marriage be treated the same as a bigamous marriage, and
annulled?
In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated a marriage
in Estate of Lint when it found that the wedding had not been properly
solemnized and, as an alternative ground, that fraud of the grossest kind
was practiced on the wife.1°° A woman seriously ill with cancer of the
lung and brain was systematically isolated from her friends and family
by a man, Christian Lint, eighteen years her junior.'0 A will making
Christian the primary beneficiary of her estate was declared invalid by
the trial court on the grounds that it was procured by fraud and undue
influence. 0 2 Citing Romano, the court noted that ordinarily a marriage
cannot be set aside after one spouse's death due to lack of capacity, but
also held that, because the Washington statute does not include lack of
solemnization or gross fraud as reasons to invalidate a marriage, "the
94. Id. at 507.
95. Patey v. Peaslee, 111 A.2d 194, 197 (N.H. 1955).
96. Id. at 196.
97. See, e.g., Levine v. Dumbra, 604 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
98. See, e.g., Parente v. Wenger, 464 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1983); Bennett v. Thomas,
327 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
99. Estate of Dominguez, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1596,26-27 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Nov. 18, 2002).
100. In re Estate of Lint, 957 P.2d 755, 757 (Wash. 1998).
101. Id. at 757-58.
102. Id. at 765.
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Legislature did not intend to entirely occupy the field."10 3 Thus, a path
was left open to the courts to annul the marriage.
Even while the incompetent spouse is alive, it may be difficult for
others to end the marriage on his or her behalf. A majority of states have
adopted the rule that, absent specific statutory authorization for a third
party to sue for annulment on behalf of the incompetent, only the compe-
tent spouse may sue to end the marriage.' n South Carolina, for example,
has held that a person "who is mentally incompetent as to his property
and his person... may not bring an action for divorce either on his own
behalf or through a guardian."'' 0 5 The rationale often cited by such courts
is that marriage is such a personal commitment that only a spouse can
decide when to end it.' 6 Other courts have adopted the minority view to
allow a guardian to sue to terminate the marriage.107 A few states have
statutes specifically authorizing the spouse's representative to bring suit,
but generally have a short statute of limitations and do not allow suit to
be brought after the spouse's death.1
0 8
The statutes and the case law confound two very different issues.
The first occurs when a valid marriage is entered into, but later one
spouse becomes incompetent. Can a third party sue to end the marriage,
either on behalf of the incompetent while he or she is alive, or on behalf
of the heirs or family once the incompetent is dead? Courts are unders-
tandably reluctant to terminate such a marriage without evidence of what
the incompetent spouse would have wanted. Our scenario is quite differ-
ent: the spouse is unable to understand that he or she is entering into a
marriage at the time of the ceremony. Should the same restrictions on
terminating the marriage apply? Some courts are willing to declare such
a marriage void on the grounds that the requirements for a valid marriage
have not been met. Illinois, for example, requires solemnization of a
marriage by going before a duly authorized officiate and consenting to
marry. °9 David Crockett's children sought to annul the marriage after
their father's death on the grounds that the decedent, suffering from an
inoperable malignant brain tumor, did not say anything at the ceremony
and thus failed to give his consent." 0 After investigating whether Illinois
law allowed proxy marriages and concluding it did not, the court held
103. Id. at 766.
104. See J.A. Connelly, Annotation, Power of Incompetent Spouse's Guardian, Committee, or
Next Friend to Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or Annulment of Marriage, or to Make a
Compromise or Settlement in Such Suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681, § 5(a)-(b) (1966 & Supp. 1993).
105. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993).
106. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Murray, 426 S.E.2d at 784.
Both Nelson and Murray involve a spouse who was competent at the time of the marriage but later
became incompetent.
107. See, e.g., Nelson, 878 P.2d at 338.
108. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-111(2)-(3) (2008) (six months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1506(b) (2008) (ninety days).
109. In re Estate of Crockett, 728 N.E.2d 765, 767 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
110. Id. at 766.
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that the children could challenge the validity of the marriage after the
death of one of the parties."'1
I. SOLUTIONS
Can we find a middle ground, where a person does not need to
choose between giving up intimacy to enter a nursing home, or staying in
his or her own home and thus forfeiting legal protection? Education of
seniors and those who work with them is a good start, but legislation may
be necessary as well. Finally, courts may need to exercise their equitable
powers more frequently.
A. Education
For those in facilities who wish to have more privacy, informing
them of the Patient's Bill of Rights and providing some mechanism for
enforcement will help, at least for those with no cognitive impairments.
Staff training is key to reversing widely held beliefs that residents of
such facilities should not be sexually active,' 2 and to help medical per-
sonnel understand that intimacy and close relationships are important for
better health. An example of comprehensive staff training can be found
in the video produced by the Hebrew Home in Riverdale, New York,
"Freedom of Sexual Expression: Dementia and Resident Rights in Long-
Term Care Facilities."'1 3 As for seniors in their own homes, training of
those issuing marriage licenses and conducting marriage ceremonies may
need to be improved, and existing laws enforced. Why would a clerk
issue a marriage license to a person in a coma?1 4 Several states have
statutes declaring it a misdemeanor to knowingly join a couple who
should not lawfully marry, or issue a license to them for a marriage cer-
emony, but no reported case describes an attempt to prosecute anyone
under these statutes.
15
B. Reconsider Void Versus Voidable Marriages
States are understandably reluctant to allow longstanding marriages
to be attacked, especially when one spouse has died and thus is unavaila-
ble to testify, consent, or object to the proceedings. The legitimacy of
children born to the couple should not be put into doubt years later, but
111. Id. at 771-72. Other irregularities occurred in the marriage ceremony. For example,
although Illinois law requires both parties to appear and sign in the presence of the county clerk-id.
at 766 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/203 (1996))-only Laveme Crockett was present at the
clerk's office to obtain the license. The court did not seem to regard this as a reason to invalidate the
marriage.
112. Hosam K. Kamel & Rarnzi R. Haijar, Sexuality in the Nursing Home, Part 2: Managing
Abnormal Behavior-Legal and Ethical Issues, 4 J. AM. MED. DIR. Assoc. 203, 205 (2003).
113. The Hebrew Home at Riverdale, http://www.hebrewhome.org/nursinghome.asp (last
visited Dec. 18, 2008).
114. Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 138 So. 775, 778 (Fla. 1932).




most states already have statutes declaring that such children are legiti-
mate even if the marriage is later annulled. 1 6 Courts are likewise reluc-
tant to inquire into the reasons for a marriage, which cases involving
fraud or undue influence often require.
Treating the marriage of an incompetent person in the same way
courts have long treated void marriages might be an effective solution.
Even states that do not allow a marriage to be annulled after one spouse's
death have recognized that a marriage can be declared null and void."
17
Thus, a Wisconsin court allowed a post-death challenge to a Texas mar-
riage that violated Wisconsin law imposing a six-month waiting period
after a divorce, and held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
require Wisconsin to recognize a Texas marriage just thirty days after the
divorce decree. 18 A New York court invalidated a bigamous marriage
and held that the husband was not a surviving spouse. 19 In our case, the
family of the incompetent person could seek to have the marriage nulli-
fied. The family's best argument to void the marriage may be to estab-
lish that the technical requirements of the ceremony were not met: the
incompetent person did not appear before the clerk, or did not indicate
consent, as required.
Alternatively, states may want to rewrite their statutes of limitations
to void a marriage. Some statutes give no recourse to the family, even
where there is fraud or undue influence, because the incompetent person
has died shortly after the wedding, and thus there was no realistic oppor-
tunity to challenge its validity. Delaware's statute of limitations is just
ninety days, 120 Colorado's is six months,' 21 and in neither state can the
action be brought after the death of one spouse. Is it necessary to have
such a short time period to sue, and for both spouses to be alive when the
suit is brought? Legislatures must balance recognizing a marriage con-
tracted by one who failed to understand that he or she was getting mar-
ried, against unseemly challenges brought long after the incompetent
spouse's death. One way to balance the two concerns is with a statute of
limitations that survives the spouse's death. A statute could allow a suit
to annul the marriage within a year of the ceremony or when the challen-
ger discovered the marriage, for example, without regard to whether both
spouses were still alive.
116. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-402(4) ("Children bom of a marriage declared invalid
are legitimate."). The statute is based on the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 208.
117. In re Estate of Toutant, 633 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
118. Id. at 699-700.
119. Estate of Dominguez, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1596, 26-27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 18,
2002).
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1506(b)(1) (2008).
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-11 1(2)(a) (2008).
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C. Better Living Conditions for Seniors
Giving seniors a third option-other than large institutions or stay-
ing at home alone-may help obviate the need for lawsuits to secure the
right to intimacy or to annul a marriage. Florida, for example, encourag-
es the establishment of housing for a small number of seniors by subsi-
dizing some of the costs. 122 Geriatrician Dr. William Thomas conceived
Green Houses, facilities for eight to ten elderly people with private
rooms and bathrooms in a home-like setting. 23 These communal hous-
ing arrangements can make seniors less isolated, and thus less vulnerable
to an unscrupulous caregiver. At the same time, because the facilities are
so small, they are more flexible in allowing privacy to the occupants.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is supporting the building of
Green Houses across the country. 124 The U.S. Administration on Aging
has encouraged the establishment of Naturally Occurring Retirement
Communities, or NORCs, by first identifying neighborhoods or buildings
in which a large proportion of the residents are elderly, and then working
to organize resources in the community to help the elderly remain in their
own homes. 25 AARP estimates that about five thousand NORCs now
exist across the country, allowing people to stay in their own homes by
providing health care, food, transportation, and other services. 26 In a
few communities, elderly with substantial resources are designing their
own community housing. The first such example of "elderhoods" was
founded in Davis, California, by twelve residents who designed their
own units and common areas, including a unit to rent to a nurse at below-
market rates. 27 ElderSpirit works on a similar concept of allowing resi-
dents to design the development; ElderSpirit communities are planned in
Virginia, Florida, Kansas, and other places in the United States.'
28
D. Equity
Finally, a court can use its equitable powers more often, especially
in dealing with the marriage of someone who lacks understanding or
competence. Courts have for a long time been willing to assess the equi-
ties in bigamous marriages; why not do so here? A spouse who believed
122. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 430.600-606 (West 2008).
123. Judith Rabig et al., Radical Redesign of Nursing Homes: Applying the Green House
Concept in Tupelo, Mississippi, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 533, 533 (2006).
124. Alice Dembner, 'Green Houses' For Golden Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2006, at
Al.
125. Athan Bezaitis, Changing Choices-Aging in Place in the 21st Century, AGING WELL,
Spring 2008, at 30, available at http://www.agingwellmag.com/07I708p30.shtml. See also Nell
Bernstein, "Aging in Place" Communities Offer Seniors Independence and Support, Caring.com,
July 9, 2008, available at http://www.caring.com/articles/aging-in-place.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also The Elder Cohousing Network,
http://www.abrahampaiss.comElderCohousing/GlacierCircle.htn (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
128. Patricia Leigh Brown, Growing Old Together, in New Kind of Commune, N.Y. TIMES,




his mate was competent to consent to their wedding would not be de-
prived of his statutory share. California, Louisiana, and Texas recognize
the concept of "putative spouse" in bigamous marriages; a good faith
spouse might still take a share. 129 In the case where a decedent is sur-
vived by more than one "spouse," the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act allows courts to apportion property "as appropriate in the circums-
tances and in the interests of justice."' 13  Courts could decline to treat a
spouse acting in bad faith as entitled to a statutory share, on the grounds
of unclean hands. 131 The bad faith spouse could be treated in the same
way as the bigamist was treated at common law, and take nothing by
operation of law. 1
32
CONCLUSION
Current law and practice force seniors to make a difficult choice,
especially for those with some cognitive impairments who lack family
who can care for them. The senior can choose to live in a facility and
give up much of his or her privacy, or can hire someone to provide in-
home help. A number of surveys have found that most elderly want to
stay in their own homes, but may feel compelled to move into a nursing
home for health reasons. 33  Facilitating innovative solutions to allow
seniors to live at home, such as NORCs, or to allow seniors to design
housing that fits their needs, is an important step toward giving seniors
more attractive living options. These new forms of housing, however, do
not address the underlying problems for the many seniors who live in
nursing homes, or who are isolated at home.
For elderly in nursing homes and assisted living facilities, two im-
portant shifts need to occur. One is a change in the attitude of family
members and staff regarding the value and importance of relationships
with others. Education and training will help. If both elderly parties are
fully competent, there seems no reason to justify nursing home policies
requiring that the families be informed of a new friendship with another
129. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West 2008); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.96 (2008); Lee v. Lee, 247
S.W. 828, 830 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923).
130. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 209 (1970) (amended 1971 and 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 192 (1998); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.2, cmt. e (2008).
131. See, e.g., Estate of Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the
status of the putative spouse "belongs only to the party or parties to a void marriage who the trial
court finds to have believed in good faith in the validity of the void marriage").
132. A bigamist might still inherit under the putative spouse's will; courts carefully examine
whether the testator bequest "was founded on her supposed legal relation with [her husband] and not
primarily on their long and intimate association." In re Estate of Carson, 194 P. 5 (Cal. 1920).
133. Lucette Lagnado, Foundation Places Big Bet on 'Green Houses'for Elderly, PITrSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, June 29, 2008 at A-2 (citing a 2003 AARP survey that 1% of Americans over age
fifty with a disability wanted to move to a nursing home); Bob Moos, Boomer Home-Bodies: Want-
ing To Stay Put Isn't New--What's New is the 76 Million Baby Boomers Approaching Golden Pond,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 28, 2004, at IH (citing an AARP survey that about 8 out of 10
elderly want to stay in their own homes).
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resident. Second, existing federal and state laws need to be enforced.
Both already require privacy and a right to associate, including the right
to have visitors, but these laws are often ignored. For elderly living at
home, existing laws may be the obstacle rather than the solution, at least
in cases where an unscrupulous caregiver has tricked the elderly person
into marriage. Short statutes of limitation to invalidate the marriage have
allowed caregivers to inherit, even in cases where the elderly person had
no idea a marriage had taken place. A more caring and creative society
should provide much better alternatives.
GOVERNMENT LAWYER AS CAUSE LAWYER: A STUDY OF
THREE HIGH PROFILE GOVERNMENT LAWSUITS
STEVEN K. BERENSONt
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the early part of the twentieth century, lawyers have
attempted to use the law, litigation, and courts as tools to effectuate so-
cial change. The best-known early examples are the campaigns by the
NAACP to end segregated schools and the ACLU for women's and re-
productive rights. By the 1960s and 1970s, politically left-of-center law-
yers were engaged with a wide range of community-based and other or-
ganizations, using both familiar and new tactics in an effort to extend the
social change-through-law efforts of their predecessors. And, by the late
1980s and 1990s, activist lawyers situated politically on the right began
to engage in similar activities, often mimicking overtly the tactics of their
predecessors on the left. The result, at present, is an extremely broad and
deep array of lawyers who use an equally vast array of approaches and
tactics to achieve social and political goals across the ideological spec-
trum.
About a decade ago, legal sociologists Austin Sarat and Stuart
Scheingold gave name to this broad group of lawyers who seek to use
legal means in order to achieve social change. In a series of collections
now numbering five, Sarat and Scheingold have demonstrated the im-
pressive range of the work of what they refer to as "cause lawyers."' In
keeping with that diversity, the editors, along with those who have con-
tributed to their project, have avoided a rigid and all-purpose definition
of "cause lawyering." Nonetheless, at least one observation can be made
after briefly surveying the range of contributions to the cause lawyering
t Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Eduardo Capulong, Elizabeth Cooper, Kate Kruse, Mary Helen McNeal, Eric Mitnick, Barry
Moon, Ascanio Piomelli, Raja Raghunath, and Tim Tarvin,for helpful comments regarding an earlier
draft, as well as Deanna Sampson for continuing support.
1. CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA]; CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
1998) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING]; CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS]; THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Schein-
gold eds., 2008) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, CULTURAL LIVES]; THE WORLDS CAUSE
LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, STRUCTURE AND AGENCY]. The editors also offered
their own mid-stream assessment of the cause lawyering project in STUART A. SCHEINGOLD &
AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING
(2004) [hereinafter SCIEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE].
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series. While a small number of the contributions in the series focus on
the work of government lawyers, these all involve the work of lawyers in
"emerging democracies," or regimes in which the rule of law is not well
established.2 Indeed, none of the contributions to the series which focus
on the work of lawyers in western democracies, where the rule of law is
well established, focus directly on the role of government lawyers.3
Thus, one of the two major questions addressed by this paper is whether
it may be appropriate, in some circumstances, to treat government law-
yers in regimes where the rule of law is well established, such as the
United States, as cause lawyers.
At first blush, it would appear that the answer to this question
should be no. After all, in some of their roles, government lawyers
would appear to be the antithesis of cause lawyers. When they defend
government officials and agencies charged with wrongdoing, or defend
existing statutes and regulations against legal challenges, government
lawyers would appear to be the ultimate defenders of the status quo. And
government lawyers certainly lack the "outsider" status that appears to be
a hallmark of many cause lawyers.
On the other hand, in other contexts, certain government lawyers do
appear to invoke the law, litigation, and courts to achieve social change.
First, where the government itself or its entities are engaged in pursuing
a progressive social change agenda, government lawyers' defense of that
agenda looks similar to the work of non-governmental cause lawyers
who represent and defend activists who pursue social change outside of
the government.4 Additionally, government lawyers may invoke their
public authority to initiate their own legal campaigns designed to alter
some aspect of the social, economic, or political status quo. Indeed, in
doing so, the work of these latter government lawyers often bears more
than a faint resemblance to the work of the first generation of cause law-
yers identified above. Thus, a closer look at the work of government
lawyers who overtly use the law and their government positions to
achieve social change is warranted.
The method used to achieve this goal will be familiar to those ac-
quainted with the cause lawyering series: the case study. More particu-
larly, Part I of this paper will begin with relatively detailed descriptions
of three legal actions initiated by government lawyers which appear to
2. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, The Global Language of Human Rights: Patterns of Cooperation
Between State and Civil Rights Lawyers in Israel, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA, supra note
1, at 246 (discussing cooperation between Israeli civil rights lawyers and lawyers within Israel's
Attorney General's office in an effort to protect the civil rights of Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories); Lucie White, Two Worlds of Ghanaian Cause Lawyers, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL
ERA, supra note 1, at 35 (discussing elite lawyers who work within government agencies on matters
of economic development policies in an effort to raise Ghanaian standards of living).
3. See Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type... : Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29
LAW & Soc. INQUtRy 657, 661 n.5 (2004) [hereinafter Hilbink, Categories] (noting the absence).
4. Thanks to my colleague Eric Mitnick for pointing this out to me.
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have fairly transparent social change objectives. 5  The first case de-
scribed will be Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore's lawsuit
against the tobacco industry.6 The second case described will be the City
of Chicago's lawsuit against the gun industry. And the third case de-
scribed will be then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's legal
action against financial services firm Merrill Lynch, relating to conflicts
of interest regarding research analyst information provided by the com-
pany. 8
Once these cases are presented, an effort will be made to situate
these legal actions within the cause lawyering literature.9 First, a general
comparison between government lawyers and certain cause lawyers will
be drawn.10 Next, the paper will rely on political science Professor
Thomas Hilbink's typology of cause lawyering, I I as well as Sarat and
Scheingold's own typology, offered in their mid-series synopsis regard-
ing the cause lawyering project,' 2 to further compare the government
lawyers studied here and cause lawyers more generally. After conduct-
ing these comparisons, the conclusion will be reached that despite dis-
tinctions with paradigmatic cause lawyering efforts, the three govern-
ment legal actions presented here may appropriately be considered a
form of what Hilbink describes as "elite/vanguard" cause lawyering.
13
This conclusion, however, raises a second major question for this
paper to address. Even assuming that government lawyers, in some cir-
cumstances, may appropriately be categorized as cause lawyers, the
question arises as to how effective they may be acting in that role. In a
similarly broad and deep literature that overlaps with the cause lawyering
project, commentators have questioned the effectiveness of cause law-
yers generally in achieving their social change objectives. Perhaps the
best-known work to raise this argument is Professor Gerald Rosenberg's
The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Achieve Social Change ?14 In this vo-
lume, Rosenberg relies on large amounts of data to contend that some of
the best known elite/vanguard cause lawyering campaigns, including
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part I.A. 1.
7. See infra Part I.A.2.
8. See infra Part I.A.3.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.B. 1.
11. See infra Part I.B.2; Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 661.
12. See infra Part I.B.3; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 98,
101,107.
13. See infra Part I.C; Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 673.
14. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1st ed. 1991) [hereinafter ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE]. A second edition of the
book was recently published. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008) [hereinafter ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 2]. The
second edition differs from the first only in adding two new chapters dealing with the legal campaign
to achieve same-sex marriage rights. See id. at xi. For that reason, references throughout the re-
mainder of this paper will be to the first edition, unless otherwise stated.
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some of those identified at the outset of this paper, failed to achieve their
objectives.
By contrast, a number of other writers, including Sarat, 15 Schein-
gold,16 and most frequently, University of Washington political science
Professor Michael McCann,17 have challenged Rosenberg's conclusions.
They suggest that the aggregate and quantitative approach taken by Ro-
senberg fails to capture the entirety of the ways in which social change
can come about through law, and suggest an alternative "cultural ap-
proach" in order to recognize what are often subtle and nuanced changes
that can result from legal action.
In Part II, this paper will rely primarily on the work of Rosenberg
and McCann to evaluate the effectiveness of the three government litiga-
tion actions described in the previous Part. After describing the work of
these authors generally, 8 the three cases that are the focus here will be
analyzed through the frames offered by these authors.' 9 The primary
question will be whether some of the factors that cause government law-
yers to fit uneasily within the category of cause lawyers, might nonethe-
less allow such lawyers to transcend some of the limits described by Ro-
senberg and others on the effectiveness of cause lawyers in achieving
their social change objectives. 20 The conclusion will be that while gov-
ernment lawyers may enjoy some advantages in achieving their social
change objectives that other cause lawyers do not, nonetheless, such
lawyers still face significant limitations in their ability to achieve broad
social change objectives through litigation.21
By demonstrating that it is appropriate in some circumstances to
think of government lawyers as cause lawyers, it is hoped that some so-
cial change oriented lawyers will be convinced to pursue their objectives
through government service. On the other hand, the final part of this
paper provides a caution to such lawyers that government service will
not absolve them of making the difficult strategic judgments required of
all successful cause lawyers.
15. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis,
Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
3, 7, 11 & n.39 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Stuart A. Scheingold, Essay for the In-Print Symposium on the Myth of Moral
Justice, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 47, 47 (2006) (reviewing THANE ROSENBAUM, THE
MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR SYSTEM FAILS TO Do WHAT'S RIGHT (2004)).
17. Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715, 716
(1992) [hereinafter McCann, Reform Litigation] (reviewing ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra
note 14); Michael W. McCann, Causal Versus Constitutive Explanations (or, on the Difficulty of
Being So Positive... ), 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 457, 477-78 (1996); see Michael W. McCann, Law
and Political Struggles for Social Change: Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Promises in Future Research,
in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 319, 328-29 (David A.
Schultz ed., 1998).
18. See infra Part l.A.1-2.
19. See infra Part ll.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra CONCLUSION.
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I. CAN GOVERNMENT LAWYERS BE CAUSE LAWYERS?
This Part of the paper begins by offering descriptions of three high-
profile government litigation campaigns which arguably fall within the
category of cause lawyering. Next, it compares government lawyering to
cause lawyering more generally, and then analyzes the three cases under
discussion in conjunction with the typologies of cause lawyering offered
by scholars Thomas Hilbink, and Austin Sarat, and Stuart Scheingold. It
ends by concluding that the three cases in question offer examples of
government cause lawyering.
A. The Cases
This section of the paper offers presentations of three high-profile
government legal campaigns, each of which appears to have been moti-
vated by social change objectives. The cases presented are Mississippi
Attorney General Mike Moore's lawsuit against the tobacco industry, the
City of Chicago's lawsuit against the gun industry, and New York Attor-
ney General Eliot Spitzer's actions against financial services firm Merrill
Lynch, regarding conflicts of interest in the provision of research analyst
information.
1. Michael Moore v. American Tobacco Company
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore filed
what became the first of many lawsuits by states against the tobacco in-
22dustry. For Moore, the lawsuit was clearly about social change. To
him, the tobacco industry was to blame for a public health crisis caused
by cigarette smoking. 23 Yet to date, the industry had gotten a free ride-
avoiding all responsibility for the harm it had caused.24  Moore also
viewed the situation in personal terms. He was offended by what he saw
as efforts by the tobacco companies to attract young children, like his
own, to become smokers.25 However, Moore was not interested in a
high-profile public relations campaign against the industry, a new push
for increased regulation, or other effort that might cause the industry to
26change its practices. 6 Rather, Moore turned to litigation and the courts
22. See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP, ADAM LEVY, JOSEPH MENN & JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, THE
PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS 30 (spec. ed. 2006)
[hereinafter MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE]; DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS: THE LEGAL SIEGE ON
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 141 (2000) [hereinafter ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS]; Complaint, Moore v.
Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Jackson County Ch. Ct. May 23, 1994), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ms/2moore.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
23. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 30.
24. See id.
25. See ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 140.
26. See id. at 141.
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to force the tobacco companies to accept responsibility for their prior
conduct and change their practices.2 7
Of course by this time, the tobacco industry was far from being new
to litigation. For decades, individual and groups of smokers had sued
tobacco companies on a variety of theories.28 Such theories included
negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, deceit, failure to
warn, and strict liability.29 However, prior to the filing of the Mississippi
suit, no plaintiff was successful in having a jury verdict sustained against
a tobacco company.30 Early on, plaintiffs had difficulty proving a causal
link between cigarette smoking and disease. 3t Later, cigarette companies
contended that they could not reasonably have foreseen the harm that
could be caused by cigarettes.32 Though the Surgeon General's 1964
report linking cigarette smoking and cancer would greatly diminish these
defenses,33 the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
34
which among other provisions, compelled placement of the well-known
warning label on cigarette packages and advertisements,35 preempted
most failure-to-warn claims. 36 Perhaps the most successful defense of-
fered by the cigarette manufacturers involved variations on the assump-
tion of risk doctrine-the argument that smokers chose to smoke despite
awareness of potential adverse health effects, and therefore were legally
responsible for their own illnesses.37
Aside from the legal defenses asserted by the tobacco companies,
their manner of litigating cases was perhaps an even greater impediment
27. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 30 (demonstrating Moore's desire to
see the tobacco companies pay what they owe); see also ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22,
at 141 (challenging the other lawyers to see the litigation through to the end).
28. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Comparing Tobacco & Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN
INDUSTRY 196,215 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) [hereinafter SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY].
29. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 71 (1997); Bryce A. Jensen,
Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular
Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1338-40 (2001); John J. Zefutie, Jr., Comment, From Butts to
Big Macs-Can the Big Tobacco Litigation and Nation-Wide Settlement with States' Attorneys
General Serve as a Model for Attacking the Fast Food Industry?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1383,
1387-88 (2004).
30. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 76; Robert L. Rabin, Essay, A Sociolegal History
of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853,854 & n. 11 (1992).
31. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71; Peter Pringle, Essay, The Chronicles of Tobacco:
An Account of the Forces that Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 387,389 (1999); Zefutie, supra note 29, at 1387.
32. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1339 (discussing Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317
F.2d 19 (5thCir. 1963)); Rabin, supra note 30, at 860-61 (discussing Lartigue, 317 F.2d 19).
33. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrrEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 229-32 (1964).
34. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965).
35. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1340-41.
36. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992); see also Jensen, supra
note 29, at 1342-43 (discussing Cipollone).
37. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71; Zefutie, supra note 29, at 1389.
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to the ability of plaintiffs to recover from the companies. The tobacco
companies resorted to a "scorched earth" style of litigation, in which they
were able to exploit their vastly superior resources to those of the plain-
tiffs and the plaintiffs' lawyers who challenged them.38 The tobacco
lawyers filed every conceivable motion, contested every conceivable
issue, took every imaginable deposition, and demanded every arguably
relevant document.39 The result was, in many cases, simply outlasting
the plaintiffs and their lawyers. Indeed, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc. ,40 even after the U.S. Supreme Court allowed most of the plaintiffs'
legal theories to go forward,4t plaintiffs' attorneys abandoned the case,42
nearly a decade after it had originally been filed,43 and nearly $3 million
worth of attorney and paralegal time and approximately $150,000 in out-
of-pocket expenses had been advanced by plaintiffs' attorneys.
44
Despite this history, Moore's case on behalf of Mississippi offered
the potential to sidestep the challenges that had derailed previous law-
suits against the tobacco industry. First, the Mississippi lawsuit was
based upon a novel theory of law involving a claim for reimbursement of
the State's Medicaid program for funds expended treating Mississippi
residents for smoking-related illnesses.45 Journalists attribute the devel-
opment of this theory to Mississippi personal injury lawyer Mike Lewis,
who arrived at the theory after visiting the dying mother of a friend of
his, who was suffering from cancer after a lifetime of heavy smoking.46
Lewis noted the tremendous amount of money the State of Mississippi
was paying, through its Medicaid program, to treat such smokers, who
had exhausted their personal resources in battling their illnesses.47
Though Lewis is credited with bringing the Medicaid reimbursement
theory to his law school classmate Mike Moore's attention, Southern
Illinois University law professor Donald Garner had advanced a similar
theory in an obscure law review article published more than a decade and
a half earlier.48  Regardless of its origin, the genius of the Medicaid
reimbursement theory was that it deprived the tobacco companies of their
strongest defense-namely that the party suing them had chosen to
38. See Jensen, supra note 29, at 1339; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71; Rabin, supra
note 30, at 868.
39. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71.
40. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
41. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1343.
42. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 72.
43. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509; Kelder & Dayard, supra note 29, at 72.
44. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 72.
45. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1344; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 73; Zefutie, supra
note 29, at 1392.
46. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 25; Pringle, supra note 31, at 392;
ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 92.
47. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 25; Pringle, supra note 31, at 392;
ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 92.
48. Pringle, supra note 31, at 393 (discussing Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare
Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269 (1977)).
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smoke despite knowing of the related health risks.49 While the individual
smoker may have made a "choice" to smoke, the State of Mississippi,
which was paying for the smoker's care, surely had not.50 Additionally,
the theory squared with Mike Moore's sense of the equities of the situa-
tion: the tobacco companies had caused the harm, but the State of Mis-
sissippi was paying the cost.
51
Secondly, though the State of Mississippi would not be able to
equal the resources the tobacco companies would bring to bear on the
lawsuit, a state party could certainly come closer to matching the indus-
try's resource advantage than the private litigants who had previously
sued the industry. Further, in order to bolster the resources available to
support Mississippi's lawsuit, Moore entered into contingent fee agree-
ments with a number of private attorneys, who in turn agreed to front
many of the out-of-pocket costs that would be needed to pursue the
case. 52 Among the lawyers who worked on the tobacco litigation with
Moore were Mississippi personal injury attorneys Don Barnett, Ron Mot-
ley, and Dickie Scruggs. 53 Each of these lawyers had been highly suc-
cessful in lawsuits involving the asbestos industry, and was anxious to
apply what he had learned from asbestos litigation to tobacco litigation.54
Moreover, their successes in the asbestos suits provided these lawyers'
firms with the resources they would need to take on big tobacco.
55
Despite potentially having neutralized tobacco's strongest defense
and its historical resource advantages, Moore nonetheless faced other
daunting challenges in pursuing the tobacco companies. For example,
the politics of a major lawsuit against the tobacco industry were complex
for an elected official such as Moore. Though Mississippi was not a ma-
jor tobacco growing state, it was a conservative southern state, and pub-
lic opinion was favorable to the tobacco companies.56 Despite Moore's
status as a rising star on the political scene, he was a Democrat in an
overwhelmingly Republican state. Indeed, the political fault lines impli-
cated by Mississippi's tobacco suit were clearly exposed when Republi-
can Governor Kirk Fordice sued Moore after the lawsuit was filed, chal-
lenging his authority to bring the suit on behalf of the State of Mississip-
49. See id. at 393-94.
50. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 25, 29.
51. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 30.
52. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 28.
53. See ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 88, 92-93.
54. See id. at 93; Pringle, supra note 31, at 389.
55. ZEGART, CIvIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 94; Pringle, supra note 31, at 389.
56. Indeed, in the fall of 1993, Dick Morris, who would later achieve notoriety as a political
advisor to President Clinton, polled potential jurors in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and found that sixty
percent supported the tobacco companies in a potential suit by the State. ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS,
supra note 22, at 140. As a result, the case was eventually filed in Chancery Court, where jury trials
were not available. Id.
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pi.57 In any event, it was doubtful that Moore's political star would sur-
vive a high profile, unpopular, expensive lawsuit, in the event it was un-
successful.
On the other hand, at the national level, public opinion had turned
strongly against the tobacco companies by the time Moore filed his suit.
Already, numerous municipalities had passed ordinances limiting smok-
ing in public places and placing other restrictions on tobacco use.58 In
February 1994, David Kessler, then chairman of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), announced that he was considering changing
decades of FDA policy and asserting the agency's jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco as a drug.59 Just a few days later, the ABC television news mag-
azine show "Day One" aired a segment charging that cigarette manufac-
turer Phillip Morris had manipulated the level of nicotine in its cigarettes
in order to make its product more addictive.6 ° In April, the House of
Representatives' Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and
the Environment held hearings regarding the tobacco industry. 61 During
these hearings, each of the CEOs of the world's seven largest tobacco
companies testified under oath that they did not believe that nicotine was
addictive,62 despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary.63
Indeed, documents produced through tobacco litigation and by whistleb-
lowers from within the tobacco companies subsequently demonstrated
both that the companies had long been aware of nicotine's addictive
properties, and that they had taken extreme steps to obfuscate public
awareness of that fact. 64
Though Moore's suit on behalf of Mississippi was the first suit by a
state against the tobacco companies, it was far from the last. In the end,
57. In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429 (Miss. 1997). Fordice argued that as the executive branch
official charged with responsibility for the State's Medicaid program, only he could sue on its behalf
to recover money expended to treat tobacco-related illnesses. Id. at 430. However, the Mississippi
Supreme Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to issue an order preventing Moore from going
forward with the tobacco case. Id. at 435.
58. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex-
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1168 (1998); Jody Hodgdon,
Notes/Comments, Live Smoke Free or Die: The Battle for Smoke Free Restaurants in New Hamp-
shire, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 49, 51 (2004) (discussing municipal ordinances that prohibit smoking in
restaurants); Jennifer McCullough, Note, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Industry: New
Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 731-32 (1997) (discussing
municipal ordinances in New Jersey regulating tobacco use).
59. See ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 113; Pringle, supra note 31, at 394. The
U.S. Supreme Court later ruled that the FDA lacks such authority. FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
60. ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 116-18. Phillip Morris subsequently sued
ABC for libel as a result of the allegation. Id. at 122. ABC settled the case by issuing a public
apology to Phillip Morris for the charges. Id. at 180. However, later evidence would more than
substantiate the allegation of nicotine manipulation. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 77.
61. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 50.
62. Id. at 50-51.
63. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988).
64. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 76-77; Pringle, supra note 31, at 387-88.
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a total of more than forty states brought actions against the tobacco com-
panies. 65 Additionally, around the time the Mississippi case was filed, a
new "wave" of private litigation was launched against the tobacco com-
panies. 66 Leading the charge was flamboyant New Orleans personal in-
jury lawyer Wendell Gauthier.67 Gauthier was the lead attorney in the
first nationwide class action lawsuit filed against the industry, Castano v.
American Tobacco Co. 68  Though the substantive claims raised in the
Castano case were similar to those that had been raised against tobacco
companies previously, 69 the plaintiffs' lawyers believed that the recently
uncovered documents and other evidence regarding the defendants' mal-
feasance might yield a different result.7 ° Moreover, in order to neutralize
the tobacco companies' resource advantage, Gauthier signed up sixty of
the nation's top plaintiffs' personal injury firms to participate in the case,
each of whom put up $100,000 to help finance the litigation.71 Though
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit eventually denied certifi-
cation of the nationwide class,72 the Castano lawyers would go on to file
statewide class actions in numerous states following the Fifth Circuit's
decision.73
The above-described shift in public opinion, the prospect of federal
regulation, and the wave of new lawsuits that threatened to bankrupt the
industry, achieved something never achieved before: it brought big to-
bacco to the negotiating table. 74 Mike Moore became the chief negotia-
tor on behalf of a large coalition of tobacco's foes in pursuing the possi-
bility of a "global settlement" with the industry.75 Moore was squeezed
from both sides in pursuing settlement talks. Public health advocates
such as David Kessler, anti-smoking groups, and at least one State Attor-
ney General were against settling, which they believed would let the de-
65. UNIV. OF CAL. SAN FRANCISCO, TOBACCO CONTROL ARCHIVES, LAWSUIT SUMMARY
CHART, http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobaccollifigationsummary.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
66. See Jensen, supra note 29, at 1338-43; see also Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71-
72 (identifying three "waves" of tobacco related lawsuits); Pringle, supra note 31, at 389; Zefutie,
supra note 29, at 1387-92.
67. MOLLENKAMp, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 73; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note
22, at 149-50.
68. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); see MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 73-74.
The named plaintiff was a friend of Gauthier's who had died from smoking related illness. Id. at 73.
69. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 737-38; MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 73.
70. See Pringle, supra note 31, at 388-89.
71. id. at 391.
72. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
73. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 74; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note
22, at 201; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 72-73; Pringle, supra note 31, at 395; Zefutie, supra
note 29, at 1391.
74. Pringle, supra note 31, at 387-88.
75. In March 1996, Liggett Group, one of the smaller tobacco companies, broke ranks with
the rest of the industry and settled with Mississippi and four other states for approximately $26
million. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 57. Liggett was struggling financially and
feared that judgments in the lawsuits or the terms of a global settlement would bankrupt it. Id. at 58.
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fendant tobacco companies off too easily.76 The companies, in turn,
were demanding concessions the plaintiffs were not prepared to give,
including immunity from all future lawsuits, whether by public or private
parties.77
Eventually, after nearly a year of intense, behind-the-scenes negoti-
ations, and merely weeks before the Mississippi case was scheduled to
go to trial,78 Moore announced that a settlement had been reached with
the tobacco companies (hereinafter, Master Settlement Agreement or
MSA).79 The settlement called for a payment by the tobacco companies
of the staggering sum of $386.5 billion in order to settle all existing to-
bacco litigation.80  In addition to the cash payment, the settlement re-
quired numerous changes to the way the tobacco companies did business.
Among the changes to be required were the following: banning all out-
door advertising including billboards; limiting magazine ads to black-
and-white text in periodicals with no more than fifteen percent youth
readership; prohibiting distribution of tobacco through vending machines
and free samples; forbidding brand-name sponsorship of cultural and
sporting events; prohibiting the industry from paying to place its prod-
ucts in movies or to be named in pop songs; empowering the FDA to
regulate the manufacture and sale of tobacco products; and penalizing the
industry further if teen smoking rates did not decline to meet specific
targets.81 In exchange for these concessions, in addition to settling exist-
ing lawsuits, the industry was to receive an elimination of class-action
tobacco lawsuits, a ban on punitive damages awarded based on past ac-
tions by the tobacco companies, and a limit on the total amount of dam-
ages the industry could be liable for in future lawsuits by smokers to $5
billion annually.82
76. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 72; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note
22, at 271-72. Minnesota Attorney General Hubert "Skip" Humphrey, H was the most vociferous
opponent of settlement within the AG camp. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22 at 72;
ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 272. However, Humphrey eventually settled his
State's suit against tobacco as well, though four months into trial. ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra
note 22, at 321.
77. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 105.
78. On the same day the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Governor Fordice's challenge to
the Mississippi suit, the court rejected a similar challenge by the tobacco company defendants to
Moore's authority to pursue the Medicaid reimbursement suit in chancery court. See In re Fordice,
691 So. 2d 429, 235 (Miss. 1997); In re Corr-Williams Tobacco Co., 691 So. 2d 424, 425-26 (Miss.
1997).
79. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 230-31; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra
note 22, at 270. Actually, by the time the Master Settlement Agreement was reached, four states,
Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and Minnesota, had reached separate settlements with the tobacco com-
panies. See Steven A. Schroeder, Tobacco Control in the Wake of the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 294 (2004).
80. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 236. This amount was to be paid out over
a twenty-five-year period. See Zefutie, supra note 29, at 1397.
81. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 236-37.
82. Id. at 237. A complete copy of the MSA appears in id. at 267-317.
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However, because federal law governed many of the areas that were
addressed by the Master Settlement Agreement, Congressional approval
would be required in order to implement the terms of the settlement.
Though Senator John McCain sponsored legislation to implement the
MSA, the legislation never made it through Congress, due to "lukewarm
support by the Clinton administration, ambivalence on the part of the
public health community, and vigorous opposition from the tobacco in-
dustry .... ,8 Eventually, in November 1998, the Attorneys General of
the forty-six states that hadn't yet settled entered into a revised MSA
with the tobacco companies. 84 The revised MSA avoided subjects that
would require federal legislation, thereby sidestepping the issue of Con-
gressional approval (such as FDA regulation of tobacco, advertising re-
strictions, etc.). The settlement provided for a sharply reduced payment
of $206 billion to be paid to the states over twenty-five years. 8 It also
provided for the dissolution of certain industry promoting entities such as
the Tobacco Institute, and prohibited advertising targeted at young
people (such as the infamous "Joe Camel" ads).86
2. Chicago v. Beretta, U.S.A
By 1998, after the tobacco MSA had been entered into, Wendell
Gauthier and his colleagues who had collaborated on the Castano na-
tionwide class action, the numerous mini-Castano suits filed in state
courts following the Fifth Circuit's denial of certification of the nation-
wide class, and who had also played prominent roles as co-counsel in
many of the Medicaid reimbursement suits brought by states, were look-
ing for a new focus for their efforts.87 The gun industry was a logical
choice, as many of the theories pled in the Castano tobacco cases might
be said to apply equally to the gun industry. 88 Though only about half of
the firms who signed on for the tobacco litigation agreed to join the ef-
fort against the gun industry, 89 and at a considerably smaller financial
stake than was put up in the prior effort,90 Gauthier was nonetheless able
to attract an impressive array of plaintiffs' firms to join the "Castano
Safe Gun Litigation Group.
9 1




87. See HOwARD M. ERICHSON, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs' Attorneys in
Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 28, 129, at 129-30, 136.
88. See id. at 136.
89. Id.
90. Unlike the $100,000 bounty each firm was required to post to take on the tobacco compa-
nies, Bob Van Voris, Gun Cases Use Tobacco Know-How: New Orleans, Chicago Lead the Charge.
Is Alcohol Next?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at Al, the gun litigation only required a pledge of
$50,000, with an initial cash outlay of $2,500, ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 136.
91. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 129-30.
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The group wasted little time in filing suit against fifteen gun manu-
facturers on behalf of Gauthier's home city of New Orleans on Hallo-
ween 1998.92 Eventually, members of the group would also file suits
against the gun industry on behalf of the cities of Atlanta, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Newark, and Wilmington.93 Nonetheless, the focus of the
following discussion will not be on any of these cases, but rather on a
different lawsuit brought against the gun industry by the City of Chicago
and Cook County, Illinois. Unlike the cases brought on behalf of the
cities mentioned above, the bulk of the work performed on the lawsuit
brought on behalf of the City of Chicago was performed by lawyers
within the City Attorney's office, rather than by outside attorneys work-
ing pursuant to contingent fee agreements with the various cities.94 Thus,
the Chicago case may present a "purer" example of government lawyers
engaged in arguably social-change oriented litigation. Additionally, and
perhaps because of the nature of the lawyers involved, the Chicago suit
was based expressly on a legal theory that was only available to the
plaintiffs by virtue of their status as public entities-namely, public nuis-
ance.95 By contrast, even when litigating on behalf of municipalities, the
Castano lawyers nonetheless focused on the same product liability theo-
ries that they had focused on in the tobacco cases and had relied on for
years in bringing cases on behalf of private parties.
96
Of course, increases in gun violence had been a major concern for
urban municipalities such as Chicago in the decade leading up to the
lawsuits filed against the gun industry. 97 Indeed, Chicago had been par-
ticularly hard hit by the combination of gangs and guns. 98 In the year
prior to the filing of its gun lawsuit, Chicago led the nation with 570 gun
homicides.99 This was despite the fact that Chicago had a significantly
smaller population than other major cities.10° As a result, Chicago's
gruff Mayor Richard M. Daley decided that the City needed to pursue
92. Id. at 137.
93. Id. at 129.
94. See id. at 134.
95. See id. at 132.
96. See id. at 137.
97. More specifically, there was a dramatic increase in homicides in large cities between the
years 1985 and 1993. See, e.g., JAMES ALAN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWrrz, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last
visited Dec. 22, 2008). Such deaths subsequently dropped significantly between 1993 and 2000,
leveling off after that. Id. Most of the deaths recorded during the 1985-1993 "spike" were attributa-
ble to handgun violence. See JULIE SAMIA MAtR, STEPHEN TERET & SHANNON FRATrAROLI, A
Public Health Perspective on Gun Violence Prevention, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note
28, 39, at 44-45.
98. See David Barstow, A Chicago Story of Guns, Gangs and Self-Defense: To Destroy or
Defend, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, at .A.
99. Id.
100. For example, New York had more than three times Chicago's population, yet had fewer
gun homicides. Id.
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social change by taking action against the gun industry. 01 He turned to
Deputy Chicago Corporation Counsel Lawrence Rosenthal to lead the
effort. 
102
At first, Rosenthal and his colleagues in the Corporation Counsel's
office focused on tort theories similar to those relied on by the Castano
lawyers in the New Orleans case. 0 3 However, these theories had been
no more successful in their prior uses against the gun industry than they
had been in early efforts against tobacco companies. 1 n Just as tobacco
companies had been able to point to individual smokers' decisions to use
tobacco products as negating the companies' liability for health harms to
smokers, gun manufacturers had been able to point to the wrongful use
of handguns by criminals as breaking the causal chain linking the harm
to victims of gun violence back to the gun manufacturers.1
0 5
There were also other reasons to be more sanguine about the pros-
pects for success of suits against the gun industry than for suits against
the tobacco companies. First, while the harms resulting from cigarette
smoking are uniformly dispersed geographically, as stated above, the
brunt of the harms of gun violence are borne by urban areas. 10 6 Thus, it
is no surprise that cities led the charge against the gun industry, rather
than states, as was the case in the legal attack against the tobacco compa-
nies. 1 7 Indeed, not only are rural areas differentially impacted by gun
violence, but many rural citizens are passionately attached to their fire-
arms and were supporters rather than opponents of the gun industry. 0 8
This urban/rural split made the prospect of legislative support for a set-
tlement with the gun industry, along the lines of what would have been
required to implement the tobacco MSA, questionable at both the state
and federal levels.' °9 Second, the gun industry was not nearly as large or
financially successful as the tobacco industry. While this may have
meant less relentless and effective opposition to litigation against the
industry, it also made the prospect of a large financial judgment bank-
rupting the industry a much more realistic prospect than in the case of the
101. Id. Accord Fox Butterfield, Chicago is Suing Over Guns From Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1998, at A18; Unnet Myers, Go Ahead... Make Her Day; With Her Direct Approach and
Quiet Confidence, Chicago Lawyer Anne Kimball Gives Gunmakers a Powerful Weapon, CHI. TRIB.,
May 2, 1999, at C12.
102. Barstow, supra note 98, at 1 A; ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
103. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
104. See id. at 132.
105. See Barstow, supra note 98, at IA; Myers, supra note 101, at C12; Van Voris, supra note
90, at Al.
106. See supra text accompanying note 97.
107. See ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 149; Van Voris, supra note 90, at Al. Only New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought a major lawsuit against the gun manufacturers on behalf of a
State. See Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
108. See ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 148.
109. The likely opposition of the powerful lobbying group the National Rifle Association
(NRA) would have been another major impediment. Id. at 151.
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tobacco industry.' l0 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was clear
that even when used in the manner for which they were intended, ciga-
rettes caused harm to both smokers and bystanders (through passive ex-
posure to cigarette smoke). However, guns, by contrast, were said to
cause harm only when used improperly, for criminal purposes, rather
than for their proper purposes of sporting use or self-defense.'l
For all of these reasons, Rosenthal soured on the idea of bringing a
traditional tort action on behalf of Chicago against the gun industry.
1 2
In order to find a more promising theory to advance, Rosenthal and his
colleagues began scouring data kept by the Chicago police department
regarding the more than 17,000 illegal guns it recovers every year. 113 It
turned out that large numbers of these guns could be traced to a small
number of gun shops located just outside the city's borders 1 4 Multiple
guns had been sold to "straw purchasers" who in turn provided the guns
to gang members and other criminals." 15 The lawyers became convinced
that gun manufacturers and distributors were deliberately oversupplying
suburban gun shops with products that, given the lack of demand for
them in the suburbs, would naturally end up in Chicago, in violation of
the city's ordinance."16 Rosenthal began to think of the excess supply of
guns in terms of air pollution, floating from a smokestack located down-
wind from the city, but leaving its harmful residue within the city lim-
its. 117 In such circumstances, public nuisance would be the appropriate
legal claim to pursue. Once word got out that Chicago was pursuing the
public nuisance theory in relation to the gun industry, Rosenthal received
an offer of assistance from Temple University Law School professor
David Kairys. t1 8 Kairys had been working with the City of Philadelphia
in developing a similar theory on behalf of Philadelphia's efforts to ad-
dress its growing gun violence problem.11 9 Philadelphia had declined to
file suit against the gun industry by the time Chicago filed its suit,120 and
110. Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18; Sugarman, supra note 28, at 207; Van Voris, supra
note 90, at Al.
111. Myers, supra note 101, at CI2.
112. Id.
113. Barstow, supra note 98, at IA. Since 1982, Chicago has had a city ordinance that virtual-
ly bans gun ownership in the City. Id.; see Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18.
114. Barstow, supra note 98, at IA.
115. Id.
116. Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18; Van Voris, supra note 90, at IA.
117. Barstow, supra note 98, at I A; Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18.
118. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
119. Id. at 132-33. For an academic presentation of Kairys' version of the theory, see David
Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of Public
Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2000).
120. Some have speculated that Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell backed down from suing the
gun manufacturers due to his gubernatorial aspirations and fears that such a suit would alienate the
rural and suburban voters whose support Rendell would need in order to be successful. ERICHSON,
supra note 87, at 133. Rendell's successor would eventually file suit on behalf of the City against
the gun industry. See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir.
2002).
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Kairys ended up working with Rosenthal in putting the Chicago case
together. '
2'
In order to support the city's public nuisance theory, Rosenthal
made use of the City Police Department's investigative resources. City
police officers launched an undercover investigation in which they posed
as gang members and other criminals, and went to many of the suburban
gun shops that had previously been identified to purchase guns for what
the undercover officers expressly described to the sellers to be illegal
purposes. 22 The undercover officers easily purchased the required fire-
arms. Based on this data, the city filed suit, contending that gun manu-
facturers, distributors, and retailers engaged in sales, supply, and market-
ing practices pursuant to which they knowingly caused guns to be im-
ported to and used illegally in Chicago for criminal purposes. 23
Not surprisingly, the gun industry responded by moving to dismiss
the city's complaint. First, the defendants argued that all of the gun sales
identified by the city were legal in themselves-compliant with the very
broad range of federal and state regulations governing the purchase and
124sale of guns. As such, they contended, these activities could not prop-
erly be deemed a public nuisance. Additionally, the defendants con-
tended that the intervening actions of criminals who improperly used
their products broke the causal chain between the manufacture, distribu-
tion, and sale of the guns and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.125 Final-
ly, the defendants challenged the theories of economic recovery ad-
vanced by the city.
126
In a judgment without a supporting opinion, the trial court granted
the defendants' motions to dismiss the case. 127 The city and county ap-
pealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, finding that the second
121. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
122. Barstow, supra note 98, at IA; Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18; Myers, supra note
101, at C12; Van Voris, supra note 90, at A1.
123. Second Amended Complaint 1, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d
1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH 015596).
124. See The Sports Authority's Section 2-615 and 2-619 Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint at II.B., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH
015596) [hereinafter Retailers Motion to Dismiss], 2000 WL 34611549; Manufacturer Defendants'
Section 2-615 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 2, City of Chicago v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH 015596) [hereinafter Manufacturers'
Motion to Dismiss], 2000 WL 34017053; Distributors' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss Counts I
and H of the Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to § 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure, at 11.1., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH 015596)
[hereinafter Distributors' Motion to Dismiss], 2000 WL 34017038.
125. Retailers Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at 1.D., F.; Manufacturers' Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 124, % 4; Distributors' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at 11.2.
126. Retailers Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at II.G.; Manufacturers' Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 124, 4; Distributors' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at 11.3.
127. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 WL 35509506 (Ill. Cir.) (Sept. 15, 2000)
(Trial Order).
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amended complaint did state a cause of action for public nuisance. 128
The defendants, in turn, appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. In a
lengthy opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court,
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the case.129 First,
the court determined that in order to state a claim for public nuisance, the
plaintiffs would have to show negligent conduct on the part of the defen-
dants. 130 However, the court found the defendants were not negligent for
a variety of reasons. First, the court found that the defendant manufac-
turers and distributors did not owe a duty of care to the public at large "to
prevent their firearms from 'ending up in the hands of persons who use
and possess them illegally."-031 Additionally, the court concluded that
the conduct of the defendants should not be viewed as the proximate
cause of the harm alleged by the plaintiffs, where their lawfully sold
products were illegally taken into the city and used by persons not under
the control of the defendants. 32 After addressing the negligence ques-
tion, the court also rejected a number of the remedial claims advanced by
the plaintiffs. 33 For example, the Court found that under the economic
loss doctrine, 134 plaintiffs would not be permitted to recover on a public
nuisance theory for purely economic losses of the type alleged in the
complaint. 35  The Court also ruled that under the municipal cost recov-
ery rule, 36 the plaintiffs would not be permitted to recover in tort for the
public expenditures made in performance of governmental functions of
the sort described above. 137  Thus, the City was left with few tangible
results from its efforts against the gun industry.
Few of the other cities to file lawsuits against the gun industry were
more successful in their efforts than Chicago was. The Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that the City of Cincinnati could go forward with its public
128. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 31 (I1. App. Ct. 2003), rev'd,
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2004). The plaintiffs' had not ap-
pealed from the dismissal of their claim for negligent entrustment from the First Amended Com-
plaint. Id. at 20.
129. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (I11. 2004).
130. Id. at 1124.
131. Id. at 1126. The Court did not decide the question whether gun retailers owe such a duty
to the public at large. See id. at 1126-27.
132. Id. at 1136.
133. Id. at 1143-44. The plaintiffs had claimed more than $433 million in operating expenses
relating the alleged public nuisance created by the defendants during the years 1994-98. Id. at 1138.
This amount included expenses for emergency communications and response, health care treatment
provided to the victims of gun violence, police investigations, and the costs of prosecuting and
defending those accused of gun crimes. Id. at 1138-39.
134. Under the economic loss doctrine, where a tortfeasor's negligence causes no harm to the
person or property of the plaintiff, the plaintiff may not recover for purely economic losses. See,
e.g., 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 58 (2008).
135. City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1143.
136. Under the municipal cost recovery rule, a government cannot recover the costs of carrying
out public services from a tortfeasor who caused the need to provide the services. See, e.g., Barbara
J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Municipal Cost Recovery Rule," or
"Free Public Services Doctrine", 32 A.L.R. 6th 261 (2008).
137. City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1146-47.
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nuisance claims against the gun industry. 138 Despite this fact, Cincinnati
dropped its suit a short while later.1 39  Similarly, the Indiana Supreme
Court ruled that the City of Gary could go forward with its gun lawsuit
on a public nuisance theory. 40 However, many courts applied reasoning
similar to that of the Illinois Supreme Court and refused to recognize the
public nuisance theory as applied to gun sales, marketing, and distribu-
tion. 1  New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer was able to enter into a
settlement with a single gun manufacturer, Smith and Wesson, 142 but the
company faced a tremendous backlash from gun activists and other man-
ufacturers, and no similar settlements were reached. 143  Additionally,
approximately thirty states passed legislation designed to protect the gun
industry from similar suits.'44 Then, in late 2005, Congress enacted fed-
eral legislation dismissing all pending claims of this type in both federal
and state courts, and preempting future such claims. 1
45
Though public nuisance claims against the gun industry were barred
by the 2005 legislation, skirmishes between cities and the gun industry
did not end at that point. Indeed, at the same time the District of Colum-
bia courts were ruling on the District's legal challenge to the gun indus-
try,146 individual plaintiffs, supported by gun advocates, challenged the
District's gun control laws in court. 47 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down some of the D.C. laws for violating the Second Amendment,
which it held confers an individual right to possess firearms as opposed
merely to vesting such a right in state militias.
148
138. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142-44 (Ohio 2002).
139. See ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 140.
140. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1234 (Ind. 2003).
141. See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421-22 (3d Cir. 2002);
Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir.
2001); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 132-33 (Conn. 2001); Penelas v. Arms Tech.,
Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750
N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001); Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195, 198-99
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
142. See ERiCHSON, supra note 87, at 140.
143. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Gun Litigation in the Mass Tort Context, in SUING THE
GUN INDusTRY, supra note 28, 176, 181 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
144. Recent Legislation, Tort Law-Civil Immunity-Congress Passes Prohibition of Qualified
Civil Claims Against Gun Manufacturers and Distributors-Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act, Pub. L No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (To Be Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903, 18
U.S.C. §§ 922, 924), 119 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1939, 1945 n.3 (2006).
145. Id. at 1940.
146. See District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 637-38 (D.C. 2005)
(rejecting plaintiffs' claims for negligence and public nuisance, but allowing claims to go forward
based on D.C. statute imposing strict liability on manufacturers of certain types of guns for injuries
caused by those guns).
147. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (striking down
gun regulation legislation for violating the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
148. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799-2800, 2821-22 (2008).
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3. Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch
In late 2000, Eric Dinallo, the head of the investor protection bureau
in the New York State Attorney General's office began to look into poss-
ible conflicts of interest within the financial services industry. 149 Dinal-
lo's interest in the matter began nearly a year previously when, during a
casual conversation, Dinallo's father posed the question of why so many
Wall Street research analysts had continued to issue "buy" recommenda-
tions for technology and internet stocks whose prices had been falling
through the floor. 150 In early 2001, Dinallo provided his boss, New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, with a memorandum outlining his bu-
reau's priorities for the upcoming year.151  "Investigation of abuses by
investment advisors" was number two on the list.
152
It is not surprising that Spitzer encouraged Dinallo to move forward
with this particular investigation. First, both shared backgrounds as
prosecutors in the prestigious Manhattan District Attorney's office.
53
Second, Spitzer assumed his role as Attorney General in 1998 with an
ambitious vision for the office as an aggressive proponent of progressive
legal reform advanced through both litigation and regulation. 154 Spitzer
saw states as needing to step into the void created by the "new federal-
ism" that had been advocated by conservatives in Washington in all three
branches of government, and become vigorous enforcers of legal protec-
tions in a variety of areas including public health, the environment, anti-
trust, and public integrity. 155 Moreover, Spitzer already had a fairly dim
view of the ethics of Wall Street practice, 156 and was reluctant to coun-
tenance what he saw as misconduct going on in his home turf.
157
Dinallo's investigation got a boost during the summer, when he no-
ticed an item in the Wall Street Journal indicating that Merrill Lynch,
one of Wall Street's biggest and best known firms, had paid $400,000 to
a doctor named Debasis Kanjilal to settle claims that Kanjilal had been
defrauded into losing hundreds of thousands of dollars by buying and
holding stock in an internet company called InfoSpace, which had been
touted by Merrill Lynch's celebrity stock analyst Henry Blodget. 58 Kan-
149. See BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 75-76
(2006); John Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW
YORKER, April 7, 2003, at 54, 55 available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/04/07/030407fafact-cassidy. Dinallo presently serves as
Superintendent of New York's State Insurance Department. See Eric. R. Dinallo-Biography,
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/bios/bios edsup.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
150. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 76-77; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
151. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 77; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
152. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55; see MASTERS, supra note 149, at 77.
153. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 11, 49; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55, 59.
154. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 53; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
155. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 52-53.
156. See Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
157. See id. at 62-64.
158. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 78; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
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jilal alleged that Merrill had misled investors about InfoSpace's true eco-
nomic circumstances because the firm was planning on purchasing
another company, Go2Net, which was one of Merrill's investment bank-
ing clients. 159 Merrill stood to make fees of $17 million if the deal went
through. 160
Using the Attorney General's authority under New York's Martin
Act, the office sent subpoenas both to Kanjilal's lawyer Jacob Zamansky,
and to Merrill Lynch, asking the latter for a broad range of documents
relating to the company's internet initial public offerings (IPOs), internet
stock recommendations, and the compensation of internet stock ana-
lysts. 16' The Martin Act is a relatively unique statute 62 which played an
integral role in this and Spitzer's future efforts to take on the financial
services industry. The statute provides extremely broad authority to the
State Attorney General to investigate and prosecute fraud or deception in
connection with any security, commodity, or investment advice. 163 De-
spite its broad sweep, the statute had been little used as a tool to attack
the securities industry, though New York Attorney General Louis Lef-
kowitz had made some use of the statute during the late 1970s.'64 How-
ever, Lefkowitz had passed on the results of his investigations to federal
authorities, who were traditionally thought to be the primary enforcers
with regard to securities violations. 165 Spitzer, on the other hand, used
the statute to assert primary authority over securities companies where he
believed federal authorities had been lax in protecting investors. 66
The documents obtained by the Attorney General's office in re-
sponse to the InfoSpace subpoena included private e-mails which sug-
gested that research analysts such as Blodget were much less enthusiastic
about InfoSpace behind the scenes than their public recommendations
suggested. 167 For example, even at a time when Blodget had publicly
159. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
160. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 78.
161. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 78-79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
162. See generally N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359h (McKinney 2008). Subsequent to the
Merrill Lynch case, a number of other states passed or considered legislation similar to the Martin
Act that would expand these states' authority to regulate the securities industry. See Jonathan R.
Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Gover-
nance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 951, 959-60 (2005).
163. See Macey, supra note 162, at 960 (citing N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2008)).
The Act, which was passed in 1921, originally provided only for civil enforcement. However, in
1955, criminal penalties were added for fraud. Aaron M. Tidman, Note, Securities Low Enforcement
in the Twenty-First Century: Why States Are Better Equipped Than the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Enforce Securities Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 379, 389 (2007). Spitzer, nonetheless,
relied solely on the statute's civil provisions in his pursuit of Merrill Lynch. See Cassidy, supra note
149, at 64.
164. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 57-58; Jonathan Mathiesen, Survey, Dr. Spitzlove Or: How
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love "Balkanization," 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 311,316 (2006);
Tidman, supra note 163, at 392.
165. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 58.
166. See Macey, supra note 162, at 952.
167. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 80.
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given the stock Merrill's highest possible rating, he was referring to the
stock in private e-mails as "a powder keg," and described the stock as
having a "bad smell."' 168 Yet Blodget did not downgrade the stock's rat-
ing until after the deal with Go2Net had been completed, even though by
then the stock price had fallen from $122 per share, when Kanjilal
bought, 169 to less than $10 per share.
170
A couple of months after issuing the InfoSpace subpoena, the At-
torney General's office issued another subpoena to Merrill Lynch under
the Martin Act relating to a company called GoTo.com (no relation to
Go2Net).171 Blodget had made that company the subject of one of his
172rare downgrades in June 2001. The Wall Street Journal had noted that
the downgrade came just hours after GoTo.com had chosen Credit Suisse
First Boston to handle its upcoming stock offering, rather than Merrill
Lynch. 173 The e-mails that turned up in response to this subpoena sug-
gested an even stronger connection between Merrill's banking business
and its analysts than was the case regarding InfoSpace. For example,
Merrill's initial decision to offer a rating to GoTo.com was based on a
promise made by its bankers to arrange for such a rating if GoTo.com
would use Merrill for a "private placement" in September 2000.174 From
there, the e-mail trail showed a consistent struggle between Merrill's
bankers, who wanted better ratings for the company, and Merrill's ana-
lysts, who were uncomfortable issuing such ratings. 175 The results were
often compromises between what the bankers wanted, and what the ana-
lysts thought was actually justified, based on the company's perfor-
mance. 176 In any event, the company was not downgraded until after the
Credit Suisse deal mentioned above.
177
After the InfoSpace and GoTo.com subpoenas, the Attorney Gener-
al's office served Merrill Lynch with yet another subpoena, this one de-
manding all of the e-mails from its research analysts' internet group.
178
Within the boxes of documents provided in response to the subpoena
were additional e-mails suggesting that research analysts had fudged
their recommendations in response to pressure from bankers within the
company, including one e-mail in which Blodget expressly threatened to
start "calling the stocks.., like we see them" unless he received clearer
instructions on how to reconcile "management's demands for down-
168. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 80-81.
169. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
173. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
174. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 58.
175. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 58-59.
176. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 59; see MASTERS, supra note 149, at 80.
177. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
178. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 60.
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grades on falling stocks with the investment banking team's demands for
good press for its clients."' 7 9
At this point, Spitzer's team finally believed it had enough evidence
to sue Merrill Lynch under the Martin Act.' 80 The team initiated discus-
sions with Merrill Lynch in an effort to settle the matter prior to filing
suit. 81 However, the negotiations did not go well. 182 A particular stick-
ing point was whether the e-mails and other evidence uncovered through
the Attorney General's investigation would become public, or would
remain sealed, as was the desire of the company. 83 Spitzer's view, with
regard to this and other matters, was that public disclosure was necessary
to based legal reform. 184 Thus, confidentiality was off the table as far as
he was concerned.
85
On April 8, 2002, the Attorney General exercised his authority un-
der Section 354 of the Martin Act, 86 to appear ex parte before a judge of
New York's Supreme Court, 87 and seek an order for a public inquiry
regarding alleged violations of the Act, as well as for injunctive relief in
support of such an inquiry. 88 The statute appears to provide the Court
no authority to refuse to grant such relief upon a showing by the Attor-
ney General that "information and belief that the testimony" of persons
alleged to have violated the Act's anti-fraud provisions is "material and
necessary."'' 89  Thus, not surprisingly, Supreme Court Judge Martin
Shoenfeld granted the order sought by the Attorney General. 90
Following issuance of the judge's order, the Attorney General en-
gaged in what would become a hallmark of his future high profile inves-
tigations: the outraged press conference.' 91 At this, Spitzer referred to
Merrill's transgressions regarding its research analyst information as "a
shocking betrayal of trust."' 92
One thing that the New York government attorneys were not aware
of was a little known provision of the Federal Investment Company Act
179. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 84.
180. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 61.
181. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 85; see Cassidy, supra note 149, at 62.
182. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 88; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 61.
183. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 88-89; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 62.
184. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 89.
185. Id.
186. N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 354 (Mckinney 2008).
187. The Supreme Court is the trial court within the New York State Court system.
188. N.Y. GEN. BUS. L. § 354 (McKinney 2008).
189. Id.
190. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 92; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 62; Order Pursuant to Gen-
eral Business Law Section 354 (Apr. 8, 2002),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/2002/apraprO8b02_attach.pdf; Affidavit in Support of
Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354 (Apr. 2002),
http://www.oag.state.ny.uslmedia-center/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf.
191. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 92; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
192. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 92.
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of 1940193 that barred securities firms under court order from operating
mutual funds. 194 A shutdown of Merrill's mutual fund business would
have seriously jeopardized the company, and went far beyond the degree
of pressure the Attorney General hoped to bring to bear against the com-
pany. 195 Thus, later that afternoon Spitzer sent Dinallo back into court
and had him request (successfully) that the judge stay the injunctive part
of his order so that Merrill could continue to operate its mutual fund
business.
196
Despite that fact, the adverse publicity from the court order caused
serious harm to Merrill. The firm's own stock-market valuation fell
more than $5 billion within a week. 197 Moreover, the SEC, embarrassed
at having been beaten to the punch by Spitzer, launched its own investi-
gation regarding research practices. 198 Unwilling to face the continuing
public relations nightmare and the prospects of an SEC investigation,
Merrill Lynch reached a settlement with Spitzer on May 21, 2002.199
Among other provisions, the settlement called for Merrill to pay a fine of
$100 million;2°° to provide certain disclosures on its research reports
regarding income received from the subject of the report relating to
banking activities;2° 1 to separate research analyst compensation from its
investment banking business; 20 2 to set up a committee designed to safe-
guard the independence of its research recommendations; 20 3 and to limit
the usage of research analysts or information in conjunction with solicit-
ing banking business.
2°4
Upon closure of the Merrill Lynch investigation, the New York At-
torney General's office expanded its inquiry regarding research analyst
independence to a number of other major Wall Street financial services
firms. By the end of the year, Spitzer and other regulators had reached a
"global settlement" with ten major Wall Street firms and other regula-
tors.20 5 In addition to implementing measures designed to promote re-
search analyst independence, the settlement provided for $1.4 billion in
193. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1.
194. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 93; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
195. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 93; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
196. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
197. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 93; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 65.
198. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 65.
199. See Agreement Between the Attorney General of the State of New York and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (May 21, 2002) (hereinafter Merrill Lynch Settlement),
www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/investor-protection/pdfs/merrill-agreement.pdf.
200. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 1 24.
201. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 5.
202. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 7-11.
203. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 91 12-13.
204. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, (M 14-15.
205. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 72. The ten firms that joined the settlement were Bear Stems,
Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase; Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Solomon Smith Barney, and U.B.S. Id.
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fines, and a ban on the practice of "spinning, '' 2°6 which Spitzer's office
had also been investigating.
207
The Merrill Lynch investigation would also form the template for a
number of other high profile investigations that Spitzer would launch
involving the financial services industry, prior to his election as Gover-
nor of New York in 2006, and his shocking resignation in 2008.208 For
example, Spitzer initiated investigations that led to major settlements
involving "market timing," or late trading practices by mutual fund com-
209panies. Spitzer also took on insurance industry giants Marsh &
McLennan and AIG over allegations of steering clients to insurance
companies that paid them kickbacks, and covering the practice up with
false insurance bids and similar devices.21°
B. Situating the Three Cases Within the Cause Lawyering Literature
This section of the paper attempts to situate the above case descrip-
tions within the literature regarding cause lawyering. In order to do so, it
will first draw a comparison between the government lawsuits and cause
lawyering generally. Next, it will apply the typologies offered by Hil-
bink, Sarat, and Scheingold to the government litigation actions de-
scribed here.
1. Cause Lawyering and Government Lawyers Generally
The idea of using law and the legal system to effectuate broad-based
social change is not a new one. In America, the idea relates back to at
least the early decades of the twentieth century, when the NAACP
launched its campaign against segregated schools, 211 and the ACLU un-
dertook a series of law reform suits in areas including women's rights,
abortion, sexual privacy, free speech rights, prisoner's rights, military
law, and amnesty.212 Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, during this period of
206. id. The practice of spinning involved reserving certain numbers of Initial Public Offering
(IPO) shares for current or future investment banking customers. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 108.
During the tech boom, when IPO shares frequently doubled or tripled in value shortly after issuance,
distributing such shares was tantamount to handing out free money. Id. By contrast, ordinary inves-
tors found it increasingly difficult to obtain IPO shares during this period.
207. See Cassidy, supra note 149, at 68.
208. See Ellen Wulfhorst, New York Governor Eliot Spitzer Resigns But More Woes Likely,
REUTERS UK, March 13, 2008, available at
http://uk.reuters.conarticle/worldNews/idUKN 1216491420080313.
209. See Macey, supra note 162, at 965-66.
210. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 201-219, 227-49.
211. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1975); WARREN D. ST. JAMES, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE: A CASE STUDY IN PRESSURE GROUPS (1958); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950 (1987).
212. Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28
STAN. L. REV. 207, 213 (1976); see SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A
HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990); Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examina-
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broad liberal social ferment, left-of-center lawyers in such diverse set-
tings as legal aid offices, law reform oriented "back up centers," and law
school clinical programs, often modeling their efforts on the earlier work
of the NAACP and ACLU, engaged in a range of efforts to use law and
lawyering to bring about social change.213 More recently, as the political
winds have shifted rightward, conservative lawyers and interest groups
have emerged that have begun to use law and legal work to achieve so-
cial change in a manner similar to that employed by their predecessors in
each of the two periods mentioned above.214
Despite this history, the term "cause lawyering" has only recently
received broad acceptance, largely due to an ongoing project of legal
sociologists Austin Sarat215 and Stuart G. Scheingold. 21 6 In an ongoing
series, now numbering five volumes, Sarat, Scheingold, and their many
contributors, have sought to map the terrain of what they have come to
identify as cause lawyering. 1 7 Sarat and Scheingold acknowledge that
the field they seek to describe defies easy identification and is subject to
constant shifts in terrain. 218 As a common denominator however, cause
lawyering is usually "directed at altering some aspect of the social, eco-
nomic, and political status quo.,, 219 Given this broad parameter, a strong
claim could be made that the cases discussed above represent examples
of cause lawyering, as each was directed in large measure at altering
some aspect of the social, economic, and/or political status quo.
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons why the govern-
ment attorneys discussed above fit uneasily within the category of cause
lawyers. First, while the examples discussed above may present in-
stances in which the involved government lawyers took on the role of
tion of the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 373 (1976).
213. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, 2-3 (1993) (describing different legal strategies for practicing poverty law
through various organizations); Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin, & Peter A. Joy, Clinical
Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (discussing the
history of student law clinics); Steven K. Berenson, A Primer for New Civil Law Clinic Students, 38
MCGEORGE L. REV. 603, 606-07, 613-14 (2007) (providing a brief history of legal aid in the twen-
tieth century). See generally Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United
States, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11 (2003); William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the
Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960s to the 1990s,
17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241 (1998).
214. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Professional Identity and Political Commitment among Law-
yers for Conservative Causes, in Sarat & Scheingold, STRUCTURE AND AGENCY 83-85; Anthony
Paik, Ann Southworth & John P. Heinz, Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization, 32 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 883, 884-85 (2007); Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over
the Meaning of "Public Interest Law," 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1224-27 (2005).
215. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science and Five
College Fortieth Anniversary Professor, Amherst College.
216. Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Washington.
217. See supra note 1.
218. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 5, 7; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT,
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note I, at 3.
219. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 4.
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cause lawyer, such lawyers play the role of conventional lawyer in many
other instances. For example, in addition to having broad ranging au-
thority to bring lawsuits in pursuit of the public interest, state attorneys
general and city attorneys have statutory and common law responsibili-
ties to defend government actors when they are sued in routine contract
and tort matters. 220  Additionally, when such government lawyers are
required to defend government entities in lawsuits challenging those enti-
ties' policies and procedures, the government lawyers frequently find
themselves on the opposite side of cases from paradigmatic cause law-
yers who have brought these cases for law reform or other similar objec-
tives. 221 Nonetheless, within Sarat and Scheingold's framework, a law-
yer need not act as a cause lawyer at all times, in all settings, in order to
claim the characterization at certain times and in certain contexts. For
example, two of the main settings that Sarat and Scheingold identify as
loci of cause lawyering activity are large corporate law firms, which en-
222
gage in cause lawyering as part of their pro bono activities, and small
private firms, which engage in a mix of cause lawyering and convention-
al lawyering, the latter often necessary to keep the firms afloat economi-
cally. 23 Thus, the mere fact that the government attorneys discussed
above were not engaged in cause lawyering on a full time basis does not
deprive the particular campaigns addressed above from being characte-
rized as such.
It should be noted that though the range of examples of cause la-
wyering identified by the contributors to the Sarat and Scheingold series
is extremely broad, none of the contributions focus on American gov-
ernment lawyers as cause lawyers.224 In countries other than the United
States, some of the cause lawyers identified do work within the govern-
ment itself.225  Perhaps this difference results from the different shape
220. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Hard Bargaining on Behalf of the Government Tortfeasor:
A Study in Governmental Lawyer Ethics, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 346 (2005) [hereinafter
Berenson, Hard Bargaining].
221. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,536-39 (2001) (U.S. government
lawyers defending restrictions on practice of legal services attorneys against challenge by a broad
range of cause lawyers).
222. SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 74.
223. Id. at 88.
224. See Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 661 n.5. Perhaps an exception to this might be
the legal services lawyers and public defenders whose work is discussed extensively throughout the
series. See, e.g., SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 80; Stuart A.
Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice Sites and the Politicization
of the Professional, 5 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 229-236 (1998) [hereinafter Scheingold & Bloom,
Politicization]. However, even though legal services lawyers and public defenders are government
lawyers in the sense that their salaries are paid by the government, they are charged with
representing individual litigants rather than the government itself. Indeed, such lawyers often
represent their individual clients against government entities (that is always the case for public
defenders, and frequently the case for legal services lawyers). Thus, for purposes of the following
discussion, I do not include these lawyers within the category of government attorneys.
225. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, The Global Village of Human Rights: Patterns of Cooperation
between State and Civil Rights Lawyers in Israel, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1,
at 248-52 (discussing cooperation between Israeli civil rights lawyers and lawyers within Israel's
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that cause lawyering takes in established liberal democracies, where rule-
of-law systems are relatively stable, and emerging democracies or autho-
ritarian regimes, where such systems are not well established. In the
latter case, cause lawyering often takes on a largely defensive role-
attempting to protect individuals from arbitrary treatment and repression
on the part of the state.226 On the other hand, cause lawyers in liberal
227states can take a more proactive role vis-A-vis the state. In any event,
this absence of discussion of American government lawyers as cause
lawyers should not be viewed as being determinative if, as will be con-
tended below, the actions of such lawyers resemble those of paradigmat-
ic cause lawyers in other respects.
Another tension in viewing ranking government lawyers of the type
discussed here as cause lawyers has to do with the status such lawyers
hold within the profession. As Sarat and Scheingold frequently point
out, "cause lawyering is everywhere a deviant strain within the legal pro-
fession. ' 28 Indeed in large measure, cause lawyers operate at the mar-
gins of the legal profession.229 It is true that the legal profession has re-
versed its initial overt hostility to cause lawyers. 230 However, the result
has been, rather than a full embrace of cause lawyers, what Sarat and
Scheingold characterize as a "fragile alliance" between cause lawyers
and the broader profession.231 Indeed, this fragile alliance may be mostly
one of convenience, with the broader profession needing the "cover"
cause lawyers provide for conventional lawyers' arguable failure to fully
live up to the profession's stated ideals of providing broad access to jus-
tice and serving the good of the public as a whole as well as that of its
individual clients.232 In any event, while government lawyers as a whole
occupy something of an intermediate status position within the profes-
sion between that of cause lawyers on the low end and corporate lawyers
on the high end,233 ranking government lawyers such as the state attor-
neys general and the city attorneys discussed above, do in fact enjoy a
respected status within the profession. As will be discussed in the fol-
lowing Part of this paper, this status may allow such government lawyers
to transcend some of the limitations that have plagued cause lawyers in
terms of their effectiveness. But for present purposes, the status of rank-
Attorney General's office in an effort to protect the civil rights of Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories); Lucie White, Two Worlds of Ghanian Cause Lawyers, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL
ERA, supra note 1, at 59-65 (discussing lawyers who work within government agencies on matters of
economic development policies in an effort to raise Ghanian standards of living).
226. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 5.
227. Id. at 5-6.
228. Id. at 3.
229. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 4.
230. Id. at 29.
231. Id. at44.
232. Id. at 49.
233. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT R. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD 0.
LAUMANN, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 82-88 (2005).
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ing government lawyers does create a tension regarding whether it is
appropriate to categorize such lawyers as cause lawyers at all.
On the other hand, there are also strong reasons to place the legal
campaigns discussed above within the category of cause lawyering. First
and foremost is the overt social change orientation of each of the legal
campaigns discussed above. Indeed, each of the government lawyers
primarily responsible for initiating these legal campaigns expressly ac-
knowledged and embraced a social change justification in initiating the
legal action. For example, Mike Moore expressly saw himself as calling
the tobacco industry to account for decades of harm caused to the health
of Mississippians and the State's public fisc. 234  Lawrence Rosenthal
similarly acted in conformity with his background in public law en-
forcement in turning to the courts to try to make the city streets of Chica-
go safer.235 And Eliot Spitzer plainly viewed himself as policing a secur-
ities industry that had victimized ordinary investors while the federal
regulators who were responsible for its oversight failed to live up to their
responsibilities.236
Additionally, Sarat and Scheingold have pointed out that one of the
distinguishing features of cause lawyering is the way it blurs what was
traditionally considered to be a clear dividing line between legal and
political activity. 237 Yet who better than an elected or an appointed state
attorney general or city attorney illustrates the confluence between law
and politics? Each of these individuals is at the same time a lawyer, le-
gal practitioner, and member of the legal profession, as well as an elected
or appointed public official, operating within the thoroughly political
milieu of electoral politics.
Finally, Sarat and Scheingold have also focused on cause and con-
ventional lawyers' differing stances toward the legal profession's non-
accountability tenet as a critical distinction between them.238 In short,
this non-accountability principle holds that lawyers are not responsible
for the ends sought by their clients, as long as the ends sought are legally
permissible. 239 As stated in Rule 1.2(b) of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "A lawyer's representation
234. See supra notes 22-27, 50-51 and accompanying text.
235. Barstow, supra note 98.
236. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
237. Sarat & Scheingold, STRUCTURE AND AGENCY, supra note 1, at 9.
238. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 3; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT,
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 7.
239. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES
AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 90 (David Luban, ed. 1983); Steven K. Berenson, Institutional Profes-
sionalism for Lawyers: Realizing the Virtues of Civic Professionalism, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 67, 96
(2006); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV.
669, 673-74 (1978). Others commentators have described this as the legal profession's "neutrality"
principle. E.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
63, 73 (1980); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36 (1978).
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of a client... does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activities.,' 240 Thus, the conventional
lawyer should be equally at home representing either side in a particular
legal dispute.24' Because lawyers are not to be judged based upon the
justice or lack thereof of the positions they advocate, the measure of la-
wyering effectiveness becomes an assessment of the technical quality of
the legal services rendered on behalf of the client.242
In contrast to conventional lawyers, cause lawyers reject this non-
accountability principle. 43 Not only do cause lawyers embrace the ends
that their clients seek, but cause lawyers affirmatively seek out clients
and causes with which they can identify in moral, political, and social
terms. 244 Indeed, for many cause lawyers, the cause itself takes priority
over any individual client.245 This stance also brings cause lawyers into
conflict with the fundamental tenet of the legal profession which de-
mands that lawyers always place their clients' objectives ahead of any
personal, financial, or political interests of the lawyers themselves.
246
However, to the extent that cause lawyers' rejection of non-
accountability places them on a collision course with the core principles
of the mainstream legal profession, cause lawyers embrace this conflict
rather than avoid it.
247
To the extent that government lawyers are engaged in defending
government officials or government entities in lawsuits challenging these
parties' actions, the government lawyers tend to embrace the profession's
240. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002).
241. Scheingold & Sarat hold out the example of renowned litigator David Boies, who in one
case defended IBM against antitrust charges brought by the federal government, yet later represented
the United States in its antitrust action against Microsoft. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 8.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 9.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. In an oft quoted passage, Henry Lord Brougham described his representation of Queen
Caroline to the British Parliament in 1820 as follows: "[An advocate, in the discharge of his duty,
knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons ... is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring
upon others." 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., London, J. Robins and Co.
Albion Press 1821). Though recent commentators have argued whether Brougham truly intended
this statement to represent his assessment of the legal advocate's proper role, compare Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, "Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and Well Considered Opinion" -
Henry Lord Brougham, Written By Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221 passim (2006), with
Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319 passim (2006),
there is little doubt that both the ethical rules governing lawyers and fiduciary principles require
lawyers to place their clients' interests ahead of their own. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002) ("a lawyer shall not represent a client.., if there is a significant risk
that the representation of [the] client[] will be materially limited ... by a personal interest of the
lawyer."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000).
247. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 9.
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non-accountability principle.248 However, in situations such as the cases
discussed above, where the government lawyer pursues public protection
actions in the name of a particular state, the United States, "the people"
of a given state, or some other similar inchoate public entity, the applica-
bility of the non-accountability principle becomes difficult. Of course,
the ability of an entity client to articulate the ends its lawyer is to seek
pursuant to the non-accountability doctrine is a difficult issue in all in-
stances of entity representation, including conventional representation of
corporate entities. However, corporate law establishes clear principles
regarding which individuals have "speaking authority" on behalf of the
organization, for purposes of giving instructions to its lawyers. 249  By
contrast, there are no such clearly established principles for determining
the ends a lawyer should pursue when the client is the state, the people,
or the public interest. 25° At a minimum, it is clear that in such circums-
tances, the government lawyer plays a much greater role in shaping and
identifying the ends to be sought by the client than is the case with regard
to conventional lawyering.251 And, in circumstances such as two of the
three cases discussed above, where the government lawyer is authorized
by law to bring an action in his or her own name,252 the non-
accountability principle no longer makes very much sense at all. Indeed,
the manner in which government lawyers in these circumstances tran-
scend the non-accountability principle is perhaps the most powerful rea-
son why it may be appropriate to characterize such lawyers as cause law-
yers.
2. Hilbink's Typology
In a thoughtful review essay focusing on the first two volumes in
Sarat and Scheingold's cause lawyering project, University of Massachu-
248. See supra note 239. Indeed, in my first job in legal practice, I worked in the office of
Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger, a liberal Democrat. I worked in the division in
the office that was responsible for defending State government agencies when they were sued re-
garding their programs and policies. Berenson, Hard Bargaining, supra note 220, at 345. At the
time, Republican Governor William Weld was engaged in a draconian program of cutting social
spending by the State in an effort to balance the State budget. This required our office to engage in
numerous suits in which we defended the various budget cuts against claims by paradigmatic cause
lawyers from within the legal services and broader advocacy communities on behalf of disadvan-
taged persons. General Harshbarger went to great pains to distance himself publicly from the Weld
administration policies that his office was legally required to defend, while at the same time lauding
the professionalism of the lawyers in his office who, for the most part, were successful in defending
the Governor's policies.
249. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. d (2000).
250. See, e.g., Berenson, Hard Bargaining, supra note 220, at 362-365.
251. In this regard, the government lawyer acts similarly to the plaintiffs' lawyer in a class
action suit, long a preferred vehicle of cause lawyers. See, e.g., Bryant Garth, Power and Legal
Artifice: The Federal Class Action, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 237,241 (1992).
252. See supra notes 22 and 186-88. Of course, in these cases the plaintiff was the government
lawyer acting in his official, rather than his personal capacity. The Chicago gun case, by contrast,
was brought in the name of the City of Chicago and the County of Cook. See Second Amended
Complaint 1 1, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2005) (98 CH
015596).
[Vol. 86:2
GOVERNMENT LAWYER AS CAUSE LAWYER
setts Professor Thomas M. Hilbink offers a useful typology for classify-
ing the various forms of cause lawyering.253 Hilbink classifies cause
lawyers into three broad categories: 1) proceduralist; 2) elite/vanguard;
and 3) grassroots.254 The distinctions between these categories, in turn,
are demarcated across three dimensions: a) the lawyers' vision of "the
system" within which they live and work; b) the lawyers' vision of the
cause for which they work; and c) the lawyers' vision of their job as law-
yers.255
Hilbink's first category is proceduralist lawyering. Proceduralists
view the legal and political systems within which they work as being
basically just.256 They view law and politics as being essentially sepa-
rate, with the former believed to be neutral and objective, rational and
predictable, and therefore superior to politics. 257 Because of their faith in
legal systems, as the name implies, proceduralist lawyers focus on pro-
cedural, rather than substantive, justice.258 As such, they are the cause
lawyers whose practices most resemble those of conventional lawyers.259
Not surprisingly, proceduralist lawyers' vision of their cause is similar to
their vision of the system. That is, they view their cause in procedural
terms.260 For example, for many legal services advocates during the
1960s, the right to counsel was viewed as an end in itself, rather than a
means to particular substantive goals. 26' Finally, with regard to the pro-
ceduralist lawyers' vision of their role, proceduralist lawyers accept a
traditional conception of the lawyer-client relationship. 262 Thus, the law-
yers' obligation to advance the particular interests of the client trump any
broader political, social, or economic goals of the lawyer or the broader
cause he or she may seek to serve.263 Thus, proceduralist cause lawyers
embrace the non-accountability principle discussed above.
A good example of proceduralist cause lawyering comes from law-
yers working with the American Bar Association (ABA) to represent
death row inmates. 264 Of course, the ABA is the most mainstream of
253. See Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 657-61.
254. Id. at 664.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 665.
257. Id. (citing JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964)).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 667.
261. Id. at 667-68 (citing John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Dis-
advantaged in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1,
at 183-84).
262. Id. at 672 & n.20.
263. Id. at 672. In some sense, as Hilbink points out, the broader cause of the proceduralist
lawyer is service to the legal system, and to the profession itself. Id. at 668 & n.15, 670 (quoting
Dotan, supra note 2, at 253).
264. See Austin Sarat, State Transformation and the Struggle for Symbolic Capital: Cause
Lawyers, the Organized Bar, and Capital Punishment in the United States, in Sarat & Scheingold,
GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1, at 189 [hereinafter Sarat, Capital Punishment].
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organizations that represent lawyers in America. In this instance, rather
than advancing substantive arguments as to the death penalty's invalidity
on either moral or constitutional grounds, the lawyers involved focused
on the procedural aspects of implementation of the death penalty in ad-
vancing their clients' interests, e.g., the availability of competent defense
lawyers for capital defendants and the availability of adequate opportuni-
ties for habeas corpus review of death penalty convictions. 65 Though
these lawyers undoubtedly served their clients' interests in avoiding ex-
ecution, the proceduralist approach had the corollary effects of legitimat-
ing both the State's death penalty apparatus (if implemented properly)
and the legal profession's paramount role in ensuring the legitimacy of
the legal system.266
The next category of cause lawyering identified by Hilbink is
elite/vanguard lawyering.267  In terms of their vision of the system,
elite/vanguard lawyers share proceduralist lawyers' vision of the legal
system as fundamentally just, and elite/vanguard lawyers work within the
context of the system rather than outside of it.268  However,
elite/vanguard lawyers reject proceduralist lawyers' sharp distinction
between law and politics. 269 Rather, elite/vanguard lawyers view lawyer-
ing as a form of politics, albeit a superior one to other forms such as di-
rect action.270 Also in contrast to proceduralists, elite/vanguard lawyers
are concerned about substantive, rather than procedural, justice. 27, What
matters is the outcome, not the legal means by which it is achieved.272
In terms of their vision of the cause, elite/vanguard lawyers embrace
the substance of the causes they represent.273 "Their goal is not to sup-
port professional values or the legal system, but to 'change policy, law,
and social systems in such a way that the status of marginalized groups'
is improved., 274 Not surprisingly then, in terms of their vision of the
lawyer's role, elite/vanguard lawyers reject the profession's non-
accountability tenet, 5 in favor of a strong identification with the ends
sought by the clients and causes they represent.2 76 Additionally, the tra-
265. Id. at 194-96; see also Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 667.
266. Sarat, Capital Punishment, supra note 264, at 194-95, 200.
267. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 673.
268. Id. at 676 (citing Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and Democracy in Transnational
Perspective, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1, and Ronen Shamir & Nita Ziv,
State-Oriented and Community-Oriented Lawyering for a Cause: A Tale of Two Strategies, in
GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1, at 298). The above description of "the system" includes legislative and
administrative forums in addition solely to courts. Id. at 677.
269. Id. at 673.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 674.
273. Id. at 675.
274. Id. (quoting Kilwein, supra note 261, at 189).
275. See supra notes 238-52 and accompanying text.
276. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 679.
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ditional agency relationship between attorney and client277 is practically
inverted in the case of elite/vanguard lawyering.278 Rather than doing the
bidding of clients who have sought out legal representation,
elite/vanguard lawyers often seek out particular clients and causes for
purposes of finding the litigants best situated to advance the goals sought
by the lawyers.279
Given elite/vanguard lawyers' reliance on formal legal systems to
effectuate social change, along with their view of lawyering as a type of
politics of superior means, it is not surprising that such lawyers place a
high value on the technical legal skills needed to achieve such results.28 °
Thus, the name elite/vanguard lawyering was chosen at least in part to
reflect the extraordinary skills of the lawyers who succeed through this
approach. Given the primacy of the lawyers within this approach, it is
not surprising that elite/vanguard lawyering reflects a "top down" ap-
proach, with lawyers often dictating appropriate strategies and tactics as
well as the substantive goals to be pursued.281
The legal campaigns of the NAACP and ACLU that were men-
tioned previously, 282 are perhaps the paradigmatic examples of
elite/vanguard lawyering. With regard to the NAACP's legal campaign
to end segregated schools, lawyers pursued a campaign of litigation with-
in the courts, rejecting direct action such as sit-ins and boycotts.283 The
NAACP lawyers recruited plaintiffs for their cases based on the parties'
ability best to represent the legal claims the lawyers sought to advance.284
The lawyers then litigated the cases in the manner the lawyers thought
best for the broader cause of desegregation (which the lawyers, of
course, wholeheartedly embraced), even where doing so may have been
in tension with the individual interests of the clients being represented in
a particular suit.285 Of course, lead lawyers Thurgood Marshall, Charles
Hamilton Houston, and others would become revered figures within the
legal profession.
The final category of cause lawyering identified by Hilbink is gras-
sroots lawyering. 286 Grassroots lawyers have a different vision of the
legal system than lawyers in the previous two categories addressed.
Grassroots lawyers reject the fundamental fairness of the legal system.
277. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
278. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 679.
279. Id. at 679-80.
280. Id. at 678 (citing MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON
PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 26 (1986)).
281. Id. at 677, 683.
282. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
283. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 676.
284. Id. at 681.
285. Id. at 680; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976).
286. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 681.
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Rather, they view the legal system as, at best, ineffective in terms of
achieving justice for their clients, or, at worst, overtly hostile or corrupt
with regard to their clients' interests.287 Because of this view, grassroots
lawyers often seek extra-legal means in order to advance their objec-
288tives. In terms of their vision of the cause, grassroots lawyers do em-
brace the social change objectives of the clients they work with.289 How-
ever, because legal approaches, such as litigation, are disfavored within
grassroots lawyering, the particular skills of lawyers are less valuable
and valued within this type of cause lawyering. 290 This fact has implica-
tions for grassroots lawyers' vision of the lawyer's role as well. Because
lawyers' skills are less important to the approaches undertaken in gras-
sroots lawyering, lawyers play less of a primary and more of a subordi-
nate role in the representation. Rather than the "top down" style of la-
wyering prevalent in elite/vanguard representation, grassroots lawyering
is "bottom up." Grassroots lawyers collaborate with and assist based
movements working for social change, often playing a subordinate, ra-
ther than a directive role.
When one looks at the government lawyer campaigns discussed
above in relation to Hilbink's typology, it becomes clear that these cam-
paigns fit rather neatly into Hilbink's elite/vanguard lawyering category.
First, not surprisingly, the elected and appointed government lawyers
who initiated the legal campaigns view the legal system as fundamentally
just and efficacious, and it is similarly not surprising that they targeted
their reform efforts at the courts, rather than utilizing other means. 29'
Second, it is also understandable why these individuals who at the same
time served as lawyers and as public officials would reject a sharp dis-
tinction between law and politics. Indeed, these officials' professional
existence is itself evidence of a blurred distinction between law and poli-
tics.
In terms of their view of the cause, the lawyers profiled above each
embraced an explicit social change orientation with the campaigns they
initiated. As stated above, the lead lawyers involved in each were at the
very highest reaches of the legal profession in terms of status. While
earlier this was offered as a tension with the outsider status of many
cause lawyers,292 it fits perfectly with Hilbink's description of the role of
287. Id.
288. Id. at 685.
289. Id. at 683.
290. Id. at 688 (citing Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice: Left-
Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 125). In
reality, cause lawyers divide less neatly than Hilbink's categories would suggest. For example, Scott
Cummings contends that many grassroots lawyers are less reluctant to pursue legal remedies, partic-
ularly in conjunction with other approaches, than Hilbink argues. Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal
Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2007).
291. See supra notes 27, 101, 154 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
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lawyers within elite/vanguard lawyering. Additionally, with regard to
the vision of the lawyer's role in the cases discussed above, given the
amorphous nature of the "clients" represented in the government lawyer
cases, 293 it seems clear that the campaigns took on a lawyer-centric ap-
proach similar to that of the classic elite/vanguard lawyering representa-
tions addressed here.294
3. Sarat and Scheingold's Typology
Similarly to Hilbink, Sarat and Scheingold have offered their own
typology of the cause lawyering examples discussed in their collec-
295 layrtions. Cause lawyers are broadly divided into those who work in sup-
port of liberal democracy, 296 and those who work against it.297 Within
the category of cause lawyers who work in support of liberal democracy,
Sarat and Scheingold identify three subcategories: 1) neoliberal lawyers;
2) libertarian lawyers; and 3) left liberal lawyers. 298 Neoliberal lawyers
primarily work "to defend and extend property rights in order to transfer
'power from government regulators to landowners and entrepre-
neurs. ' 99 They often work in the areas of tort reform, environmental
regulation, and land use planning.3°° Well-known organizations that fall
into this category include the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Manhattan
Institute, and the Mountain States Legal Foundation.3 1
Libertarian lawyers, by contrast, "look beyond property rights and
the protection of business interests to individual liberties in the social and
cultural spheres. 30 2 Libertarian cause lawyers work in areas such as
school choice, welfare reform, and interracial adoptions, while support-
ing decriminalization for "victimless" crimes such as drug use and por-
nography.
30 3
Left liberal cause lawyers, in turn, seek to "defend the public, as
well as the private, [first generation] rights of individuals. ' 3 ° 4 Thus, such
293. See supra notes 262-63, 275-79, 287-89 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
295. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 101.
296. Id. at 107.
297. Id. at 113. Sarat and Scheingold identify liberal democracy in conjunction with represent-
ative government, the rule of law, individual rights, and an autonomous, open, and pluralistic civil
society. Id. at 102. The individual rights recognized in such regimes are civil and political, of the
type enshrined in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution, as opposed to the social and economic
rights, which are recognized in social democratic alternatives to liberal democracy. Id. at 102-04.
Sarat and Scheingold refer to the former category of rights as "first generation" rights, and the latter
category as "second generation" rights. Id. at 102-103.
298. Id. at 102.
299. Id. at 108 (quoting John P. Heinz, Anthony Paik & Anne Southworth, Lawyers for Con-




303. Id. at 109.
304. Id. at 110. See supra note 290 for a description of first generation and second generation
rights.
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lawyers seek to encourage "a robust and inclusive form of political and
social citizenship," as opposed to a broad sphere of negative liberty from
government interference, as is the case with regard to neoliberal and li-
bertarian cause lawyers.3 °5 Of course, the ACLU is the paradigmatic left
liberal cause law firm in America.306 However, in addition to the sexual
freedom, free speech, and electoral accountability cases that the ACLU is
known for, other left liberal cause lawyers focus on issues such as immi-
gration reform, the death penalty, police violence, employment discrimi-
nation, the right to die, tenants rights, and abortion rights.30 The primary
difference between these lawyers and lawyers on the left who work
against liberal democracy, and who will be discussed below, is their ba-
sic stance toward "the system, ',' 308 to echo Hilbink's typology from
above.3° While these left liberal lawyers work to achieve social change
within the bounds of the existing legal system, the lawyers discussed
below work to change the system itself.
310
Within the category of cause lawyers who work against liberal de-
mocracy, Sarat and Scheingold identify three additional subcategories: 1)
evangelical democratic; 2) social democratic; and 3) emancipatory dem-
ocratic.311 Evangelical democratic cause lawyers work defensively to use
first generation negative liberty rights to carve out a broad space for reli-
312gious expression. However, evangelical democratic lawyers also work
"offensively" to seek a radical transformation of the liberal democratic
society toward a theocratic society.313 Social democratic cause lawyers,
in turn, also seek to transform the liberal democratic state, this time in
the direction of a more inclusive and egalitarian distribution of wealth,
and an orientation toward equality of outcomes, rather than equality of
opportunity, which is at least a formal hallmark of the liberal democratic
state.314 And while emancipatory democratic cause lawyers agree with
the ends sought by social democratic cause lawyers, they differ as to the
means that should be used to achieve those ends. For example, social
democratic cause lawyers are more favorably inclined toward the state
than their emancipatory counterparts, who mistrust the state and seek
broad diffusion of power and political participation.31 5
305. Id. (citing DANIEL C. KRAMER, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: DEVELOPING IDEALS OF
THE POLITICAL LEFT (1972).
306. Id.
307. Id. (citing MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF
PRACTICE 145-63 (1994).
308. Id. at 111 (quoting Scheingold & Bloom, Politicization, supra note 224, at 230).
309. See supra notes 253-294 and accompanying text.
310. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note I, at 111, 113.
311. Id. at 102.
312. Id. at 115.
313. Id. at 116.
314. Id. at 103,113
315. Id. at 113,121.
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Naturally, within the major division between those cause lawyers
who work in favor of liberal democracy and those who work against it,
the government lawyers profiled above fall within the group working for
liberal democracy. After all, these are elected and appointed officers of
the state we are talking about.316 Moreover, each of the cases discussed
above falls on the left hand side of the political spectrum. Thus, it would
appear that within Sarat and Scheingold's typology, the government law-
yers discussed above would be characterized as left-liberal cause lawyers
working in favor of liberal democracy.
Because Sarat and Scheingold's typology offers more categories
than Hilbink's, it perhaps better reflects the complex realities of the
world of practice than the latter. Nonetheless, this complexity limits the
effectiveness of Sarat and Scheingold's typology as a heuristic device.
Therefore, the balance of this paper will focus on Hilbink's typology, as
opposed to that of Sarat and Scheingold.
C. Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer-Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the conclusion here is that the
three government legal campaigns described above should be considered
examples of cause lawyering. It is true that the lawyers involved in these
cases did not always act in the role of cause lawyer and lacked the out-
sider status that is a hallmark of cause lawyers. Yet, as pointed out
above, many cause lawyers do not operate as such at all times, and the
high level of professional status enjoyed by the lawyers involved here is
consistent with that attained by Hilbink's elite/vanguard lawyers, who
have sometimes become icons within the legal profession as a result of
their social change oriented lawyering. Also similar to Hilbink's
elite/vanguard lawyers, the lawyers in the cases discussed here both
blurred the line between law and politics and rejected the profession's
non-accountability tenet in conjunction with these cases. Rather, the
lawyers involved embraced as their own the substantive causes of tobac-
co and gun control or investment research analyst independence. There-
fore, the three campaigns discussed above may appropriately be de-
scribed as examples of elite/vanguard cause lawyering. Given this con-
clusion, it is this author's hope that some social change oriented lawyers
will consider government service as an appropriate professional path to
take in which to pursue their objectives.
316. Note however that Scheingold & Sarat characterize the private personal injury lawyers
who worked as co-counsel in some of the above-described matter as social democratic transforma-
tive cause lawyers, given the manner in which they use the courts to attack the abuse of corporate
and private power against the interests of individual citizens. Id. at 119-20; see also Tim Howard,
Cause Lawyers and Cracker Culture at the Constructive Edge: A "Band of Brothers" Defeats Big
Tobacco, in Sarat & Scheingold, CULTURAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 79.
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I. CAN GOVERNMENT CAUSE LAWYERS TRANSCEND THE LIMITATIONS
THAT CONSTRAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OTHER CAUSE LAWYERS?
Having determined that the lawyers involved in the government le-
gal campaigns addressed in Part I may appropriately be characterized as
cause lawyers within that context, the next question to be addressed is
whether such government lawyers can act effectively in that role.
A. Two Approaches to Evaluating Cause Lawyer Effectiveness
The following section summarizes two broad approaches to evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of cause lawyering efforts. The first, which is ex-
emplified by Professor Gerald N. Rosenberg's book The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change?,317 is described here as the ac-
tuarial approach. The other, which is exemplified by the work of politi-
cal science Professor Michael McCann, is described here as the cultural
approach.
1. The Actuarial Approach: The Hollow Hope
The starting point for an assessment of the effectiveness of the legal
campaigns discussed above should be Professor Gerald N. Rosenberg's
seminal work, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change ?318 In The Hollow Hope, Rosenberg challenges conventional
wisdom regarding the effectiveness of the type of litigation campaigns
described by Hilbink as elite/vanguard lawyering.319 For example, Ro-
senberg questions the effectiveness of the NAACP's legal challenge to
segregated schools which resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.320 He similarly questions the effectiveness
of the campaign for abortion rights that led to the decision in Roe v.
Wade.321 And, in the recently-released second edition of the book,
322
Rosenberg challenges the effectiveness of the campaign for same-sex
marriage rights that culminated in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.323
317. Supra note 14.
318. Id.
319. See supra notes 267-285 and accompanying text.
320. 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 42-169;
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE
L. REv. 795, 809 (2006) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Courting Disaster]; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Substitut-
ing Symbol for Substance: What Did Brown Really Accomplish?, 37 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 205
(2004) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Substituting Symbol].
321. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 175-201;
Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 810; Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Real World of
Constitutional Rights: The Supreme Court and the Implementation of the Abortion Decisions, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 390 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
322. Supra note 14.
323. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 2, supra note 14, at
339-419; Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 812.
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Rosenberg's methodology is largely quantitative-he analyzes large
amounts of data of various types to try to measure the effect of these
landmark court decisions. For example, with regard to Brown's effec-
tiveness, he points to data showing that even a decade after Brown, al-
most 99% of African-American children in the eleven states of the for-
mer confederacy still attended segregated schools.324 And, with regard to
Roe, Rosenberg points out that the rate of increase in abortions in Ameri-
ca actually slowed following the Supreme Court's decision.325
Rosenberg's analysis may not be precisely on point for purposes of
our discussion. Rosenberg's primary focus in the book is the inability of
courts, acting on their own, to foster progressive social change, rather
than the lawyers who appear before them.326 Rosenberg explains this
inability on a number of grounds. First, Rosenberg points out that
throughout their history, with the possible exception of a couple of dec-
ades during the middle of the twentieth century, American courts have
been opponents, rather than supporters, of progressive social change, and
that courts have been defenders of, rather than challengers to, the eco-
327nomic, political, and social status quo. Second, Rosenberg offers four
explanations for why this is so. The federal judicial appointments
process, particularly as it relates to Supreme Court Justices, requires
broad acceptability on the part of judicial appointees.328 Thus, progres-
sive social reformers are unlikely to be appointed to the federal bench.329
Next, the Constitution itself is a constraint on liberal social reform, with
its recognition of first generation political and civil rights, to use Sarat
and Scheingold's terminology discussed above,33 0 and with its failure to
recognize economic, social, and cultural rights,331 which might alter the
presently existing balance of wealth and power in society. Additionally,
courts are constrained from pushing too far ahead of the other branches
of government in introducing reforms, because courts need the assistance
of the other branches to implement and enforce court decisions.332 And
finally, courts themselves lack the power to implement and enforce their
own decisions.33 3
324. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 809 (citing Rosenberg, Substituting
Symbol, supra note 320, at 205).
325. Id. at 810. To be fair, it is hard to image that the goal of abortion rights advocates was an
increase in the number of abortions performed.
326. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 1.
327. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 797. Rosenberg discusses Supreme
Court decisions in areas including civil rights, id., civil liberties and dissident speech, id. at 802, and
economic regulation, id. at 806, to illustrate his point.
328. Id. at 808.
329. Id.
330. See supra notes 295-316 and accompanying text.
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Though courts may be the primary focus of Rosenberg's critique, he
does not spare from his ire what he would describe as the nalve cause
lawyers who over-rely on litigation as a means to achieve their goals.
Not only are such lawyers misguided in their belief in litigation's ability
to achieve social reforms, but they also, in his view, harm the very causes
they champion by pursuing litigation as a means. First, resorting to the
courts tends to replace the building of social movements and the kind of
community support that Rosenberg believes is crucial to achieving and
sustaining progressive social reform.334 Second, court decisions in favor
of progressive reformers may result in mobilization of opposition forces
which can have the effect of preventing successful implementation of the
court decision. For example, Rosenberg points to massive popular resis-
tance in the South to forced desegregation following the Brown decision
as hindering, rather than helping, the cause of desegregation. 335 And,
Rosenberg similarly points to Roe v. Wade as leading to the rise of the
"right to life" movement in the United States, which has so vigorously
opposed abortion and abortion rights over the past three decades.336 The
fact that numerous states passed either statutes or constitutional amend-
ments banning same-sex marriage in the immediate aftermath of Goo-
dridge provides further support for Rosenberg's "backlash" thesis.
3 37
Note that Rosenberg suggests that conservative activists may have an
easier time achieving success through social change oriented litigation
than liberal or progressive activists.33  That is because conservatives
generally ask courts to preserve the status quo, or to dismantle precedents
that were achieved during the brief reign of progressive judicial decision-
making during the mid-twentieth century, each of which courts are more
inclined to do than to effectuate liberal social change.339 In any event,
Rosenberg contends that progressive social reformers would do well to
avoid resorting to courts alone and to seek other avenues to pursue their
social change objectives.
2. The Cultural Approach: Michael McCann
Despite the force of his arguments, critics have contended that Ro-
senberg's analysis fails to apprehend at least some benefits that may be
associated with social reform litigation. More particularly, these critics
suggest that litigation may have impacts that go beyond the outcome of
particular cases, and that Rosenberg's quantitative approach may miss
334. Id. at 796-97.
335. Id. at 809; Rosenberg, Substituting Symbol, supra note 320, at 207.
336. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 811.
337. Id. at 812-13. Note that Rosenberg's writings regarding Goodridge predate the decision
of the California Supreme Court similarly recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under the Cali-
fornia Constitution. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
338. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 814.
339. Id.
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some of the qualitative impacts litigation may have in shaping social
consciousness and social practices.34 °
Perhaps the most persistent of Rosenberg's critics has been Michael
McCann, a professor of political science at the University of Washing-
ton.341 McCann suggests that Rosenberg's court-centered, "top-down"
view of social change through law fails to capture the entirety of what is
provided by adding a de-centered, 342 "bottom-up" approach to analyzing
social change through law. The latter approach recognizes that very few
disputes are actually resolved by courts, and that very few actors who are
influenced by, and implement, legal decisions are in fact bound by, or
participants in, the actual case itself.343 Thus, the interpretations com-
munities attach to legal decisions become more important than the actual
decisions themselves. As stated by McCann:
[T]he decentered view emphasizes that judicially articulated legal
norms take on a life of their own as they are deployed in practical so-
cial action. This points to what many analysts refer to as the consti-
tutive capacity of law: Legal knowledge prefigures in part the sym-
bolic terms of material relations and becomes a potential resource in
ongoing struggles to refigure those relations.
344
Thus, what appears on the face of a judicial decision to be a defeat
for the legal reformers who brought the suit might turn out to be some-
thing entirely different in practice. A good example of this comes from
McCann's own research regarding the pay equity movement.345 McCann
points out that many of the arguments advanced by pay equity advocates
were not ultimately accepted by courts.346 However, what appeared to be
litigation defeats were utilized by pay equity advocates including unions
and feminist groups to organize and mobilize grassroots support for their
claims.347 This support helped pave the way for legislation in support of
pay equity.348 Moreover, lawsuits were used to create leverage for col-
lective bargaining and other agreements between unions, employees, and
340. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 394-95 (citing Paul Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of
Capital Punishment: Surveying the Benefits of a Cultural Analysis of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1129, 1140 (2002) and Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 129, 134 (2000)).
341. See supra note 17.
342. McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 17, at 730.
343. Id. at 730-33.
344. Id. at 733.
345. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
346. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 119; McCann,
Reform Litigation, supra note 17, at 737-38.
347. McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 17, at 738.
348. See id. at 738-39.
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employers that led to greater advances in pay equity than either the law-
suits or negotiations alone could have led to.
34 9
McCann identifies four different axes along which his approach to
analyzing the effectiveness of law reform tactics differs from that of Ro-
senberg's. The first has to do with the symbolic power of the law.
350
While Rosenberg essentially views legal arguments as either being suc-
cessful or unsuccessful in court, McCann suggests that even an "unsuc-
cessful" legal argument may have important symbolic value beyond its
acceptance or non-acceptance in court.35' The next difference has to do
with causality and power.352 Rosenberg views causality and power in a
linear fashion, measuring for a direct link between judicial action and
discernable impacts in the social world.353 McCann, by contrast, views
causality and power multi-directionally, with the impacts of judicial de-
cisions flowing back and forth in many different directions, with many
different, often difficult to discern effects.354 The third axis of difference
has to do with research methods. 355 While Rosenberg focuses on aggre-
gate, quantifiable data, McCann focuses on more qualitative analysis,
usually in the form of detailed case studies of narrowly targeted popula-
tions or institutional venues.356 The final axis of difference has to do
with the scholars' definitions of what constitutes "significant" social
change.357 Rosenberg views significant social change in terms of based,
national, statistically measurable changes in official policies.358
McCann, by contrast, contends that significant social change may be
episodic, uneven, and difficult or impossible to measure.359
In fairness, both Rosenberg and McCann concede that their varying
approaches may "argue past" each other, rather than colliding head-on.360
As mentioned above, Rosenberg's focus is on nationally-based, large-
scaled social reform movements that culminated with decisions from the
United States or State Supreme Courts. 36 1 Given this broad lens, it
makes sense that Rosenberg would focus on aggregate and quantifiable
measures of litigation success. By contrast, McCann's focus is much
narrower, on small-scaled and local efforts at social reform through
law.362 In such circumstances, it makes sense that the more qualitative
349. Id.






356. Id. at 741-42.
357. Id. at 742.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See id. at 720; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to
Feely and McCann, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 761,777 (1992).
361. See supra notes 320-25, 335-37 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 347-49, 356 and accompanying text.
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measures of effectiveness advocated by McCann would do a better job of
capturing complex realities than the approach advocated by Rosenberg.
Extending this analysis to our earlier discussion of typologies of
cause lawyering, it may well be the case that Rosenberg's actuarial ap-
proach does a better job of measuring the effectiveness of the type of
cause lawyering identified by Hilbink as elite/vanguard lawyering 363 than
McCann's cultural approach, given the broad scale of most
elite/vanguard lawyering campaigns. Because such campaigns aspire to
nationally recognizable impacts, the broad and aggregate measures em-
ployed by Rosenberg may be the most accurate measures of the refor-
mers' success or failure in achieving their broad goals. On the other
hand, McCann's cultural approach may do a better job of capturing the
effects of what Hilbink describes as grassroots lawyering, 6 or what Sa-
rat and Scheingold describe as lawyering against liberal democracy,365
than Rosenberg's broader-based, more quantitative approach. Because
the goals of such grassroots legal reformers are local and small-scaled,
the aggregate measures utilized by Rosenberg may fail to identify suc-
cesses achieved by such reformers. By contrast, McCann's narrower
focus and qualitative methods may identify such successes where Rosen-
berg's methods cannot. Indeed, Hilbink has insightfully pointed out that
the very limitations Rosenberg has identified regarding the effectiveness
of elite/vanguard lawyering have driven increasing numbers of cause
lawyers to move in the direction of grassroots, rather than elite/vanguard,
approaches.366
For present purposes, because the government legal campaigns that
are the focus here fall within the category of elite/vanguard lawyering, it
may well be the case that Rosenberg's aggregate approach offers a more
promising avenue through which to assess the effectiveness of the cam-
paigns than McCann's constitutive approach. Nonetheless, in the inter-
ests of thoroughness, the following section of the paper will attempt to
evaluate the effectiveness of the three litigation campaigns under discus-
sion here utilizing elements from both Rosenberg's actuarial approach
and McCann's cultural one.
B. Evaluating the Government Cause Lawyer Cases Under the Two Dif-
ferent Approaches
The following section attempts briefly to evaluate each of the cases
studied here utilizing both an actuarial and a cultural approach. We be-
gin with an assessment of the Mississippi tobacco case from an actuarial
perspective. Assuming a correlation could be proven, the most important
363. See supra notes 267-85 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
366. See Thomas Hilbink, The Profession, The Grassroots, and the Elite, in SARAT &
SCHEINGOLD, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 63.
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positive impact of the Mississippi tobacco case would be a reduction in
smoking rates. And indeed nationally, smoking rates among adults did
decline significantly during the years immediately following execution of
the MSA. In 1997, overall smoking prevalence in the United States
among adults was 24.7%.367 By 2004, that rate had declined to 20.9%.368
The number has been relatively stable since then, measured at 20.8% in
2006.369 The reduction in youth smoking, which was a major target of
those who brought the suit,370 was even more dramatic. Use of tobacco
by high school students nationally declined from 36.4% to 23% from
1997 through 2005. 37 1 Within Mississippi itself, there was a similar de-
cline in youth tobacco use during the relevant period.372 On the other
hand, adult tobacco use in Mississippi did not decline subsequent to ex-
ecution of the MSA.37 3 Of course, as will be discussed below, many fac-
tors beyond the tobacco lawsuit may have contributed to these figures.
Probably the most direct relationship that can be claimed between
the litigation and the decline in smoking rates has to do with the econom-
ic impact of the settlement. Though this impact was significantly re-
duced given the eventual settlement of $206 billion as opposed to the
original $368 billion agreed upon, the economic impact was nonetheless
noticeable. Most experts attribute about a forty to forty-five cent per
pack increase in the price of cigarettes to the MSA.374 Given established
figures relating to the price elasticity of cigarette sales,375 it is possible to
attribute most of the reduction in cigarette use to the price increase re-
sulting from the MSA. Of course some of the money from the tobacco
367. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults-United




370. See supra notes 25, 81 and accompanying text.
371. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Use Among High School Stu-
dents-United States, 1991-2005, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 724, 725 (2006),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5526.pdf.
372. See OFFICE OF HEALTH DATA AND RESEARCH, MISS. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, TOBACCO
USE TREND AMONG MISSISSIPPI YOUTH: FINDINGS FROM THE 1998 TO 2006 YOUTH TOBACCO
SURVEY 1 (2008), available at
http://www.health.ms.gov/msdhsite/index.cfnm31,2557,303,pdf/YTSTobaccoTrends 1998-2006.pdf
(current tobacco use among Mississippi high school students declined from 30.3% in 1998 to 18.7%
in 2006).
373. The adult smoking rate in Mississippi in 1997 was 23.2%. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, State-Specific Prevalence Among Adults of Current Cigarette Smoking and Smoke-
less Tobacco Use and Per Capita Tax-Paid Sales of Cigarettes - United States, 1997, 47
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 922, 923 tbl.l (1998), available at
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr/wk/mm4743.pdf. In 2005, that figure was 25.1%. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, State-Specific Prevalence of Cigarette Smoking Among Adults
and Quitting Among Persons Aged 18-35 Years-United States, 2006,56 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 993,994 tbl. 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/PDF/wk/mm5638.pdf.
374. See Schroeder, supra note 79, at 295; see also F A Sloan, C A Matthews & J G Trogdon,
Impacts of the Master Settlement Agreement on the tobacco industry, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 356,
359 (2004) [hereinafter Sloan, Impacts] (citing W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS 18 (2002)).
375. Schroeder states that for every 10% increase in the price of cigarettes there is about a four
percent decrease in demand. Schroeder, supra note 79, at 295.
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settlement went to fund an unprecedented level of smoking cessation
programs, 376 as well as to fund counter-advertisements by the American
Legacy Foundation against tobacco use.377 On the other hand, states
have found it increasingly difficult to avoid the temptation of utilizing
the tobacco settlement funds allocated to them for purposes other than
tobacco control.378 Also, while the main purpose of the initiators of the
litigation was not necessarily to punish the tobacco companies, it at least
seems incongruous that the tobacco parties to the settlement have flou-
rished financially following the settlement.379 This result is certainly not
consistent with the rhetoric of the government attorneys during the
course of the tobacco suits vilifying the tobacco defendants.
Next, we turn to an analysis of the results of the tobacco case from a
cultural perspective. It would seem that the state tobacco lawsuits at
least in some ways contributed to building the public narrative that de-
veloped around the time of the lawsuits demonizing the tobacco industry
and isolating smokers within society. However, that narrative had been
developing since at least the 1950s, with major contributions coming
from the Surgeon General's landmark 1964 Report,380 and a spate of lo-
cal regulations banning smoking in public places and limiting the sale of
cigarettes to minors.38' Closer to the present, media coverage, including
the Day One report discussed above,382 contributed much to increase
public awareness of nicotine addiction, as well as the lengths gone to by
the tobacco industry to obfuscate both nicotine's addictiveness and the
other health harms caused by smoking.383 Many of the documents which
demonstrate the industry's efforts to conceal the harmful effects of smok-
ing were disclosed by whistleblowers independent of the states' lawsuits,
though certainly some documents were brought to light through the liti-
gation that would not otherwise have become available.384 Further, it
seems clear that it was the weight of the possibility of lawsuits brought
by all fifty states that brought big tobacco to the negotiating table for the
first time in its history.
385
Critics of the tobacco settlement have suggested that it will have
negative impacts of a qualitative nature that will far outweigh any posi-
376. A recently released study shows a positive correlation between expenditures on state anti-
tobacco programs and declines in smoking prevalence. See Matthew C. Farrelly, Terry W. Pecha-
cek, Kristin Y. Thomas & David Nelson, The Impact of Tobacco Control Programs on Adult Smok-
ing, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 304,304 (2008).
377. Sloan, Impacts, supra note 374, at 356; see also Schroeder, supra note 79, at 294. Fund-
ing for the American Legacy Foundation expired five years after the settlement. Id.
378. Id. at 294-95.
379. See, e.g., Sloan, Impacts, supra note 374, at 356.
380. Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DePaul L. Rev.
331, 352 (2001) [hereinafter Rabin, Tentative Assessment].
381. Id. at 350.
382. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
383. Rabin, Tentative Assessment, supra note 380, at 352-53
384. Id.
385. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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tive ones. Some theorists have suggested that the MSA sets a dangerous
precedent from a constitutional law perspective, violating core principles
of separation of powers and amounting to "regulation through litiga-
tion." Others have been particularly critical of the use of contingent
fee arrangements with private attorneys in order to bring such large scale,
social reform lawsuits.387 While it is too early to determine whether such
harms, which would likely only be discernable over long periods of time,
have ensued, it is worth noting that the flood of "copycat" lawsuits antic-
ipated by critics of the tobacco litigation, against industries ranging from
fast food, to lead paint, to health care, have largely failed to material-
ize.
388
It is also possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the Chicago gun
case from an actuarial perspective. Looking at the Chicago gun case
from a similar point of view as that applied to the tobacco case above,
perhaps the best quantitative measure of success of the gun lawsuits
would be a reduction in gun violence. As mentioned above, the number
of gun homicides nationally declined in the two years immediately fol-
lowing the filing of the Chicago suit. 389 However, that was a continua-
tion of a steep decline that had begun years prior to the filing of the Chi-
cago suit, and that leveled off beginning in 2000.390 In Chicago itself,
gun homicides did decline in the year following the suit, but then began
to creep back upwards.39' In any event, it would be extremely hard to tie
any decrease in handgun violence, either nationally, or in Chicago par-
ticularly, to a lawsuit that was wholly unsuccessful from a legal perspec-
tive. Indeed, the broad academic consensus seems to be that the gun
lawsuits as a whole were similarly unsuccessful.392
386. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Overview to REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1,7 (W. Kip Vis-
cusi ed., 2002); Michael E. DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and Separation of Powers in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 563-65 (2001); Margaret A.
Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Govern-
ments' Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1143-44 (2001); Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of
Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433,449-50 (2000).
387. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes": Myth and Reality About the
Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 252 (2001); David A.
Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens Patriae
Litigation by Contingent Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 323 (2001); Little, supra note 386, at 1183.
388. Indeed, on July 1, 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in favor
of the State of Rhode Island against manufacturers of lead paint and dismissed the State's public
nuisance case against the industry. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 434-35 (R.I.
2008).
389. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
391. In 1999, gun homicides in Chicago numbered 460, down from 569 in 1997 and 536 in
1998. RESEARCH & DEV. DIVISION, CHICAGO POLICE DEPT., CRIME SUMMARY-CHICAGO 2003,
http://egov.cityofchicago.org/webportal/COCWebPortal/COC-EDTORIAL/03YEHomicide-I .pdf
(last visited Jan. 12, 2009). However, in 2000, the number climbed to 472 and to 514 in 2001. Id.
392. See Allen Rostron, Lawyers, Guns, & Money: The Rise and Fall of Tort Litigation
Against the Firearms Industry, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 481, 486 & n.31, 487 (2006) (reviewing
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 28) (citing authorities). However, Rostron himself chal-
[Vol. 86:2
GOVERNMENT LAWYER AS CAUSE LAWYER
Furthermore, the gun litigation seems to offer a vivid illustration of
Rosenberg's backlash thesis.393 The gun lawsuits appear to have brought
together a new alliance between the NRA and the gun manufacturers
themselves that had not previously existed.394 The result was both state
and federal legislation that dramatically reduced the likelihood of suc-
cessful lawsuits against the gun industry in the future.395 Additionally,
the Supreme Court's ruling in Heller396 seems likely to significantly in-
hibit further efforts of gun control advocates.
The gun cases were not much more successful from a cultural pers-
pective than from an actuarial perspective. On the one hand, the cases
did go a long way toward publicizing the marketing and distribution
practices of gun manufacturers that seemed to increase the likelihood that
guns would fall into the hands of those who would use them illegally.397
However, gun control advocates seem to have had only limited success
in leveraging the legal arguments rejected in the Chicago case into gains
in other forums. Indeed, at least as much momentum for the cause of
gun control came from highly publicized shootings such as those at Co-
lumbine High School,398 and from their aftermath, 399 as from the gun
litigation. In the end, the country remains deeply polarized over its
views regarding firearms,4°° in sharp contrast to the emerging consensus
against tobacco.4°'
In terms of actuarial measures of success, the results of the New
York Attorney General's case against Merrill Lynch fall somewhere be-
tween those of the tobacco and gun cases. Though the $100 million pe-
nalty paid by Merrill is nothing to sneeze at, it was, of course, minute as
compared to the tobacco settlement. It also amounted to little more than
a slap on the wrist given the capitalization of Merrill Lynch, and critics
have pointed out that none of the money went directly to reimburse in-
vestors who were harmed by Merrill's tainted research information.4 2
In addition to the monetary aspect of the Merrill Lynch settlement,
the company did agree to a number of reforms that resulted in a separa-
lenges this view, and attributes greater success to the lawsuits than most other commentators. Id. at
485.
393. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
394. See PETER HARRY BROWN & DANIEL G. ABEL, OUTGUNNED 48 (2003) [hereinafter
BROWN & ABEL OUTGUNNED]. Prior to this round of suits, the NRA had viewed itself primarily as a
representative of gun owners, rather than gun manufacturers. Id. at 32.
395. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. Even champions of the gun lawsuits such
as Rostron concede this point. Rostron, supra note 392, at 508.
396. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
397. See Rostron, supra note 392, at 490-93.
398. See, e.g., BROWN & ABEL, OUTGUNNED, supra note 394, at 81-103.
399. See, e.g., BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (Alliance Atlantis Communications 2002).
400. See Rostron, supra note 392, at 505-06.
401. See supra notes 58 and accompanying text.
402. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 101.
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tion between Merrill's research and banking businesses.4 °3 Also, as dis-
cussed above, similar settlements were reached with ten additional bro-
kerage firms,4 4 essentially implementing these reforms industry wide.
This must certainly be viewed as a success, at least in terms of achieving
the objectives set by the government attorneys prior to initiating the law-
suit. On the other hand, one must question whether these measures have
led to the ultimate consumer protection goals that Spitzer and his col-
leagues pursued. Though Rosenberg does not focus directly on this
point, other critics of the use of litigation to achieve social reform have
pointed out that the "law of unintended consequences" appears to apply
with force to court orders obtained through litigation.4 °5 Thus, even
where the specific measures desired are in fact realized through litiga-
tion, the results flowing from those measures may not be as predicted.
Fordham Law School Professor Jill Fisch argues that this has been the
case with regard to the research analyst settlements. 4° More particularly,
Fisch contends that the economics of providing research information are
such that it is not profitable for brokerage firms to provide this informa-
tion independently from their banking businesses. 40 7 Thus, the result of
the settlements has in fact been a net decrease in the amount of research
analysis available to independent investors.408 Other commentators have
reached similar conclusions. 4°
The Merrill Lynch settlement remains a mixed bag from a cultural
perspective as well. On the one hand, Spitzer seems appropriately to
have raised consciousness that financial services firms are worthy targets
of consumer protection advocates' concern. Prior to initiation of Spitz-
er's actions, few consumer advocates focused much attention on Wall
Street.410 On the other hand, many commentators have raised questions
regarding the impact of Spitzer's actions on principles of federalism, and
correspondingly, the health of the financial markets. As mentioned
above, traditionally, regulation of the securities markets was handled at
411the federal level. Critics have contended that if other state officials
follow Spitzer's lead, the financial services industry will face the crip-
pling prospect of having fifty separate sets of rules to comply with.412
403. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., Little, supra note 386, at 1180.
406. Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REv. 39, 39
(2007).
407. Id. at 43.
408. Id. at 39. Fisch points out that the firms have continued to provide adequate levels of
research information to their institutional clients, who are large enough to demand such information.
Id. at 42.
409. See, e.g., MASTERS, supra note 149, at 267.
410. Spitzer's actions seem particularly prescient in light of the economic collapse that effected
Wall Street and the nation in the Fall of 2008.
411. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
412. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 268-69 (quoting University of Chicago Law Professor
Richard Epstein and American Enterprise Institute Scholar Michael Greve); Christopher R. Lane,
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Some commentators, in turn, have contended that "Spitzerist" interven-
tions in the financial markets do not threaten "balkanization" or the
health of the financial markets. 413 A middle ground position suggests
that Spitzer's actions served a useful purpose in "awakening" the SEC
and other federal regulators to assert their proper, primary enforcement
role with regard to the financial services scandals of the early 2000s.4 14
In any event, though the worst fears regarding "balkanization" appear not
415to have come to pass, it remains to be seen whether "Spitzerism" can
survive the shocking downfall of its namesake.416
C. The Effectiveness of Government Cause Lawyering-Transcending
Limitations
Professor Rosenberg does not rule out entirely the possibility that
litigation might form the basis for progressive social change. However,
he does outline a stringent set of conditions that must be satisfied in or-
der for elite/vanguard cause lawyers to achieve their objectives. First,
there must be adequate support in legal precedent for the change sought
by the reformers.1 7 Second, there must be support for the change from
legislative and executive officials. 4 18 Finally, there must be at least some
citizen support for (or minimal citizen opposition to) the change
sought,419 along with satisfaction of at least one of the following four
conditions: 1) positive incentives offered to induce compliance; 420 2)
costs imposed to induce compliance; 42' 3) court decisions allowing for
market implementation; 422 or 4) non-judicial actors who are willing to
use court orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources or for hiding
behind when such persons decide to act.423
A quick comparison between the cases described above and Rosen-
berg's conditions for elite/vanguard lawyer success suggests that while
Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts Between State and Federal Securities
Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 339 (2005); Mindy Olson, Note, The Securities Fraud Deter-
rence and Investor Restitution Act: More Effective Than Current Regulation?, 30 J. CORP. L. 425,
441-42 (2005); Steve A. Radom, Note, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Feder-
al Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 322-23 (2003); John C. Coffee, Competitive Federalism: The
Rise of the State Attorney General, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 2003, at 5; Michael G. Oxley, Letter to the
Editor, Who Should Police the Financial Markets?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 3, at 11.
413. See Jonathon Mathiesen, Survey, Dr. Spitzlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love "Balkanization," 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 311,313-14 (2006); Tidman, supra note 163, at
399.
414. See Macey, supra note 162, at 957, 973.
415. Tidman, supra note 163, at 398.
416. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
417. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 31. This argues in favor of incremen-
talism, preferring small and gradual changes over dramatic ones. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 31-32.
420. Id. at 32.
421. Id. at 33.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 33-35.
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the governmental positions of the lawyers initiating the campaigns may
be adequate in themselves to satisfy some of the conditions, nonetheless,
other conditions will remain a challenge to social change oriented litiga-
tion campaigns initiated by government attorneys. For example, with
regard to Rosenberg's second condition, legislative or executive support,
that condition by definition will be satisfied when a government attorney
initiates an elite/vanguard lawsuit. By the same token, it is likely that if a
government lawyer is initiating an action, Rosenberg's third condition, at
least a minimal degree of public support for the action, will be satisfied
as well. After all, given the political nature of the positions of the attor-
neys involved in initiating such suits, it is hard to see them getting so far
"out in front" of public opinion with regard to a particular issue as to fail
to achieve the minimal level of support required by Rosenberg's fourth
condition.
On the other hand, the governmental nature of the plaintiffs will not
necessarily transcend Rosenberg's first condition, at least adequate pre-
cedential support for the change sought. Thus, the Chicago gun suit ul-
timately foundered on the Illinois Supreme Court's unwillingness to ex-
tend the tort of public nuisance to the gun distribution context.424 On the
other hand, the tobacco lawsuit was able to achieve considerable success
with what many commentators described as a questionable legal
theory.425 Both the legitimacy of the Attorneys General who brought the
suits, as well as the ample resources they were able to bring to the litiga-
tion, may well have made up for what was lacking in terms of the doc-
trinal strength of the claims. It is also worth noting that government liti-
gants may have substantive claims available to them which are more
favorable than those that are available to private litigants. For example,
it is quite clear that the relaxed procedural and substantive standards un-
der the Martin Act contributed mightily to the New York Attorney Gen-
eral's success against Merrill Lynch.426
Finally though, Rosenberg's last four conditions often are likely to
be outside the control of the government actors initiating the
elite/vanguard litigation. For example, the State Attorneys General in-
itiating the tobacco lawsuits have not been able to prevent many state
officials from "raiding" the tobacco settlement monies for purposes other
than tobacco control.427 And, market forces may have deprived the re-
search analyst settlements from having their intended effect of improving
the research offerings available to independent investors.428
424. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
425. E.g., Little, supra note 386, at 1159; but see Rabin, Tobacco Litigation, supra note 30, at
866 ('The second obstacle-finding an effective legal theory-appeared somewhat less formidable by
the early 1980s, in light of the continuing evolution of products liability law.").
426. See supra notes 162-63, 166 and accompanying text.
427. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 405-08 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests that each of the government legal
campaigns described above should be considered an example of cause
lawyering. It is true that the government attorneys involved in these
campaigns do not at all times act in the role of cause lawyer, and the
prominent professional status of these lawyers is at odds with the outsid-
er status of most cause lawyers. Nonetheless, the clear social change
objectives that drove these lawyers in their resort to the courts provide an
obvious connection to cause lawyering. Additionally, the very nature of
the public offices held by these lawyers blurs the line between law and
politics in a way that is a hallmark of cause lawyering. Similarly, the
lawyers' obvious personal embrace of the social change objectives of
their actions represents a clear rejection, in the circumstances of each
case, of the profession's non-accountability tenet. Moreover, the lack of
an easily identifiable client in each of the cases led to an inversion of the
typical lawyer-client relationship, in a manner that is consistent with
elite/vanguard cause lawyering.
Despite the factors that distinguish them from prototypical cause
lawyers, the government attorneys involved in the cases discussed here
were not able to transcend entirely the constraints that have traditionally
limited elite/vanguard cause lawyers from achieving the full extent of
their objectives. On the one hand, the high professional status of the
government attorneys involved clearly lent a degree of legitimacy to their
cases that increased their likelihood of success. Additionally, the cases
benefited from the availability of certain legal claims that are only avail-
able to government litigants. On the other hand, each of the cases dem-
onstrated the continuing existence of the above-mentioned traditional
constraints.
For example, in the tobacco case, the full effects of the MSA origi-
nally agreed to by Attorney General Mike Moore were substantially li-
mited by Congress's unwillingness to pass the federal legislation that
would have been needed to implement the MSA in its entirety. And,
Moore has been similarly unable to prevent certain state legislatures from
"raiding" the proceeds of the tobacco settlement for use in balancing
budgets and for additional purposes besides tobacco control. Likewise,
the lawyers in the Chicago City Attorney's office were stymied by the
Illinois Supreme Court's unwillingness to extend the legal doctrine of
public nuisance to the context of gun distribution and sales. Moreover,
the lobbying effectiveness of the NRA and other interests supporting
rural gun owners resulted in legislation at both the state and federal le-
vels that severely set back the objectives of the advocates of gun control.
Finally, market forces have seriously limited the benefits to ordinary
investors intended by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's efforts
to ensure research analyst independence in the financial services indus-
try.
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None of this should be read to contend that government attorneys
ought to avoid entirely efforts to use the law and courts to effectuate so-
cial change. To the contrary, at least two of the cases discussed here
were at least partially successful in achieving their objectives. The to-
bacco lawsuit likely did at least contribute to the nationwide decline in
smoking rates that followed the MSA. And, Attorney General Spitzer
did help bring about major reforms within the financial services industry
that served to insulate research analysts from the influence of investment
bankers. And, given the cultural perspective discussed above, it is likely
that all three of the cases influenced legal consciousness and actors in
ways that are difficult to measure but may well result in social change
over the long term. On the other hand, given the limitations mentioned
above, it behooves government attorneys to think carefully about the
means they wish to pursue in seeking to bring about based social change,
and to think hard about the constraints that have historically limited the
effectiveness of elite/vanguard cause lawyering.
BAZE V. REES: LETHAL INJECTION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
METHOD OF EXECUTION
INTRODUCTION
In the realm of capital punishment, method-of-execution challenges
have become more common.' In Baze v. Rees,2 the United States Su-
preme Court considered whether Kentucky's lethal injection protocol
satisfied the Eighth Amendment.3 The Court held that the risk of pain
from potential maladministration of such a humane method of execution,
and Kentucky's refusal to adopt untested alternative methods, did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.4 The plurality developed a
three-step process for determining when a method of execution violates
the Eighth Amendment.5 When there is a "substantial risk of serious
harm" and "feasible, readily implemented" alternatives exist, a state vi-
olates the Eighth Amendment if it fails to adopt such alternatives, unless
it has a "legitimate penological justification" for such failure.6
As this Comment presents, the plurality's approach solved some
problems associated with method-of-execution challenges, but other
troubles remain. By implementing a purposive test in the creation of its
"substantial risk" standard, the Court eliminated some of the subjective
problems associated with the "evolving standards of decency" test.7
However, the Court did not perform a proper pain analysis, practically
ignoring scientific testing and medical evidence surrounding lethal injec-
tion.8 Without such an inquiry, there is no guarantee that the use of le-
thal injection will comport with the Eighth Amendment.9
Part I of this Comment reviews the history of methods of execution
and the creation of lethal injection. Part II provides an overview of the
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part I analyzes lethal
injection in light of the plurality opinion. Part III suggests that the plu-
rality integrated a purposive test for constitutionality into the objective
"evolving standards of decency" test, thus comporting with the penologi-
cal goals of society and creating stronger precedent. Part III also argues,
1. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dis-
mantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 107 (2007).
2. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
3. Id. at 1529.
4. Id. at 1526.
5. Id. at 1532.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1531; see William W. Berry I1, Following the Yellow Brick Road of Evolving
Standards of Decency: The Ironic Consequences of "Death-is-Different" Jurisprudence, 28 PACE
L. REV. 15, 17-25 (2007).
8. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533.
9. See Denno, supra note 1, at 121.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
however, that the Court should perform an extensive pain analysis, in-
cluding both scientific testing and medical opinion evidence, in order to
ensure that lethal injection complies with the Eighth Amendment. Final-
ly, Part Il concludes by proposing methods by which society can assure
the constitutionality of lethal injection as the least severe method of ex-
ecution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A History of Methods of Execution and Oklahoma's Creation of Le-
thal Injection
The Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punish-
ments [shall not be] inflicted."' 10 Capital punishment has not traditionally
been considered cruel and unusual, provided that the methods of execu-
tion are not excessive and comport with "evolving standards of decen-
cy.
' 11
As society's view of humane punishment has changed, so have its
methods of execution. 12 Hanging was the principal form of punishment
both before and after the enactment of the Eighth Amendment. 3 Occa-
sionally, death sentences were intensified through the use of "superad-
ded" punishments, but by the late eighteenth century such violent modes
of execution were considered both cruel and unusual.14 In 1888, New
York became the first state to consider electrocution as a more humane
form of punishment. 1' While some states used the firing squad and lethal
gas as their methods of execution at one time, electrocution remained the
predominant method for nearly a century.' 6 Eventually, botched electro-
cutions gave rise to intense scrutiny of the execution method, and the
public began to view lethal injection as a safer, more humane alterna-
tive. 17
In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state to implement lethal injec-
tion.' 8 Chief medical examiner A. Jay Chapman, while clear about his
lack of expertise, nonetheless agreed to develop a lethal injection formu-
la. 19 Chapman created a vague standard that originally provided for the
injection of two drugs, sodium thiopental (still used in modern lethal
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
12. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1538.
13. Id. at 1556.
14. Id. at 1557-58.
15. Id. at 1526.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 1, at 62-64.
18. Id. at 65 ("At each step in the political process, concerns about cost, speed, aesthetics, and





injections) and chloral hydrate. 20 However, Chapman later modified the
protocol to include a third drug, potassium chloride. a Concern about a
lack of testing stalled the lethal injection bill during the legislative de-
bate. 2 However, on March 2, 1977, Oklahoma voted to adopt lethal
injection as the state's execution method.23 In doing so, Oklahoma
created a lethal injection template, which other states quickly imple-
mented, usually without further analysis. 24
B. United States Supreme Court Precedents Regarding Methods of
Execution
The United States Supreme Court has issued three key opinions re-
garding methods of execution. In Wilkerson v. Utah,25 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of firing squads.26 In Wilkerson, the Court held that
only punishments involving "unnecessary cruelty" violated the Eighth
Amendment. 27 These unnecessarily cruel punishments included exotic
tortures such as emboweling alive or beheading. 28 The Court took a his-
torical approach in its analysis, citing cases from England in which pain
or terror were "superadded" to the punishment of death. 29 The Court
stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments involving tor-
ture and any other unnecessarily cruel punishments.30  However, the
Court pointed out that this category did not include the firing squad as a
method of execution.3
In In re Kemmler,32 the Court carried the method of execution anal-
ysis further. Although the Court actually decided the case on a "question
of jurisdiction," Kemmler allowed electrocution as a more humane me-
33thod of execution. In dicta, the Court stated that "punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel .... [A cruel punishment] implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment
20. Id. at 67.
21. Id. at 74.
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 78-79.
25. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
26. Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to be Retributive: Execution Methods, Culpa-
bility Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1099, 1108 (2003).
27. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
28. Id. at 135.
29. Id. (stating that superadded punishments included public dissection, burning or embowe-
ling alive, beheading, and quartering).
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 134-135.
32. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
33. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1108.
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of life. 3 4 The Supreme Court routinely cites this "negligible pain" stan-
dard in its application of the Eighth Amendment.35
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,36 a plurality of the Court
upheld a second attempt to execute a prisoner after the first attempted
electrocution failed due to a mechanical malfunction.37 The Court con-
cluded that a mere accident did not violate the Eighth Amendment be-
cause there was no "purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unneces-
sary pain involved. 38 The Constitution only protected an inmate from
cruelty inherent in the method of execution, not any suffering involved in
death.39
In sum, method of execution challenges began with Wilkerson, in
which the Court determined that "unnecessarily cruel" punishments vi-
olated the Eighth Amendment. 40 In Kemmler, the Court carried the anal-
ysis further. It developed the "negligible pain standard," determining
that the punishment of death itself was not cruel, but that a method of
execution cannot inflict unnecessary or wanton pain.4' Finally, in Res-
weber, the Court decided that where there was no purpose to inflict pain,
there was no Eighth Amendment violation; thus, a mere accident would
comport with the Eighth Amendment. 42 Current Supreme Court method-
of-execution jurisprudence uses these famous cases as its basis.43
II. BAZE V. REES4
A. Facts
Petitioners Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling were each con-
victed of double homicide and sentenced to death in Kentucky. 5 Baze
and Bowling sued, seeking to have Kentucky's lethal injection protocol
declared unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.4 6 While peti-
tioners conceded that lethal injection, if applied as intended, would result
in a humane death, they contended that Kentucky's lethal injection pro-
34. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
35. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1108 (noting that the Supreme Court regularly looks to
Kemmler for the proposition that capital punishment cannot "involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain").
36. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
37. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008).
38. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
39. Id.
40. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
41. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890).
42. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
43. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530-31 (2008).
44. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
45. Id. at 1528-29.
46. Id. at 1529.
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tocol was unconstitutional because of a risk of severe pain if the protocol
was not properly followed.47
1. Objective Review of Kentucky's Lethal Injection Protocol
Kentucky's protocol consists of the injection of three drugs. 48 The
first is sodium thiopental, a barbiturate anesthetic that induces uncons-
ciousness, thus preventing the prisoner from feeling any pain.49 The
second drug is pancuronium bromide, which causes paralysis and stops
respiration.50  Kentucky specifies potassium chloride as the third and
final drug.51 Potassium chloride induces cardiac arrest, ultimately caus-
ing the prisoner's death.
2
In addition to identifying the three drugs to be used in the execution,
the Kentucky protocol also specifies the procedures to be followed.5 3 It
requires qualified personnel with at least one year of professional expe-
rience to insert the IV catheters, but only the warden and deputy warden
remain in the execution chamber. 54 The execution team administers the
drugs from the control room through five feet of IV tubing.55 If visual
inspection by the warden demonstrates that the prisoner is still conscious
within sixty seconds of delivery of the sodium thiopental, another dose of
the drug is administered.56 A physician is present to attempt to revive the
prisoner in the event of a stay of execution at the last minute.5 7 An elec-
trocardiogram verifies death.58
2. Challenges to Kentucky's Protocol
Petitioners raised several challenges to Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol. First, petitioners alleged that there was a danger of unneces-
sary pain if the executioners used an inadequate dosage of sodium thi-
opental, the first drug.59 If the execution team administered the sodium
thiopental properly, the condemned prisoner would feel no pain when the
pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride were added. 60 However, if
the dosage of sodium thiopental was inadequate, the administration of
the second and third drugs would cause the prisoner to slowly suffocate
47. Id. at 1526.
48. Id. at 1528.










59. Id. at 1533.
60. See id. at 1536.
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to death, thus experiencing excruciating pain.6' Petitioners claimed that
there was a risk of an improper dosage because Kentucky employed un-
trained executioners and because of potential problems with Kentucky's
injection practices.62
Next, petitioners challenged the use of pancuronium bromide.6 3 As
a paralyzing agent, pancuronium bromide could prevent any indication
that the prisoner was experiencing a painful death because he or she
would be unable to move or cry out.64 The drug would also mask any
other visible signs of pain.65 Petitioners argued that, in light of these
dangers, the use of pancuronium bromide was unnecessary, because it
served no therapeutic purpose while masking signs of possible distress.
66
Potential problems also exist with the use of potassium chloride.
67
If administered to a conscious person, potassium chloride could cause an
excruciating, burning pain.68 Thus, if the execution team did not admi-
nister a proper dosage of sodium thiopental, the first drug, the inmate
would die an extremely painful death.69 However, petitioners' argument
focused on the dangers associated with sodium thiopental and pancuro-
nium bromide, ignoring the dangers of potassium chloride.7 °
Because of the potential problems associated with Kentucky's
three-drug protocol, petitioners proposed a new one-drug protocol, which
has never been tried or adopted by any state.71 Petitioners' one-drug
protocol consisted only of the injection of a barbiturate such as sodium
thiopental. 72 They argued that such a protocol is regularly used by vete-
rinarians during animal euthanasia, and that many states actually forbid
veterinarians to use paralytic agents such as pancuronium bromide.73
61. Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying Problems
in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection for Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919,
921 (2008).
62. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533 (noting that these problems included possible difficulties with the
IV lines, inadequate facilities and training, and the fact that Kentucky had no reliable way to monitor
a prisoner's "anesthetic depth").
63. Id. at 1535.
64. Deborah W. Denno, Introduction, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701, 702 (2008). "Even a slight
error in dosage or administration can leave a prisoner conscious but paralyzed while dying, a sentient
witness of his or her own slow, lingering asphyxiation." Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
65. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation
of the Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 774 (2008).
66. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1535.
67. See Gaitan, supra note 65, at 774.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-35.
71. Id. at 1526.
72. Id. at 1534.
73. Id. at 1535.
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Finally, petitioners alleged that Kentucky's protocol lacked a me-
thod to monitor the "anesthetic depth" of the inmate.74 They suggested
that Kentucky use a variety of measures to verify that the prisoner was
indeed unconscious before injecting the final two drugs.75
B. Procedural Posture
After extensive hearings, the Kentucky trial court recognized the
absence of satisfactory methods of execution for those who oppose the
death penalty but concluded nonetheless that Kentucky's protocol com-
plied with the Eighth Amendment.76 The Kentucky Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that a method of execution violates the Eighth Amend-
ment when it "creates a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary in-
fliction of pain, torture, and lingering death. 77 Kentucky's protocol did
not violate this standard.78
C. Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Kentucky's lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth
Amendment.79 The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts
and joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, affirmed the Kentucky Su-
preme Court's decision.80 The Court held that the risk of pain from the
three-drug protocol, and Kentucky's failure to adopt the untested one-
drug method, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.81
The plurality created a three-step test to determine whether a me-
thod of execution was cruel and unusual.82 First, the plurality rejected
both petitioners' "unnecessary risk" standard and the dissent's "untoward
risk" standard, adopting instead a "substantial risk of serious harm" stan-
dard and describing such a risk as an "objectively intolerable risk of
harm., 83 Under this standard, the mere possibility of pain would not
establish a risk of harm that would qualify as cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment.84 Second, it was not enough that the condemned
prisoner suggested a slightly safer alternative. 85 Rather, any proffered
alternative would have to be "feasible, readily implemented, and in fact
74. Id. at 1536.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1526.
77. Id. at 1529.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1526.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1531-32.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1531.
85. Id.
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significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. 86 Third, the state
needed a legitimate penological justification for the refusal to adopt a
feasible alternative.87 If the state did not have a legitimate justification,
its refusal to alter its method of execution violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.
88
In applying its newly-described standard, the plurality opinion re-
jected petitioners' claims. 89 First, lethal injection could not be "objec-
tively intolerable" because a majority of the states and the federal gov-
ernment have adopted both the method of execution and the three-drug
combination.90 Second, petitioners did not show a substantial risk of an
inadequate dose of sodium thiopental being administered, especially in
light of the safeguards that Kentucky employed.91 Kentucky required
experience and training for the members of its execution team, mandated
the presence of the warden and deputy warden in the execution chamber
to monitor the inmate's consciousness, and established a backup line in
case the primary injection failed.92 Furthermore, as long as the team
followed the manufacturer's instructions regarding the handling of so-
dium thiopental, there was minimal risk of improper application, even if
a layperson injected the drug.93 Thus, while petitioners argued that an
improper dose of the drug would result in a substantial risk of suffocation
from the pancuronium bromide and pain from the potassium chloride,
they failed to show that the risk of an inadequate dose was substantial.94
Third, the plurality rejected the adoption of the untested one-drug
protocol.95 No other state has adopted such a method, and there was
nothing to indicate that it was an equally effective method of lethal injec-
tion.9 6 The plurality rejected petitioners' claims that pancuronium bro-
mide served no therapeutic purpose and suppressed movements that
might indicate consciousness.97 According to the plurality, pancuronium
bromide was necessary because it not only prevented involuntary spasms
during unconsciousness once the potassium chloride was injected, thus
ensuring that the procedure retained its dignity, but it also stopped respi-
ration.98 The Eighth Amendment, therefore, did not forbid Kentucky
86. Id. at 1532.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1537-38.
90. Id. at 1532 (indicating that thirty-six states and the federal government had adopted lethal
injection as their method of execution, while thirty states and the federal government employed the
three-drug protocol used in Kentucky).
91. Id. at 1533.
92. Id. at 1533-34.
93. Id. at 1533.
94. Id.






from using the drug in its execution procedure.99 Additionally, although
veterinary medicine guidelines prohibit veterinarians from using such a
paralytic agent during animal euthanasia, the plurality pointed to the fact
that the states have a legitimate interest in preserving the inmates' digni-
ty that is not present in animal euthanasia.' ° Moreover, the Netherlands
allows physician-assisted suicide, and that country recommends the use
of such a drug in order to prevent an undignified death. 101
Fourth, the Court rejected petitioners' argument that the Kentucky
protocol lacked a method to monitor the "anesthetic depth" of the in-
mate. 102 The Court stated that, because a proper dosage of sodium thi-
opental would result in a satisfactory anesthetic depth, the risks of con-
sciousness during the procedure were not substantial.10 3 Furthermore,
Kentucky implemented satisfactory safeguards in its protocol; conse-
quently, the addition of further steps would still not be sufficient to en-
tirely ensure a painless process.I°4
Finally, pointing to the fact that the three previous method-of-
execution challenges were also rejected in Wilkerson, Kemmler, and
Resweber, the plurality suggested that society has nonetheless moved
toward more humane methods of execution, currently settling on lethal
injection. 10 5 The plurality stated that its decision would not prevent the
legislatures from taking any steps they deem necessary to ensure humane
methods of execution, just as they had done in the past. 106
D. Concurring Opinions
Five concurring opinions indicated the wide range of views sur-
rounding method-of-execution challenges. 0 7 First, Justice Alito argued
that because ethical guidelines prohibit medical professionals from par-
ticipating in executions, requiring their participation in such a procedure
could not be a "feasible" alternative under the plurality's standard.
10 8
Justice Alito then argued that proof of a well-established scientific con-
sensus should accompany any method-of-execution challenge, 1°9 and he
concluded by reminding the Court that the issue in this case was the con-




102. Id. at 1536.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1538.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1538, 1542, 1552, 1556, 1563.
108. Id. at 1540 (Alito, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1542.
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Justice Stevens lamented that the plurality's decision left open ques-
tions surrounding the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol and the
justification for the death penalty itself."' First, Justice Stevens ques-
tioned each of the three rationales commonly cited in support of the
death penalty." 2 Quickly rejecting both incapacitation and deterrence as
justifications, Justice Stevens focused on the retributive rationale, ar-
guing that this rationale is undermined by society's insistence on more
humane forms of punishment that protect an inmate from suffering pain
comparable to that which he inflicted on his victim." 3 Second, Justice
Stevens relied on his own subjective experience to conclude that the im-
position of the death penalty is excessive and thus violates the Eighth
Amendment.114 However, because stare decisis required him to adhere to
precedent, Justice Stevens concurred in the plurality's judgment.15
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, responded to Justice Ste-
vens, basing his argument in favor of the death penalty on the text of the
Presentment and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment."' Jus-
tice Scalia's strongest attack against Justice Stevens rested on the retribu-
tive rationale of the death penalty." 17 Justice Scalia pointed out the major
flaw in Justice Stevens's reasoning: Justice Stevens proposed that any
punishment that inflicts pain violates the Eighth Amendment, but pu-
nishment must inflict pain proportionate to that of the offender's crime in
order to be properly retributive."18 Justice Scalia concluded by accusing
Justice Stevens of ruling by judicial fiat in taking his experience into
account over, and indeed at the expense of, the experience of all oth-
ers.
1 19
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, looked to history and Su-
preme Court precedent to suggest that a method of execution violates the
Eighth Amendment only if it is "deliberately designed to inflict pain."' 2°
Justice Thomas argued that Kentucky did not intend to inflict pain but
instead adopted its protocol in an effort to make its executions more hu-
mane. 12 Justice Thomas also disagreed with the plurality's formulation
of the governing standard, worrying that the plurality's decision would
require the Court to resolve controversies beyond its expertise.1 22
111. Id. at 1542-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1547.
113. Id. at 1547-48.
114. Id. at 1551.
115. Id. at 1552.
116. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 1554.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1555.
120. Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 1563.
122. Id. at 1562.
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Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsburg's dissent regarding the
proper standard. 23 However, after a review of the related literature, Jus-
tice Breyer concluded that the adoption of more thorough measures of
consciousness would not make a noteworthy difference in the safety of
lethal injection.124 Thus, Justice Breyer concluded that Kentucky's pro-
tocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it did not create "a
significant risk of unnecessary suffering."'
' 25
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, proposed "untoward,
readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain" as the
appropriate pain standard. 126 Justice Ginsburg would have inquired into
whether Kentucky's omission of basic safeguards regarding uncons-
ciousness violated this standard. 127 Citing a string of practices in other
states, Justice Ginsburg proposed a variety of safeguards beyond mere
visual inspection to ensure unconsciousness after the injection of the first
drug. 128 These measures included calling the inmate's name, shaking
him, brushing his eyelashes, or presenting him with a noxious stimu-
lus. 12 9 Justice Ginsburg argued that the degree of risk, magnitude of
pain, and availability of alternatives are interrelated factors, and a strong
showing of one reduces the significance of the others. 30 Justice Gins-
burg proposed that a state fails to adhere to "contemporary standards of
decency" if it does not employ "readily available" method-of-execution
alternatives that will decrease the potential for pain.13' Finally, Justice
Ginsburg would require Kentucky to conduct scientific studies and con-
sult with medical professionals regarding lethal injection instead of
merely falling "in line" behind Oklahoma.
32
I1. ANALYSIS
In Baze v. Rees, the Court attempted to redefine the test of constitu-
tionality surrounding methods of execution. While it succeeded to some
degree by integrating a purposive test into the objective aspects of the
"evolving standards of decency" test, its analysis did not go far enough.
Extensive scrutiny of the potential for pain caused by botched lethal in-
jections, including an evaluation of scientific tests and medical opinion
evidence, would more fully guarantee compliance with the Eighth
123. Id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 1566.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1569-71 (including Oklahoma, Florida, California, Alabama, and Indiana).
129. Id. at 1569.
130. Id. at 1568.
131. Id. at 1569.
132. Id.
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Amendment. 133 Furthermore, while beyond the scope of Baze, the use of
a national litigation strategy accompanied by a constitutional tort and
more transparent lethal injection protocols would help to ensure the con-
stitutionality of lethal injection.
A. Integration of a Purposive Test with the "Evolving Standards of
Decency" Test
Courts use the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine to deter-
mine whether a punishment is "excessive.' 35 Originally, any death pe-
nalty practice needed to comport with "evolving standards of decency" in
order to comply with the Eighth Amendment. 36 However, the subjective
aspect of the "evolving standards of decency" test presents several prob-
lems.137 In an attempt to solve these problems, the Court in Baze inte-
grated a "purposive" test into the "evolving standards of decency" analy-
sis. 138 By focusing on the state's penological purpose, the purposive test
corrects many of the problems associated with the subjective aspects of
the "evolving standards of decency" test. M
1. The "Evolving Standards of Decency" Test
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment includes the right to be free from excessive sanctions. 40 It thus
incorporates the concept of proportionality, requiring that the degree of
punishment for the offense fit the seriousness of the crime. 141 Consider-
ing that the death penalty is irreversible and extremely severe, the pro-
portionality analysis has particular importance in death penalty cases.
14 2
In order to determine whether a punishment is disproportional and there-
fore excessive, the Court looks to currently prevailing societal norms and
values rather than the standards in place when the Eighth Amendment
was adopted. 43 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment "draw[s] its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.144
In evaluating the Eighth Amendment in light of society's "evolving
standards of decency," the Court looks to objective factors whenever
133. See Denno, supra note 1, at 121.
134. See Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1162-63; see also Dwight Aarons, The Abolitionist's
Dilemma: Establishing the Standards for the Evolving Standards of Decency, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 441,
466-67 (2008); Gaitan, supra note 65, at 784.
135. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-312 (2002).
136. Aarons, supra note 134, at 444.
137. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 7, at 22-24.
138. See id. at 19.
139. See id. at 31.
140. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
141. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
142. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
143. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008).
144. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
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possible. 45 Originally, courts used six objective factors to determine the
contemporary values indicative of "evolving standards of decency."
146
The most significant of these factors are: 1) statutes enacted by the na-
tion's legislatures and 2) jury verdicts. These two factors are immensely
important because they reflect public opinion on contemporary norms
and values.147  Courts will rarely have a better sense of the Nation's
views on a particular topic than the members of the legislature, elected
by the American people, or the members of a jury, comprised of the
American people.
148
In Baze, the plurality implemented this objective "evolving stan-
dards of decency" test by looking to four of the six objective factors.
49
The Court began its analysis with a review of the history of methods of
execution. 50 It determined that because society has steadily moved to-
ward more humane execution methods, ultimately settling on lethal in-
jection, lethal injection must be consistent with society's standards of
decency. 151 Next, the Court studied judicial precedent, concluding that
the Court has never invalidated a chosen method of execution when chal-
lenges have arisen. 152 Third, the Court looked to the practice of state
legislatures and the federal government to determine whether lethal in-
jection was "objectively intolerable."' 53 In light of the number of states
using the three-drug combination in their protocols, and considering that
no state had implemented a one-drug protocol, the Court determined that
Kentucky's lethal injection protocol did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment. 154 Finally, the Court looked to international practices in order to
rebut the claim that the states should implement a one-drug protocol.
55
The Court indicated that the Netherlands, a country that allows physi-
cian-assisted suicide, uses a muscle relaxant in addition to sodium thi-
opental in order to prevent an undignified and painful death. 56 Thus, in
its analysis, the Baze Court implemented four of the six "evolving stan-
145. See Berry, supra note 7, at 21-22 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).
146. Aarons, supra note 134, at 445 (stating that the objective factors were: (1) history; (2)
judicial precedent; (3) statutes; (4) jury verdicts; (5) penological goals; and (6) international and
comparative law).
147. Id.
148. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 323 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
149. See infra notes 150-56.
150. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526-27 (2008).
151. Id. at 1538. "[fIn moving to lethal injection, the states were motivated by a desire to find
a more humane alternative to then-existing methods." Id. at 1527 n 1.
152. Id. at 1530 (analyzing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) and In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890)).
153. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
154. Id. "Of these 36 states [using lethal injection as their primary means of execution], at
least 30 (including Kentucky) use the same combination of three drugs in their lethal injection proto-
cols." Id. at 1527.
155. Id. at 1535.
156. Id.
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dards of decency" factors to determine that Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
157
2. The Subjective Element of "Evolving Standards of Decency"
and Its Problems
While the objective factors are still important in the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" inquiry, recent Supreme Court decisions add a subjec-
tive element to that test.158 Consequently, objective evidence is no long-
er entirely determinative of whether a death penalty practice is "exces-
sive.''159 Instead, courts are now required to balance objective evidence
of contemporary values with their own judgment in deciding whether the
Eighth Amendment has been violated. 16°
The incorporation of subjective factors into the "evolving standards
of decency" analysis is potentially problematic.' 61  A court's use of its
own subjective judgment in making Eighth Amendment decisions gives
it the opportunity to override the views of the American people and their
elected legislators regarding contemporary norms and values. 62 Eighth
Amendment challenges are thus decided by the "feelings and intuition"
of the justices rather than by the people themselves.' 63  This poses a
problem because the Eighth Amendment reflects society's "evolving
standards of decency"; in order to determine those standards, the court
must look to the legislatures, elected by the people, and to juries, repre-
sentatives of the people, rather than prescribe the standards itself.164 As
Justice Scalia emphasized in his Baze concurrence, the subjective "evolv-
ing standards of decency" test opens the door to "rule by judicial fiat,"
' 165
creating a situation in which precedent might easily be overturned and in
which the "evolving standards of decency" determination is no longer a
reflection of the contemporary values of the American people. 
66
157. See supra notes 150-56.
158. Aarons, supra note 134, at 448; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312
("[Iln the end [the Justices'] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptabili-
ty of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." (quoting Coker v. Georgia., 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977))). Atkins looked to only three of the six objective factors in its decision, while Roper
used only four.
159. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
160. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 605 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. Berry, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that the use of subjective factors "creates the perception
that the Court's interpretation of the objective standards is merely a pretext for the expression of
their subjective views.").
162. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
163. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("By what conceivable warrant can nine
lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the Nation?").
165. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1555 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
166. See Aarons, supra note 134, at 452; see also Berry, supra note 7, at 28 ("[l]f the Court's
imposition of restrictions on the use of the death penalty is tied to ... the subjective views of its
members, then its decisions are merely written in pencil, waiting to be rewritten."); Gregg v. Geor-
gia., 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) ("In a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to
respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." (quoting Furman v. Georgia.,
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3. To Correct These Problems with Subjectivity, Baze Adopts the
Purposive Test
167
A "purposive test of constitutionality" solves the problem presented
by the subjective factors in the "evolving standards of decency" test. 168
Under the purposive test, as developed by William W. Berry III,69 if a
court finds a method of execution to be both "degrading in its severity"
(cruel) and "wantonly imposed" (unusual), the burden will switch to the
states to show that the same penological goal could not be achieved by a
less severe punishment.170 Originally, only methods of punishment simi-
lar to torture were considered "degrading in severity" and thus cruel.'
17
However, the Court later expanded the phrase to prohibit any type of
degradation, potentially even the "the cruelty of pain."'' 72 The Court in-
terpreted the prohibition against "unusual" punishments to mean one of
two things. 173 It can refer to either a method of punishment that is rare,
or a method of punishment that is "arbitrary and discriminatory" ("wan-
tonly imposed"). 74 If the method of punishment is found to be both "de-
grading in its severity" and "wantonly imposed," the state has the burden
of justifying the imposition and severity of the chosen method of execu-
tion.175 If the state cannot justify the method it selected, it must imple-
ment a less severe method of execution in order to comply with the
Eighth Amendment.
176
Accordingly, the purposive test looks at the purpose of the state's
method of execution.177 The test focuses on the "potential abuse of state
power" by assessing the state's intention in implementing its chosen ex-
ecution method. 78 The test evaluates a method of execution by asking
whether the state's purpose is to inflict pain as punishment, or whether
the purpose is to inflict the least amount of pain necessary to execute.
179
408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (internal marks omitted))); Roper, 543 U.S. at
616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Juries 'maintain a link between contemporary community values and
the penal system' that this Court cannot claim for itself." (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181)).
167. See Berry, supra note 7, at 17-18.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18-19.
171. Id. at 18; see also Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penal-
ty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1785 (1970).
172. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910); see also Berry, supra note 7, at 18;
Goldberg, supra note 171, at 1786.
173. Berry, supra note 7, at 19.
174. Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 171, at 1790-91.
175. Goldberg, supra note 171, at 1784, 1794.
176. Id. at 1794.
177. See Jeffrey Waincymer, Commentary: Reformulated Gasoline Under Reformulated WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora Out of a Chapeau?, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141,
172 (1996) ("To speak of 'means' can be linguistically suggestive of a purposive test.").
178. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach but
not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 19(2006),
www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol I05/griffin.pdf.
179. See generally Berry, supra note 7; see also Griffin, supra note 178. The purposive test is
used in a wide variety of contexts (see Christian M. De Vos, Mind the Gap: Purpose, Pain, and the
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The purposive test seeks to protect "the dignity of man," a concept inhe-
rent in the Eighth Amendment, by forbidding excessive punishment. 180
Although originally proposed in the context of the death penalty itself,18'
the test can also be applied to methods of execution. It is a systematic
approach to analyzing whether a method of punishment is cruel and un-
usual. 
82
a. The Purpose of Lethal Injection is to Inflict the Least
Amount of Pain Necessary to Execute
The issue of whether a state's purpose should be to inflict pain as
punishment or to inflict the least amount of pain necessary to execute is
highly contentious.1 83 It is clear that the Constitution "does not require a
pain free death, nor should it.'' 84  However, it is also clear that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the implementation of the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain. 1 85 Arguments are heated as to where the
purpose of lethal injection fits between these two boundaries.
1 86
Retributivists argue that a punishment involving too little pain un-
dermines the retributive function of the death penalty.187 They suggest
that the most atrocious killers deserve to die an extremely painful
death.1 88  Supporters of this view claim that the ideas of "punishment"
and "pain" cannot be separated, because in order for punishment to be
punishment, it must be painful. 89 However, even extreme retributivists
admit that while society inflicts pain on criminals because they deserve
it, such pain may only be inflicted to an extent that is proportional to the
crimes committed.' 90 The problem with lethal injection under the retri-
butivist view is that, by not distinguishing between the very violent and
Difference Between Torture and Inhuman Treatment, 14 No. 2 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 4 (2007) (human
rights); Eloise Scotford, Trash or Treasure: Policy Tensions in EC Waste Regulation, 19 J. ENVTL.
L. 367 (2007) (environmental law); Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19 (2000) (employment law)), but at the time of
publication there were no cases directly on point regarding use of the purposive test in this context.
180. Berry, supra note 7, at 17.
181. ld. at 18.
182. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 171, at 1784.
183. See Robert Blecker, Killing Them Softly: Meditations on a Painful Punishment of Death,
35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 980-81 (2008) (indicating that, during oral argument in Baze, counsel
for the condemned and Justice Scalia found common ground only in the idea that the "Constitution
permitted a risk-free punishment of painless death, while it forbade the intentional infliction of
painful death.").
184. Gaitan, supra note 65, at 787.
185. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
186. See Blecker, supra note 183, at 970-74 (revealing the two extremes of the debate by
discussing retributivist and utilitarian views); see also Gaitan, supra note 65, at 764 (adopting a
utilitarian view and focusing not on the condemned's crimes but on whether the sentence will com-
port with the Eighth Amendment).
187. See Denno, supra note 64, at 731.
188. Blecker, supra note 183, at 970.
189. Id. at 971-72.
190. Id. at 973 ("The Biblical 'eye for an eye,' originally understood as no more than an eye
for an eye, exemplifies retribution as a restriction on pain as much as justification of punishment.").
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barbarous murderers and those who inflicted relatively little pain on their
victims, the states seem willing to arbitrarily expose all murderers to the
excruciating pain inherent in a botched lethal injection.1 91 Therefore,
even retributivists occasionally condemn lethal injection, not because it
has the potential to cause pain, but because it arbitrarily breaks the con-
nection between crime and punishment that is necessary to avoid an
Eighth Amendment violation. 
192
In contrast, utilitarians believe that physical pain can never be used
as an "instrument of justice" if the punishment is to be humane, even if
some degree of pain may be inherent in the punishment. 193 Pain cannot
be inflicted for the "sake of the past"; rather, the purpose of punishment
is to deter others. 94 Consequently, punishments should offer the strong-
est impressions in the minds of witnesses while subjecting the criminal to
the least amount of pain possible.195 Supporters of the utilitarian view
argue that the mere act of killing inflicts enough pain on the condemned
to "balance the scales" of justice. 196 While utilitarians acknowledge the
potential for pain in any method of execution, they also urge that the
process be as painless as possible.
197
Supreme Court precedent developed in the direction of the utilita-
rian approach.198 In Kemmler, the Court stated that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."' 99 In
Resweber, the Court explained that the Constitution protects against pu-
nishments that are inherently cruel, not against any pain that may be in-
volved in a humane execution method. 200 The contention in many me-
thod-of-execution challenges is that the "evolving standards of decency"
test requires that executioners use a method of execution that brings "as
little physical pain as possible to the condemned., 20' In other words, an
execution should be so painless that the punishment is reduced to nothing
more than death itself.20 2 Similarly, Supreme Court precedent defines the
states' purpose in executions as inflicting the least amount of pain neces-
sary to execute rather than as inflicting pain as punishment in itself.
20 3
191. Id. at 997.
192. Id. at 998.
193. Id. at 993.
194. Id. at 972.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 970.
197. Id. Both retributivists and utilitarians agree, however, that "gratuitous pain and suffering"
is never allowed under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 974.
198. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see also La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459,464 (1947).
199. Kemnzler, 136 U.S. at 447.
200. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
201. Aarons, supra note 134, at 461.
202. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1137.
203. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 437; see also Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
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To a certain degree, the Baze plurality followed precedent by im-
plementing this utilitarian approach. While the Court indicated that
some pain may be inherent in capital punishment, it also suggested that
the state's purpose should be to inflict only an amount of pain that would
not pose a "substantial risk" of harm.204 The Court never discussed
whether an appropriate punishment might actually require a painful
death.20 5 Instead, it focused on the fact that a method of execution could
inflict some pain, as long as it did not present an "objectively intolerable
risk of harm., 20 6 In fact, the Court offered the opportunity for a con-
demned inmate to show that an alternative method of execution existed
that "reduce[d] a substantial risk of severe pain., 20 7 It could hardly be
inferred that the Court would allow the state to purposely inflict pain;
otherwise, it would not have presented the opportunity to develop a pro-
cedure that reduces the risk of pain. Accordingly, the Baze plurality in-
dicated that the state's purpose was not to inflict pain for pain's sake, but
rather to inflict only the amount of pain falling below a "substantial pain"
208threshold that would be sufficient to execute. It developed its purpo-
sive standard in light of this purpose.
b. The Integration of the Purposive Test Solves Many of the
Problems Inherent in the "Evolving Standards of Decency"
Test
Perhaps in an attempt to rid itself of the problems associated with
the subjective elements of the "evolving standards of decency" test, the
Baze plurality implemented a purposive test. First, the Court's "substan-
tial risk of serious pain" standard mirrored the "degrading severity"
prong of the purposive test because it looked to whether the method of
execution created such a substantial risk of pain that it is exceedingly
cruel.20 9  Second, the plurality incorporated the "wantonly imposed"
prong of the purposive test in its requirement of a "legitimate penological
justification" for the method of execution.210 If there is no legitimate
justification, the method of execution would be "wantonly imposed," or
unusual.21 Finally, the plurality's requirement of a "feasible and readily
available" alternative method of execution was a reflection of the purpo-
sive test's analysis of whether the same penological goal could have been
achieved by a less severe punishment.21 2 If such an alternative existed,
and the state refused to implement it without a "legitimate penological
204. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008).
205. Denno, supra note 63, at 73 1.
206. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530-3 1.
207. Id. at 1531-32.
208. See id. at 1530-32.
209. See id. at 1531.
210. See id. at 1532.
211. See id.; see also Berry, supra note 7, at 19 (suggesting that "unusualness" included pu-
nishments that were "arbitrary and discriminatory").
212. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532; see also Berry, supra note 7, at 19.
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justification," then the state's refusal could be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment under the purposive test.
21 3
By creating its "substantial risk" test as a purposive test, the Baze
plurality avoided some of the problems associated with the subjective
"evolving standards of decency" test. Under its new standard, the Court
first looks to objective "evolving standards of decency" factors, as indi-
cated above.2 14 Then, the Court performs a subjective evaluation of the
method of execution, using its newly-developed purposive test. Unlike
the subjective element found in the "evolving standards of decency" test,
however, the subjective evaluation of the purposive test "ties the use of
the death penalty to the penological goals of the states. 215 Instead of
merely subjecting method of execution challenges to the whims of the
justices, the purposive test analyzes the method of execution's purpose in
light of the state's penological goals.216 Because those goals are often
espoused by the state legislature, which is composed of representatives
of the people, the purposive test is less subject to the whims and fancies
of judges who may not be popularly elected.217 By requiring the courts
to consider the state's purpose for the method of execution, the purposive
test promotes consistency in court decisions, eliminating the chances of
decisions being overturned and more closely reflecting the values and
norms of the people.1 8
However, while the Baze plurality determined that Kentucky's cur-
rent lethal injection protocol withstands this purposive test,219 the inquiry
is not finished. While lethal injection itself is not unusual, it may very
well be considered cruel under a proper pain analysis. 220 Furthermore, it
is likely that the death penalty itself would be considered both cruel and
unusual under the first two prongs of the purposive test.22' Consequent-
ly, future challenges will likely focus on whether the lethal injection pro-
tocol is the least severe method by which a state can accomplish its peno-
logical objectives.222 A proper pain analysis is the key to solving this
issue. If lethal injection truly assures a painless death, then it might
comport with the "dignity of man" and might be judged, not as the "wan-
ton infliction of pain," but as a humane method of execution under the
213. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
214. See supra Part 11I.A. 1.
215. Berry, supra note 7, at 31.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 22. In fact, "penological goals" is considered an objective factor under the
"evolving standards of decency" test. Aarons, supra note 133, at 445.
218. See Berry, supra note 7, at 31.
219. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526 (2008).
220. See Denno, supra note 1, at 102 (stating that problems concerning medical complications
surrounding lethal injection have never been so pronounced); see also Mortenson, supra note 26, at
1161 ("Our system is constructed in such a way that it knowingly puts inmates through agony every
year as they are killed.").
221. Berry, supra note 7, at 30.
222. Id.
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purposive test.223 However, a proper pain analysis is likely to indicate
that lethal injection is by no means a truly humane option for execution,
at least as it is currently implemented.224
B. The Court Must Perform an Extensive Pain Analysis in Order to
Ensure Compliance with the Eighth Amendment
While the Baze plurality succeeded in implementing an improved
test for analyzing methods-of-execution challenges, its proposed standard
is not entirely flawless. In failing to perform an extensive pain analysis,
the Baze plurality did not sufficiently adhere to Kemmler's "negligible
pain" standard in evaluating Kentucky's lethal injection protocol.225 The
Kemmler approach looks at the inmate's experience of death itself rather
than the execution method as a whole.226 Such an approach is appropri-
ate because the Eighth Amendment focuses on the individual experience
of pain during punishment rather than the tool used to punish.227 How-
ever, the Baze plurality not only clearly stated that the potential for pain
does not violate the Eighth Amendment, but it also almost entirely ig-
nored the lack of testing and evaluation surrounding lethal injection.228
In order for lethal injection to remain free from constitutional challenges,
the Court must perform a more comprehensive pain analysis, focusing on
the individual's experience of pain and including proper scientific testing
and medical advice.
1. Conservative Versus Empirical Approaches to Methods of Ex-
ecution
There are two schools of thought regarding a challenge to a method
of execution: the conservative school and the empirical school.229 The
conservative school compares the challenged execution method to pre-
vious methodologies or other currently available methods.230  However,
this approach rarely takes into account the actual operation of the execu-
223. Zimmers & Koniaris, supra note 61, at 920.
224. See Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1104 (stating that even with advanced methods of execu-
tion, more than seven percent of executions continue to be botched, "inflicting... extraordinary pain
on the condemned prisoners as they die."); see also Denno, supra note 1, at 51 (indicating that six of
the eleven inmates lethally injected in California might have been conscious during the procedure,
"potentially creating an 'unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering' in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.").
225. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,443 (1890).
226. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1109.
227. id. at 1138 ('The same paddle could be used to spank [a misbehaving] child in very dif-
ferent ways. A drunk . . . parent might genuinely hurt the child ... in a way that would universally
be considered cruel .... It makes more sense to describe the spanking (rather than the paddle) as
cruel.").
228. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1529 (2008) ("Some risk of pain is inherent in any method
of execution-no matter how humane-if only from the prospect of error in following the required
procedure. It is clear, then, that the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in
carrying out executions.").
229. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1107.
230. id. at 1112.
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tion method. 23' Thus, many conservative courts view pain as simply part
of the death experience itself rather than looking at the individual expe-
rience of a "lingering" or "torturous" death.232
In contrast, the empirical approach looks first to scientific and med-
ical evidence that indicates pain inherent in the execution method.233
Only if such evidence is not sufficient for a finding of unconstitutionality
does the Court consider legislative trends.234 By reviewing legislative
trends "as only one element of a more complex analysis" and by focusing
instead on the infliction of pain, the empirical approach better complies
with Kemmler's "negligible pain" principle.
In following the conservative approach, the Baze plurality per-
formed a comparative analysis. It analyzed prior method-of-execution
cases and took into account the consensus among the states and federal
government surrounding lethal injection.235 However, in order to adhere
to Kemmler, the Court should have adopted the empirical approach. The
Court first should have looked to evidence of pain in Kentucky's lethal
injection protocol, as indicated by scientific and medical evidence. Only
after such an analysis should it have turned its attention to legislative
trends and prior cases. By performing a pain analysis, the Court would
have been properly informed of both the dangers and the benefits of le-
thal injection.
2. Scientific Testing of Lethal Injection
Neither courts nor legislatures appear to place sufficient focus on
scientific studies concerning the potential for pain involved in lethal in-
jections. In developing its lethal injection protocol, Oklahoma virtually
ignored the potential for pain.236 Because most lethal injection states
followed Oklahoma's lead in developing their own protocols, most now
follow a procedure implemented over thirty years ago.237 This procedure
has not been significantly updated and was not properly based on scien-
tific study.238
Because a relatively constant number of executions are botched an-
nually, scientific analysis of the potential for pain in any lethal injection
231. Id.
232. ld. atl 110-ll, 1116.
233. Id. at 1113.
234. Id. The Ninth Circuit has proposed a pain analysis under the empirical approach, consist-
ing of the following steps: first, a review of "objective evidence of pain involved in the challenged
method"; second, a determination of the length of time the condemned inmate will consciously
suffer pain in a "typical" execution, free from botches or failures; and third, a determination of the
risk that a botched execution will occur and cause pain worse than that in a "typical" case. Id. at
1113-14.
235. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530-32 (2008).
236. Denno, supra note 1, at 65.
237. Id. at 78-79.
238. Id.
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is important.2 39 Lethal injection is constructed in such a way that it can
create problems when performed incorrectly. 240 Even a slight error in
dosage or administration of the first drug can leave an inmate conscious
when the second and third drugs are administered, but paralyzed and thus
prevented from giving any indication of pain.24  Additionally, intense
pain can result if the drugs are injected in the wrong direction in the
veins or the muscle.242 Although such painful executions are "inherently
unjustified and inherently unjustifiable, ' 243 executioners still use the
same formula invented years ago because courts have not required exten-
sive scientific studies on the potential for pain.244
The Baze Court did not appear concerned with performing a pain
analysis. While Justice Ginsburg's dissent called for more extensive
scientific studies regarding the potential pain inherent in lethal injec-
24524tion, the plurality did not require further testing.246  Instead, it pro-
posed that an execution method is not cruel and unusual merely because
it may result in pain.247 However, because severe pain beyond that inhe-
rent in death itself is possible during any lethal injection, the Court must
at least provide for more extensive scientific testing if it wishes to ensure
that lethal injection protocols are in accord with the Eighth Amend-
ment. 248
3. Lethal Injection and the Medical Profession
"[M]edicine is the key to understanding the problems of lethal in-
jection.,,249 However, an unfortunate paradox exists: ethical guidelines
prohibit participation by those who are the most qualified to ensure that
the procedure is performed humanely and constitutionally.250 The Amer-
ican Medical Association clearly forbids doctor participation in execu-
tions, worrying that lethal injection will come to be associated with the
medical profession.251
239. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1104 (noting that seven percent of executions are botched
each year); see also Denno, supra note 1, at 51 (noting that of the eleven inmates lethally injected in
California, six may have been conscious and suffering severe pain).
240. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1124.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1124-25.
243. id. at 1160.
244. See Denno, supra note 1, at 78-79.
245. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1569 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 1532-34 (plurality opinion).
247. Id. at 1531.
248. See Denno, supra note 1, at 120.
249. Id. at 55.
250. Id. at 53.
251. Id. at 80-81 (quoting Code of Ethics E-2.06 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2000)) (noting that the
American Medical Association guidelines provide that "[a] physician, as a member of a profession




Yet, physician involvement in lethal injection could be a solution to
the problems associated with the procedure. 2  Many execution team
members are improperly prepared to perform lethal injections; they have
no formal training or knowledge of the drugs used or the risks posed.253
In contrast, medical professionals, especially anesthesiologists, have the
expertise and knowledge to perform lethal injections safely and accurate-
ly.254 There is evidence that a surprising number of physicians partici-
pate in executions despite the existence of ethics rules.255 Some physi-
cians do so because they want the condemned inmates to have the most
competent and humane lethal injection possible; others believe that phy-
sicians are not deciding who gets the death penalty, but rather ensuring
that the procedure is performed accurately and competently.
256
Not only do many medical professionals participate in executions
despite the ethical considerations put forth by the medical associations,
but also the vast majority of lethal injection states include physician re-
quirements in their statutes.257 The presence of such statutory language
illustrates that medical association requirements may not have had their
desired effect.
2 58
In light of the growing number of physicians who participate in le-
thal injections, it appears that medical opinions regarding lethal injection
are changing.25 9 Even the American Medical Association Ethics Council
admitted that doctors can make executions more humane. 260 The pres-
ence of a medical professional at a lethal injection can eliminate the risk
of severe pain, thus ensuring compliance with the Eighth Amendment.26'
Additionally, physician presence would eliminate the lack of training and
262knowledge that permeates nearly every lethal injection execution. The
incorporation of rules regarding physician presence at executions into
lethal injection statutes is a step in the right direction; perhaps it is also
time for medical association guidelines to change as well. This is not to
suggest that physicians should be required to participate in executions, in
light of the strong divergence in public opinion surrounding the death
252. See id. at 77.
253. Id. at 56.
254. See id. at 58.
255. Id. at 83-84, 86 (citing as evidence "Missouri's 'Dr. Doe,' who began performing lethal
injections in the mid-I 990s," and results from the Breach Report).
256. Id. at 86-87 ("Angel of mercy, not agent of harm, is the role inmates seek for the doctor.
Palliative care from a doctor to prevent unnecessary suffering . . . is not unprofessional or unethi-
cal.").
257. Id. at 88. While Illinois' statute explicitly states that doctors cannot participate in execu-
tions, twenty states mention the presence of a doctor at a lethal injection execution, sixteen provide
that a doctor should pronounce or certify death, and eight specifically provide that lethal injections
are not the practice of medicine. Id. at 88-89.
258. Id. at 89.
259. See id. at 121-22.
260. Id. at 121.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 57.
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penalty. However, if medical associations allowed their members to
make their own decisions on whether or not to participate, the risks asso-
ciated with lethal injection would decrease, and the method would be
more likely to comply with the Eighth Amendment.263
C. Solutions to Ensure a Humane Lethal Injection
The past few years have seen an increase in lethal injection chal-
lenges. 264 A constitutional tort may be one way to offer a proper remedy
to the petitioners in these challenges.265 Such a tort would provide for
"the fact that the government has intentionally created a system under
which it knows, ex ante, that some proportion of executed inmates will
suffer agonizing deaths. 266 The possibility of being liable in tort for
botched or painful executions would create an incentive for the govern-
ment either to develop safer and more reliable methods of execution or to
improve the training and research involved in existing execution me-
thods.267 Additionally, it would serve as a formal admission of wrong-
doing and would provide some measure of compensation to the inmates'
families.268
However, a constitutional tort is not by itself a sufficient way to en-
sure the continuous prevention of excessively painful executions. To do
so, attorneys and death penalty abolitionists should implement a national
26legal strategy that incorporates method-of-execution cases. 69 Under
such a coordinated legal strategy, attorneys and abolitionists could work
together to decide which cases and issues should be brought before the
Court.270 This approach would build on past successes and minimize
adverse rulings, thus helping the courts properly define the pain stan-
dards necessary in lethal injections.271 While Baze cemented the use of
lethal injection as a method of execution,272 if a proper pain analysis
were performed, even lethal injection, the most "humane" method of
execution, might be viewed as inflicting substantial pain. A coordinated
legal strategy would assist the courts in this analysis.
Supreme Court decisions based on method-of-execution cases might
also help prompt the legislative branches to take action. Supreme Court
decisions have occasionally brought legislative and executive attention to
273the death penalty.  By coordinating a national litigation strategy fo-
263. See id. at 91.
264. Id. at 107.
265. See Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1121.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1162.
268. Id. at 1105, 1163.
269. Aarons, supra note 134, at 464.
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526 (2008).
273. Aarons, supra note 134, at 442.
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cused on lethal injection cases, abolitionists and attorneys could prompt
state legislatures to extensively review their protocols using valid and
accurate scientific research, implement regulations requiring adequate
training and knowledge, and allow physician participation. This legisla-
tion would help to create a humane lethal injection protocol that passes
constitutional muster.
Furthermore, lethal injection protocols with greater transparency
and oversight would help to ensure compliance with the Eighth Amend-
ment.27 4  In addition to challenges regarding the three-drug protocol,
many lethal injection challenges have arisen regarding, inter alia, the
method in which the drugs are prepared, the qualifications of execution
personnel, facilities where the executions occur, and whether the execu-
tion team properly ensures unconsciousness before the injection of the
second and third drugs.275 Additionally, many lethal injection protocols
are incomplete and filled with scientific inaccuracies. 6 They are written
merely to reassure witnesses that the process is orderly and subject to
controls.277 Moreover, states have withdrawn their protocols from public
scrutiny.278 This likely occurred because public protocols expose the
states' ignorance and incompetence. 279 This lack of public information
surrounding the protocols makes it difficult to evaluate their constitutio-
nality.280 Additionally, because state lethal injection protocols are simi-
lar to one another, when a prisoner challenges one state's protocol, courts
can point to the similar protocols of the other states to show that none
have been held unconstitutional.28'
In order to ensure that lethal injection comports with the Eighth
Amendment, states must revise their protocols. A protocol should be in
writing, and it should specify the conditions of the lethal injection proce-
dure so that the prisoner can be properly monitored for consciousness.282
Most importantly, the protocol should be public information.283  By
opening the state protocols to public viewing, the condemned inmates
will know what to expect, and, most importantly, the public will be able
to monitor the state's lethal injection process.284 Consequently, the state
will not be able to hide the inaccuracies and potential problems inherent
in any improperly developed protocol. By developing a written and pub-
lic protocol, the states will provide more transparency in their lethal in-
274. See Gaitan, supra note 65, at 784.
275. Id. at 774-75.
276. Denno, supra note 64, at 713-14.
277. Id. at 713.
278. Denno, supra note 1, at 95-96.
279. Id. at 95.
280. Id. at 96.
281. Id. at 101-02.
282. Gaitan, supra note 65, at 785-86.
283. Id. at 786.
284. Id.
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jection process, helping to ensure compliance with the Eighth Amend-
ment.285
CONCLUSION
The struggle confronting the courts regarding the constitutionality
of lethal injection is clear after Baze. While Baze integrated a purposive
test of constitutionality into the already-existing objective "evolving
standards of decency" test, it did not incorporate scientific testing and
medical evidence into its pain analysis. Until the Court performs an ex-
tensive pain analysis on the dangers of lethal injection, it cannot ensure
that challenged lethal injection protocols comply with Kemmler's "neg-
ligible pain" standard and thus comport with the Eighth Amendment.
286
Perhaps it is because of a fear of what they will discover that neither
courts nor legislatures are willing to perform an extensive pain analysis
regarding lethal injection. Lethal injection, rightly or wrongly, is consi-
dered the most humane method of execution.287 If it is deemed unconsti-
tutional due to its capacity to inflict severe pain, the courts would be pre-
sented with a challenge to the death penalty itself. This is a type of chal-
288lenge they are not yet ready to consider.
However, the fear of the unknown is no reason to ignore the prob-
lems associated with lethal injection. Scientific testing and medical opi-
nions need to be taken seriously to determine the extent of pain a botched
lethal injection might inflict. 289 Future debate will likely center on
whether there is a less severe alternative to lethal injection. The Court
will be well-prepared for these challenges if it has previously engaged in
an extensive, objective pain analysis regarding lethal injection as a me-
thod of execution.
Courtney Butler*
285. See id. at 786-87 ("In examining the evolving standards of decency, we cannot expect the
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286. See Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1108.
287. Denno, supra note 1, at 65.
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CRA WFORD V. MARION CouNTY ELECTION BOARD: THE
MISSED OPPORTUNITY To REMEDY THE AMBIGUITY AND
UNPREDICTABILITY OF BURDICK
INTRODUCTION
The right to vote has been described as the most precious of rights
in a democratic society because it protects so many other rights.' The
Supreme Court has long recognized the individual's right to vote as a
fundamental right,2 with states having the constitutional right to manage
election procedures.3 In earlier cases, the Court reviewed many election
regulations using something akin to strict scrutiny analysis.4  However,
the Court realized the tenuous balance between the individual's right to
vote and the state's right to manage elections.5 Seeking to develop a
standard that would adequately balance these competing rights, the Court
developed a test to accomplish the goal.6 This balancing test weighs the
burden on the right to vote against the state interests in passing legisla-
tion that manages election procedures, 7 unfortunately, though, it has lead
to differing interpretations producing unpredictable outcomes. 8
The Court had the opportunity to resolve the ambiguity and unpre-
dictability resulting from prior decisions when it granted certiorari to
review the constitutionality of Indiana's Senate Enrolled Act No. 483
("SEA 483") 9 in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.'0 In a 6-3
decision, the Court held that SEA 483 was constitutional; however, the
plurality opinions reached that conclusion by very different reasoning. "
The Court's lack of unity did nothing to settle the confusion courts were
experiencing when determining the correct application of prior
precedent, 12 or to provide guidance on how to measure the severity of a
1. Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a Standard
that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1174 (2007) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1963)).
2. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,433 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,667 (1966).
3. U.S. CONST. art. L § 4, cl. 1.
4. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-68.
5. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
6. Id. at 789.
7. Id.
8. See Ordway, supra note 1, at 1192.
9. S.B. 483, 114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005).
10. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
II. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that the majority opinion rests its decision
on a balancing approach while the concurrence bases its decision on an "important regulatory inter-
ests" standard).
12. Id. at 1627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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burden on the right to vote.' 3 The Court's plurality opinions demonstrate
the need for a new rule to evaluate the constitutionality of election regu-
lations.
Part I of this Comment explains the evolution of the standard the
Court has used in its election law jurisprudence with three important
cases-Harper, Anderson, and Burdick-and establishes the legal cli-
mate and precedent prior to Crawford. Part II discusses Crawford by
starting with the facts and procedural history and then turning to the plu-
rality opinions and dissents. Part Ill.A discusses the issues left unre-
solved by the Crawford decision-namely the ambiguity and unpredicta-
bility of the Anderson and Burdick standards. Part III.B suggests a new
rule to resolve the limitations of the Anderson standard in reviewing
election law challenges. The suggested rule would maintain the pre-
sumption of constitutionality for election laws. However, if there is evi-
dence of political party entrenchment or the law disproportionately im-
pacts an identifiable group that shares a particular political ideology, an
intermediate level of scrutiny would be applied. Part III.C discusses the
importance of facial challenges in light of Crawford. Part IV concludes
that this new rule will remove the ambiguity and unpredictability from
election law cases, protect against political party entrenchment and dis-
criminatory effects, and maintain the state's ability to manage its elec-
tions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Constitution expressly grants the right to vote in federal elec-
tions; 14 however, no such right is expressly granted for voting in state
elections.1 5 Despite this omission, the Court has found the right to vote
in state elections to exist implicitly in the First Amendment and to be
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, with challenges gener-
ally brought as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 16 The follow-
ing three cases demonstrate the right to vote has remained fundamental,
but the approach used in detecting unconstitutional infringements of the
right has changed.
13. David Schultz, Election Law: Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the
Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 530 (2008).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
15. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
16. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) ("It must first consider the character
and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."); see also Harper, 838 U.S. at 666 ("Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously
discriminate.").
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A. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections
17
In Harper, Virginia residents challenged the constitutionality of a
section of the Virginia Constitution that required residents to pay a poll
tax in order to register to vote. i8 The issue was whether a voter's afflu-
ence (i.e., the ability to pay the poll tax) was a valid qualification for
voting.19 In a 6-3 decision, the Court held the poll tax unconstitutional
because a classification that makes voter wealth a qualification for exer-
cising the right to vote was an invidious discrimination and invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 °
Although passing on the possible issue of racial discrimination,2'
the Harper Court did stress the fundamental importance of the right to
vote in a democratic society because it protects and preserves all other
22rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In fact, so important is the right
to vote that the Court believed it was the driving force behind President
Lincoln's philosophy of "government of the people, by the people, [and]
for the people., 23 After identifying the right at stake, the Court then
turned to the level of review required for its analysis.
The Court did not expressly state it was reviewing the poll tax under
strict scrutiny but noted that when a classification infringes upon a fun-
damental right under equal protection, the classification "must be closely
scrutinized and carefully confined., 24 Under this level of review, the
Court found no relation between the ability to pay the poll tax and an
individual's qualifications to exercise the right to vote. The lack of
relationship between economic status and voter qualifications placed an
unnecessary burden on the right to vote, which would be an invidious
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.26 The final
sentence of the majority opinion simply stated that "the right to vote is
too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned. 27
Harper provided no guidance on how election regulations would be
reviewed in the future. Was the poll tax unconstitutional because it had
no relation to voter qualifications, thus failing under any level of scruti-
ny? Or did the infringement on the fundamental right to vote trigger a
17. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
18. Id. at 665 n. 1 (discussing the various sections of the Virginia Constitution that authorize
the poll tax). In 1965, one-year prior to Harper, the Virginia poll tax was declared a violation of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment as a prerequisite to voting in federal elections. Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528, 544 (1965).
19. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 665-66.
20. Id. at 666-67.
21. Id. at 666 n.3.
22. Id. at 667 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
23. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1963) (alteration in original)).
24. Id. at 670.
25. Id. at 666.
26. Id. at 666-67.
27. Id. 670 (referring to conditioning the right o vote on affluence).
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heightened level of scrutiny? If the latter is true, then nearly all election
regulations would be declared unconstitutional, which would be contrary
to an express provision of the Constitution.28
The Constitution expressly grants states the power to regulate the
time, place, and manner for holding elections of senators and representa-
tives to the United States Congress.29 In order for elections to be fair,
honest, and orderly there is a need for substantial regulation,30 which
necessarily burdens the right to vote. 31 The fear is that subjecting all
election laws to strict scrutiny analysis, which Harper may suggest,
would frustrate the state's ability to effectively manage elections and
render its constitutional power a nullity. 32 In Anderson, the Court an-
nounced an approach in reviewing election laws that sought to protect
the fundamental right to vote while respecting the state's right to regulate
its elections.33 The new approach was a noble effort, but the result would
later prompt Justice Scalia to refer to it as "Anderson's amorphous flexi-
ble standard.,
34
B. Anderson v. Celebrezze
35
John Anderson sought to have his name included on the ballot as an
independent candidate for President in the Ohio primary election but was
denied because of Ohio's early candidacy registration requirements for
independent candidates.36 Although Anderson was denied access to the
ballot, the issue became whether the early registration deadline was an
unconstitutional infringement on the right to vote of Anderson's suppor-
ters.37 Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion,38 holding the early
registration deadline unconstitutional.39 Justice Stevens concluded that
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
29. Id.
30. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974)).
31. Id.
32. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433. But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV.
793, 795 (2006) (discussing the myth "that strict scrutiny is an 'inflexible' rule that invalidates every
(or nearly every) law to which it applies").
33. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 ("Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all
restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally
suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates.").
34. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
36. Id. at 783 n. 1 (explaining the challenged Ohio statute).
37. Id. at 782.
38. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall joined in the majority
opinion. Id. at 781.
39. Id. at 805-06.
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the deadline may substantially impact independent voters40 and that this
burden outweighed the state's minimal interest for the regulation.4'
For purposes of analysis, the Court drew the parallel between the
rights of the candidate and those of the voter because a burden on one is
necessarily a burden on the other.42 The Court also recognized the di-
chotomy between the individual's right to vote and the state's right to
regulate elections, noting that "the [s]tate's important regulatory interests
are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restric-
tions. 43 The Court did not expand on what was meant by nondiscrimi-
natory--either facially nondiscriminatory or a nondiscriminatory ef-
fect-but would later state that burdens falling on a particular voter seg-
ment would be hard to justify by the state.44 The Court then announced
the following approach to guide its analysis:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the as-
serted injury to the rights protected by the ... [Constitution] that the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then identify and evaluate the
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the bur-
den imposed by its rule.... [T]he Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it must also con-
sider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden
the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the re-
viewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provi-
sion is unconstitutional.45
In Storer v. Brown,46 which seems to have borne the early parame-
ters of this approach,47 Justice White rather prophetically stated: "What
the result of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult
to predict with great assurance. 48 The unpredictability stems from the
ambiguity created by three possible interpretations of the Anderson stan-
dard. First, the standard may simply stand for a balancing test between
the burden on the individual's right to vote and the interest of the state.49
Second, the standard could suggest that identifying the magnitude of the
40. Id. at 790.
41. Id. at 806.
42. Id. at 786.
43. Id. at 788 (first and second emphasis added). This quotation was cited in both Burdick
and Crawford. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008); Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). Justice Scalia believed the statement, as used in Burdick, helped
refine the Anderson approach into "an administrable rule." Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
44. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786, 792-93.
45. Id. at 789.
46. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
47. See id. at 730.
48. Id.
49. This appears to be the interpretation the Anderson Court adopts, as it finds the state inter-
ests do not outweigh the burden on the right to vote. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
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burden on the right to vote triggers a set level of scrutiny by the Court.5°
Finally, the standard could also support the idea that the level of scrutiny
is on a sliding-scale, where the level of scrutiny increases corresponding-
ly with an increase of the burden on the right to vote. 5' The Court
seemed to adopt the balancing test interpretation as it found the burden
on the right to vote outweighed the state interest, but in doing so, it left
few clues as to the proper application of this interpretation.
The Court found there to be a "particular" burden on the rights of an
identifiable segment of Ohio voters.52 The existence of this particula-
rized burden prompted the Court to note that "it is especially difficult for
the State to justify a restriction that limits political participation by an
identifiable political group whose members share a particular viewpoint,
associational preference, or economic status. 53 The previous passage
suggests the Court viewed the burden on the right to vote to be sufficient
enough to elevate the state's burden in showing that the deadline was
necessary to protect its interests. However, the Court never defined the
magnitude of the burden on the right to vote, which is troubling because
under any interpretation of the standard the first step of the analysis is to
identify the level of the burden. 4 Equally troubling, the Court did not
provide any guidance on how to measure the magnitude of the burden on
the right to vote.
The Court then closely reviewed-without announcing a level of
scrutiny-the state's asserted interests of voter education, equal treat-
ment of candidates, and political stability, 55 not only looking at the legi-
timacy of the interest, but also how well the early registration deadline
served those interests.56 After determining the state interests to be minor,
and not advanced by the deadline,57 the Court declared them insufficient
to outweigh the burden on the right to vote. 58
50. This is the interpretation, although refined by Burdick, which Justice Scalia adopts. See
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 at 1624-25 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
51. This is the interpretation that the Burdick Court seemingly adopted. See Burdick v. Taku-
shi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the proprie-
ty of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.").
52. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790, 792 ("An early filing deadline may have a substantial impact
on independent-minded voters"). This evidences that the Court has been willing to look at genera-
lized burdens that impact voters differently-contrary to Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Craw-
ford, 128 S. Ct. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793.
54. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806; see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
55. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796-802.
56. Id. at 797-98, 800-01.
57. Id. at 798, 801, 805.
58. Id. at 806.
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Justice Rehnquist dissented59 in Anderson because he believed the
Court's precedent never required a state to narrowly tailor its election
laws.6° Instead, Justice Rehnquist stated it was the Court's duty to make
sure the state was not attempting to freeze the "status quo.",6 1 If it was
not, then the "State's laws will be upheld if they are tied to a particula-
rized legitimate purpose, and are in no sense invidious or arbitrary. 62
Justice Rehnquist believed that the early registration deadline passed this
test and would have found it constitutional.63
Anderson attempted to create an approach that would protect the
rights of individuals and states, but the end result was an ambiguous
standard with three possible interpretations. Anderson adopted the ba-
lancing test interpretation, but it did not provide guidance on how to
measure the burden on the right to vote nor did it reveal the level of scru-
tiny to apply when reviewing the state interest. The ambiguity of the
Anderson standard and the Court's lack of guidance in its application
lead to unpredictable outcomes. In Burdick, the Court followed the slid-
ing-scale interpretation of the Anderson standard instead of the balancing
test, evidencing the ambiguity.64 Further, the majority and dissenting
opinions reached different conclusions as to the magnitude of the burden,
evidencing the unpredictability.
65
Another factor that may have played a role in choosing a different
interpretation of Anderson is that the composition of the Court changed
during the time between the Anderson and Burdick decisions. Justices
Stevens, Blackmun, Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor were the only jus-
tices to hear both cases. In Anderson, Justices Stevens and Blackmun
were in the majority, whereas Justices Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor
dissented. In Burdick, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
O'Connor were in the majority, whereas Justices Stevens and Blackmun
dissented.
C. Burdick v. Takushi
66
At issue in Burdick was whether Hawaii's ban on write-in voting
was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.67 Alan Burdick
was a registered voter in Hawaii claiming he would cast a write-in vote
for a person who was not on the ballot and, among other things, had the
59. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 817 (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971)).
62. Id. (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted)).
63. Id. at 818, 823.
64. See discussion infra Part I.C.
65. See discussion infra Part I.C.
66. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
67. Id. at 430.
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right to cast a write-in "protest vote for Donald Duck" or anyone else he
chose. 68 Burdick argued that any infringement on this right was uncons-
titutional. 69 Justice White, delivering the opinion of the Court, acknowl-
edged that the right to vote is fundamental ° but, as in Anderson, quali-
fied the right as non-absolute.7' In holding Hawaii's ban on write-in
voting constitutional, the Court rejected the argument that all voting reg-
ulations should be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis72 and applied An-
derson's "more flexible standard. 7 3
As the Court began its analysis, it seemingly used the sliding-scale
interpretation of the Anderson approach by declaring that the rigorous-
ness of its inquiry was dependent on the magnitude of the burden on the
right to vote.74 The first step of the analysis found a "very limited" bur-
den on the right to vote. 5 Hawaii had three mechanisms through which
a candidate could gain access to the ballot at least sixty days prior to the
primary election 76 and the Court believed these mechanisms reduced the
burden on the right to vote.77
However, after finding the burden limited,78 the Court noted, "the
State need not establish a compelling interest to tip the constitutional
scales in its direction., 79 This would suggest that the Court viewed the
Anderson standard as triggering a set level of scrutiny depending on the
magnitude of the burden on the right to vote.80 A possible explanation is
that the Court was merely referencing an earlier quotation from Norman
v. Reed,8' stating that a state would have to show a compelling interest in
order to justify a severe burden on the right to vote.82 In Norman, how-
ever, the statement was an example of a sufficiently weighty correspond-
ing interest as opposed to saying that a severe burden triggers strict scru-
tiny."
68. Id. at 430, 438 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. at 438.
70. Id. at 433 (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979)).
71. Id. at 433 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986)).
72. Id. at 432.
73. Id. at 434.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 437. The majority opinion also characterized the burden as "limited" and "slight."
Id. at 438-39.
76. Id. at 435-36 (explaining that the three mechanisms to gain ballot access were filing
through a party petition, an established political party, or a designated non-partisan ballot).
77. Id. at 436-37.
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
81. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
82. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. at 289).
83. Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89 ("To the degree that a State would thwart this interest by
limiting the access of new parties to the ballot, we have called for the demonstration of a correspond-
ing interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation, and we have accordingly required any
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The Court quickly analyzed the asserted state interests of avoiding
unrestrained factionalism and party raiding 84 and came to the conclusion
that the legitimate state interests outweighed the burden on the right to
vote.85 The use of the word "outweighed" suggests the Court was using
the balancing test interpretation of the Anderson standard. However, this
may just be a result of the sliding-scale analysis as there inevitably must
be a comparison between the burden on the right to vote and the state
interest.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dis-
sented in Burdick.86 Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority opinion
that Anderson was the correct standard, but seemed to follow the balanc-
ing test interpretation. Justice Kennedy believed the record showed that
the write-in ban placed a significant burden on the right to vote87 and was
unnecessary to advance the state interests.88 Justice Kennedy, therefore,
would have declared the write-in ban unconstitutional as the state's as-
serted interests were insufficient "under any standard" to justify the limi-
tation on the right to vote.89
Criticizing the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy stated: "The ma-
jority's analysis ignores the inevitable and significant burden a write-in
ban imposes upon some individual voters by preventing them from exer-
cising their right to vote in a meaningful manner." 90 This line of reason-
ing is also consistent with Anderson's statement that a state would have a
difficult time justifying a regulation that disproportionately burdened
certain groups.91 It is also significant to recognize the Court's cogniz-
ance of how election regulations can affect voters that fall within identi-
fiable groups of the voting population at large.
Burdick further muddied the already murky Anderson water by in-
jecting new language into the analysis. The Burdick Court replaced the
Anderson requirement of looking at the legitimacy and strength of the
92state's interests with looking at the state's precise interests. The Court
did not define what "precise" interest means, which adds to the ambigui-
ty of the Anderson standard. Further, the Court added that the state in-
terests would have to be compelling and narrowly tailored to justify a
severe restriction to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.")
(internal citations omitted).
84. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439-40.
85. Id. at 440.
86. Id. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 448.
89. Id. at 450.
90. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
91. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983).
92. Compare Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, with Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. This alteration may
be an import from Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Anderson. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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severe burden on the right to vote.93 Unfortunately, the Court did not
announce how to measure the severity of a burden. Taken as a whole,
the Court's language could be read as adopting either the sliding-scale or
trigger interpretation of Anderson. The Burdick Court failed to relieve
the interpretation ambiguity of Anderson, to announce a test to measure
the severity of the burden on the right to vote, or to provide an answer as
to what a precise state interest is.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, five lower court
cases decided the constitutionality of voter photo ID laws.94 Three of
these cases upheld the voter photo ID law, while the other two found the
law unconstitutional.95 The courts upholding the voter photo ID laws
applied the flexible standard of Burdick96 in determining the laws were
not a severe burden on the right to vote.97 However, in the cases holding
the law unconstitutional, the District Court of New Mexico used the Bur-
dick test and applied a level of scrutiny similar to that in Anderson, and
the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the Burdick test and used state
constitutional law in declaring the law unconstitutional.98 With courts
following different interpretations of Burdick, measuring the burden on
the right to vote differently, or being unwilling to follow Burdick, com-
bined with the recent national prominence of voting rights,99 the Supreme
Court noted the importance of voter photo ID cases and granted certiorari
to hear Crawford.'°°
HI. CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD 01
Following the problems stemming from the 2000 Presidential Elec-
tion, voter rights became an issue of national prominence. Congress
passed legislation, such as the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), seek-
ing to alleviate some of the issues faced in the 2000 election. 10 2 Former
President Jimmy Carter and James A. Baker HI co-chaired a commission
that issued a report with recommendations on how to restore voter confi-
93. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
94. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 503-22 (discussing Crawford v. Marion County Election
Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); ACLU of N.M. v.
Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d
1333 (N.D. Ga. 2005); In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA
71, 740 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007); Weinshenck v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006)).
95. Id. at 521.
96. Id. By this time courts were referring to the Anderson standard as the "Burdick test." See
id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 522.
99. See Ordway, supra note 1, at 1174 ("Since the presidential election of 2000, a host of new
claims has arisen alleging unlawful denial of the right to vote. Litigants have challenged the use of
error-prone voting machines, misleading registration forms, and the highly controversial photo
identification requirements for in-person voting.").
100. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008).
101. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
102. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 15301(b)(1) (West 2008); see also Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614 n.3,
1617-18 (discussing the requirements of HAVA).
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dence and improve election procedures. 10 3 HAVA had a provision re-
quiring voters to present identification at the time of voting with photo
ID being one valid form of identification. 1°4 Similarly, the Carter-Baker
Report suggested that photo IDs were necessary to combat in-person




In 2005 Indiana enacted Senate Enrolled Act No. 483 ("SEA
483"), 107 requiring voters to present a valid, government-issued photo ID
in order to cast an in-person vote at general and primary elections.' 0 8 If a
voter did not have the valid photo ID at the time of casting the vote, the
voter could later bring the identification to the county clerk's office in
order to have the vote counted.'0 9 The photo ID requirement was not
applicable to mail-in absentee ballots. 110 SEA 483 excluded residents of
state-licensed facilities from the requirement."' Impoverished voters or
religious objectors could cast a provisional ballot that would be counted
provided they executed an affidavit with the clerk of the circuit court
within ten days after the election." 2 SEA 483 did not require a voter to
present a photo ID in registering to vote but did require the voter to
comply with the requirements of HAVA.U
3
B. Procedural History
Almost immediately after its enactment, multiple parties filed two
suits seeking to enjoin enforcement 14 of SEA 483 as a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Voting Rights Act, l5 and provi-
sions of the Indiana Constitution."l6 After consolidating the suits in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indiana inter-
103. COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 4 (2005), available at
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf [hereinafter CARTER-BAKER REPORT].
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (West 2008).
105. See CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 103, § 2.5.
106. Schultz, supra note 13, at 485-86.
107. S.B. 483, 114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005).
108. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (2008).
109. Id. at 1614 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b) (West 2006)).
110. Id. at 1613 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1(e) (West Supp. 2007)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1613-14 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c) (West 2006)).
113. Id. at 1614 n.3, 1617-18 (discussing the requirements of HAVA); see also 42 U.S.C.A. §
15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (West 2008) (stating that HAVA did require a voter to include in her registra-
tion application some form of identification, e.g., bank statement, utility bill, paycheck, etc., for
verification purposes).
114. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (West 2008).
116. IND. CONST. art II, §§ 1, 2.
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vened to defend the statute."17 The District Court granted Indiana's mo-
tion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to provide suffi-
cient proof that SEA 483 would prevent any citizens from voting or
would unduly burden their right to vote.1 18
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the petitioner's argument
that the heightened scrutiny of Harper should apply.119 In affirming the
District Court's ruling, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the burden on
the right to vote was offset by the state's interest in preventing voter
fraud.120
The Court granted certiorari after four judges on the Seventh Circuit
voted to rehear the case en banc. t2 1 In a plurality opinion, six justices
agreed SEA 483 did not unduly burden the right to vote and affirmed the
decision of the Seventh Circuit.
C. Plurality Opinions
The issue before the Court was whether the requirement of having
to present a photo ID prior to casting an in-person vote or an early vote at
the circuit court clerk's office is a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 122 The majority of the Court agreed SEA 483 was constitutional;
however, the plurality opinions both purported to use the Burdick test but
disagreed as to the interpretation of what the test was. 123
1. Justice Stevens's Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens in
his plurality opinion.1 24 Justice Stevens discussed Harper to the extent
that regulations that invidiously discriminate are unconstitutional but
"'evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the
electoral process itself' are not invidious and satisfy the standard set
forth in Harper."' 125 Justice Stevens acknowledged there was no test in
place to measure the severity of the burden a state election regulation
places on the right to vote; 126 however, the state must still have legitimate
interests to justify the burden no matter how slight the burden is. 127
117. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782-83 (S.D. Ind. 2006), affd sub
nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), affd 128 S. Ct. 1610
(2008); see also Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
118. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 783).
119. Id. at 1615 (citing Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952 (7th Cir. 2007)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1613-14.
123. Id. at 1616 n.8; see also id. at 1624-25.
124. Id. at 1613.
125. Id. at 1616 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
126. Id. at 1616.
127. Id.
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Justice Stevens then started his analysis by testing the legitimacy of
the asserted state interests of preventing voter fraud, modernizing elec-
tion procedures, and maintaining voter confidence.1 28 Finding these in-
terests legitimate, Justice Stevens turned to the burden on the right to
vote, but noted that because of the facial challenge of SEA 483, the peti-
tioners had a heavy burden of proof.129 Justice Stevens found there to be
little or no burden on the right to vote, thus the state's legitimate interests
were sufficient to justify the requirements of SEA 483.130
Although claiming to follow Anderson and Burdick,131 Justice Ste-
vens's approach does not seem to fit any of the three possible interpreta-
tions. All three interpretations call for identifying the burden first and
then analyzing the state interests. Justice Stevens's analysis began by
verifying the state's legitimate interests, and when compared to no evi-
dence of a burden on the right to vote, the state law was constitutional.
Comparing the two interest may suggest he was using the balancing test
interpretation. However, Justice Stevens's approach did not provide a
test to measure the burden on the right to vote, which the balancing test
interpretation of Anderson and Burdick requires.
2. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia in his plurality opi-
nion.' 32 Justice Scalia believed the other plurality opinion misinterpreted
Burdick as simply adopting the flexible Anderson standard. 133 Justice
Scalia interpreted Burdick to reshape Anderson into a more rigid, two-
tier analysis. 134 One tier of the analysis would allow for a deferential
standard of review when a regulation is non-severe and nondiscriminato-
ry. 135 The second tier of the analysis would require strict scrutiny for
regulations producing severe burdens on the right to vote. 136 However,
Justice Scalia was unclear as to what constitutes a severe burden, in one
instance saying a severe burden goes "beyond the merely inconvenient,"
and in another saying a severe burden is "so burdensome as to be virtual-
ly impossible to satisfy."'
137
Justice Scalia believed it was of no importance that SEA 483 would
burden some voters more than others. 138 Justice Scalia stressed that the
regulation created a burden for all voters but just impacted voters diffe-
128. Id. at 1617-20.
129. Id. at 1621.
130. Id. at 1624.
131. Id. at 1616 n.8.
132. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (calling this tier a "deferential important regulatory interests standard") (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1625 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. at 1626.
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rently.139 Therefore, a law that applied to all voters would not violate the
Equal Protection Clause and addressing these individual impacts would
"effectively turn back decades of equal-protection jurisprudence."' 140
Justice Scalia was unwilling to look at discriminatory effects; therefore,
his definition of nondiscriminatory would only include facially non-
discriminatory laws. Combining the first tier of Justice Scalia's analysis
with an indifference to discriminatory effects would allow political party
entrenchment to go unchecked, as many laws can be passed that produce
a non-severe burden on the total population and are not discriminatory on
their face.
Justice Scalia also believed a flood of litigation would occur if the
courts were to review the impact of a regulation on individual voters, a
task the Constitution relegated to the states. 14' Further, the uncertainty
created by the plurality opinion "will embolden litigants who surmise
that our precedents have been abandoned. ' 42 Although Justice Scalia's
interpretation of Burdick would make great strides in eliminating the
ambiguity and unpredictability of Anderson and Burdick, the plurality in
Crawford does not provide guidance as to what interpretation the Court
will apply in the future.
D. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg joined in Justice Souter's dissent.1 43 Justice Souter
would have declared SEA 483 unconstitutional and remanded the case
for further proceedings. 1" He agreed that the Burdick test guided the
analysis but further qualified it by stating the state "must make a particu-
lar, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the particular
impediments it has imposed."1 45 He believed that Indiana had not made
the requisite showing. 
146
Justice Souter started his analysis by identifying the "character and
magnitude" of the burdens placed on the right to vote, which were the
travel and costs associated with obtaining the required documentation or
casting a provisional ballot.t 47 In Justice Souter's opinion, the magnitude
equated to how many voters would have to shoulder the burden. Using
the district court's findings as an acceptable estimate 48 and adjusting that
139. Id. at 1625.
140. Id. at 1626.
141. Id. at 1626-27.
142. Id. at 1627.
143. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1643.
145. Id. at 1627.
146. Id. at 1643.
147. Id. at 1628.
148. Id. at 1632 (accepting estimate "that 43,000 voting-age residents lack the kind of identifi-
cation card required by Indiana's law").
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number downward for several factors, Justice Souter determined that tens
of thousands of eligible voters would still be without a photo ID, many of
whom would be in poor financial shape. 149 Finding that a significant
number of residents would be discouraged or disabled from voting due to
the burdens in place, 50 Justice Souter subjected the state interests to
"more than a cursory examination."'' l
Justice Souter believed the asserted state interest should be shaved
down to the precise interest and discounted to the extent the regulation is
necessary to protect that interest.152  Probing the state interests more
deeply, Justice Souter found them insufficient to justify the burden on the
right to vote.
153
Justice Souter's approach follows the sliding-scale interpretation of
Anderson and Burdick. His analysis is very similar to that of the Ander-
son Court in reviewing the necessity of the regulation and taking a close
look at the state interests. Further, Justice Souter made an attempt to
define how to measure the burden on the right to vote by stating that the
quantity of voters that are burdened is determinative. However, this does
not speak to the severity of a burden because it does not define what con-
stitutes a severe burden. Does a severe burden mean a voter must be
denied the right to vote or just have a very difficult time in casting a
vote? In addition, how many people must a regulation affect before the
burden moves into the severe category? Ultimately, Justice Souter's
dissent will do little to clear up the ambiguity of Anderson and Burdick
as he subscribed to a different interpretation than either of the plurality
opinions. Justice Souter's attempt to define what a burden is also will do
little to create a predictable measure.
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer applied the standard he articulated in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 54 which he described as similar to the stan-
dard used by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter. 155 Under this standard,
Justice Breyer would:
[B]alance the voting-related interests that the statute affects, asking
whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of
proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others (perhaps,
149. Id. at 1634.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also id. at 1635 ("But having found the Voter ID Law burdens far from trivial, I
have to make a rigorous assessment of the precise interests put forward by the State ....") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
152. Id. at 1636.
153. Id. at 1642-43.
154. 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
155. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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but not necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior,
less restrictive alternative). 156
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Carter-Baker Report recom-
mended states require photo ID but noted that the recommendation was
conditional on the IDs being free to voters and the regulations "phased in
over two federal election cycles."'157 Considering Justices Stevens and
Souter's analyses of the state interests in conjunction with the findings of
the Carter-Baker Report, Justice Breyer believed that SEA 483 created a
disproportionate burden on voters who did not have a government-issued
photo ID. 58
Justice Breyer, like Justice Souter, believed that SEA 483 imposed a
"significantly harsher, unjustified burden" 159 on the poor, elderly, and
disabled due mainly to costs involved in obtaining the documentation
required to get a photo ID.1 60  The cost of obtaining a copy of a birth
certificate could be as much as $12, a passport up to $100, and some
people may not even know how to go about obtaining these docu-
ments. 16  Furthermore, the exception for not presenting a photo ID at the
polling place added the additional burden of making more than one trip
in order to execute a vote by provisional ballot.1 62 Justice Breyer be-
lieved this additional burden was particularly problematic in those Indi-
ana counties that lacked public transportation.
163
Finally, Justice Breyer believed there were less restrictive alterna-
tives to SEA 483.164 He cited Georgia and Florida as examples of states
that had passed voter photo ID laws but had requirements less restrictive
than those of SEA 483.165 Additionally, Indiana made the regulations
effective immediately without the phase-in period suggested by the Cart-
er-Baker Report. 1
66
156. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id. at 1644; Carter-Baker Report, supra note 103, §§ 2.5, 2.5.3.
158. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1645.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1644.
161. Id. Justice Breyer noted, by way of comparison, that the $1.50 poll tax-declared uncons-
titutional in Harper-would be less than $10 today.
162. Id. (citing Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616-17 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
163. Id. (citing Justice Souter's dissent, which stated 21 of Indiana's 92 counties have no
public transportation and an additional 32 counties only regional county service).
164. Id. at 1643 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000)).
165. Id. at 1644-45; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.043(1)-(2), 101.048(2)(b) (West 2008); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-381, 21-2-417 (West 2007). The Florida and Georgia laws allow the voter a
greater range of acceptable forms of identification to present when voting, similar to the list supplied
by HAVA.
166. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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11I. ANALYSIS
The decision in Crawford was, for the most part, dissatisfying be-
cause the plurality opinion did not provide a clear legal standard. 167 The
Court neither resolved the ambiguity of Burdick nor did it provide a test
on how to measure a burden on the right to vote. Justice Scalia's opinion
was the closest to offering a workable solution, but his rule would make
virtually all election laws constitutional. The downside to such an out-
come is political party entrenchment and discriminatory effects will be
ignored when considering election law challenges. This Comment sug-
gests developing a rule courts can administer with clarity and predictabil-
ity, while being cognizant of the ill effects and purposes behind some
election laws. Finally, one significant teaching from Crawford is that
succeeding on a facial challenge of a law will be difficult--especially
without evidence of an actual harm. Future litigants now know an as-
applied challenge will be the necessary avenue in order to challenge vot-
er photo ID laws. This section closes by speculating on the outcome of
Crawford had there been evidence of a voter who was unable to obtain a
photo ID.
A. Questions Unresolved
The Crawford decision becomes less tidy when one considers the
questions that were left unresolved. First and foremost, what is the Bur-
dick test? There are three possible interpretations of the approach an-
nounced in Anderson and Burdick. Unfortunately, Crawford provided no
guidance on the correct interpretation. Second, how does a court meas-
ure the severity of a burden on the right to vote? In Crawford the Court
recognized there was no test to determine the magnitude or severity of
the burden but failed to articulate a test for future guidance. The Court's
lack of guidance on these issues could possibly leave lower courts grap-
pling with a slew of new cases that may arise after the 2008 presidential
election; 168 however, these cases will most likely have real plaintiffs who
were not able to vote due to lack of a photo ID.
The first question lower courts will have to confront is what is the
Burdick test? Justice Stevens believed that Burdick reaffirmed the flexi-
ble approach announced in Anderson,169 but he did not offer guidance as
to which interpretation. However, Justice Stevens started his analysis by
discussing the state interests instead of identifying the severity of the
167. Id. at 1627 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("The lead opinion's record-based resolution of
these cases, which neither rejects nor embraces the rule of our precedents, provides no certainty, and
will embolden litigants who surmise that our precedents have been abandoned.").
168. See generally Posting of Michael C. Doff to Doff on Law,
http://www.michaeldorf.org/2008/04/roberts-court-on-facial-challenges.html (Apr. 29, 2008, 14:43
EST).
169. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 n.8 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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burden on the right to vote.170 Under any interpretation of Burdick, the
character and magnitude of the burden must be determined before pro-
ceeding to an inquiry of the state interests.1 7t This deviation from Bur-
dick may simply have been a matter of form over substance, as Justice
Stevens later stated that due to the absence of any evidence in the record
the magnitude of the burden could not be measured.
1 72
Justice Scalia disagreed with the other plurality opinion in that Bur-
dick simply adopted the balancing test from Anderson. 173 Interestingly,
though, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Burdick that expli-
citly stated Anderson was the correct standard for evaluating burdens on
the right to vote. 74 However, in Crawford he believed that Burdick re-
fined Anderson's sliding scale "into something resembling an administr-
able rule" by creating a two-tier analysis.1 75 The first tier would allow
deference to the state for important regulatory interests when the chal-
lenged law was non-severe and nondiscriminatory.176 The second tier
would subject laws imposing a severe burden on the right to vote to strict
scrutiny. 77 Burdens that are merely inconvenient and applicable to the
general public are not severe. 78 Thus, in Justice Scalia's opinion, Bur-
dick refashioned the sliding scale of Anderson into the interpretation
where a severe burden would trigger strict scrutiny.
It seems plausible, however, the Burdick Court did not intend this
result. First, as previously stated, the Burdick Court explicitly stated
Anderson was the controlling standard. 79 Although one of the interpre-
tations of Anderson is a strict scrutiny trigger, neither Anderson nor Bur-
dick expressly stated it was using that interpretation. The Burdick Court
could have simply held that the burden on the right to vote was non-
severe and the state's reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction suffi-
ciently justified the burden. Second, prior to explaining the Anderson
standard, the Burdick Court stated that "a more flexible standard ap-
plies," as opposed to subjecting all election laws to strict scrutiny.180
This statement seems contrary to an intention to create a rigid, two-tier
approach in analyzing restrictions on the right to vote. Finally, Burdick
incorporated language stating that severe burdens on the fight to vote
170. Id. at 1616.
171. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
172. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
174. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992); Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 n.8 (Stevens,
J., plurality opinion) ("The Burdick opinion was explicit in its endorsement and adherence to Ander-
son .... ") (citing Burkick, 504 U.S. 428 at 434).
175. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
176. Id.
177. Id. Justice Scalia, in a parenthetical, seemed to suggest a severe burden is such where a
law is "so burdensome as to be virtually impossible to satisfy." Id. at 1625.
178. Id. at 1625 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-29 (1974)).
179. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
180. Id. at 433-34.
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require strict scrutiny and a "State's important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify [reasonable, non-discriminatory] restric-
tions.' 8' The quoted phrase originated in Anderson, 82 which the Court
immediately followed by stating there was no litmus test to distinguish
between valid and invalid restrictions.183  In addition, the use of the
phrase "generally sufficient" suggests a balancing or sliding-scale aspect
to a test because "generally" does not mean "always" and leaves open the
possibility that some reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions are not
justifiable. This further supports the idea that the Court did not intend to
create a bright-line rule between valid and invalid restrictions.
After deciding which interpretation of Burdick to follow, the lower
courts will have to decide how to measure the burden on the right to
vote. Applying Justice Scalia's interpretation will, in essence, foreclose
the matter as nearly all reasonable, nondiscriminatory state election laws
will be upheld unless the burden is severe.' 84 However, if a lower court
accepts Burdick as either the balancing test or sliding-scale interpretation
of Anderson, then it will have to determine how to measure the severity
of the burden on the right to vote.
85
In Crawford Justice Stevens acknowledged that there was no "lit-
mus test for measuring the severity of a burden a state law imposes on"
the right to vote. 186 This fact was quite obvious as, looking at the same
evidence, Justice Stevens found a limited burden 87 and Justice Souter
found more than a trivial burden. 88 Undoubtedly, the availability of a
bypass, such as the provisional ballot in SEA 483, affects the burden on
the right to vote. 89 However, the availability of bypasses is not conclu-
sive in measuring the burden either, as Justice Stevens believed the pro-
visional ballot lowered the burden' 90 and Justice Souter believed it in-
creased the burden.' 9' Furthermore, in Burdick, Justice Stevens joined in
Justice Kennedy's dissent, who did not believe Hawaii's mechanisms for
ballot access lowered the burden on the right to vote.'
92
Justice Scalia's two-tier analysis would make measuring the burden
unnecessary. Unfortunately, this resolution would come with the side
181. Id. at 434.
182. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
183. Id. at 789.
184. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624-25 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion).
185. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
186. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
187. Id. at 1623.
188. Id. at 1635 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 1621 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 1631-32 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1992).
190. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
191. Id. at 1631-32 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 448.
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effect that nearly all election laws would be held constitutional. 193 Only
regulations that were facially discriminatory or made it virtually imposs-
ible for anyone to vote would be unconstitutional.194
However, fashioning the Anderson standard into a more rigid legal
rule does have a benefit. There is evidence that legal doctrine, more so
than standards, constrains judicial ideology. 95 There is strong support
for the proposition that judges ruled along political party lines in the vot-
er photo ID cases in Indiana, Michigan, Georgia, Arizona, Missouri, and
New Mexico.196 Similarly, it is more likely for Democratic judges than
for Republican judges to rule in favor of claims brought under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act. 197 On the extreme end, one need look no fur-
ther than Bush v. Gore'98 to ascertain the pitfalls of partisan ideology in
judicial decision-making. 199 Commenting on the result in Bush v. Gore,
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky noted that the Supreme Court "invented new
constitutional rules and disregarded old ones to decide a presidential
election," and concluded the decision was inexplicable except for parti-
sanship ideology.2° Indeed, Justice Stevens's dissent in Bush v. Gore
suggests the real loser in the case was "the Nation's confidence in the
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."
20'
The negative effects would largely outweigh the positive effects of
adopting Justice Scalia's rule. Many election laws that sought to en-
trench political parties through disproportionately burdening the right to
vote of groups that share a political ideology would pass constitutional
muster under the guise of reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations.
193. See Posting of Dan Tokaji to Election Law @ Moritz,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2008-04O0lequalvotearchive.html (Apr. 29, 2008 06:53
CST) [hereinafter Tokaji].
194. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
195. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence I (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 231, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1260998.
196. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a
Structural Theory of the Right to Vote, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 646-47, app. at 703 (2008)
("By way of summary, Democratic judges have expressed 'anti' views on the constitutionality of
photo ID requirements 14 times, and 'pro' views only 3 times. For Republican judges, the respec-
tive numbers are 3 (anti) and 15 (pro).").
197. Cox & Miles, supra note 194, at 1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides in part:
"No person acting under color of law shall - - (A) in determining whether any individual is qualified
under State law or laws to vote in any election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different
from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals
within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State offi-
cials to be qualified to vote." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (West 2008).
198. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
199. Erwin Chemerinsky, Further Thoughts, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 59,60 (2001).
200. Id. at 60. Dean Chemerinsky supported this contention by stating "[n]o prior case ever
had found that differences within a state in counting ballots violates equal protection. For decades,
the Supreme Court emphasized that state courts have the final say in interpreting state law; yet, the
Supreme Court ended the counting because it believed Florida law required that result." Id.
201. Bush, 531 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Justice Scalia noted in McConnell v. Federal Election Commis-
sion20 2 that those in power will instinctively try to keep it, with the best
way to achieve that being the "suppression of election-time speech. 2 °3
The Harper Court declined to discuss the current motivation behind the
poll tax; 2°4 however, one-year prior to Harper, in Harman v. Forsse-
205nius, the Court did discuss the original purpose behind Virginia's poll
tax. The Harman Court looked to the legislative history of the poll tax to
determine that its purpose was to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment
206and disenfranchise African-Americans. In support of the idea that
election regulations can be an effective means to disenfranchise certain
groups of citizens, Carter Glass20 7 at the 1901-02 Virginia Constitutional
Convention stated:
Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exact-
ly, is what this Convention was elected for-to discriminate to the
very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the Fed-
eral Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every negro voter
who can be gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the
numerical strength of the white electorate.
20 8
Indeed, within three months of becoming effective, the poll tax in
Harper reduced the number of African-Americans registered to -vote
from 147,000 to 22,000.20
In Clingman v. Beaver, 210 Justice O'Connor echoed these concerns
by recognizing that the political party in power has an incentive to shape
election laws in order to retain power. 2 1 According to Justice O'Connor,
under the Burdick test the Court's function is a limited but important one
as a check against legislative action.21 2 A heightened level of scrutiny
202. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
203. Id. at 263 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment
in part).
204. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 n.3 (1966).
205. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
206. See id. at 543. See also Va. Historical Soc'y, The Civil Rights Movement in Virginia-
Voting Rights, http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/vote.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) [herei-
nafter Voting Rights].
207. Carter Glass served in the Virginia Senate from 1899-1903, then enjoyed a long career as
a Representative and Senator from Virginia in the United States Congress, eventually serving as the
Secretary of the Treasury for the United States from 1918-20. Biographical Directory of the U.S.
Congress, GLASS, Carter, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000232 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2008).
208. Harman, 380 U.S. at 543 (quoting 2 VA. CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION (1901-1902),
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OF
VIRGINIA: HELD IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, JUNE 12, 1901, TO JUNE 26, 1902, at 2937, 3076-77
(J.H. Lindsay, ed., Hermitage Press 1906)). The Court noted that this was the general theme of the
poll tax discussion with the only real debate occurring as to the effectiveness of the poll tax in disen-
franchising African-Americans. Id. at 543 n.23.
209. Voting Rights, supra note 206.
210. 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
211. Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
212. Id. at 602-03.
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should be used when election regulations have "discriminatory effects 213
because "there is increasing cause for concern that those in power may
be using electoral rules to erect barriers to electoral competition. 214
Yet in Crawford, very little attention was paid to the evidence of en-
trenchment. Justice Stevens devoted a single paragraph discussing the
evidence of entrenchment. 21 5  Fifty-two out of fifty-two Republican
House members voted for SEA 483, while forty-five out of forty-eight
Democrats (three were excused from voting) voted against it.216 In addi-
tion, thirty-three out of thirty-three Republicans in the Senate voted for
SEA 483 and seventeen out of seventeen Democrats voted against it.
217
Each of the opinions and dissents recognized that the burden SEA 483
placed on the right to vote would most likely fall on the poor.2 , 8 Justice
Stevens recognized that partisanship may have played a large part in the
enactment of SEA 483, however, only if partisanship was the sole reason
the law was passed would it be declared unconstitutional.2 9
B. A New Rule for Reviewing Election Regulations
The Anderson standard was the result of an effort to balance the in-
dividual's fundamental right to vote and the state's constitutional right to
manage election procedures.22° Voter rights issues came to national
prominence after the problems experienced in the 2000 presidential elec-
tion, 22 culminating in Bush v. Gore.2  The complexity of these issues
may not have been contemplated by the Anderson court in developing
the flexible standard. The Court's interpretation and application of the
Anderson standard after Burdick has yielded inconsistent results, with
judicial political ideology playing a role in the decisions.223 This unpre-
213. Throughout Part III of this Comment the phrase "discriminatory effect" is synonymous
with disparate impact, discriminatory impact, or disproportionate impact.
214. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 603.
215. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623-24 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion).
216. Id. at 1624 n.21.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1621 ("[A] somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited number of persons.
They include.., persons who because of economic or other personal limitations may find it difficult
either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or to assemble the other required documentation to
obtain a state-issued identification .... ); id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("The Indiana law
affects different voters differently, but what petitioners view as the law's several light and heavy
burdens are no more than the different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes
on all voters.") (citation omitted); id. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Tens of thousands of voting-
age residents lack the necessary photo identification. A large proportion of them are likely to be in
bad shape economically.") (citations omitted); id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]n Indiana
nondriver, most likely to be poor, elderly, or disabled, will find it difficult and expensive to travel to
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles."); id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]his statute imposes a dis-
proportionate burden upon those without valid photo IDs.").
219. Id. at 1624 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
220. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
221. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 485-86.
222. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
223. See supra Part IH.A.
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dictability suggests the Anderson standard needs to be refined into an
"administrable rule' 224 or test.
The foundation of this proposed rule is that the right to vote is a
fundamental right.225 The right to vote is of the utmost importance in a
democratic society because it allows a voice that protects and preserves
226all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The protest that
sparked the Revolutionary War was based on the theory of no taxation
without representation.227 The founding of the United States was based
on the citizen's right to have a voice in the government through represen-
tation and although through the years the citizens allowed to vote have
228changed, the right itself has not. Although this rule supports an idea
that Justice Scalia described as "turn[ing] back decades of equal-
protection jurisprudence, ' 229 it is this Comment's position that the plural-
ity opinions in Crawford did not place enough value on the fundamental
right to vote.
230
The new framework would begin with the presumption that election
laws are constitutional.2 31 This must be the starting point in order to pre-
serve the state's express constitutional right to manage election proce-
dures.232 This starting point also stays true to the rule from Anderson and
Burdick that reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulations will generally be
constitutional.233 However, if there is evidence of political party entren-
chment or the law has a discriminatory effect, then the level of analysis
would be raised to intermediate scrutiny. 234 The combination of evi-
224. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Although Burdick
liberally quoted Anderson, Burdick forged Anderson's amorphous 'flexible standard' into something
resembling an administrable rule.") (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
225. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 599 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)); Burdick, 504
U.S. at 433 (quoting 111. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979));
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788; Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
226. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17.
227. UK Parliament, "No Taxation Without Representation"-Britain, America and the 1765
Stamp Act,
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary-publications-and-archives/parliamentary-archives/archive
s.stampact.cfm (last visited on Dec. 18, 2008).
228. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 484.
229. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
230. Neither Justice Stevens's, nor Justice Scalia's opinion mentioned that voting was a fun-
damental right. See id. at 1613-24 (Stevens, J.), 1624-27 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
231. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.
Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008).
233. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428,434 (1992).
234. See Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Voting Rights-Seventh Circuit Upholds Voter ID
Statute, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1984-86 (2007) [hereinafter Voting Rights]. The Voting Rights
article advocates a raised level of scrutiny, similar to the review used of campaign finance laws, that
would look more to the "process by which such laws were enacted ...." Id. at 1985. The analysis
would also "take a peek" at the effects of such regulations. Id. This comment suggests that evidence
of entrenchment or discriminatory effect should raise the level of scrutiny to intermediate; the pres-
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dence of both entrenchment and discriminatory effect would trigger strict
235scrutiny. An intermediate level of scrutiny will shift the burden of
proof to the state to provide evidence that the law is necessary to effec-
tuate an important state interest.236 Strict scrutiny will require a showing
that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
237
Political party entrenchment is repugnant to the presumption of con-
stitutionality and goal of democracy-that state legislatures can be held
accountable by the constituency they represent.238 Election regulations
are the most logical way to achieve entrenchment.239 Justice Rehnquist
noted in his dissent in Anderson that it was the Court's duty to ensure the
state was not trying to maintain the status quo through election regula-
tions. 240  Evidence of entrenchment should remove the presumption of
constitutionality and allow a court to take a closer look at the challenged
law to ensure "the State's asserted interests are not merely a pretext for
exclusionary or anticompetitive restrictions. 241
Evidence of discriminatory effect should also trigger intermediate
scrutiny. The strongest authority for this proposition is Washington v.
Davis,242 holding that discriminatory impact does not imply the regula-
tion was passed with a discriminatory purpose. The Court had strong
policy reasons for its holding in that subjecting all laws having a discri-
minatory impact to strict scrutiny would invalidate a great deal of legisla-
tion.243 The Court was careful to state that discriminatory impact was not
irrelevant and it would be viewed in conjunction with the facts on the
record.244  Applying intermediate scrutiny to election laws that have a
discriminatory impact would not upset the policy considerations contem-
plated by the Davis Court.
245
ence of both entrenchment and discriminatory effect should trigger strict scrutiny. See also Cling-
man v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting heightened scrutiny should be used in cases where discriminatory effects are
present).
235. See infra note 250.
236. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 ("In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine
the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.").
237. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 ("[W]hen those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.").
238. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) ("The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races."); Voting Rights,
supra note 233, at 1986.
239. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003).
240. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
241. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005).
242. See 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
243. Id. at 248.
244. Id. at 241-42.
245. The contested regulation in Davis was "Test 21," a test to determine minimum verbal and
communicative skill, which applicants for the police academy were required to take. Id. at 234. The
Supreme Court found no error in the District Court's finding that the test was "directly related to the
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In suggesting that evidence of discriminatory effect trigger interme-
diate scrutiny it is relevant to note the Davis Court held that discrimina-
tory effect alone was not sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.246 In addi-
tion, the respondents in Davis did not suffer a complete deprivation of
the right to work, just in their chosen profession.247  There is evidence
that some voters-more likely African-Americans and Hispanic-
Americans-will be completely deprived of their right to vote as a result
of voter photo ID laws.
248
Finally, evidence of both entrenchment and discriminatory effect
should warrant strict scrutiny. Justice Stewart noted, in his concurring
opinion in Davis, "that the line between discriminatory purpose and dis-
criminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as criti-
cal, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume., 249 The majority
noted that although discriminatory impact was not the sole touchstone to
trigger strict scrutiny, it was not irrelevant either. 20 The Court further
noted that a discriminatory purpose could "be inferred from the totality
of the relevant facts., 251  Taken together, these statements suggest the
record need not contain an overabundance of evidence to push discrimi-
natory impact into discriminatory purpose and thus trigger strict scrutiny.
This Comment suggests that evidence of entrenchment, combined with
evidence of discriminatory impact, is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.
C. Facial Challenges
Although Crawford did not settle the proper interpretation of Bur-
dick, what Justice Stevens made clear is that a facial challenge, where the
record contains little or no evidence of an actual harm, has little chance
of prevailing.252 State laws carry with them a presumption of constitu-
tionality. 3 As a result of this presumption, a state need only offer legi-
timate interests as justification for the law-without necessarily provid-
requirements of the police training program." Id. at 251-52. Further, this contention "was supported
by a validation study, as well as by other evidence of record." Id. Under intermediate scrutiny, Test
21 would comply with the requirement of a necessary regulation to effectuate an important state
interest.
246. Id. at 242.
247. See id. at 232-33.
248. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 501-03.
249. Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
250. Id. at 242.
251. Id.
252. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621-22 (2008); see also
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) ("We add an afterword on Sabri's technique for
challenging his indictment by facial attack on the underlying statute, and begin by recalling that
facial challenges are best when infrequent.") (emphasis added); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parent-
hood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006) ("We prefer, for example, to enjoin only the
unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force, or to sever its
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.") (citation omitted).
253. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
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ing any evidence. 54 A plaintiff, on the other hand, must present evi-
dence that an actual harm has occurred. 255 This principle was evident in
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,256 a
case decided approximately one month prior to Crawford, where the
Court denied a facial challenge to Washington's Initiative 872 ("I-
872").257
The Washington State Republican Party ("Party") filed suit almost
immediately after implementation of 1-872 seeking to have the law de-
clared facially invalid.25 8  The Party believed that the candidates' party
designations on the ballot would confuse voters. 259 It argued that voters
would assume a candidate was the nominee of the party he designated on
the ballot, or at least believe the party supported the candidate, thus vi-
olating their associational rights.2 ° Similar to Crawford, in Washington
State Grange the Court would have to speculate as to the burden caused
by the new ballot. In concluding that 1-872 was constitutional, 61 the
Court acknowledged that it was possible voters could be confused but
there was "no evidentiary record against which to assess [the Party's]
assertions that voters [would] be confused. 262
Prior to reaching its decision, the Court laid out significant obstacles
to overcome in order to prevail on a facial challenge.2 63 The Court noted
that it must resist the temptation to "speculate about hypothetical or im-
aginary cases.,,264 The following passage is of particular importance in
understanding Justice Stevens's opinion in Crawford:
Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial
invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the
risk of premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually
barebones records. Facial challenges also run contrary to the funda-
254. See Posting of Rick L. Hasen to FindLaw,
http://writ.lp.findlaw.comcommentary/20080326_hasen.html#bio (Mar. 26, 2008).
255. Id.
256. 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
257. Id. at 1187 ("The People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872 (1-872), provides
that candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-designated party preference;
that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the top two votegetters for each office, regardless of
party preference, advance to the general election.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. Id. at 1189.
259. Id. at 1193.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1195.
262. Id. at 1194. The Court further noted the record did not contain the new style of ballot
because they had not been created yet; therefore, there was no way to determine how the party
preference would appear on the ballots. Id.
263. Id. at 1190-91 ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid ....') (second alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 (2008) ("Given the fact that petitioners have advanced a
broad attack on the constitutionality of SEA 483, seeking relief that would invalidate the statute in
all its applications, they bear a heavy burden of persuasion.").
264. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither antic-
ipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. Finally, fa-
cial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by
preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being imple-
mented in a manner consistent with the Constitution. We must keep
in mind that a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the
elected representatives of the people.265
In Crawford, Justice Stevens stated that the Court's reasoning in
Washington State Grange applied "with added force to the arguments
advanced by [the] petitioners in these cases. 266 Like the plaintiffs in
Washington State Grange, the plaintiffs in Crawford filed suit shortly
after SEA 483 was enacted.267  In Crawford, the District Court,268 the
Seventh Circuit,269 and the Supreme Court270 all stressed that the record
contained no evidence that any voter would be unable to vote due to the
photo ID law. The lack of evidence proved fatal in both cases.27'
Professor Richard Hasen suggested the strong stance on facial chal-
lenges in Washington State Grange set the stage for the more controver-
sial issue of the voter photo ID law in Crawford.272 However, the Court
did state that it recognized the importance of the voter photo ID law cas-
es. 273 It is hard to imagine that the Court granted certiorari with the idea
that it would simply deny the plaintiffs facial challenge, especially con-
sidering the District Court and Court of Appeals had already done that.274
A more plausible explanation is that the plurality opinions could not
agree on an interpretation of Burdick. Disposing of the case via the fa-
cial challenge kept the Court from pronouncing an interpretation of Bur-
265. Id. at 1191 (internal brackets omitted) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
266. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622.
267. Id. at 1614.
268. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub
non. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd 128 S. Ct.
1610, 1623 (2008).
269. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952.
270. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-23.
271. Id. at 1615 ("[T]he District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the validity of the entire statute..
. ."); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2008) ("But these
cases involve a facial challenge, and we cannot strike down 1-872 on its face based on the mere
possibility of voter confusion.").
272. Hasen, supra note 254. Professor Hasen calls this the "unfair double standard" because
the state can justify its election law by "merely positing-not proving-the existence of voter confu-
sion or another interest. However, if voters (or groups) want to challenge a law, then they need to
come forward with actual evidence of confusion or another burden. For them to posit the risk of
confusion is not enough." Hason, supra note 254; see also Schultz, supra note 13, at 521-22.
273. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615.
274. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 845 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub
nora. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd 128 S. Ct. 1610
(2008); Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954.
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dick that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens and Kennedy could
not agree with.
It is possible the outcome in Crawford would have been drastically
different had the plaintiffs produced one person that was unable to vote
due to SEA 483 .275 The difference in the record between Crawford and
Burdick is that in Burdick there was evidence of an actual harm to Alan
Burdick, a voter who claimed he would not be able to vote for the candi-
date of his choice due to Hawaii's ban on write-in voting.276 As pre-
viously noted, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, authored the
dissent in Burdick.277 In Crawford, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Kennedy, stressed the significance of the absence of a single voter who
would be harmed by the photo ID law.278 Similarities exist when com-
paring the analysis of Justice Kennedy's dissent in Burdick with the
analysis of Justice Souter's dissent in Crawford.2 9 Both dissents found a
significant burden to exist as to a certain group of voters and that the
asserted state interests were lacking. Regardless of the facial challenge,
it would seem possible that both Justices Stevens and Kennedy would
have joined with Justice Souter in Crawford had there been at least one
voter who had been denied the right to vote as a result of the photo ID
law.
Justice Stevens's disposition of Crawford by way of the facial chal-
lenge was correct based on the reasoning in Washington State Grange,
although it may have only delayed the inevitable as future plaintiffs now
know they must bring an "as applied" challenge2 80 and be able to prove
they have suffered an actual harm. The downside, unfortunately, is
275. Crawford was a 6-3 decision upholding SEA 483; however, provided the record had
shown evidence of an actual harm and Justices Stevens and Kennedy adhered to their reasoning in
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442-450 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), it is possible the out-
come of the case would have been 6-3 or 5-4 (depending on Chief Justice Roberts's vote) holding
SEA 483 unconstitutional. The facial challenge would seemingly be a non-issue in such a case
because Justice Scalia expressed his dissatisfaction with the lead opinion resolving the case in such a
manner, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), and the dissenting opinions did
not discuss facial challenges, id. at 1627-43 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
276. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
277. Id. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
278. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621.
279. Compare Burdick, 504 U.S. at 448-450 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Crawford, 128 S.
Ct. at 1636-1643 (Souter, J., dissenting). The result of each dissent is not surprising as both used the
flexible standard of Anderson in finding a substantial burden on the right to vote and thus taking a
close look at the purported state interests.
280. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008) ("An 'as applied' challenge to the constitutio-
nality of a statute is evaluated considering how it operates in practice against the particular litigant
and under the facts of the instant case, not hypothetical facts in other situations."); see also Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule may be
held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right
although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond
question. Thus, in cases involving religious freedom, free speech or assembly, this Court has often
held that a valid statute was unconstitutionally applied in particular circumstances because it inter-
fered with an individual's exercise of those rights.").
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someone will have been denied his or her fundamental right to vote in
order for these cases to be filed.28'
CONCLUSION
The standard articulated many years ago in Anderson was an effort
at compromise between the fundamental right to vote and the state's con-
stitutional right to manage elections. The standard was ambiguous be-
cause it was open to different interpretations resulting in unpredictable
outcomes. In Crawford, the Court had the opportunity to clarify Ander-
son and Burdick in order to provide guidance to the lower courts that
may face multiple lawsuits after the 2008 presidential election. Unfortu-
nately, the Crawford Court did not provide this guidance. Justice Scalia
fashioned a rule that would remove the ambiguity and unpredictability of
Anderson, while eliminating political ideology from judicial decisions.
However, this rule would also allow greater opportunity for political
party entrenchment through the disproportionate burden of groups of
voters that share similar political ideologies.
Therefore, this Comment suggests a rule similar to that of Justice
Scalia's but allows for adjustments to be made to account for evidence of
entrenchment or discriminatory effects. The existence of such evidence
would trigger an intermediate level of scrutiny in place of the baseline
differential review. Further, the existence of evidence suggesting both
entrenchment and discriminatory effect would trigger strict scrutiny.
This rule would eliminate the ambiguity and unpredictability of Ander-
son and Burdick, account for entrenchment and discriminatory effect,
curtail political ideology in judicial decisions, and allow states to manage
election procedures.
The Court's disfavor of facial challenges provided guidance to liti-
gants in terms of what type of suit to file in the future. The next voter
photo ID case that comes before the Court will be an as-applied chal-
lenge. The Court must then make hard decisions concerning the correct
interpretation of Burdick and measuring the magnitude of the burden on
the right to vote. It is this Comment's suggestion that the Court adopt a
rule that requires an intermediate level of scrutiny where there is evi-
dence of entrenchment or discriminatory effect and strict scrutiny where
evidence of both are present.
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